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ABSTRACT 
Although a substantial body of literature has developed in recent years in the area 
of cross-border insolvency, this scholarship has been dominated by scholars from 
the United States and Europe, so that a perspective from most of Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries is lacking. This study addresses this perspective. It 
makes an in-depth examination and discussion of the challenges that SSA 
countries face in reform and application of cross-border insolvency law given the 
ever-growing multinational trade and investment. The study focuses on the risk 
of failure of SSA legislative processes to properly address the potential 
challenges of cross-border insolvencies in a manner that is sensitive to the local 
contexts and which provides a balance with international insolvency benchmarks. 
It examines cross-border insolvency theories; the global drivers for convergence 
of insolvency law through global insolvency norms; and the implications for 
cross-border insolvency regulations arising from cross-border trade and 
investment arrangements, such as the bilateral investment treaties, before 
considering the state and future of the legislative frameworks of SSA countries.  
It then brings out the ‘pressures’ exerted on and issues that emerge in the 
consideration and quest for crafting a workable and appropriate cross-border 
insolvency framework for a SSA  country. Notably, the current insights and the 
pressures from the global convergence may result in unsuitable legislative 
reforms as such insights and the global insolvency norms are not necessarily and 
directly relevant to SSA situations.  The study offers the perspective that has 
hitherto been lacking in the current scholarship and provides a theoretical insight 
and understanding on how the crafting of a workable and appropriate legislative 
framework may be undertaken, taking account of local policies and providing a 
balance with the existing international insolvency benchmarks. The study 
underscores the significance and challenge of prioritising the local contexts in 
developing a functional cross-border insolvency framework.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets the context in which this study was conducted, using Tanzania 
and Kenya as representative case studies for Sub-Saharan Africa (“SSA”). The 
chapter provides the background to the research that culminated in this study; it 
outlines the focus of the investigation before setting out the aim, objectives, and 
research questions which guided the study all along. The key propositions of this 
chapter are as follow: Firstly, much has been done that intensifies the integration 
of SSA countries into the global market and their interdependence with other 
countries in trade and investment. The integration into global trade and 
investment requires SSA countries to consider and actually reform their 
respective laws relating to cross-border insolvency. The consideration for the 
reform is critical since the certainty as to the approach to be taken in insolvencies 
is believed to be one of the factors that fosters confidence and may encourage 
investment. And the second and last proposition is the challenge as to how best 
to make such reform in order to avoid the risk of legislative failure. The countries 
under study are vulnerable to the pressure of convergence of laws and, worse 
still, the existing materials relevant to the subject of cross-border insolvency lack 
the perspectives of most of SSA. 
 
1.2 Background  
 
SSA countries have recently been involved in significant amounts of cross-
border trade and investment facilitation arrangements.1 They include bilateral, 
                                                 
1 T Ginsburg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Governance’ (2005) 25 Int’l Rev L & Econ 107; V Mosoti, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies 
Caught in Between?’ (2005-2006) 26 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 95, 114; and United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), World Investment Report 2008: Transnational 
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multilateral and regional co-operation arrangements. Development of these forms 
of arrangements in the recent years was intensified and driven by the 
implementation of liberalization policies undertaken under the auspices of the 
multilateral institutions from the mid 1980s and early 1990s in most of the SSA 
countries.2 The main aim of the arrangements is to facilitate co-operation in trade 
and investment through provision of a conducive environment that ensures 
stability, predictability and certainty in commercial transactions and thus 
reduction of transaction costs and consequently enhances the accessibility of 
credits. As far as SSA countries are concerned, the arrangements are meant to 
boost the inflow of capital, enlarge their markets and enhance their participation 
in international trade, with the ultimate result of contributing to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. The co-operation arrangements concluded thus far 
provide a very strong legal basis for a continued interdependence and cross-
border links between SSA countries and the outside world.  
 
Apart from the bilateral trade and investment co-operation arrangements with, 
mainly, developed countries in Europe and more recently with China, SSA 
countries are member states of regional arrangements within and to some extent 
beyond the SSA region.3 Tanzania and Kenya are, for example, members of the 
East Africa Community (“EAC”), and individually and respectively are also 
members of the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”). Other SSA 
countries are also members of other similar arrangements such as the Economic 
Community for West African States (“ECOWAS”), the Organization for 
                                                                                                                                    
Corporations and Infrastructure Challenge (United Nations, New York 2008); and UNCTAD, 
Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for 
Africa’s Development (United Nations, New York 2009); and JL Westbrook, A Global View of 
Business Insolvency Systems (World Bank, Washington 2010) 227 
2 J Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents (Penguin Books, London 2002)16, 80-88; A 
Anghuie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, CUP 
2004) 245, 258-262. See also generally, M Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts 
of IMF and World Bank Reforms (London, Zed Books 1997) and V Mosoti (n 1)  
3 UNCTAD (n 1) 15 and 34; JW Salacuse, ‘The Treatification of International Investment Law’ 
(2007) 13 Law & Bus Rev Am 155, 163; R Jenkins and C Edwards, ‘The Economic Impacts of 
China and India on Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends and Prospects’ (2006) 17 Journal of Asian 
Economics 207–225; and F    Söderbaum and P Stalgren, The European Union and the Global 
South (Lynne Rienner Publisher, Colorado 2010) 
 3
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (“OHADA”), and the Economic 
Community of Central Africa States (“ECCAS”).4 Some statistics suggest that on 
average each SSA country is a member of at least two regional arrangements and 
maintains an average of twelve bilateral investment treaties with other countries.5 
The importance of the regional schemes and the other facilitation arrangements is 
in relation to the opportunity they create for exploitation of economies of scale 
which entails regional specialization and attraction of investment by enlargement 
of the market.6  
 
Effective implementation of the arrangements enhances cross-border co-
operation in trade and investment among the participating member states. The 
increased cross-border co-operation in trade and investment means increased 
involvement of business enterprises, especially multinational corporations which 
transcend their home country’s borders to invest and trade in the host countries 
such as in SSA. It also implies the increased movement of people across national 
borders, and the consequent increase in business competition. 7 Indeed, as cross-
border trade and investment is enhanced, the integration of SSA countries in the 
global economy is bolstered, so is the exposure of the countries to cross-border 
implications whose solution might need a transnational approach.8 One 
implication relevant to the present context is the potential problem of 
insolvencies having an international element which would mandate extra 
vigilance and co-operation in regulation and dealing with them similar to, and 
perhaps to a greater extent than other problems that have long received attention. 
It is, indeed, in this context that some regional communities such as those of the 
European Union (“EU”), North America Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and 
OHADA, have crafted regimes for cross-border insolvency regulation among 
member countries, based on the recognition of the need to foster free movement 
                                                 
4 R Shams, ‘The Drive to Economic Integration in Africa’ (2005) Hamburgisches Welt-
Wirtschafts-Archiv (“HWWA”) Discussion Paper No 316 < http://www.hwwa.de > accessed 12 
March 2009 
5 V Mosoti (n 1) 
6 DK Mbogoro, Global Trading Arrangements and Their Relevance to Tanzania Economic 
Development: Challenges and Prospects, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dar es salaam 1996) 
7 DK Mbogoro (n 6) 
8 HK Amani,  ‘Challenges of Regional Integration for Tanzania and the Role of Research’ (Open 
University of Tanzania Convocation General Meeting Address 2005) 
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of goods and service for trade and investment purpose.9 It is in the same context 
that treaties for co-operation in cross-border insolvencies among countries with 
significant commercial relations were concluded in the past. 10 
 
The arrangements have influenced considerable changes and reforms in SSA 
countries in regard to cross-border trade and investment.11 The reforms have 
been undertaken in the context of the continued implementation of the 
IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes which culminated in the 
liberalisation of trade and investment and the consistent need for creation of an 
enabling environment for capital flow and trade.12 The implication of the reforms 
includes intensification of the challenges of potential cross-border insolvencies in 
SSA countries which would ordinarily require an appropriate and relevant legal 
framework. Since SSA is relatively less integrated into the global economy than 
are the developed countries and the majority of the emerging economies outside 
SSA region, the potential effect of cross-border insolvencies might   be 
considerably less than in developed countries. 
 
Despite the potential cross-border insolvencies resulting from the changing 
business environment and the actual occurrences of a series of high profile cross-
border insolvency cases in other jurisdictions which have bilateral co-operation 
with most of the SSA countries, it has relatively taken long for legislative 
attention to start to emerge in SSA countries to address the challenge.13 Regional 
arrangements of which these countries are members provide an avenue for the 
making of protocols on trade co-operation, investment and finance in order to 
address such issues as harmonisation and settlement of trade disputes.14 The 
                                                 
9 B Wessels, BA Markell and JJ Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Matters (OUP, Oxford  2009 ) 101 
10 B Wessels, BA Markell and JJ Kilborn (n 9) 101 
11 WP Ofosu-Amaah,  Reforming Business- Related Laws to Promote Private Sector 
Development: The World Bank Experience in Africa, (World Bank, Washington 2000) ; and JW 
Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP, Oxford 2010) 
12 WP Ofosu-Amaah (n 11); JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A 
Changing Role of Law in Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875 
13 The exception is Republic of South Africa and Eretria which are among the first countries in 
the world to adopt the Model Law.  
14 Treaty for Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) Art 21 and 22 (1); and 
Treaty for Establishment of East Africa Community (“EAC”) Art 126(2)(b), 131 and 152 
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inter-regional arrangements provide for requirements for reform in a bid to 
institutionalise the rule of law, good governance and liberalisation of the market, 
to mention but a few, as part of the requirements for SSA countries to  enjoy the 
benefits offered by such arrangements.15 Arguably, the room for the making of 
protocols and the requirement for reform have all the potential for ensuring the 
availability of legal frameworks for regulation of cross-border insolvencies. In 
addition, the requirement for reform to SSA countries potentially means pressure 
on the part of such countries as regards the reform of insolvency related laws.  
 
It is only OHADA within SSA that has widely been acknowledged for 
institutionalising a regional cross-border insolvency regime among its sixteen 
Francophone member states.16 Based on uniform law, the regime reflects the 
French civil law and has arguably failed to attract other Franco-phone and 
Anglo-phone countries as earlier anticipated.17 Since it was enacted and brought 
into force, it has been modestly implemented and used in appropriate cases, 
which could raise questions as to its appropriateness and suitability of the 
approach it takes.18  
 
The drive for global convergence of the insolvency laws and cross-border 
insolvency in particular (as signified by the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and its adoption by the subsequent international 
initiatives by the World Bank, IMF and the UNCITRAL) has, under the auspices 
of the multilateral institutions, paved the way for development of global 
insolvency norms providing standards of benchmarks on the basis of which and 
                                                 
15 Text to part 4.6 in   Chapter 4 
16 These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Ivory 
Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and Togo. 
See, B Martor, N Pilkington, DS Sellers and S Thouvenot, Business Law in Africa: OHADA and 
the Harmonisation Process (Kogan, London 2002) 20; and RF Oppong ‘Re-Imagining 
International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the Reception of International Law into 
National Legal Systems in Africa’ (2007) 30 Fordham Int’l LJ 296, 307 and 308 
17 Text to n 179  in chapter 4. Notably, Cameroon which is a member state of the OHADA is both 
Francophone and Anglophone state given its past French and British colonial history. 
18 JA Owusu-Ansah, ‘The OHADA Treaty in the Context of International Insolvency Law 
Developments’ <  www.iiiglobal.org > accessed 6/11/2008; and B Wessels, International 
Insolvency Law (Kluwer, Netherland 2006) 47 
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against which domestic insolvency laws could be crafted and adjudged.19 The 
assessment as to the extent to which developing countries observe the norms and 
provision of advice on how reform ought to be effected on the laws is the domain 
of the multilateral institutions. Indeed, the leverage of the multilateral 
institutions, reinforced by the vulnerability of the developing countries and the 
intricacies of the globalised economy, seems to have the potential to influence 
developing countries in SSA to comply with the insolvency benchmarks to the 
extent of undermining the local contexts.20  
 
The review of literature that has been undertaken shows that, although a body of 
literature has developed in recent years in the area of cross-border insolvency, 
this scholarship has been dominated by scholars from the United States and 
Europe writing mostly from the perspective of advanced economies. 
Accordingly, an insight from the perspective of SSA is lacking. There is 
therefore an apparent dearth of literature that dwells on SSA in respect of the 
area under study, though the existing literature provides an important theoretical 
background for examination and discussion of cross-border insolvency from the 
perspective of SSA.   
 
                                                 
19 World Bank and UNCITRAL, ‘The Unified Creditor Rights and Insolvency Standard Based on 
World Bank Principles for Effective Creditors Rights and Insolvency Systems and UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ <http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/FINAL-ICRStandard-
March2009.pdf> accessed 22 July 2009. The Unified Global Insolvency Standard is based on and 
integrates the World Bank Principles for Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems and 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. Thus, the unified standard essentially 
incorporates the benchmarks of all the previous efforts. It is noteworthy that the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law has had advantages of taking into account all the previous 
efforts including the IMF and World Bank’s initiatives documented in IMF, ‘Orderly and 
Effective Insolvency Procedures –Key Issues (IMF, Washington 1999); and World Bank, 
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (World Bank, 
Washington 2005). Recently, the UNCITRAL Working Group V dealing with insolvency matters 
has addressed the problem of multinational groups in insolvency. Its work has led to 
recommendations for inclusion of a new part of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law providing international standards in the area of insolvency of groups. See I Mevorach, 
‘European Insolvency Law in a Global Context’ [2011] JBL 666, 667 
20 TC Halliday, ‘Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The Building Blocks of Insolvency 
Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead’ 32 Brook J Int’l L1081; TC Halliday, and 
BG Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis (Stanford University 
Press, California 2009); and  K Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies’ (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 97, 102 
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The existing theories on cross-border insolvencies, as well as the global 
insolvency benchmarks that have emerged in recent years, have almost 
exclusively been developed and addressed from the viewpoints of developed 
economies, which are not necessarily relevant to developing countries, especially 
the least developed economies, such as those of SSA. Accordingly, the position 
of these countries, the least developed ones in particular,21  deserves to be 
considered, given the pressures towards globalisation and convergence of laws. 
There is thus the potential for the pressure to result in unsuitable legislative 
reforms in SSA countries which, because of their socio-economic situations, can 
hardly withstand the pressure. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
 
The focus of this study is on the looming risk of failure of SSA legislative 
processes to craft appropriate and workable legislation for regulating cross-
border insolvencies as a part of the efforts to foster an improved environment for 
private sector development and economic growth.22 The failure entails two 
potential aspects. The first is the failure to recognise and draw on the growing 
challenge of potential cross-border insolvencies emerging from the increasing 
cross-border co-operation in trade and investment. And the second is the failure 
                                                 
21 The least developed countries (“LDCs”) the majority of which being in SSA, represent the 
poorest and weakest segment of the international community. These countries are characterized 
by their exposure to a series of vulnerabilities and constraints, such as limited human, 
institutional and productive capacity; acute susceptibility to external economic shocks, natural 
and man-made disasters and communicable diseases; limited access to education, health and 
other social services and to natural resources; poor infrastructure; and lack of access to 
information and communication technologies. As such, the LDCs are considered to be in need of 
the highest degree of attention on the part of the international community. Criteria used by the 
UN to classify a country as among the LDCs include: low income, in the light of a three-year 
average estimate of the gross national income per capita; weak human assets, and economic 
vulnerability. See for instance UN, Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries 
Adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Brussels 
on 20 May 2001 UNITED NATIONSA/CONF.191/11 8 June 2001, 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//aconf191d11.en.pdf> accessed 24/11/2009. With regard to 
SSA, this study adopts the ordinary meaning of SSA which refers to the region consisting of 
countries situated in the area of the African continent which lies South of the Sahara. However, 
South Africa is excluded from the consideration and treatment of the SSA perspective. This is 
because South Africa is relatively more advanced than most of SSA countries in economic terms 
and cross-border insolvency matters. 
22 E Rubin, ‘The Conceptual Explanation for Legislative Failure’ (2005) 30 Law & Soc Inquiry 
583. Rubin notes how legislative failure has been a subject of concern and attention by   scholars 
from different disciplines such as law, political science and sociology. 
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to make appropriate choices commensurate with the local contexts and which 
also takes account of the international insolvency standards.   
 
There are significant challenges that are likely to be faced and encountered in the 
reform process. The challenges may pose far reaching implications for the 
legislative processes that SSA countries might undertake. The constant pressure 
to strengthen their troubled economies, desperation to attract capital inflow and 
boost trade, the vulnerability to external pressures and the nature of the global 
norms providing benchmarks for reform, may all present different types of 
challenges that might need to be carefully dealt with in order to allow reform that 
would result in to an effective and relevant regime for the countries under study. 
 
It is common knowledge that some laws that were enacted to facilitate the 
implementation of liberalisation policies imposed by the multilateral institutions 
have not been working well in some respects, as they do not appropriately reflect 
the local circumstances.23 It has been argued that in some instances they have 
tended to have an adverse impact on the societies that have been required to 
embrace them. The adverse impact on such societies is mainly because in some 
respects such laws are designed and implemented with little, if at all, regard for 
specific needs of the particular countries concerned.24 In fact, there is an on-
going debate, which investigates the effectiveness of the liberalisation policies in 
developing countries which were imposed under the umbrella of the multilateral 
institutions, notably the IMF and the World Bank. This debate has produced 
large volumes of literature with fundamental degrees of divergences.25 The 
                                                 
23 CRP Pouncy, ‘Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal Institutions as a 
Component of Neo-Colonial Project’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 85; TA Kelley, ‘Exporting 
Western Law to the Developing World: The Troubling Case of Niger’ (2007) 7 Global Jurist  
(Frontiers) Article 8 < http://wwwbepress.com/gj/vol7/issu3/art8 > accessed 01/06/2010; T 
Halliday ‘Crossing Oceans, Spanning Continents: Exporting Edelman to Global Lawmaking and 
Market-Building’ (2004) 38 L & Soc’y Rev 213, 217; and A Anghie (n 2) 259 
24 Ibid 
25 See for example, A Berg and A Krueger, ‘Trade, Growth and Poverty: A Selective Survey’, 
(2003) IMF Working Paper 03/30 <  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0330.pdf .> 
accessed 31 August 2009; AL Winter, N McCulloch and A McKay, ‘Trade Liberalization and 
Poverty’ (2004) 42 Journal of Economic Literature 72-; A Harrison, A and G Hanson G, ‘Who 
Gains from Trade Reforms? Some Remaining Puzzles,’ (1999) Journal of Development 
Economics 59; and  J Stiglitz (n 2 ) 
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implication of this trend for the reform of insolvency related laws in SSA 
countries might be far reaching given that insolvency laws and their 
implementation and usages are considerably sensitive to local policies. 26   
 
A number of measures have been developed to deal with cross-border 
insolvencies.27 Most of these measures have traditionally been effected either by 
treaties concluded between two or more countries having close commercial 
relations or unilateral initiatives undertaken by respective countries.28 More 
recently, international initiatives have significantly emerged. One of the 
significant developments in this respect is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, which may be adopted by countries as part of their domestic 
legislation.29 The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (“ECIR”) is another 
example of such initiatives undertaken in respect of a regional community.30 The 
measures that have been developed all along underlie the divergence that exists 
between substantive laws of different countries because of different local 
contexts to which insolvency laws are sensitive.31 Lessons that can be learnt from 
such measures need to be considered in light of the ever increasing cross-border 
co-operations in trade and investment within and outside the existing regional 
arrangements. The apparent question is which strategy these countries should use 
in responding to such challenges and developments, taking into account the 
socio-economic, cultural, and institutional conditions, to mention but a few, that 
pertain to these countries and the realities of the world economy.   
 
 
                                                 
26 N Martin ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 4;  JAE Pottow, ‘Greed 
and Pride in International Bankruptcy’ (2005-2006) 104 Mich L Rev 1819; and F Tung, ‘Fear of 
Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2000-2001) 33 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 555, 561 
27 B Wessels, BA Markell and JJ Kilborn (n 9); and Fletcher,  Insolvency in Private International 
Law(2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 
28 Ibid 
29 For the trends on adoption of the Model Law see generally, LC Ho (ed), Cross-Border 
Insolvency, A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law (Globe Law & Business, London 
2009)  
30 Council Regulation (“EC”) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings 
31 See n 26  above 
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1.4 Aim, Objectives, and Research Questions of the Study 
 
In view of the focus of the study mentioned above, the aim that this study seeks 
to achieve is to provide, through doctrinal legal scholarship, and from a SSA 
perspective, an insight into the challenges involved in the development, 
implementation and use of law in dealing with and regulating cross-border 
insolvencies. Tanzania and Kenya are used as case studies for SSA, though 
occasionally, reference is made to other countries in SSA where it is appropriate 
to do so.  
 
1.4.1 Objectives 
 
In seeking to attain the aim of this study, the following key objectives guided this 
study. 
 
i) Examining the challenges to cross-border co-operation in trade and 
investment posed by globalisation, bilateralism and multilateralism, 
as well as regional schemes. 
 
ii) Investigating the laws and practices on cross-border insolvencies in 
SSA and establishing the extent to which they recognise and address 
the challenges of potential cross-border insolvencies arising from 
cross-border co-operations in trade and investment. 
 
iii) Exploring the challenges and aspects to be considered in developing a 
framework to be used as a guide in addressing cross-border 
insolvencies in SSA countries, given the socio-economic, cultural and 
institutional environment and aspirations of the countries under study. 
 
1.4.2 Research Questions 
 
To the research problem stated above and based on the above objectives, the 
following questions guided this study. 
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i) What implications do the co-operations in trade and investments have 
for Tanzanian and Kenyan law and in particular on insolvency issues? 
 
ii) Do the existing regulatory frameworks and practices for insolvencies 
in Tanzania and Kenya adequately cater for cross-border insolvency 
issues that are prone to arise as a result of enhanced cross-border co-
operations in investment and trade? 
 
iii) What challenges, aspects and strategies should respectively be 
considered and employed in Tanzania and Kenya in formulating, 
negotiating, enacting, and concluding an effective mechanism for 
regulation of cross-border insolvencies?  
 
1.5 Research Methodology and Sources 
 
A traditional doctrinal legal scholarship that involves analysis of primary and 
secondary sources of law has been used in this study to address the focus and aim 
of this study. This is the methodology that is overwhelmingly used in similar 
legal studies. A critical legal analysis of relevant legislation, case law, policies, 
research studies, multilateral and international institutions’ reports, governments’ 
reports, treaties, international insolvency standards,  and protocols related to or 
on the subject under study has been undertaken.  
 
The use of various legal methods, especially rules of statutory interpretations, 
and various forms of legal reasoning such as deductive reasoning and inductive 
reasoning have been applied in appropriate circumstances in the study. It is 
through this methodology and from the mentioned sources that materials were 
generated, analysed and systematically presented and explained in relation to the 
context of this study.  
 
The sources were obtained mainly from libraries, relevant websites, such as those 
of governments of the countries under study, law reform commissions of the 
countries under study and international and multilateral institutions. Relevant 
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reports/treatises by governments of the countries under study, international and 
multilateral institutions and law reform commissions in the countries under study 
have been sought and used in determining whether, and to what extent, 
consideration of an appropriate approach to cross-border insolvencies co-
operation has been made. To some extent, and without compromising the 
relevance of local contexts, relevant experience from other countries and regions 
derived from source materials were used to assess the legal frameworks of the 
countries under study and to gain insights and lessons that could be considered in 
addressing the challenges and to provide an insight into the crafting of a 
workable and appropriate cross-border insolvency framework for SSA. Tanzania 
and Kenya have been used as representative case studies for SSA countries. The 
use of the case studies was intended to allow in depth investigations of the 
research questions to be undertaken. The use of the case study approach in this 
study was however not intended to completely preclude occasional reference to 
other SSA countries where it was considered desirable to do so. While Tanzania 
and Kenya are used as case studies, the study was not strictly speaking meant to 
be a comparative study.  
 
1.6 Organisation of the Study 
 
This study is structured in eight chapters as follows. The present chapter has laid 
out a contextual framework of the study. Chapter Two provides a critical review 
of the conceptual and theoretical aspects of the cross-border insolvency 
landscape from a SSA perspective.32 Chapter Three revisits the global drive for 
convergence of insolvency law systems in the context of the international 
insolvency benchmarks and the quest for a cross-border insolvency framework 
for SSA. Chapter Four makes an in-depth examination of the arrangements for 
the facilitation of cross-border trade and investment and inquires into the extent 
to which they implicate and inform cross-border insolvency regulation in SSA. 
Accordingly, Chapter Four in particular answers the question whether SSA 
                                                 
32 An article based substantially on chapter two of this thesis won the 2010 International 
Insolvency Institute (2010 III) Bronze Medal Award and has since been published. See BS 
Masoud, ‘Theoretical Aspects of the Cross-Border Insolvency Landscape: Issues and 
Perspectives for Sub-Saharan Africa’ in [2011] Norton Annual Review of International 
Insolvency  338-378  
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would need a different framework from those suggested by the theories and the 
benchmarks.  
 
Chapter Five and Six basically look at the existing legal frameworks and 
practices for cross-border insolvencies in Tanzania and Kenya as case studies for 
SSA while considering their historical backgrounds and origin as well as the 
emerging reform trend. The chapters consider the extent to which the existing 
legal frameworks address cross-border insolvencies in the context of the existing 
theories, and international insolvency benchmarks. The application of the 
common law and its impact is used as a case study for the impact of colonial 
legacy in cross-border insolvency regulation.  
 
Chapter Seven explores the specific practical challenges and aspects that might 
need to be considered in developing a framework for Tanzania and Kenya-the 
case studies for SSA- for addressing the challenges of cross-border insolvencies. 
The chapter demonstrates the manner in which different systems diverge from 
one another because of differing local policies and the emerging trend of 
accepting and recognising legitimate local interests that deserves to be protected. 
It also shows how the existing national policies can be used to identify relevant 
policy perspectives to be served in the insolvency systems and the challenges 
involved in negotiating the local contexts and the corresponding policy choices 
to be made in developing a framework for cross-border insolvency.  
 
Chapter Eight concludes and summarises the main insights from the findings of 
this study based on the chapters from which they emerge. The chapter states the 
contribution to knowledge that the study claims to make and outlines limitations 
of the study and gaps for further research. Notably, the main thrust of the 
foregoing chapters is to expose the challenges that SSA countries face in 
addressing the challenges of cross-border insolvencies and providing an insight 
for crafting of a workable and appropriate cross-border insolvency framework. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY LANDSCAPE WITH REFERENCE TO SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA	
 
   
 
2.1 Introduction  
Problems that arise in the event of an insolvency in which an insolvent 
company’s creditors and assets are spread across more than one jurisdiction, have 
long given rise to competing theoretical approaches; each purporting to provide 
the best solution to overcome the problems that cross-border insolvencies pose. 
With the globalisation drive, the competing theories have been a subject of 
intense debate, leading to the consideration of some form of alternative 
approaches, mainly drawn from the dominant competing theories developed and 
addressed from the perspective of developed countries. This chapter provides a 
perspective that has been hitherto lacking in the cross-border insolvency 
literature. It examines the theoretical approaches to cross-border insolvency in 
relation to the general theories underlying the objectives of an effective 
insolvency law system from a perspective of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Salient 
features of the theories and emerging aspects within the theoretical debate on 
cross-border insolvency approaches are considered with particular reference to 
the SSA context and issues that arise between the needs of such jurisdictions and 
the approaches outlined in the literature that has emerged in developed countries, 
in particular from the US and Europe are identified. This chapter begins by 
outlining the basic issues of insolvency and cross-border insolvency.  Attention 
will then turn briefly to theories of insolvency law in general and this discussion 
will be used as a springboard for a discussion of the theories of cross border 
insolvencies, as developed in the literature, before a view from a sub-Saharan 
perspective is offered and the issues that emerge in the quest for crafting a 
workable and appropriate cross-border insolvency framework for SSA are 
outlined.   
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2.2 The Concept of Insolvency and Cross-Border Insolvency 
In a modern competitive market economy, which characterises the global 
economy, and where business operations increasingly rely upon credit, 
insolvency is an inevitable aspect and a truism.1 It traditionally refers to a 
situation whereby a company’s outstanding liabilities exceed its assets’ 
measurable value.2 Whereas the traditional approach represents a balance sheet 
or absolute test of insolvency, the modern approach represents a cash flow test of 
insolvency which is signified by the company’s inability to pay its debts, as and 
when they fall due.3 
 
In the context of efficiency and value maximisation of the insolvent debtor’s 
estate, the cash flow test is regarded as the most appropriate. Firstly, it facilitates 
commencement of insolvency proceedings early enough in the period of 
insolvency and secondly, it allows other parties, particularly creditors, to 
ascertain the true position of the debtor’s financial position.4 However, some 
countries that make use of the cash flow test also make use of the balance sheet 
test.5  This is in line with the global convergence which not only gives credence 
                                                 
1 M Balz, ‘The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’ (1996) Am Bankr L J 
485; and K Anderson, ‘The Cross-border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of Modified Universal 
Approach Considering the Japanese Experience.’ (2000) 21 U Fa  J Int’l L 679. As noted in 
chapter 1, an article based on this chapter (i.e chapter 2) won the 2010 International Insolvency 
Institute Bronze Medal Award and has since been published. See BS Masoud, ‘Theoretical 
Aspects of the Cross-Border Insolvency Landscape: Issues and Perspectives for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ in Norton Annual Review of International Insolvency (Thomson West, 2011) 338-378 
2 IF Fletcher, Insolvency Law in Private International Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 1-4 
3 Australia and the Cayman Islands are examples of Commonwealth jurisdictions whose 
legislation, namely Corporation Law 2001 s 95A and Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 s 95(c) 
respectively, provide for a cash flow test only. On the other hand, the UK is a typical example of 
a jurisdiction whose legislation (Insolvency Act 1986 s 123) provides for the employment of both 
tests, albeit in varying circumstances and alternative manner. It is noteworthy that in Tanzania 
Companies Act 2002 s 280  has also adopted the UK’s approach as it  provides for the 
employment of both tests. 
4 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2005, 45 and 46,  
<www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf > accessed 02/06/2009 
5See n 3 above. See also, T Heaver-Wren, ‘“Striking a Balance”-the Test for Insolvency in the 
Cayman Islands’ Insolvency’ (2008) 22 Insolvency Intelligence 152, 152-153; and H Peter and 
others (eds) The Challenges of Insolvency Law Reform in the 21st Century: Facilitating 
Investment and Recovery to Enhance Economic Growth (Zurich, Schulthess Juristische Medien 
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to the cash flow test, but also advises against the use of a balance sheet standard 
as a single test on account of its inherent weaknesses of relying on information in 
the control of the debtor to prove insolvency. Such a test would present 
significant difficulties for creditors seeking to prove that the debtor is insolvent.6  
 
Cross-border insolvency describes a situation where an insolvent debtor has 
assets and or creditors in more than one jurisdiction.7 As most routine business 
dealings are becoming global, it is increasingly becoming impossible to avoid the 
international effect of insolvency. This is attributed to the increased 
interconnectedness and interdependence between national economies,8 
improvements in technology, particularly in transport and communication, and 
the resulting reduction in the cost of moving goods, funds and information 
around the world which has paved the way for growth of larger corporate 
entities.9 However, SSA is relatively less integrated to the world economy given 
that it is characterised by the United Nations as a least developed economy.10 As 
such, the potential effect of cross-border insolvency is relatively much less than 
in advanced and emerging economies.11  
                                                                                                                                    
AG 2006) 18-20 which observe that even countries whose legislation provides only for a cash 
flow test have tended in practice to make use of balance sheet test in providing a complete picture 
of a debtor’s present and prospective financial situation. Australia and recently the Cayman 
Islands offer good examples.  
6 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2005 (n 4). See also International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”), Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues (Legal Department, 
IMF, Washington 1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm> accessed 
4/6/2009; and World Bank’s Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems 
2005  <http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/IPG%20-
%20Revised%20Pples%20FINAL%20%5B21%20Dec%202005%5D.pdf  >  accessed 
23/6/2009 
7 Other terms that are used interchangeably to describe the same situation include; interstate 
insolvency, international insolvency, transnational insolvency, multi-state insolvency, multi-
jurisdictional insolvency, multinational insolvency and multinational default. 
8 This includes interaction between economic entities located in different countries. 
9 This is partly a result of modern features of business consisting of mergers and takeovers. See 
IMF (n 6); and PR Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd edn, Maxwell London 2007) 
10 Text to n 21 in chapter 1 
11 It has been noted that SSA countries are among the countries that were not immediately and 
directly affected by the current economic recession. This is largely by reason of being less 
integrated to the world financial system. Accordingly, the only effects that these countries 
experienced were a reduction in financial aids from developed countries, a fall in the demand for 
SSA exports, thereby a drop in commodity price and decline in the inflow of foreign direct 
investment which accounted significantly to the GDP of such countries. See IMF, Regional 
Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, Washington, D.C. 2009); and World Bank, The 
World Development Indicator 2009 (Washington 2009)       
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Insolvency is described as wholesale as, upon its occurrence, it affects not merely 
one or a few distinct transactions but also every legal relationship involving the 
insolvent debtor, including the national economy.12 As such, insolvency law has 
been termed as a type of meta-law that ‘…swoops in and trumps baseline legal 
relationships in unusual circumstance of general default.’13 The 
internationalisation of insolvency law thus multiplies these complexities.  The 
very nature of insolvency, it has thus been argued, influences nations to legislate 
for it in a manner that takes into account and reflects the nations’ historical, 
social, political and cultural needs.14 The different policy choices that 
characterise a given insolvency system are a reflection of such country’s norms 
and inclinations.15 This explains why insolvency systems of different countries 
vary from one another. It is however unlikely that this argument can equally hold 
in SSA, whose laws and legal systems were largely superimposed by and 
inherited from countries that colonised the region.16 Given the low level of 
economic development and integration into the global economy as well as the 
hitherto dominance of a centralised economy system, the insolvency laws largely 
inherited from the colonial powers have not been widely and effectively 
implemented.17 This is partly attributable to lack of circumstances that warrant 
                                                 
12 See PR Wood (n 9); and F Tung, ‘Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2000-
2001) 33 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 555, 566; PJ Omar European Insolvency Law (England, Ashgate 
2006) 6-9. The impact of insolvency on the national economy is often evidenced in loss of 
revenues in terms of taxes, loss of jobs to citizens, loss of economic activities and consequently 
collapse or shrinking of cities and towns which may in turn lead to migration and congestion to 
other areas. 
13 JAE Pottow, ‘Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed 
Solutions to Local Interests’, (2005-2006)104 Mich L Rev 1899, 1902; and M Balz, (n 1) 486 
14 N Martin ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 4; F Tung (n 12) 561; 
and JAE Pottow (n 13) 
15 A Davydenko and JR Franks, ‘Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, 
Germany, and the UK’ (2008) 63 Journal of Finance 565; PR Wood (n 9) and M Rowat, 
‘Reforming Insolvency Systems in Latin America’, (Viewpoint No. 187, World Bank, June, 
1999) < http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/187rowat.pdf> accessed 
12/3/2009 
16 D Berkowitz, K Pistor, and J Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant 
Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165; and SL Sempasa, ‘Obstacles to International 
Commercial Arbitration in African Countries’ (1992) 41 Int’l & Com L Q 387, 413 
17 South Africa and the Organization of Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) are 
exceptions in this regard. They have received more attention in insolvency discourse than any 
other SSA country or region organisation. 
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the application of such laws.18 As such, any initiative for reform of insolvency 
law systems in the majority of SSA countries would supposedly require 
consideration of the extent to which the inherited laws have been enforced19 and, 
additionally, if over the years there have been changes in favour of particular 
policy choices. This would arguably need to be undertaken within the wider 
context of consideration of the SSA countries’ historical, socio-economic, 
political and cultural needs. 
 
Despite the historical divergences that are apparent in national insolvency law 
systems, it is noteworthy that there have recently been significant pressures 
towards global convergence and harmonisation of insolvency laws.20 However, 
special concerns have been directed at emerging and transitional economies due 
to the immense commercial interest that advanced countries have in those 
economies, and the need to ensure stability and the prevention of an occurrence 
such as the crises of the 1990s. Such interests are largely evident in the activities 
of multinational enterprises by advanced countries in terms of trade and foreign 
direct investment inflow.21 The interest is also reflected in the academic 
scholarship and the pressure that has been exerted for reform of these economies, 
suggesting modernisation of the insolvency laws along the lines of the advanced 
countries models. 
 
                                                 
18 There has been a general lack of interest in how these countries deal with insolvency and even 
involvement of these countries in international insolvency law reform initiatives. On this kind of 
observation see CG Paulus, ‘Global Insolvency Law and the Role of Multinational Institutions’ 
(2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 755, 761. However, the general view is that SSA countries have, 
if at all, weak, outdated and inefficient insolvency systems.  
19 This is seemingly important because the implementation of law is always likely to result in 
substantial differences between the law and practice. See CG Paulus (n 18) 765  
20 See n 6 above; and S Block-Lieb and T Halliday, ‘Harmonization and Modernisation in 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2006-2007) 42 Tex  Int’l L J 475, 511-512 
21 J Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Penguin Books, London 2002) 98; TC Halliday, 
and BG Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis (Stanford 
University Press, California 2009); and DW Arner and others  ‘Property Rights, Collateral, 
Creditor Rights, and Insolvency in East Asia’ (2007) 42 Tex Int’l LJ 173 
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2.3 A Brief Overview of Theoretical and Policy Foundations of 
Insolvency Systems 
There has been controversy over the policy objectives of insolvency systems. 
Several opposing theoretical explanations have been put forward in an attempt to 
provide a coherent policy basis for the existence and application of insolvency 
law systems.22 The theoretical views have hitherto been used to explore and 
rationalise the theoretical approaches for cross-border insolvencies as it is shown 
in the discussion that follow below.  
 
Two main groups of theoretical views on the policy basis for insolvency systems 
are worthy of brief attention. The first theoretical view is from the commentators, 
who view insolvency law systems from the economic analysis point of view, and 
is mainly based on and draws from Jackson’s ‘common pool problem’ concept.23  
According to this group, an insolvency law system is more of a collectivised debt 
collection device created in response to the common pool problems that arise 
when individual creditors assert rights against a common pool of assets that is 
not large enough to pay each of them in full.24 This view posits that the role of 
insolvency law therefore is to constrain individual creditor action against an 
insolvent debtor, and make the creditors act in a cooperative manner to maximise 
the aggregate value of the debtor’s assets to the creditors’ collective return. The 
underlying goal is to ensure that creditors do not make a bad situation worse by 
engaging in a destructive race to the debtor’s assets. Thus, the source of 
bankruptcy law is in the common pool problem and the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’25 
                                                 
22 TH Jackson and R Scott.  'On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and 
the Creditors’ Bargain’, (1989) 75 Va L Rev 155; and E Warren ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World’ (1993-1994) 92 Mich L Rev 336, 337 
23 TH Jackson, ‘Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and 
Nonbankruptcy Rules’ (1986) 60 Am Bankr L J 399; TH Jackson and R Scott (n 22)). 
24 TH Jackson (n 23) 401-403; TH Jackson and R Scott (n 22); and V Finch, Corporate 
Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2009) 29 arguing that ‘ creditor wealth maximization vision has been highly influential and has 
been put into legislative effect in some jurisdictions.’ 
25 This is a concept used to explain a situation whereby there is higher incentive for parties to 
defect than to cooperate for the common good of all while the pursuit of self interest by each 
leads to a poor outcome for all. In the context of insolvency it is used to show the difficulty in 
securing co-operation of all creditors in an insolvency situation, as what is best for each creditor 
individually is more likely to lead to mutual defection, whilst every creditor would have been 
better off with mutual co-operation. 
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that it brings about. In this instance, the company’s assets are too few to 
sufficiently cover payment of the company’s debts in their entirety. As such, 
insolvency law attempts to solve the dilemma by pooling all creditors together 
and submitting them to collective proceedings.  
 
The theoretical basis for insolvency systems as advanced by law and economics 
commentators has been heavily criticised, mainly for confining itself solely to 
creditors’ maximum returns and ignoring other non-creditors’ interests equally 
affected by insolvency.26 In the context of SSA countries, this view might be 
seen to undermine wider national interests inclined to poverty reduction 
strategies.27 
 
The second group of commentators who have advanced opposing views have 
taken a broader outlook at the underlying basis for insolvency systems. They 
view attempts to reckon with a debtor’s multiple defaults, distributing the 
consequences among a number of different actors and providing answers to a 
wide range of questions emerging there from as the policy basis of an insolvency 
system.28 This view may be welcomed by the SSA countries given the possible 
need of addressing the wider interests of society and the concerns for poverty 
reduction. However, the view is potentially open to problem of indeterminacy 
because of the breadth of concerns that it seeks to encompass.29 The magnitude 
of this problem can be seen in chapter seven where attempt is made to identify 
and discuss relevant policy concerns in relation to cross-border insolvency. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
 For general details of this concept see for instance R Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation 
(Penguin, London 1990) 7-24  
26 V Finch (n 24) 28; B Adler ‘Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy’ (1992-1993) 45 Stan L Rev 311, 313-314;  and DG Baird and RK Rasmussen ‘End 
of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55 Stan L Rev 751 
27 Poverty reduction in developing countries is a dominant feature envisaged in the Millennium 
Development Declaration signed by 189 countries, including 147 heads of state and government, 
in September 2000. See United Nations, 55/2 United Nations  Millennium Declarations, 
Resolution adopted by General Assembly[without ref to main committee(A/55/L.2)]  
<www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>  accessed 23/9/2009. See also text to n 153 
in chapter 3; and the discussion in the text to part 7.4.3.3 in chapter 7 
28 E Warren ‘Bankruptcy Policy,’ (1987) 54 U Chi L Rev 775, 777; and D Korobkin, 
‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 717  
29E Warren ibid 790. See also V.Finch (n 24) 37 
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Apart from the foregoing views, there is also a ‘contractualism’ view emerging 
from law and economic commentators.30 They mainly argue that in the event of 
insolvency the recovery process should be governed by contracts between the 
insolvent debtor and its creditors, with insolvency law only serving as a default 
option for those who do not enter into insolvency contracts.31 This view also 
challenges the argument that the insolvent debtor presents a common pool 
problem for its creditors and that creditors would voluntarily agree to the 
enactment of insolvency law.32 The most radical proposal in this approach 
advocates for repeal of insolvency law, since private collective action would 
provide an efficient substitute.33 This approach has been criticised in a number of 
respects but mainly for its failure to pay regard to the effects that the contract 
concluded between the debtor and some creditors might have on the other 
creditors who are not party to the contract.34 It has also been argued that this 
approach labours under a gross mistake in assuming that it is cheaper to agree 
upon a settlement instead of utilising the legal mechanism available.35  
 
Notably, the theoretical attempts to explain the foundations and policy objectives 
of insolvency systems reveal the following common points. Firstly, insolvency 
systems characteristically involve collective action whose main preoccupation is 
to ensure value maximisation to be distributed to designated beneficiaries.36 
Notwithstanding the debate on the choice of beneficiaries, each view would want 
to maximise value for its favoured beneficiaries. Secondly, that co-operation is 
necessary in maximising the value for the interested parties’ benefits. Thirdly, 
there is an apparent emphasis on efficiency and the assumption that the 
                                                 
30 S Block-Lieb, ‘The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy’, (2001) Ull. L Rev 503, referring 
to these scholars’ as neo-libertarian theorists; RK Rasmussen, ‘Debtor’s Choice: A Menu 
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy’, (1992) 71 Tex L Rev 51; and A Schwartz, ‘A Contract 
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’, (1998) 107 Yale L J 1807 
31 JL Westbrook ‘The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy’ (2003-2004) 82 Tex L Rev 794, 798  
32 BE Adler. ‘Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation’ (1992) 77 Cornell L Rev 439, 441-442; BE Adler, 
‘A World without Debt’, (1994) 72 Wash U L Q 811; and S Block-Lieb ‘The Logic and Limits of 
Contract Bankruptcy’ (n 30) 512 
33 DG Baird & RK Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’, (n 26); and S Block-Lieb ‘The Politics 
of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy Law’ (2000) 74 Am Bankr LJ 77, 82 
34 S Block-Lieb  (n 30); S Block-Lieb (n 33)77 
35 Ibid 
36 JL Westbrook, (n 31) 821; and JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ 
(1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2284 
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protection of entitlements that arose prior to insolvency would maximise the 
aggregate efficiency.37 Fourthly, there is an apparent lack of an explicit reference 
to cross-border insolvency situations, though the views have subsequently been 
useful in cross-border insolvency discourse.38 Accordingly, Westbrook, while 
arguing as to how the so-called ‘grab rule’ would lead to lower returns for 
creditors as a whole in a cross-border insolvency setting, invokes the common 
pool problem and the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ conception. He argues: 
 
Obviously this situation is merely the international version of the 
problem of collective action- the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”-that has been 
solved by the adoption of collective insolvency proceedings in almost 
every country. Universalism internationally would provide the same 
benefit of maximization of asset values for creditors and other parties 
across the range of cases…….The larger argument,….rests upon the 
benefits to local citizens from the increased flow of trade at lower 
transaction costs…39 
 
Likewise, albeit from a different perspective, Tung argues: 
 
When a firm fails, bankruptcy law attempts to maximize the value of the 
firm’s assets for the benefit of the firm’s creditors. Bankruptcy law also 
determines how that value should be distributed among those creditors. 
The failure of a multinational firm typically leaves assets and unpaid 
creditors in several jurisdictions. However, no overarching international 
bankruptcy system exists. Instead, the national bankruptcy laws of 
several states might plausibly apply to govern the firm’s bankruptcy or 
particular aspects of the case. Conflicting claims of jurisdiction often 
arise. 40 
 
Fourthly, the views do not take into account the level of the various countries’ 
economic development, despite its potential in influencing policy objectives of a 
country’s insolvency law. Apparently an insolvency system of a well developed 
                                                 
37 See I Haviv-Segal ‘Bankruptcy Law and Inefficient Entitlements’, (2005) 2 Berkeley Bus L J 
355 
38 B Wessels, BA Markell and JJ Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Matters (OUP, Oxford  2009 )9;  LM LoPucki ‘The Case for Cooperative 
Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2216, 2219; LM LoPucki, 
‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach,’(1998-1999) 84 
Cornell L Rev 696, 703; JL Westbrook ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice 
of Law and Choice of Forum’ (1991) 65 Am Bankr LJ 457, 465- 466; JL Westbrook, ‘A Global 
Solution to Multinational Default,’ (n 36) 2285; and F Tung  (n 12) 557 
39 JL Westbrook ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum’ (n 38) 466 
40 F Tung (n 12) 557 
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country might not necessarily be the same and appropriate for a lesser developed 
one. In all, the views help to explain the divergence of insolvency systems that 
exist in the world because of the emphasis that each system places on particular 
aspects that parallel the theoretical views, reflected through approaches such as 
redistribution to favoured groups.41  This is evident among developed nations 
whose systems significantly influenced the insolvency systems of developing 
countries, inclusive of the least developed nations, because of colonisation and 
regularised relationships.42  
 
Among the advanced countries, some have traditionally been known to favour 
the general interests and public order or recovery of the company and 
maintenance of employment before satisfaction of creditors’ claims,43 whilst 
others place priority on the satisfaction of creditors’ claims.44 Certainly, the 
choices that signify the divergence reflect different, and conflicting, policy 
decisions.45  It is noteworthy, however, that there are aspects that are shared by 
all systems, such as the collective nature of insolvency systems, co-operation and 
the maximisation of the value of the insolvent debtor’s estate. SSA countries 
would probably need to consider this divergence in the context of their lesser 
developed economies with a view to developing systems that will not only be 
workable and appropriate but will also boost their national economies and 
contribute to poverty eradication as discussed in chapter seven of this work. 
 
Generally speaking, the characteristic features apparent in the various views 
advanced have, by and large, been reflected in the drive for global convergence 
of insolvency laws in which the objectives of an effective and efficient 
insolvency regime have been held to include the provision of certainty in the 
market to promote economic stability and growth; maximisation of the value of 
                                                 
41 E Warren (n 22); RK Rasmussen, ‘Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private 
Ordering’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2252, 2253; and CG Paulus (n 18) 765 
42 A Davydenko and JR Franks (n 15) ; D Berkowitz and others (n 16); and TC Halliday, and BG 
Carruthers (n 21)  
43 The US and France are always cited as examples in this regard. It is emerging from recent 
experiences that South Africa’s system is one that is heavily influenced by labour unions in terms 
of its political economy. 
44 The UK and Germany are generally referred to as examples of pro-creditor systems.  
45 RK  Rasmussen (n 41) 2253 
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assets; striking a balance between liquidation and reorganisation; ensuing 
equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors; provision of timely, efficient 
and impartial resolution of insolvency; preservation of the insolvency estate to 
allow equitable distribution to creditors; recognition of existing creditor rights 
and the establishment of clear rules for the ranking of the priority claims; and the 
establishment of a framework for cross-border insolvency. 46 Indeed, these policy 
objectives take on board the need of an effective insolvency system to address 
the intricacies of cross-border insolvencies in a globalised economy which are 
discussed below. 
2.4 Problems and Issues Involved in Cross-Border Insolvencies 
Cross-border insolvencies cause complex problems for not only debtors and 
creditors but also jurisdictions involved.47 The more a country’s economy is 
integrated into the world economy, the more susceptible to cross-border 
insolvency it is. The problems arise when an insolvent company has assets or 
interests in property and creditors located in multiple jurisdictions. The 
diversified state of the insolvent entity’s activities may be such that conditions 
for opening insolvency proceedings are simultaneously met with regard to more 
than one country, giving rise to the possibility of multiple proceedings in 
different jurisdictions. A jurisdiction in which one of the multiple proceedings is 
initiated may lay claim to universal recognition and enforcement, although in 
practice the proceeding is may be confined to the local estate of the insolvent 
debtor on which effective control can be exercised. 48 
 
Thus, the collective action problems which the domestic insolvency laws are 
primarily designed to address are multiplied and exacerbated by cross-border 
insolvency. This situation consequently raises ‘a considerable number of issues, 
                                                 
46 See n 4 and 6 above. It is however noteworthy that these norms have been modelled on 
practices prevailing in developed economies. 
47 IF Fletcher, ‘International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment’ (1993) 27 Int’l L 429, 
430; and JL Westbrook and D Trautman ‘Conflict of Laws Issues in International Insolvencies’ 
in J Ziegel (ed), Current Development in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency 
Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 657, 658 
48 IF Fletcher, ‘The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice of Law 
Provisions’, (1998) 33 Tex Int’l LJ 119,124 
 25
the attempted resolution of which may bring national systems into conflict’.49 
There is often an issue as to whether the court where such proceedings are 
commenced will have jurisdiction over foreign assets of the insolvent debtor, 
and, if so, whether it is likely to have easy access in ‘marshalling the assets’ to 
the best interest of creditors. It is again uncertain and unpredictable as to whether 
and to which extent all creditors, irrespective of their location, will be equally 
treated alongside the local ones. The other apparent issue is the extent to which 
the local court might recognise foreign proceedings and whether the different 
courts in different jurisdictions are likely to cooperate in ‘marshalling the assets’. 
These issues, including many others, such as the manner in which assets should 
be dealt with in the event of concurrent proceedings in multiple jurisdictions; the 
law applicable in matters of substance and procedure and whether the local 
courts have jurisdiction over an insolvent foreign company in the first place, are 
essentially likely to complicate the process.  
 
The diversity that exists between the sovereign legal systems of the world and 
the lack of a unified framework that is universally enforceable contributes 
significantly to the existence of the problems that present themselves in a cross-
border situation.50 Equally important in a cross-border insolvency context are 
issues of efficiency and effectiveness of proceedings. The problems become 
more complicated when the insolvency laws of the jurisdictions involved are 
outdated, rigid, formalistic, and above all have a strong bias in favour of 
particular categories of locally interested parties.51 It is equally so where there is 
no law in place; non-enforcement; or a lack of practical experience in 
administering the law. The additional complexities surrounding cross-border 
insolvencies necessarily lead to uncertainty, risk, injustice, and ultimately cost to 
businesses.52  
 
                                                 
49 PJ Omar (n 12) 15 
50 See D McKenzie, ‘International Solutions to International Insolvency: An Insoluble Problem?’ 
(1997) 26 U Balt L Rev 15, 23; and IF Fletcher (n 47) 430 
51 M Rowat (n 15). Developing countries inclusive of the least developed ones, such as those in 
SSA are generally taken to have weak and less developed insolvency systems. 
52 JL Westbrook ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:  Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum’ (n 38) 460 and 558 
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The prevailing consensus53 is that the globalisation of the world economy has 
enhanced the growth and involvement of companies in international business, 
and consequently enhanced the challenges posed by cross-border insolvencies.54 
This situation is assumed to lead to a significant increase in international 
business failures, and hence potential for multiple insolvency proceedings in 
multiple jurisdictions as creditors seeking recovery attempt to seize assets in any 
country in which they are located.  Admittedly, this assumption is not based on 
findings of an empirical global study, but rather on an impression seemingly 
drawn from instances of international business collapses in recent years in 
developed countries and the increased pace of the globalisation drive. The 
assumption seems, however, to include all countries, irrespective of their 
individual level of development and participation in the global economy.  
 
Despite the increase in prominence of cross-border insolvencies in recent times, 
instances of cross-border insolvencies have long attracted the attention of 
creditors and scholars.55  Notwithstanding the history of cross-border 
insolvencies and the recent global and regional initiatives, the solution to the 
numerous issues arising from cross-border insolvency is still a subject of 
debate.56 This lack of consensus implies challenges for jurisdictions, particularly 
the least developed countries, in considering how to approach the crafting of a 
workable and appropriate cross-border insolvency framework.   
 
                                                 
53 Notably, the consensus is to almost all scholars of insolvency law irrespective of their 
inclination in the debate on competing theories of cross-border insolvencies.  
54 AT Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism,’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich L 
Rev 2177, 2178. Guzman cites numerous examples of international business failures of recent 
years and makes reference to a great deal of scholars who share the view that globalization has 
led to growth of business failures; LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A 
Post-Universalist Approach’ (n 38) 699; and PJ Omar (n 12) 15-18 
55 For an account of early cases, and in particular  Solomon v Ross, 1H. B1. 131, decided in 1764, 
see KH Nadelmann, ‘Solomon v. Ross’ (1946) 9 MLR 164; KH  Nadelmann, ‘Bankruptcy 
Treaties’ (1944) 93 Univ Penn L Rev 58, 59; IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 2005) 15-19; and J Lowell, ‘Conflict of Law as Applied to Assignment 
of Creditors’(1888) 1 Harv  L  Rev 259 
56 See the UNCITRAL Model Law (n 20); and the various instruments designed by the 
international organizations with a view to forging an effective global system of insolvency law 
such as IMF (n 6); and  World Bank (n 6) 
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2.5 Competing Theories in Cross-Border Insolvencies  
Traditionally, there have been two competing theories of cross-border 
insolvencies, namely territoriality and universality. The increasing incidences of 
cross-border insolvency associated with the globalisation of the world economy 
have, in recent years, drawn attention to, and given rise to a debate over, the 
theories.57 However, while the territorial approach has been much favoured in 
practice by most jurisdictions, the universality approach has enjoyed tremendous 
appeal to most theorists and academics.58  
 
The two competing theories notwithstanding, there is also the notion of unity, 
which means that one court administers all assets.59 However, a wider treatment 
of universalism, in modern times, has tended to include unity as a form of pure 
universalism.  Fletcher contends that: 
 
One form of utilisation of the concept of universality is as an integral 
aspect of the doctrine of unity of bankruptcy…..whereby it mounts to a 
logical corollary of the idea of unity. Indeed, in this conception the two 
terms can be treated as virtual synonyms for each other. However, it is 
important to recognize that the concept of universality is not exclusively 
dependent upon that of unity.60 
 
Accordingly, universalism as envisaged in the current debate is an approach 
which vests in a single sovereign state, which is the home country of an insolvent 
debtor, an exclusive right to administer all of the assets and debts of an insolvent 
debtor wherever located through one central proceeding governed by the court 
and the law of the home country.61 The home country’s insolvency laws will 
                                                 
57 IF Fletcher (n 47)  
58 IF Fletcher (n 47) 433; JAE Pottow (n 13)1904 stating that ‘[m]any countries’ existing 
bankruptcy laws reflect territorialist conceptions of jurisdictions. The competing paradigm, 
‘universalism’, probably enjoys a privileged academic status inversely proportionate to its current 
acceptance by policy-makers in countries around the world’; SM Franken, ‘Three principles of 
Transnational Corporate Bankruptcy Law: A Review,’ (2005) 11 Eur LJ  232, 235, arguing that 
‘territorialism still is the dominant approach to cross-border insolvency..’.  However, JL 
Westbrook ‘Universal Priorities’ (1998) 33 Tex Int’l L J 27, 28, maintains that territorialist 
system is what most people assume exists today. 
59 JL Westbrook,  ibid 28 
60 IF Fletcher (n 48)124 
61 See JL Westbrook (n 36); I Fletcher (n 47) 433. See also LC Ho, ‘Navigating the Common 
Law Approach to Cross-border Insolvency’(2006) 22 Insolvency Law and Practice 217 
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apply to such issues as the conduct of the administration of the assets, the priority 
ranking, the stay of enforcements, transactions avoidance and whether to 
liquidate or rescue.62  
 
Thus, assets located in countries other than the home country would be 
repatriated to the home country jurisdiction for administration or subjected to 
ancillary proceedings conducted under the substantive insolvency law of the 
home country jurisdiction.63 The idea is to facilitate global distribution to 
creditors or approval of a single plan of rescue.64 
 
Territorialism65 is a theory that vests in each sovereign state an exclusive right to 
administer assets of an insolvent debtor situated within its own borders using its 
own laws without having regard to the debtor’s insolvency proceedings initiated 
in other sovereign states.66 The theory denies the extraterritorial effect of an 
insolvency administration, but caters for assets and persons within the territory of 
the sovereign state whose jurisdiction is asserted. It is thus only claims that 
originate within the sovereign state of the relevant jurisdiction that may be 
                                                                                                                                    
describing universalism as ‘no more than a convenient label’ which is only used ‘when the court 
feels inclined to grant the assistance sought.’ 
62 See LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universality Approach’ (n 
38); JL Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice 
of Forum’ (n 38) 
63 UR Bang-Pedersen ‘Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability 
and Protection of Local Interests’ (1999) 73 Am  Bankr L J 385, 386, observing that ‘ it is 
common to refer to a system as universalist even if all matters are not settled by the law of the 
state where the proceedings are initiated.’ By way of illustration, a good example of this theory 
being used in practice is Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in the Re HIH Casualty and General 
Insurance [2008] UKHL 21,[2008] 1 WLR 852 where he expressly makes reference to 
universalism as the justification for repatriating English assets to a liquidation of an Australian 
insurer taking place in the home country.  It is not clear from the House of Lords judgments as a 
whole how far Lord Hoffmann’s approach constitutes majority reasoning.   
64 JL Westbrook ‘ The Duty to Seek Cooperation in Multinational Insolvency Cases’ in H Peter, 
and others (eds)  (n 5) 362  
65 Territorialism is also increasingly referred to as a ‘grab rule’ because of its inherent incentive 
for each country to use its law to grab insolvent debtor’s asset within its jurisdiction for benefit of 
local creditors. 
66 IF Fletcher (n 47), 431; LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy:  A Post-
Universality Approach’ (n 38) 701 and 743; J Pae, ‘The EU Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings: The Need for a Modified Universal Approach’ (2003-2004) 27 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp L Rev 555, 563 
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included on the list of beneficiaries of any resulting distribution.67 In the context 
of the insolvency of a multinational corporation, a court has jurisdiction over 
those portions of the corporation that are within its country’s borders.68  
 
2.5.1 Theoretical Underpinning for Territorialism and Universalism  
The underlying basis of territorialism is the notion of sovereignty.69 
Traditionally, the notion is characterised by the ability of a sovereign state to 
exercise power to dominate a territory and assets located thereon.70 It includes 
the imposition of the law of the sovereign on all within the territorial reach of the 
sovereign state and the restriction of the application of foreign laws within the 
borders of the sovereign state. The other theoretical basis for territorialism, 
which descends from sovereignty, is the desire of a sovereign state to protect its 
local interests. This justification is related to the claim that insolvency laws often 
reflect deeply held societal norms, values, interests, policies and priorities of the 
respective countries.71  
 
Conversely, universalism, in the modern parlance, traces its basis from the theory 
of market symmetry, which requires a legal system to be symmetrical with the 
market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders with respect to 
the legal rights and duties embraced by those systems.72 The theory requires 
insolvency law systems to reflect and meet the needs and demands of the global 
market as opposed to merely focussing on national markets.73 In this way, the 
insolvency proceedings can reduce the costs which would arise from multiple 
                                                 
67 JJ Kilborn (n 37) citing LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy:  A Post-
Universalit Approach’ (n 37) 744-748 
68 LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (n 38) 2218 
69 IF Fletcher, ‘International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment’ (n 47) 431; AJ 
Berends ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive 
Overview’ (1998) 6 Tulane J Int’l L & Comp Law 309, 314 arguing, ‘territoriality …is more or 
less based on constitutional grounds….’ 
70 JJ Kilborn (n 38) 5 & 6; JL Westbrook, ‘Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 
15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2002) 76 Am Bankr LJ  1, 5 
71 SM Franken (n 58) 233; JJ Chung, ‘The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step 
Towards Erosion of National Sovereignty,’ (2006-2007) 27 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 89; JAE Pottow 
(n 13); and N Martin (n 14) 
72 JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (n 36) 2277 and 2283-2292 
73 Ibid 2308 
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proceedings, maximise the value of a debtor’s assets wherever located and realise 
the desired effect of principles of equality and priorities by a unified approach 
that treats the assets of the debtor as a part of a common pool in a global market 
for the benefit of all stakeholders.74 It is however noteworthy that the traditional 
basis of universalism was in rem jurisdiction whose effect was to render one 
court as having jurisdiction to decide all matters involving a debtor’s assets.75  
 
2.5.2 A Review of the Debate over Territorialism and Universalism 
The debate on the cross-border insolvency theories essentially reflects issues that 
have been raised in the past.76 However, the current manifestation of the debate 
encapsulates the current globalisation challenges and the corresponding increase 
in international business failures that characterised the advanced and emerging 
economies in the recent decades. The main arguments exchanged in the debate 
mainly focus on local interests protection; predictability; efficiency and value 
maximisation; and practicality within the broader contexts of addressing the 
demands arising from the growing operations of multinational corporations. 
 
2.5.2.1 Protection of Local Interests 
Territorialism aims to protect local interests in the jurisdiction where the assets of 
an insolvent debtor are situated.77 This is achieved by the application of domestic 
laws, which reflect local policies with regard for instance to priorities of creditors 
in distribution, security rights, and pre-petition transfers. It is therefore claimed 
to meet the expectations of the local claimants whose interests in the locally 
vested assets are accordingly dealt with in insolvency proceedings to satisfy their 
claims using the local laws to the exclusion of other foreign claimants.  
                                                 
74 Ibid 2285. See also KH Nadelmann, ‘Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American 
Bankruptcy Act’, (1952) 1 Int’l and Comp LQ 484; JJ Chung (n 71) 94 stating that the underlying 
theory of universalism posits that the overall value of bankruptcy estate will be maximized 
because one forum will be able to realize the sum of the parts or the going concern value, as 
opposed to piecemeal liquidation or treatment. 
75 JL Westbrook, ‘Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15,  The ALI Principles, 
and The EU Insolvency Regulations’ (n 70) 6 
76 J Lowell (n 55) 
77 AM Kipnis, ‘Beyond UNCITRAL: Alternatives to Universality in Transnational Insolvency’, 
(2008) 36 Denv J Int’l L & Policy 155, 169 &170 
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On the contrary, universalism is discredited for downplaying national 
sovereignty and local interests which leads to local claimants losing the 
protection of their local laws.78 Consequently, the entire social and commercial 
stratum would be carved out of the country’s sovereignty and subjected to 
foreign law.79 This adds costs to local ‘non-adjusting creditors’80 while large 
international lenders adjust their contractual terms, hence benefiting from the 
system.81  
 
From universalists’ standpoint local claimants are less significant than 
anticipated by territorialists, as their expectation and attitude as to treatment of 
their claims and potential risk have no connection at all with the location of the 
debtor’s choice.82 To circumvent any cost, however, they may charge 
competitive rates of return on their entire portfolio of loans.83 Thus there would 
be no good reason for preferential treatment to individual local expectations as in 
the globalised market the value is to be distributed to creditors beyond national 
borders.84 Much as they deal with a multinational enterprise, they should expect 
that their insolvency claim will be part of the worldwide collection of claims and 
that the local assets will be collected in a common pool for satisfying all 
claimants. The weak local claimants are more likely to be protected under 
universalism than under a territorial system as most jurisdictions seem not to 
have law in place for their protection in the event of the insolvency of a 
                                                 
78 It is worth noting the modifications to choice of law made under the EC Regulation on  
Insolvency Proceedings 2000 Art 5-15, which are designed to overcome this problem. 
79 F Tung  (n 12 ) 576 
80 The terms adjusting, non-adjusting, weakly non-adjusting and strongly adjusting which 
frequently feature in the debate originate from LA Bebchuk and JM Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for 
the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale L J 857; and were further  
explained and used by AT Guzman (n 54) 2181-2182. Accordingly, while fully adjusting 
creditors can charge their debtors a risk-adjusted market rate of return, non-adjusting creditors 
who are usually further sub-divided into weakly non-adjusting and strongly non-adjusting refer to 
those creditors who are generally unable or unwilling to adjust their position by changing the 
terms of their loan. 
81 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’ (n 38) 
709 
82 See S M Franken (n 58) 238 
83 AT Guzman (n 54) 2184, 2187-2191 
84 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2310 
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multinational corporation.85 It is argued that universalism is more likely to lead 
to agreement and enforcement of a limited range of international priorities, which 
may ensure such protection.86 
 
2.5.2.2 Predictability 
Predictability has been claimed by each theory as being one of its neutral 
consequences arising from its implementation. Universalist scholars argue that 
under universalism, the application of home country law by the single home 
country court guarantees fairness and equality of distribution among creditors, 
which also reduces informational costs and hence enables more accurate credit 
pricing. In contrast, universalist scholars claim that territorialism does not 
provide predictability and cost efficiency, as creditors have to inform themselves 
on the insolvency law position of each country in which the debtor has assets 
whilst also facing the risk of debtors moving assets to another jurisdiction in the 
interests of the debtors. 87 
 
On the other hand, proponents of territorialism maintain that the use of the court 
and application of the laws of the country where the assets of an insolvent debtor 
are located offers greater predictability to the lenders than universalism.88 Since 
lenders are aware of their debtors, the only information they would need to 
ascertain to predict their treatment in insolvency proceedings is the countries 
where the debtor’s assets are located, the distributional priorities and other 
insolvency effects such as the impact of any local stay on enforcement by 
secured creditors. Unlike the territorial approach, universalism does not create 
the desired predictability, because the home country standard lacks a workable 
definition and test to determine a jurisdiction where insolvency proceedings can 
                                                 
85 See JL Westbrook, ‘Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI 
Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation’ (n 70) 9; JL Westbrook (n 36) 2310-2311 
86 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2310 
87 JL Westbrook (n 38) 460 
88 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’ (n 38) 
751 
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be commenced.89 As such, the home country standard could mean and refer to 
more than one jurisdiction where insolvency proceedings can be commenced. 
This tarnishes the claimed predictability.    
 
Universalists have also criticised the territorial approach, arguing that basing 
jurisdiction on the mere existence of assets could increase the possibility of 
forum shopping as debtors can easily move assets to a jurisdiction of their choice 
to suit their interests.90 In response to this, territorialists maintain that the 
potential harm resulting from international forum shopping is greater than any 
harm resulting from forum shopping in the domestic context, though the latter 
has never been practically experienced throughout the dominance of 
territorialism.91  
 
Universalists admit the inherent problem of the home country principle, which is 
the bedrock of universalism.92 Some scholars have gone as far as attempting to 
suggest solutions to deter the possibility of forum shopping. Guzmann is of the 
view that a universalist jurisdiction should identify the home country using such 
criteria as the main location of a company’s activity or location of assets which 
can not be easily changed.93  While Perkin argues for a treaty or convention 
                                                 
89 LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (n 38 ) 
2223-2234; and LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach’ (n 38) 713-725 
90 AT Guzman (n 54) 2212; LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in 
International Bankruptcy,’ (n 38) 2241-2242 arguing that instances of forum shopping involving 
shifting of assets do not normally occur nor has it been a serious problem in the existing 
territorial regime. However he advances means that could be used to restrict the possibility of 
forum shopping, which are                                    
employing contractual restrictions and local legal devices and treaties or conventions that could 
provide for a return of shifted assets. 
91 JJ Chung (n 71)123 
92  See AT Guzmann (54); UR Bang-Pedersen (n 63) 418; JL Westbrook (n 36) 2315-2317; DT 
Trautman, JL Westbrook, and E Gaillard, ‘Four Models for International Bankruptcy,’ (1991) 41 
Am Bankr LJ 573, 624;  RK Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies’ (1997) 
19 Mich J Int’l L 1 
93 AT Guzman (n 54) 2214. For arguments on concerns and problems of COMI principle under 
the EC Regulation, see for instance,  W Ringe, ‘Forum Shopping under EU Insolvency 
Regulation,’ (2008) 9 European Business Organisation Law Review 579, suggesting changes of 
the current COMI approach within the EU Insolvency Regulation in favour of company’s 
registered office, arguing that it will render insolvency law applicable predictable and changeable 
upon fulfillment of prerequisite conditions; and MM Winkle, ‘From Whipped Cream to 
Multibillion Euro Financial Collapse: The European Regulation on Transnational Insolvency in 
Action’ (2008) 26 Berkeley J Int’l L 352. See also I Mevorach, ‘Jurisdictions in Insolvency: A 
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making a place of incorporation as a determinant of the home country,94 Bufford 
advocates that a company’s centre of main interests should be located in a 
country for six months or a year before that country would be regarded as a home 
country.95 Westbrook on his part suggests a multidimensional test citing the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, which presumes the place of incorporation as the 
debtor’s centre of main interest.96  
 
2.5.2.3 Efficiency and Value Maximisation 
Universalists claim that universalism is the only approach in the globalised 
economy that would efficiently address the collective action problem discussed 
above at 2.1 as it provides a unified procedure for administration of all the assets 
of the insolvent debtor irrespective of their location.97 The unified procedure 
reduces the costs of insolvency proceedings by theoretically eliminating multiple 
proceedings in all the countries where assets happen to be situated, and 
maximises the value of the assets for distribution to all designated beneficiaries 
while also offering a workable framework for the rescue of an insolvent debtor. 
This argument on the reduction of the costs is based on the common pool 
problem conception, which in the present context is viewed and applied at 
international level to cater for assets and creditors wherever they are in the global 
market. 
 
In contrast, territorialism has been criticised for being costly, and inefficient. It is 
argued that its approach not only limits efficient administration of an insolvent 
debtor by restricting insolvency proceedings to national borders but it also does 
                                                                                                                                    
Study of European Courts’ Decision’ (2010) 6 J Priv Int’l Law 327 for an up to date empirical 
investigation of  cases applying COMI principle  under the EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings and for arguments against the concerns and criticisms so far raised against the 
Centre of Main Interest (“COMI”) principle. 
94 L Perkins, ‘A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-border Insolvencies’ (2000) 32 NYU J 
Int’l L and Pol 787,815 
95 SM Bufford, ‘Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki,’ (2005) 79 
Am Bankr LJ 105, 139 
96 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2317. It is however a noteworthy that this presumption has not necessarily 
succeeded in assuaging the concerns of territorialists if experience under the EC Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings is anything to go by! Contribution of Professor Adrian Walters on this 
point is highly acknowledged. 
97 Ibid 2285; JJ Kilborn (n 38 ) 17-18 
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not work in favour of rescue proceedings for it is difficult to engage in co-
operation with many courts having competing interests.98 This is a serious 
shortcoming since a majority of insolvencies of large corporations involve 
rescue.99  
 
The claimed efficiency in universalism is questioned by territorialist advocates 
mainly for its potential in injuring interests of creditors on account of the 
application of home country law to the adjudication of claims, which will mean 
invocation of the home country’s own notion of due process of law.100 This 
would in effect deprive injured parties of active involvement in court 
proceedings. Additionally, failure of the universalist approach to provide an 
efficient manner of dealing with corporate groups is regarded as a serious flaw 
since most multinational corporations are part of corporate groups.101 On the 
contrary, it is argued that territorialism offers an optimal solution to problems of 
corporate groups. According to LoPucki: 
 
[T]he territorial solution to the problem of corporate groups is 
remarkably elegant. It does not rest…..on an assumption that all assets 
within a country are owned by the same corporation. Rather, it assumes 
only that each asset is located in some particular country. The solution is 
that the law of that country governs whether the asset is available to 
                                                 
98 JL Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum (n 38)460; and RK Rasmussen (n 41) 2252, 2257-2258 
99 AT Guzmann (n 54) 2202-2204 
100 LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (n 38) 
2225. 
101 Ibid 2230-2234. On the work that has recently been undertaken by UNCITRAL Working 
Group V on the topic of enterprise groups (including multinational ones) in insolvency, see text 
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Solution’ (2007) Eur Bus Organ L Rev 179; I Mevorach, ‘The Home Country of a Multinational 
Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency’ (2008) ICLQ 427; I Mevorach, ‘The Road to a Suitable and 
Comprehensive Global Approach to Insolvencies Within Multinational Corporate Groups’ (2006) 
15 J Bankr L & Practice 455; CG Paulus, ‘Group insolvencies: Some Thoughts About New 
Approaches’ (2007) 42 Tex In’l LJ 819; H Peter, ‘Insolvency in a Group of Companies, 
Substantive and Procedural Consolidation: When and How?’ in H Peter and others (eds) (n 5) 
199; and G Moss ‘Group Insolvency-Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience under 
the Influence of English Pragmatism’ (2006-2007) Brook J Int’l L 1005  
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satisfy any particular debt, regardless of the corporate structure and 
regardless of whether the applicable body of law is denominated veil 
piercing, consolidation, agency, sham or voodoo. The application of that 
law will be by the local court, and will have no extraterritorial effect.102 
 
2.5.2.4 Practicality 
Territorialism remains a practically dominant approach to cross-border 
insolvencies as various countries continue to apply their own diverse laws to 
insolvent debtors and their assets within their borders albeit that the approaches 
adopted tend not to be in territoriality’s purest form.103 In this context, 
universalism has thus been challenged for being impractical, largely owing to the 
prevailing notions of sovereignty, which make it unlikely that there is a single 
country that will unquestioningly allow enforcement of foreign law within its 
borders. Yet, operationalisation of this theory is dependant on other countries 
accepting and applying the theory.104 Difficulties and prolonged efforts in 
working out and operationalising an effective framework have been claimed as 
evidencing the deep rooted territorialist sentiments and reluctance of nations to 
commit themselves to a universalist approach.105 Accordingly, initiatives that 
have been operationalised so far are modest in their aspirations and fall short of 
the pure universalist ideal.106 It is generally accepted that universalism will only 
flourish in a harmonised world that is not in existence yet.107 The regional 
initiatives effected to date, such as the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 
2000, have thus not wholesalely adopted the universalism theory.  On the other 
                                                 
102 LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (n 38) 
2233 
103 Ibid  2219. LoPucki has named territorialism the international law of bankruptcy. IF Fletcher 
(n 48) 123; PJ Omar (n 12) 24 observing that ‘very few territorial proceedings in modern times 
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104 AJ Berends (n 69) 313; J Wade, ‘Not So Welcoming? United States Cross-Border Insolvency 
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20; P Kite, ‘The Bear Stearns Decision-A Concerned View from BVI’ 2 Insol World 22; K 
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105 F Tung (n 12) 559, 565 
106 Ibid 
107 F Tung ibid; and  JL Westbrook, ‘Duty to Seek Cooperation in Multinational Insolvency 
Cases’ (n 64) 362; JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default,’ (n 36) 2299 and 
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hand, universalists admit that a country adopting a territorial approach can 
benefit economically from protecting its local interests.108    
 
2.5.3 Alternative Approaches Emerging from the Debate  
Amidst the debate there have emerged alternative theoretical approaches 
signifying a drive towards pragmatic versions and compromise arising from the 
hitherto competing theories.109 This development is largely in response to the 
inherent problems of the two competing theories and ‘the resilient power of 
sovereignty’.110 The main alternative theories, that have also not been free from 
criticisms, are modified universalism, cooperative territorialism and bankruptcy 
selection clause theory. The latter theory is also called contractualism. 111  
 
It might be appropriate to argue that the alternative approaches that have 
emerged fall between the opposite ends of the spectrum, from universalism on 
the one hand to territorialism on the other.112 On the part of the universalists, the 
alternative approaches, save for contractualism, are mere transitional solutions 
towards universalism, which to them is the only proper long term solution.113 
 
                                                 
108 LA Bebchuk and AT Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies,’ 
(1999) 42 JL&Econ 775,778 and 806 
109 J Pae (n 66) 556 and 561 
110 JL Westbrook (n 58) 43 
111 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2300. Westbrook observes that cooperative territorialism is one form of 
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See also JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (n 58) 43 where Westbrook arrived at this 
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dealing with assets exclusively on territorial basis.  
113 JL Westbrook ibid 2299-2302. See also JJ Kilborn (n 38) 
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Despite the differences in the alternative theoretical approaches and the fact that 
they still characterise the two competing models of cross-border insolvency, they 
signify compromise in some respects and in particular on the element of co-
operation among nations in cross-border insolvency.114 Thus, the possible 
difference in outcome between modified universalism and cooperative 
territoriality is seemingly minute. It would seem that LoPucki had this conclusion 
in mind when he observed that ‘[a] cooperative territorial system and a 
universalist one will differ less in practice than in theory……one can think of 
cooperative territoriality as a simplification of universalism in which 
multinationals conclusively are presumed to do what they usually do ─ 
incorporate separately in each country.’115  
 
Indeed, the alternative approaches advanced suggest that the territorialists and 
universalists both agree on the suitability of universalism in the globalised era 
but they only differ on whether the pre-conditions are yet in place to make 
universalism practical.116 While territorialism, as mainly represented by LoPucki, 
suggests that the best way of progressing towards universalism is building a 
transitional framework based on the existing territorialist practices of national 
states, universalism, whose main proponent is Westbrook, suggests a system 
basing on pure universalism as a starting point.117 
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2.5.3.1 Cooperative Territorialism 
This is a refined form of the territoriality theory of cross-border insolvency law. 
It accommodates all features of territorialism, in particular the right of a 
sovereign state to administer assets located within its borders without regard to 
insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions. However, it provides room for 
insolvency courts within jurisdictions engaged in administering assets of the 
insolvent debtor located within their respective borders to cooperate on a case-
by-case basis if and when they deem it fit, in addition to establishing  a 
convention to restrict transfers of assets from one jurisdiction to another.  
 
Co-operation agreements where effected may enable the filing of claims by 
foreign creditors in local proceedings subject to priorities available to similarly 
situated domestic creditors and existing restrictions whose effect are to prefer 
local creditors. This approach also contemplates co-operation in other aspects as 
may be deemed important, including firstly, the establishment of procedures for 
replicating claims filed in any one country in any other country where the 
insolvent debtor has filed; secondly, sharing of distribution lists to restrict double 
recovery; thirdly, co-operation in joint sales of assets to maximise returns; and 
lastly, facilitating voluntary investment and reorganisation efforts.118 The co-
operation may also involve deference to a foreign state’s laws to control 
domestic proceedings, if a state determines it to be in its best interests.119  
Although, these areas of co-operation may pave the way to an efficient cross-
border insolvency system, the co-operation from other jurisdictions is not 
guaranteed. 
 
In addition to the advantages that it shares with pure territorialism, cooperative 
territorialism has the further advantage of being simple and less expensive to 
undertake as it is based on the current territorialist practices of cross-border 
                                                 
118 See LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’ 
(n 38) 750 
119 JAE Pottow (n 114 ) 954-955  
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insolvencies.120 Therefore, unlike universalism, cooperative territoriality confines 
international co-operation to aspects in which co-operation has been most 
successful in the past. On the contrary, the approach suffers a risk of multiple and 
inconsistent jurisdictional and choice of law decisions.121 The nature of the risk is 
attributed to assets involved which may not do not necessarily fall within one 
jurisdiction. This creates a potential for difficulties in choice of law. Like pure 
territorialism, cooperative territorialism has been criticised, among other things, 
for being non-symmetrical to global markets, as it is based on individual 
countries’ insolvency laws that do not conform to requirements of the global 
market.122  
                                                                                                                                   
2.5.3.2 Modified Universalism 
As the name suggests, modified universalism is ‘a watered down version of 
universalism’123 which requires a local court to consider and decide whether to 
comply with a request from a court or foreign representative emanating from a 
foreign insolvency proceeding of an insolvent debtor having assets in the local 
jurisdiction. The whole idea of this approach is to make each court cooperate 
with others involved in insolvency proceedings of an insolvent debtor in either an 
ancillary or parallel approach to attain some form of unified result.124 According 
to Westbrook, modified universalism ‘…permits the court to view the default and 
its resolution…from a worldwide perspective [rather than as a series of rights 
vested in each territory] and to cooperate with other courts to produce results as 
close to those that would arise from a single proceeding as local law will 
permit.’125 In effect, while this approach creates a framework open for co-
operation and extraterritorial effect, it also accommodates territorial elements 
                                                 
120 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’ (n 
38) 753 
121 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2320 
122 Ibid 2319 
123 LM LoPucki , ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’(n 
38) 725; and JAE Pottow (n 114) 952, saying that modified universalism gives a deferring court a 
choice by replacing the ‘must’ of universalism with ‘may’ as to application of one country’s 
insolvency law.  
124 This is also envisaged in IF Fletcher (n 48) 122 
125 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2302 
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characterised by a local court’s power to exercise discretion to deny co-
operation.126 
 
One advantage of modified universalism is that while it maintains some claimed 
efficiencies of universalism theory in the era of growing globalisation of business 
enterprise, it is a flexible and simple approach to adopt. It does not of necessity 
require a convention or treaty for implementation as it can be achieved by 
domestic legislation. In addition, it contains the sovereignty sentiments that have 
apparently rendered territorialism a dominant regime of cross-border insolvency. 
The other advantage is that in the context of the drive towards universalism, it 
provides the necessary experience needed for formulation of a convention for 
universalism.127 On the contrary, modified universalism, by attempting to strike a 
balance between universalism and territoriality has lost the claimed certainty and 
predictability of universalism.128 It is, as such, uncertain and less reliable, as 
courts still retain power to scrutinise home country laws and exercise discretion 
whether or not to cooperate. Similarly, transaction costs that seem to be saved by 
avoiding duplicative proceedings are offset by costs incurred in petitioning for 
assistance in local courts. Nevertheless, modified universalism, like universalism, 
still suffers the difficulty of ascertaining the home country of an insolvent debtor. 
 
2.5.3.3 Contractualism or Bankruptcy Selection Clause Approach  
This is a relatively recent alternative theory,129 tracing its roots from the ‘contract 
bankruptcy movement’, which characterises the broader theory of 
contractualism.130 It advocates a system whereby each corporation will make a 
choice regarding the applicable forum and law in the event of its insolvency, 
which choice has to be made during the incorporation stage and reflected in the 
corporation’s charter. The forum chosen will administer the proceedings in 
                                                 
126 See K Anderson (n 1) 679, 690, and 691 
127 JL Westbrook (n 36) 2319 
128 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’ (n 
38) 728-732 
129 See JL Westbrook, ‘Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy’ (n 31) 27-830; JL Westbrook (n 36) 
2304; and K Anderson (n 1) 679, 694 
130 See generally S Block-Lieb (n 30) 503; RK Rasmussen (n 30); A Schwartz (n 30) 
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accordance with the principle of universality. To deter possible manipulation of 
the home country of a debtor and restrict room for forum shopping, the proposal 
provides for change of the choice of the applicable insolvency regime only with 
the consent of creditors.  The courts of every country would consequently be 
bound to enforce the choice as reflected in the corporation charter unless the 
result would be unreasonable and unjust. 
 
The underlying justification for this approach is that allowing companies to 
specify the relevant insolvency system through a clause in the corporation charter 
is premised on efficiency reasons.131 It is assumed that some companies are 
likely to favour a territorial system, while others may favour a universalist 
approach or other modified forms of dealing with cross-border insolvency.132 
Given this situation, it is the companies that can best choose a regime that suits 
their situations and interests.133 
 
Of significance, this approach claims to overcome the problem of determining an 
insolvent debtor’s home country which is inherent under universalism.134 More 
importantly, it is likely to provide an incentive to corporations selecting 
jurisdictions with the most efficient insolvency system. This could consequently 
lead to competition among countries in putting in place and enforcing efficient 
insolvency systems whose ultimate result is improved international insolvency 
law.135 
 
However, critics agree that this approach suffers from theoretical and pragmatic 
problems.136 Firstly, it has been condemned for disregarding a number of other 
interested parties from the contracting process, thereby removing the protection 
                                                 
131 See RK Rasmussen  (n 41) 2255; and RK Rasmussen (n 92) 22 
132 Ibid 
133 Ibid 
134 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’ (n 
38) 738. See also AM Kipnis (n 77) 178; and K Anderson (n 1) 695 
135 RK Rasmussen (n 41) 2273; K Anderson (n 1); and  SM Franken (n 57 ) 242-245 
136 LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (n 38) 
2216, 2243; LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist 
Approach’ (n 38) 738; S Block-Lieb, ‘The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy’ (n 30) 528-
529; and JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (n 36) 2303- 230 
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provided by the mandatory domestic legislation.137 Secondly, the approach 
encourages debtors to select regimes with laws that are favourable to debtors, as 
opposed to most efficient regime. Thirdly, it would be difficulty to obtain 
enforcement of this approach by countries without a convention, which is also 
unlikely to be concluded. 
 
2.6 Placing the Theoretical Approaches and the Associated Issues in SSA 
Context 
The theoretical approaches and the resulting debate have emerged and developed 
from the viewpoint of developed countries which are characterised by highly 
advanced technology, large and multinational corporations and sophisticated 
financing systems. This fact therefore necessitates a different debate in order to 
address the specific needs of the least developed countries such as those in SSA 
in so far as approaching development of a workable and appropriate cross-border 
insolvency framework is concerned. However, the current theories on cross-
border insolvencies may have potentials to offer what is termed as a 
‘comparative vocabulary and framework’ in investigating the optimal approach 
to cross-border insolvency problems in SSA that take into account the existing 
global initiatives and the local contexts.138  
 
Important issues arise from the debate for SSA.139  The first issue is whether and 
to what extent the claimed growth of international business activity makes SSA 
susceptible to implications of and growth of insolvencies. The second issue is on 
the theoretical approach that may be envisaged in the existing SSA insolvency 
systems and whether it is the most appropriate in responding to the implications 
of the growth of international business, while taking into account their concrete 
socio-economic conditions and the realities of the global economy. 
 
                                                 
137 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach’ (n 
38) 738-740; K Anderson (n 1) 697 
138 K Anderson (n 1) 699 and 700 
139 See F Tung (n 12) 577; and IF Fletcher, ‘Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest 
for Global Standards and Principles to Govern Cross-border Insolvency’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J 
Int’l L 767, 774 
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Since the mid 1980s, SSA countries have been implementing economic reforms 
and liberalisation programmes as part of the conditions of financial aid 
administered by the IMF and the World Bank in a bid to restructure and build 
their economies.140  The adopted approach entails putting in place conducive 
policy and legal frameworks for attracting, promoting and protecting foreign 
investment,141 and has resulted in the making of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on trade and investment. The receipt of disbursements from the 
international lending agencies and other donor countries, with which SSA 
maintains bilateral and multilateral arrangements, is at times contingent upon 
progress in putting such policies and laws into effect.142  
 
Given the economic reforms and policy emphasis on the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments, potential for such countries favouring a 
universalist stance, including its modified versions, seems to be looming; as is 
the wholesale adaptation of the prescription of the international bodies with 
regard to the regulation of cross-border insolvency.143 Certainly, this endeavour 
might be pursued by these countries144 in a bid to further attract foreign investors, 
for it is now widely acknowledged that an effective and predictable insolvency 
law is a crucial factor for investors interested in investing in a particular 
jurisdiction.145 A universalist argument is such that a universalist insolvency 
system would effectively enable investors to plan their transactions more 
effectively while confidently aware that in the event of insolvency, their home 
country law will apply and govern proceedings, or their home representative will 
                                                 
140 It is noteworthy that IMF and World Bank are among regional and global organizations that 
have also been instrumental in devising and promulgating models, principles, and normative 
standards and paradigms as prescriptive for good insolvency law. 
141 Many of SSA countries have enacted specific legislation for investment protection and 
promotion for example Investment Promotion Act 2004 (Kenya) and Tanzania Investment Act 
1997 which apply in Kenya and Tanzania respectively. 
142 HS Burman ‘Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective’ 
(1995-1996) Fordham L Rev 2543, 2547  
143 See ED Flaschen and  T B DeSienno, ‘The Development of Insolvency Law as Part of the 
Transition from a Centrally Planned to a Market Economy,’ (1992) 26 Int’l L 667; PH Brietzke, 
‘The Politics of Legal Reform’ (2004) 3 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 1; and HS Burman (n 142) 
2547; and JW Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP, Oxford 2010) 
144 This may depend on prevailing domestic politics of the government that is in power. 
145 CG Paulus (n 18); and R Parry and H Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: 
Perspective and Principles’ (2008) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113, 123 
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be accorded the requisite recognition and co-operation in the resulting 
proceedings. The assumption is that such law will lower the cost of credit and 
stimulate foreign investment, as foreign creditors would be more inclined to 
invest in such a corporation.  
 
The foreign investors, as well as developed countries with which SSA countries 
maintain bilateral and multilateral agreements in trade and investments, may, 
depending on their leverage, influence reform in a manner that is seemingly 
favourable to them.146 Equally important, since the legal systems and legal 
profession and training in SSA countries trace their origin from former colonial 
powers, there is also a strong chance that the direction of reform will be much 
influenced by the law and the trend of legal reform in the former colonial 
powers.147  
 
Having an effective insolvency system is one thing, but achieving its effective 
implementation is quite another. Although such countries may effect legal reform 
of their insolvency systems in a bid to attract investment, they may not possess 
the requisite institutional capacity, experience and resources necessary in dealing 
with intricacies arising from cross-border insolvencies.148 This is particularly so 
if, for instance, a country assumes a universalist home country status or a 
territorialist local country jurisdiction which might require judicial co-operation 
with other territorialist jurisdictions to ensure effective ‘marshalling of the assets’ 
of the insolvent company to the advantage of creditors.  
 
                                                 
146 TC Halliday, and BC Carruthers (n 21) xxi, stating that ‘…convergence could occur if 
creditors or investor groups, which possess considerable international mobility push hard for laws 
that favour their interests.’ 
147 See n 3 above; and D Berkowitz, K Pistor, and J Richard (n 16) 165-195.  Indeed, the 
insolvency legal regime designed for (and operational since 1999 under) OHADA - an 
organization for Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa with member states among Franco-
phone countries- is heavily drawn from and influenced by the French insolvency system. See B 
Wessels, International Insolvency Law (Kluwer, Netherlands 2006) 45; and  B Martor, N 
Pilkington, DS Sellers and S Thouvenot, Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the 
Harmonisation Process (Kogan, London 2002) xxi, xxii, and 7 
148 The presence and actually development of effective domestic institutions is crucial for the 
governance of global markets. See K Pistor ‘Standardization of Law and its Effect on developing 
Economies’ (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 97, 99 noting that ‘absent supranational enforcement 
system, law enforcement [for global markets] is dependant on local institutions.’ 
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On the contrary, the likelihood of refuting such a universalist stance can also not 
be underestimated. It is commonplace that countries may be reluctant to commit 
themselves to a universalist stance but may instead opt to co-operate with foreign 
courts on an ad hoc basis. Apparently, nationalist sentiments manifested in the 
desire to protect local policies149 and creditors are still dominant in some of these 
countries.150 Similar sentiments were apparent during implementation of the 
IMF/World Bank reform policies in some of these countries.151 This may in 
some instances render these countries to favour territorialism or to opt to remain 
with an outdated system, as they may not be keen to reform. Likewise, legal 
reform may ostensibly be undertaken for simply creating a good impression with 
the international lending organisations and investors.152 The resulting insolvency 
system is thus unlikely to be followed by effective implementation and 
enforcement. Additionally, a universalist stance might not be favoured for it may 
be seen as less advantageous to a least developed country where few local 
business enterprises might be holding assets in other countries.153  Thus a 
universalist stance might imply rendering a SSA country the target for a claim of 
extraterritorial insolvency jurisdiction.  As aptly observed by Tung: 
Given the current pattern of investment flows, less developed countries 
(LDCs) are far more likely to be the targets for assertion of 
extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction, rather than their initiators. For 
most multinational corporations, the home country will be an industrial 
country. Therefore, under universalism, LDCs would regularly have to 
defer to industrial country insolvency regimes. In addition to social 
policy concerns, LDCs creditors would be forced to learn about and 
function under various foreign systems. But LDCs creditors may be 
exactly the sorts of creditors most vulnerable to these international 
                                                 
149 Unlike in other jurisdictions, especially developed countries, it may be noted that the argument 
regarding the protection of local policies (upon which insolvency laws were founded) may not 
have a basis and relevance in most Sub-Saharan Africa where the majority of the existing laws 
were mainly imposed by, and consequently inherited from, the countries that colonised them e.g. 
several countries still have laws based on the UK Companies Act 1948.   
150 Interests originating mainly from decolonisation process may a influence choice and crafting 
of a regime that is unfavourable to a unified stance but offers favourable treatment to local 
interests.  
151 TA Kelley, ‘Exporting Western Law to the Developing World: The Troubling Case of Niger’ 
(2007) 7 Global Jurist Frontiers < http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss3/art8 > accessed 
4/5/2009; and PH Brietzke,(n 143)17 
152 According to CG Paulus  (n 18) 760, ‘many countries have adopted quite modern insolvency 
legislation that appears on paper as successful approximations of the propositions in the 
guidebooks. But, upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that the law in action bears little 
resemblance to the written law.’ 
153 L Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective’ (1995-1996) 64 Fordham L 
Rev 2507, 2510 
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complications. In general, they will be less sophisticated than their 
industrial country counterparts. They are less likely to be able to adjust 
appropriately- even on average- to the risks of various foreign 
insolvency regimes.154 
 
The implication of deferring to advanced nations’ regimes as home countries of 
the insolvent multinational corporations is that the least developed countries will 
failingly develop and build the requisite internal capacity and experience. 
 
The experience that SSA countries might have, if any, in cross-border insolvency 
and the extent to which they might have been involved in and affected by the 
massive and high profile cross-border insolvency cases that troubled the 
advanced nations in the recent past are also likely to influence the approach to be 
taken to cross-border insolvency regulation.  However, the majority of these 
countries lack such experience, as they have not been directly involved in and 
affected by such cases. 
 
The varied interests and the potential for global pressure for convergence of 
insolvency law may render complexities in determining an appropriate approach 
that will address the needs of SSA while keeping pace with global trends and 
international best practices. An approach that may be appropriate and work well 
within a regional grouping framework in Sub-Saharan Africa, may not 
necessarily work the same in dealing with other key partners in international 
commerce that fall outside the regional arrangement.155  Consideration of the key 
investment and trading partners156 within and outside regional groupings as well 
as Sub-Saharan Africa might thus be inescapable in the endeavour of developing 
an appropriate framework for regulation of cross-border insolvencies, which 
takes into account the existing global cross-border insolvency frameworks.  
 
                                                 
154 F Tung (n 12) 576-577.  See also ES Adams and JK Finkle, ‘Coordinating Cross-Border 
Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism’ (2008-2009) 15 Colum J Eur L 43, 54 
citing F Tung (n 12) in approval. 
155 It is worth noting that at least each and every country in SSA is a member of at least two 
regional groupings. 
156 This may appropriately involve consideration of the investment and trading partners’ legal 
frameworks for cross-border insolvencies. 
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Indeed, an approach that is pragmatic and balances the varied interests might be 
advantageous in many respects, as opposed to ‘dogmatic insistence on the means 
by which a result is to be achieved’.157 The question remains how best such a 
balanced approach could be devised, if it is at all needed.  
 
2.7 Some Thoughts and Issues Relating to Reform Strategies  
Some thoughts and issues have evolved over the years and amidst the debate and 
promulgation of global initiatives with regard to reform strategies of insolvency 
law systems. The thoughts and issues that have been raised attempt to explain 
what reform of the insolvency law system should consider and how it should be 
undertaken.  
 
Firstly, it is increasingly becoming accepted among theorists and academics that 
there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to insolvency law.158 This view is premised 
on the assumption that each country has its diverse values and norms, which have 
to be taken into account in the reform process, as they would require different 
policy choices for its insolvency system that should not necessarily correspond 
‘lock stock and barrel’ with other countries’ insolvency systems or global 
insolvency norms.159 Such differences are reflected in divergences in priorities 
and understandings of the goals of insolvency proceedings, such as the protection 
of creditors, workers, and companies. This thought seemingly warns against the 
dangers of legal transplantation and it indeed runs counter to the idea of ‘best 
practices’.160 However, this view seems to over emphasise the peculiarity of the 
national values and norms that account for the claimed diversity. The implication 
                                                 
157 IF Fletcher (n 48) 124  
158 See R Parry and H Zhang (n 145) 125; CG Paulus (n 18) 765; N Martin (n 14) 5; JJ Chung (n 
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is that the over emphasis on the peculiarity of the national values, if taken 
without caution, may unnecessarily complicate the approach to insolvency law 
reform. The complication is that it may not be that easy, in contemporary 
pluralistic societies, to determine those propositions of values that are not only 
representative of a national wide consensus but also relevant to cross-border 
insolvencies.161 Despite this intricacy, it is necessary to accept the challenge for 
the purpose of a coherent insolvency policy.  
  
The second theoretical view related to reform of insolvency systems is 
incrementalism.162 In relation to insolvency law reform, and in particular the 
global convergence, this view advocates for modest and gradual reform 
mechanisms in relation to global insolvency law, allowing for substantial 
deviation, whilst also reducing the risk of outright rejection. 163 This approach 
claims to accommodate even the sceptical individuals or states that may not be 
happy with or ready to carry out a wholesale reform and adaptation as it accords 
room for gradual and piecemeal reform. This approach is significant in cross-
border insolvency by virtue of the absence of theoretical and political consensus 
of how best to design international insolvency regimes. The benefits of 
incrementalism in international law making have been summarised thus: 
 
Rather than confront states immediately with a legal regime that couples 
challenging goals with strong sanctions for failure to meet them, states can be 
gradually led towards stronger legal rules. This can be accomplished by 
starting with relatively weak international rules backed by little or sanctions 
that all states feel comfortable joining, but then gradually pushing states to 
accept successfully stronger and more challenging requirements.164 
 
An incrementalist approach to the development of global law is more relevant 
where law reformers possess limited authority and the subject is either 
                                                 
161 PH Brietze (n 143) 24 and 25; and G Johnson, ‘Towards International Standards on 
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controversial or technical.165 It has been argued that it is this approach that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency adopted, thus making it 
possible to overcome the theoretical gap between universalism and territorialism 
whilst also implicitly advancing universalism. According to Block-Lieb and 
Halliday, incrementalism, in its dynamic form, operates vertically, horizontally 
and in a pyramidal form, which creates potential for broad, and in depth 
application involving international organisations and building from prior 
efforts.166 Notwithstanding its advantages that include minimising chances for 
confrontation and resistance, the approach is biased towards a universalist stance 
and more importantly, it operates in a manner that conceals the ultimate intent of 
the reform process.  
 
The third thought is based on the assumption that an effective and efficient 
insolvency law which guarantees certainty, predictability, transparency and 
efficiency should stimulate efficient market exchange processes and thus 
strengthen national and global economies.167 It thus advocates for strategic 
reform of insolvency laws so as to conform to the global market and in particular 
to attract investments and support the operations of the credit system. The 
argument is that such law enables investors and creditors to effectively plan their 
commercial transactions while assured that, in the event of insolvency, the 
proceedings will be conducted fairly and efficiently.                                                                            
 
Apparently, this view assumes a correlation between the growth of a country’s 
foreign investment and national economy on one hand and the presence of an 
effective functional insolvency law, though no global comprehensive empirical 
study has been undertaken in this regard.168 The inherent difficulty of measuring 
such a correlation and obtaining reliable evidence thereof has long been 
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acknowledged though it is a widely held belief that such a relationship does 
pertain.169 This view is seen as particularly relevant for economies in transition, 
as well as developing countries, where it can play a critical role in addressing 
economic problems in these countries.170 However, it has been argued that it is 
unrealistic to expect such countries to adopt a new insolvency law system for the 
sake of the supposed economic advantage; as such a move would require a long 
term approach involving the sharing of skills and expertise.171 As noted earlier, 
having an effective insolvency law is one thing, but its effective implementation 
is quite another thing for the latter is highly dependent on the existence of a 
strong institutional infrastructure, something that cannot be developed within a 
time frame necessary to respond to immediate and pressing needs.172 
 
Arguably, none of the approaches discussed is sufficient in itself to provide an 
effective reform strategy for SSA which faces by a number of problems. To be 
sure, it may be imperative for these approaches to operate collectively and in a 
holistic manner for want of an efficient output. This is probably the reason why 
each of them when viewed critically seems to be just an aspect of the other, such 
that employment of one strategy would necessarily lead to consideration and 
application of the other. However, the collective and holistic utilisation of all the 
strategies is highly demanding in terms of human and financial resources which 
might be lacking in SSA. Indeed, the drive for international convergence 
undertaken by the global and regional institutions seems at least in theory to have 
adopted these strategies, though the resulting benchmarks arguably do not reflect 
the least developed economies’ perspectives.173  
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2.8 Conclusion 
It is apparent that every theoretical approach that is being advocated is not free 
from one disadvantage or another. While one approach might be seen as 
advantageous from the perspective of globalisation and from the standpoint of 
multinational corporations, it might not equally be seen as a favourable option to 
a particular country in view of its domestic policies, level of development and 
extent of integration to the global economy. While an approach might be 
theoretically sound, in practical terms it might be unattainable in the near future. 
The above circumstances seem to justify the emergence of a pragmatic approach, 
and hence development of the alternative approaches which some scholars have 
described as transitional strategies to universalism.  Nevertheless, the debate 
serves to expose the benefits and ills of each approach, which then need to be 
considered in developing a framework for legislation in light of the existing 
global initiatives and the local contexts. In all, the theoretical models and the 
resulting debate provide an important benchmark which any reform measure 
ought to take into account while prioritising the specific needs and values of the 
SSA countries.  
 
It is however worthwhile to note that the endeavour of exploring the theories for 
cross-border insolvency has proceeded under the assumption that there is a 
greater challenge for increasing cases of cross-border insolvency arising from the 
growing scale of international business. The apparent question is whether this is 
realistic and equally the same in all countries and in particular SSA countries, 
bearing in mind that the endeavours to develop coherent theoretical models and 
the resulting debate over the same have evolved from developed economies 
which are characterised by multinational corporations, advanced technology and 
sophisticated financial and credit systems. Certainly, another challenge is on the 
methodology to be adopted to unveil what would constitute relevant specific 
needs and values for these developing countries. The next chapter looks at the 
global convergence of insolvency law in relation to the quest for a cross-border 
insolvency framework for SSA. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF INSOLVENCY LAW AND THE 
QUEST FOR A SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The globalisation drive has not only led to an intense debate over the competing 
cross-border insolvency theories addressed from the perspective of developed 
countries but also to macroeconomic instabilities. These instabilities have 
facilitated the development of international insolvency standards under the 
auspices of the multilateral institutions within the context of the international 
financial architecture and global convergence of laws. However, the international 
insolvency standards that have emerged as benchmarks for standardising 
development of effective domestic insolvency systems are based on the ‘best 
practices’ prevailing in advanced economies which may not necessarily be 
directly relevant and appropriate for Sub-Saharan African (“SSA”) countries. 
There is thus a potential risk for the efforts by these countries to comply with the 
standards as they approach the crafting of a workable and appropriate cross-
border insolvency framework to result in unsuitable legislative reform. Although 
the international benchmarks seem in some ways to inherently recognise the 
differences between legal regimes and allow room for innovation to reflect local 
circumstances, they potentially suggest a ‘one size fits all approach’ to the 
vulnerable countries of SSA which are taking initiatives to impress the 
international community as a strategy to attract foreign direct investment, aid and 
technical assistance as they can hardly withstand the pressures and incentive for 
reform from international institutions.  
 
This chapter provides an insight into the dilemmas and challenges for cross-
border insolvency reform posed by such developments for SSA- a major group of 
developing countries with a large number of countries adjudged by the United 
Nations as “least developed” countries.1 It provides a perspective on the 
                                                 
1 Text to n 21   in chapter 1 
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ramifications of the international insolvency standards for SSA that arises from 
the multilateral institutions involvement in facilitating the observance of the 
standards and the nature of the standards themselves. Salient features of the 
standards, and emerging aspects and issues within the assessments for 
compliance with the standards will be identified and considered with particular 
reference to the SSA context. This chapter begins by giving an overview of the 
globalisation of trade and capital and its implication for convergence of 
insolvencies before outlining the development of international insolvency 
standards within the context of the international financial architecture. Attention 
then turns briefly to the salient features that underpin adoption and observance of 
the standards in general and this discussion will be used as a basis for a 
discussion of the relevancy of the standards to SSA and appraisal of the 
multilateral institutions’ assessments of observance of the standards, before a 
view from SSA is given as to the potential implications of the current crisis for 
any potential reform process. 
 
3.2 Globalisation and the Pressure for Convergence of Insolvency Law 
Systems 
 
Globalisation of trade and capital is having a direct impact of opening up and 
linking together national market economies across the globe.2 Enterprises are 
increasingly taking a more global outlook, pursuing strategies which link and 
coordinate the production and distribution of goods and service on an 
international basis;3 and setting up business and undertaking economic expansion 
                                                 
2 This is noticeable in the emergence of new patterns of commercial links involving emerging 
economies and SSA and steady growth of volume of global trade and capital flow. See World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), International Trade Statistics 2006 (WTO Publications, Geneva 
2006);  R Jenkins and C Edwards, ‘The Economic Impacts of China and India on Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Trends and Prospects’ (2006) 17 J Asian Econ 207–225 
3 Multinational enterprises from developed countries are still dominant, though there is a rapid 
increase of such enterprises from emerging economies as well. In SSA, such trend is said to be 
more characterised by the growth and expansion of South Africa industry, though there is 
evidence of significant outward investment from other countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and 
Mauritius. See L Thomas, J Leape, N Bhinda, and M Martin, ‘Intra-Regional Private Flows in 
Eastern and Southern Africa: Findings from Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe’ (Research Paper at the LSE Centre for Research into Economics and 
Finance in Southern Africa & Development Finance International 2003) <  
http://www.development-finance.org/en/services/research-a-analysis/publications-and-technical-
briefings/private-capital-publications/synthesis-analysis/173-intra-regional-private-capital-flows-
55 
 
in more than one jurisdiction.4 These developments have led to growth in 
transnational activities undertaken by ordinary enterprises having international 
connections in multiple jurisdictions.5 This is increasingly leading to 
interconnectedness and interdependence of national economies which 
consequently demands for harmonisations of domestic systems to facilitate and 
sustain trade and investments growth and in particular the operations of 
multinational enterprises.  
 
To this extent, the emerging global economic order has made it imperative for 
international regulation of the global markets to ease international commerce by 
ensuring stability, certainty, and predictability. This is sought to be achieved by 
forging a harmonised framework for crisis resolution which is expected to reduce 
transaction costs.6 Such endeavour is partly reflected in the growing number of 
arrangements for facilitation of trade and capital that have been concluded across 
the globe and the emerging trend towards renegotiation and negotiation of such 
and similar arrangements.7  It is within this context that attention has greatly been 
given to cross-border insolvency treatment, standardisation initiatives and 
indeed, the debate on the competing theoretical approaches for dealing with 
cross-border insolvencies.8 
 
                                                                                                                                    
in-eastern-and-southern-africa.html  > accessed 06/07/2011; and I Mevorach, Insolvency Within 
Multinational Enterprise Groups (OUP, Oxford 2009) 
4 R Mason, ‘Implications of the UNCITRAL Model Law for Australian Cross-border 
Insolvencies’ (1999) Int’l Insolv Rev 83, 84; PJ Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate, 
England 2006)15; and SO Riain, ‘States and Markets in an Era of Globalization’ (2000) 26 Annu 
Rev Sociol 187, 189 
5 World Bank, World Development Indicator, 2009 (Washington 2009). The World Indicator 
notes that this also involves establishment of footholds in new markets and shifting production 
sites to other jurisdictions to take advantage of lower cost or gaining access to supplies of natural 
resources. 
6 World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone 
(World Bank, Washington 2004) 181  
7 These are in the nature of international investment treaties and bilateral investment treaties. See, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), World Investment Report 
2008: Transnational Corporations and Infrastructure Challenge (United Nations, New York 
2008). Chapter 4 of this thesis is devoted to these facilitation arrangements as they implicate 
cross-border insolvency regulation in SSA. 
8 The theoretical aspects of cross-border insolvencies are thoroughly discussed in chapter two of 
this thesis. 
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All these developments reflect pressures for global convergence of corporate 
insolvency laws involving multilateral institutions and other international 
organisations. This is in part a reflection of insolvency as a feature of any well-
developed market based economy.9  The pressure for convergence has indeed in 
the last few decades given way to the rise of global insolvency norms based on 
practices predominantly found in advanced economies and has focussed attention 
upon the global dimensions of insolvency law reform. It is noteworthy that more 
pressure has been greatly felt in developing countries than the developed ones 
given the involvement of multilateral institutions which have hitherto been 
responsible for the liberalisation policies that were being implemented as a 
precondition for eligibility for loans.10 This pressure is mostly because of the 
vulnerability of the developing countries and lack of capacity to withstand such 
forces.11  
 
As far as developing countries are concerned the pressure for convergence of 
insolvency law by using models of best practices from advanced economies 
started to be experienced long before the promulgation of the global insolvency 
norms. Indeed, modernisation of the insolvency systems, by the use of foreign 
models,  was at times a condition for qualifying for international lending from 
such international institutions and advanced countries.12 The use of foreign 
models was open to criticisms centred on the suitability of the legal 
transplantations given that their effectiveness is dependant on among other things 
‘the recipient country’s legal culture and tradition and the degree of similarity of 
such factors to those of the importer.’13 In some quarters, the approach of the 
                                                 
9 S Hagan, ‘Insolvency Reform and Economic Policy’ (2001-2002) 17 Conn J Int’l L 63  
10 S Hagan (n 9) 63 
11 R Tomasic, ‘Insolvency Law Reform in Asia and Emerging Global Insolvency Norms’ (2009) 
Insolv LJ 15 
12 G Ajani, ‘By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe’ (1995) Am 
J Comp L 93, 113; and F Dahan and J Dine, ‘Transplantation for Transition on Concept around 
Russian Reform of the Law on Reorganisation’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 284; and H Xanthaki, 
‘Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing the Trap’(2008) 57 ICLQ 659 
13 F Dahan and J Dine (n 12) 284, 289; G Ajani (n 12); H Xanthaki (n 12) 659; JR Hay and 
others, ‘Privatization in Transition Economies: Toward a Theory of Legal Reform’ (1996) 40 Eur 
Econ Rev 559, 565; and TW Waelde and JL Gunderson, ‘Legislative Reform in Transition 
Economies: Western Transplants- A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status?’ (1994) 43 
Int’l & Comp LQ 347, 360 
57 
 
international institutions has been criticised for equating modernisation of 
insolvency law with westernisation of developing countries’ laws;14 which 
practice was predominant in colonial days and reflects the prevailing inequalities 
in power structure among nations.15 While the pressure for convergence of 
insolvency law was particularly and directly felt in developing economies of 
Eastern Asia, Latin America and the transition economies in Eastern Europe, it 
was a different story in SSA where the pressure, during that time, was broadly 
felt on implementation of the ‘one-size-fits all’ structural adjustment policies and 
other development protocols promoted and imposed by the multilateral 
institutions (i.e the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) which 
were also characterised by the importation or imposition of Western legal rules 
and institutions.16    
  
3.3 Global Insolvency Norms and the Benchmarking of Insolvency 
Reform Process 
 
Consistent with the above discussion, the globalisation of trade and capital and 
the implications it has had in insolvency law, influenced and inspired multilateral 
institutions, driven by the collective will of G7 to create global insolvency norms 
to benchmark development of effective insolvency law systems across the 
globe.17 Special regard is given to developing countries, as they are considered to 
                                                 
14 S Steele, ‘The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia: Towards a Modern Corporate 
Bankruptcy Regime’ [1999] MULR 5 < 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MULR/1999/5.html > accessed 11 August 2009; CRP 
Pouncy, ‘Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal Institutions as a Component of 
Neo-Colonial Project’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 85; TA Kelley, ‘Exporting Western Law to 
the Developing World: The Troubling Case of Niger’ (2007) 7 Global Jurist  (Frontiers) Article 8 
< http://wwwbepress.com/gj/vol7/issu3/art8 > accessed 01/06/2010; T Halliday ‘Crossing 
Oceans, Spanning Continents: Exporting Edelman to Global Lawmaking and Market-Building’ 
(2004) 38 L & Soc’y Rev 213, 217; and SE Merry, ‘From Law and Colonialism to Law and 
Globalization’ (2003) 28 Law and Social Inquiry 569, 570 
15 SE Merry (n 14) 570 
16 J Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Penguin Books, London 200); and CRP Pouncy (n 
14) 86 
17 World Bank and UNCITRAL, ‘The Unified Creditor Rights and Insolvency Standard Based on 
World Bank Principles for Effective Creditors Rights and Insolvency Systems and UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ <http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/FINAL-ICRStandard-
March2009.pdf> accessed 22 July 2009. The Unified Global Insolvency Standard is based on and 
integrates the World Bank Principles for Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems and 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. Thus, the unified standard essentially 
incorporates the benchmarks of all the previous efforts. It is noteworthy that the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide itself has had advantages of taking into account all the previous efforts 
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be responsible for the global crises due to their weak crisis resolution systems 
which are perceived as a major threat to stability of the entire global financial 
systems.18 This inspiration is partly seen as a reflection of the need to address the 
shortcomings arising from the implementation of the ‘Washington Consensus’19 
policies that contributed to the occurrence of the East Asian financial crisis.20  
 
The global norms have hitherto been classified as international insolvency 
standards, following earmarking of insolvency and creditor rights as among the 
key elements of international financial architecture which merit international 
regulation both for sound functioning of domestic real and financial markets and 
for reduction of the risks and costs of systemic instability.21 Unlike other 
international standards, the standardisation initiative for insolvency laws is seen 
to be more directly linked to financial stability. This link is because of the role 
that effective insolvency law is deemed to play in containing the effect of 
                                                                                                                                    
including the IMF and World Bank’s initiatives documented in IMF, ‘Orderly and Effective 
Insolvency Procedures –Key Issues (IMF, Washington 1999); and World Bank, Principles and 
Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (World Bank, Washington 
2005). Insolvency is among the key areas identified as crucial for standardization initiative. 
Others include corporate governance, monetary and financial policy transparency, accounting, 
auditing, and banking supervision. See J Stiglitz (n 16) 15, 233 and 234, on some reflections on 
the backdrop of the international financial architecture initiative within which the international 
insolvency standards are situated. 
18N Onder, ‘Global Financial Governance: ‘Soft’ Law and Neoliberal Domination’ (Paper for  the 
Canadian Political Science Association Congress, June 2-4 2005 London)  <  http://www.cpsa-
acsp.ac/papers-2005/Onder.pdf  > accessed 25/11/2009 [ 2]; R Tomasic (n 11) and J Stiglitz (n 
16); UNCTAD, Trade and Development  Report, 2001 (United Nations, New York 2001) 89; 
IMF and World Bank, ‘Assessing the Implementation of Standards: A Review of Experience and 
Next Step’ (Report Prepared by Staff of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 11 
January  2001) <http://imf.org/external/np/pdr/sac/2001/eng/review.pdf > accessed 22/08/2009; 
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2008 (UN, New York 2009) . The view that 
developing countries are the ones responsible for occurrence of crises  has since been 
contradicted by the current global financial crisis which originated in the US in 2008 before 
initially spreading to other advanced economies such as the UK.  
19 R Tomasic (n 11) and J Stiglitz (n 16) 16, 80-88.  The Washington Consensus was a consensus 
between the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury regarding the right policies for 
developing countries. The policies arising from this consensus signified a radically different 
approach to economic development and stabilisation. 
 
20 J Stiglitz (n 16) 80-88 and 233 
21 The standards and codes are designed mainly by the Group of 7 (G7) and other industrialised 
countries. See B Schneider, ‘Do Global Standards and Codes Prevent Financial Crises? Some 
Proposals on Modifying the Standards-Based Approach’ (UNCTAD Discussion Paper, No. 177, 
2005) < http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20051_en.pdf> accessed 17/07/2009 [1]; J Stiglitz 
(n 16 ) 15, 233 & 234  
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insolvency problems and preventing contagion effects that result from 
insolvencies of large corporations with extensive international networks.  
 
The initiative builds incrementally upon the previous efforts that led to 
promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency in 
1997.22 The principal trigger for action for standardisation of the international 
insolvency norms within the context of the global financial architecture was the 
1997-1998 East Asian Financial Crisis,23 and the desire to prevent similar 
consequences in future.24  
 
The idea of standardisation of global insolvency norms hinges on the following 
assumption: that despite the wide divergence of national insolvency law systems, 
there are common and uniform aspects of ‘best practices’ that are shared by 
different insolvency systems which could be utilised as standards to benchmark 
development of effective insolvency regimes across the globe.25 Accordingly, 
observance of such standards would have a global effect of harmonising 
substantive aspects of different insolvency law systems which will ensure 
consistency in application, interpretation and enforcement, worldwide.26 In 
                                                 
22 S Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, ‘Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook 
J Int’l L 851; and S Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, ‘Harmonization and Modernization in 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2006-2007) 42 Tex Int’l LJ 475; and HV 
Morais, ‘The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs Sovereignty’ (2001-2002) 
50 U Kan L Rev 779, 802 & 803 
23 It is worth noting that the crisis had its subsequent problems in Latin America and Russia. 
24 J Stiglitz (n 16) 233, 234; R Tomasic (n 11) 15; CG Paulus, ‘Global Insolvency Law and the 
Role of Multinational Institutions’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 755, 756; B Schneider (n 21 )1 
& 2 
25 KW Abbott and D Snidal, ‘International “Standards” and International Governance’ (2001) 8 J 
Eur Pub Pol’y 345, stating that a standard is a ‘guide for behavior and for judging behavior. It 
assumes to connote some universally or at least generally accepted canons of behavior for states 
in the conduct of for instance business and financial matters’; A Davydenko and JR Franks, ‘Do 
Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, Germany, and the UK’ (2008) 63 
Journal of Finance 565; and PR Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, (2nd edn Maxwell, 
London 2007) 
26 TC Halliday, ‘Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The Building Blocks of Insolvency 
Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L1081, 
1091 
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theory, this will potentially lower the transactional costs and hence attract more 
foreign investments and commercial dealings.27  
 
The benchmarks are also meant to help national authorities of developing 
economies in particular in their efforts to strengthen domestic economic and 
financial sector policy frameworks. The strengthening of such frameworks is 
deemed to have potentials to make such economies safer for the global financial 
system as a whole.28  
 
3.3.1 The ‘Soft Law’ Approach of the Standardisation Initiatives and the 
Strategies for Ensuring Observance 
 
The global insolvency norms from which the insolvency standards emanate 
reflect the efforts of multilateral institutions particularly, UNCITRAL, the World 
Bank, and IMF. The norms have now been unified in a single global insolvency 
standard represented by the integration of UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law with the World Bank’s Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems.29  
 
The international insolvency standards take on board all the global insolvency 
norms propounded by multilateral institutions. They have now however been 
compiled in a unified document in order to facilitate observance and avoidance 
of any confusion that might have arisen by having different documents from 
different multilateral institutions. Basically, the standards provide 
recommendations, guidelines and reference to respective national policy and 
lawmakers, in the form of the so-called ‘soft law approach’30 rather than through 
legally binding treaties.31  
                                                 
27 K Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’ (2002) 50 Am 
J Comp L 97, 107; and R Cranston, ‘Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law’ (2007) 42 Texas 
Int’l LJ 597, 608 
28 IMF and World Bank (n 18 ); IMF and World Bank,  ‘The Standards and Codes Initiative-Is It 
Effective? How Can It Be Improved’(Report by the Staff of the IMF & and World Bank 1 July 
2005) < http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ROSC%20review%202005.pdf > accessed 01/08/2009 
[24][27] and [41] 
29 See n 17 above 
30 C Giannini, ‘Promoting Financial Stability in Emerging Market Countries: The Soft Law 
Approach’ (2002) 44 Comp Econ Studies 125, 126. As explained by Giannini, Soft law approach 
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Although the non-binding and the general nature of the standards seem to have 
the potential to militate the extent of harmonisation and observance, it is clear 
that the leverage of the multilateral institutions that monitors observances and the 
intricacies of globalised economy strongly influence developing countries to 
adopt the insolvency standards.32 As it was noted earlier, this is reinforced by the 
vulnerability of the developing countries, especially those of SSA, to pressure 
from the multilateral institutions, international institutions and advanced 
economies.  
 
The pressure arises from the fact that such countries rely heavily on financial 
aids and technical assistances from such institutions, and the advanced 
economies. Indeed, SSA countries have hitherto been slavishly implementing the 
structural adjustment policies imposed and overseen by the multilateral 
institutions. Consequently, as far as the poor developing countries such as those 
of SSA are concerned, the soft law approach of the standards may potentially 
translate into an indirect form of binding requirement.33 
 
In view of the above, there is a danger of developing countries in SSA making 
improper domestic policy choices that do not reflect the local contexts. These 
countries may not have the confidence to resist pressures for convergence and 
compliance with the global norms and even to challenge recommendations for 
reform provided to them by the multilateral institutions; let alone taking a 
                                                                                                                                    
constitutes ‘standards of good practice and codes of conduct endorsed at international level but 
lacking legal standing, so that their implementation in the various countries is essentially left to 
the discretion of national authorities.’  
31UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 
<www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf > accessed 02/06/2009, 2 
para 1. The Legislative Guide for instance, in an explicit and categorical manner, provides that it 
is ‘intended to be used as a reference by national authorities and legislative bodies when 
preparing new laws and regulations or reviewing the adequacy of existing laws and regulations’; 
and K Pistor (n 27) 
32 TC Halliday (n 26) 1081, 1086-1087; K Pistor (n 27) 102; and N Onder (n 18)1&2.  Onder 
describes the philosophy behind the non-binding approach to the standardisation initiatives thus 
‘…national governments are not willing to cede authority to a world…..authority anytime soon, 
and as national….systems continue to be diverse, the soft law approach offers an attractive 
alternative to formal, legally enforceable treaties at international level.’ 
33 N Onder (n 18) 2 
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different course that is ‘fit for purposes’ and commensurate with their 
circumstances.34  
 
Apart from the leverage of the multilateral institutions, the pressure for 
observance of the standards is bolstered by market induced discipline and official 
incentives. 35 Whereas the former (i.e market induced discipline) is characterised 
by investors’ utilisation of information on a country’s adoption and observance 
of relevant international standards in making investment and lending decisions; 
the latter (i.e official incentive) involves the use of peer pressure, name and 
shame, surveillance and financial incentives by the multilateral institutions.36  
 
In recent years, multilateral institutions have underlined the importance of 
market discipline in their strategy to facilitate adoption and observance of 
standards. This has involved efforts geared at raising market participants’ 
awareness of standards, dissemination of assessments’ results, encouraging use 
of the information on countries’ observance with the standards for commercial 
decisions and undertaking of assessment of observance and compliance with the 
standards.  
 
The assumption of the above undertaking is that the incentive would inspire 
developing countries including those of SSA countries to undertake voluntary 
assessments in a bid to enhance observance with the standards in anticipation of 
creating good economic and institutional environments; and help build investors’ 
confidence and improve access to private capital. It is thus not surprising that the 
number of SSA countries that have undertaken the assessment in relation to 
insolvency has increased over the years to include Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, South Africa, Burkina Faso, while other 
                                                 
34 TC Halliday and BG Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and national 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes’ (2007) 112 American Journal 
of Sociology 1136, 1150  
35 N Onder (n 18) 3; and C Giannini (n 30)149 
36 N Onder (n 18) 3; and C Giannini (n 30 )149 
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assessments for Tanzania, Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa, Kenya (an update) are 
reported either to be underway or to have just been concluded.37  
 
Thus, according to the World Bank, ‘[a]n important component of these 
assessments is the measurement of countr[ies’] laws and systems against 
principles that reflect best practices, so as to maximize a given country’s ability 
to meaningfully participate as a trusted partner in international trade and 
commerce, and to assure that a country’s laws protect both its citizenry and the 
capital invested in that country.’38 The issue is whether or not this contention is 
reflected in the actual assessment. 
 
It is noteworthy that the report on observance of standards and codes (“ROSC”) 
and other surveillance instruments, such as the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme (“FSAP”) of the multilateral institutions characterise the peer 
pressure and name and shame approach.39 Such characterisation is in regard to 
their potential effect in promoting compliance with the standards. Although the 
information contained in such assessments is increasingly being used for 
commercial decision making, the extent of the impact it might have had is still 
yet to be established.40 It seems that the increasing use of information from such 
assessments for commercial undertakings contribute towards encouraging 
countries to adopt and implement the standards and undertake assessments 
conducted by the multilateral institutions.  
 
                                                 
37 See World Bank, ‘UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law on the Treatment of 
Enterprise Groups: Updating the World Bank Principles’ The World Bank  Insolvency and 
Creditor/Debtor Regimes  Task Force Meetings, Washington 10/01/2011 <  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTGILD/0,,con
tentMDK:22823517~menuPK:7711943~pagePK:4789622~piPK:64873779~theSitePK:5807555,
00.html   > accessed 29/06/2011 
38 Ibid 
39 Giannini (n 30) 149. Giannini attributes this to the fact that they are based on an analysis of 
conditions of individual country and their publication is voluntary. 
40 IMF and World Bank (n 28)19 and 24 
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In view of the above, the Doing Business Report41 published by the World Bank 
has for about a decade been consistently including the status of domestic 
insolvency law and practice as one of indicator sets to rank jurisdictions’ 
regulatory environments for business.42 The report provides benchmarks on the 
speed of resolving insolvency, the cost of procedures and the average recovery 
rate. The recent trend of the rankings in the reports, as shown in the table below, 
suggests that SSA is one of the regions with the weakest insolvency systems by 
the standards of time frames spent in finalising proceedings, costs incurred in the 
proceedings and the proceedings’ recovery rate. 
 
The Efficiency of Insolvency Regimes by Region 
Region     Time (Years) Cost (% of estate) Recovery rate (cents on 
the dollar) 
East Asia & Pacific  2.7  23.2  28.4  
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  3.1  13.4  28.3  
Latin America & Caribbean  3.3  15.9  26.8  
Middle East & North Africa  3.5  14.1  29.9  
OECD  1.7  8.4  68.6  
South Asia  5  6.5  19.9  
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4  20.2  16.9  
Source: Doing Business Report 2009  
  
There is therefore potential for rating agencies assigning countries’ ratings on the 
basis of the level of compliance with the standards, based on information 
presented in the ROSCs and other surveillance instruments while the intentions 
of the assessment by the multilateral institutions is arguably not ranking 
participating countries on the basis of ‘fail’ or ‘pass.’43 Nevertheless, countries, 
                                                 
41 < http://www.doingbusiness.org/  >accessed 2/10/2009. Launched more than 8 years ago, the 
report is published by the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank 
Group. It purports to provide an objective basis for the regulatory environment for business.    
42 According to World Bank, Doing Business Report 2009 (Washington, 2009), Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s average time spent to complete insolvency proceedings, average cost of insolvency 
proceedings, and recovery rate (cents in USD) was 3.4 years, 20.2%, and 16.9, compared to 3.1 
years, 13.4%, and 28.3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia; 2.7 years, 23.2%, and 28.4 for East 
Asia and Pacific; 3.3 years, 15.9%, 26.8% for Latin America and Caribbean and lastly 1.7 years, 
8.4%, and 68.6 for OECD. Notably, similar trend is reflected in the subsequent Doing Business 
Report for 2010 and 2011. 
43YV Reddy, ‘Legal Aspects of International Financial Standards: National Law Perspectives’, 
(International Seminar on Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Financial Stability sponsored by the 
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as found by multilateral institutions, do not generally see the initiative ‘as having 
yet had a commensurate impact on actual reform implementation,’44 which 
perception may according to the multilateral institutions partly reflect ‘the 
substantial time needed to introduce reforms….[hence absence] of [h]ard 
evidence on the impact of the initiative on countries’ adherence of standards.’45  
 
It is worth noting that while the inherent nature of the standards seems to leave 
space for taking account of special circumstances, especially those of developing 
countries, such as those of SSA,46 the opportunity to reflect such special 
circumstances in the law reform process is, in some respects, expressly curtailed 
by stipulations found in the insolvency norms that create the standards.47 It is 
accordingly not surprising that the emerging rankings do not differentiate states 
and regions based on the levels of development or the welfare of the 
disadvantaged members of the international community.48 All states and regions, 
notwithstanding their different level of development, are subject to the same 
benchmarks of assessment and ranking.  
 
3.3.2 Relevance and Suitability of International Insolvency Standards in 
SSA Context 
 
The prevailing consensus is that the globalisation of the world economy has 
enhanced the involvement of companies in international business, and 
consequently, enhanced the potential challenges of the occurrence of cross-
border insolvencies. This situation has in theory potential pitfalls that may lead to 
                                                                                                                                    
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements and the 
Financial Stability Forum at BIS, Basel, Switzerland 2002) 
< http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/83833/Reddy_Legal_Aspects.pdf >, accessed 
2/10/2009 [4]; and IMF and World Bank, ‘The Standards and Codes Initiative-Is It Effective? 
How Can It Be Improved’ (n 29) 24, 27 and 41 
44 IMF and World Bank (n 28) 5 
45IMF and World Bank (n 28) 5; and R Harmer, ‘Assessing the Assessment,’ (INSOL 
International Academics’ Group Meeting, Radisson Blu Royal Hotel Dublin, 11-13 June 2010) 
46 UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide (n 31 ) 9 and 10 
47 UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide (n 31) 13; Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, para 12. This is also reflected in the imperative nature of most of the recommendations. See 
S Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, ‘Harmonization and Modernization in UNCITRAL’s Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2007) 42 Texas Int’l LJ 475, 506 
48 P Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-state 
Relations’ (1999) 10 Eur J Int’l L 549, 554 
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creditors seeking recovery by attempting to seize assets in any country in which 
they are located or insolvent companies manipulating movement of assets across 
jurisdictions to the detriment of some creditors and stakeholders. The above 
consensus is seemingly based on impressions drawn from instances of 
international businesses collapses in recent years, mostly in developed countries 
and the increased pace of the globalisation drive.  
 
Consistent with such assumptions are the emerging new patterns of increased 
capital flow, participation in the global trade and new commercial links among 
nations and regional groupings.49 While the developing world, most notably 
China, Brazil and India, is becoming a significant participant in international 
commerce, there are growing commercial links between the emerging economies 
and SSA countries.50 Studies undertaken thus far have revealed that while 
participation of countries in international commerce has steadily been increasing, 
the intra-trade among SSA countries, Asia and Latin America has remained 
relatively lower than is the case in other regions within the developed economies 
which depict a high level of integrated market place and capital inflow.51 
Nevertheless, the general understanding reflected in most studies is that although 
the level of intra-trade among African countries is still small, it is rapidly 
growing.52 One of the factors behind this trend is said to be the expansion of 
South African industry into the region, although there is also evidence of 
significant outward investments from other countries such as Mauritius, Kenya, 
and Nigeria.53  
 
                                                 
49 WTO (n 2) ; WTO,  World Trade Developments, 2008 (WTO Publications, Geneva 2008) ; LA 
Bebchuk and AT Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies’ (1999) 42 JL 
& Eon 775, 777; UNCTAD (n 7) 777 
50 Africa’s exports to Asia were estimated to have increased by 20 per cent with shipments to 
China rising by more than one-third. See WTO, World Trade Developments in 2005,  
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_general_overview_e.pdf> accessed 
14/10/2009; R Jenkins and C Edwards (n  )207–225 
 
51WTO, World Trade Developments, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_world_trade_dev_e.pdf> accessed 
14/10/2009; and UNCTAD (n 7 ) 
52 L Thomas, J Leape, N Bhinda, and M Martin (n 3) 
53 Ibid 
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The global trend towards growth of trade and investment is reflected in the 
emerging trend of renegotiation and negotiation of trade and investment treaties 
and other forms of arrangements in an attempt to balance the rights of foreign 
investors and respect for legitimate public concerns. This trend reflects the 
efforts employed in the attempt to ensure predictability, certainty and 
transparency which are critically important in facilitating economic co-operation 
and development.54 The trend also underlies the growing global importance 
attached to, and the role states play in competitively affording, a reliable legal 
environment to attract foreign investment and promote other commercial 
activities.55  It is in this context that the involvement of SSA in trade and 
investment requires cross-border insolvency regulation that addresses the new 
trends and patterns of the cross-border trade and investment.  
 
To be sure as national states in SSA are increasingly becoming interdependent 
and connected to the global market, they face the challenge of reflecting in their 
insolvency regimes, the demands of the global market, which consists of various 
players from different jurisdictions and addressing financial fluctuations that are 
inherent in market economies.56 The cross-border trade and investment 
arrangements involving SSA imply a further challenge to SSA countries.57 The 
challenge, among other things, requires SSA countries to align their insolvency 
regimes with their entire legal environment for facilitation of trade and 
investment, as well as the standards and principles envisaged in such 
arrangements to which SSA countries are contracting or member states.58 This 
                                                 
54 Cranston (n 27) 608; and UNCTAD (n 7) 
55 AT Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1997-1998) 38 Va J Int’l L 640, 652 
56 J Stiglitz (n 16) 120 
57 From the early 1980s the rate of bilateral investment treaties ratification in SSA countries has 
considerably accelerated with European countries, and more recently the US and Asian countries 
(China and India in particular). The average number of the bilateral investment treaties per 
country in Africa is 12. See for instance, V Mosoti, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Possibility 
of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in 
Between?’ (2005-2006) 26 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 95; UNCTAD (n 7) 15 and 34; and  JW Salacuse, 
‘The Treatification of International Investment Law’ (2007) 13 Law & Bus Rev Am 155, 163 
58 JW Salacuse (n 57)155, 158 & 163; and M Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit…and they could Bite’ (2003) World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper, WPS No 3121  
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will perhaps add value in the endeavour of attracting, protecting and promoting 
cross-border trade and investment in accordance with the agreed standards and 
principles during financial difficulties of the entities involved in the cross-border 
trade and investments.59 This may perhaps also entail adopting best practices 
common to most of its trade and investment partners’ insolvency law systems 
and cross-border insolvency in particular. The potential need of embracing 
common practices in dealing with cross-border insolvencies directly links with 
the idea and the rationale behind the standardisation initiative. 
 
Since insolvency laws can significantly influence investment decisions, in terms 
of its effects on investment incentives, which can result in additional insolvency 
costs, a country may have to reconsider maintaining regulatory frameworks that 
contradict legitimate expectations of investors and trading partners in the global 
market.60  Essentially, all the above forces not only tend  to pull insolvency law 
away from its traditional orientation of addressing domestic concerns but also to 
pull countries away from purely territorialist approaches that are perhaps 
envisaged in their insolvency legal frameworks. Consistent with the implication 
arising from such forces, there is a widely held consensus in favour of assistance, 
co-operation and co-ordination of cross-border insolvencies as a means of 
preserving rather than destroying going concern value. 61 
 
The most critical challenge that the SSA region faces is sustaining and 
accelerating the economic growth that it has been attaining since the 1990s which 
is reflected in the growth of export trade and foreign direct investment inflow.62 
                                                                                                                                    
< http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091
104060047/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf > accessed 22/02/2010 
59 O Chung, ‘The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future of 
Investor-State Arbitration’ (2006-2007) 47 Va J Int’l L 953, 960 
60 RK Rasmussen   ‘The Ex Ante Effects of Insolvency Reform on Investment Incentives’ (1994) 
72 Wash U L Q 1159, 1163; and E Berkovitch, R Israel and JF Zender, ‘An optimal Insolvency 
Law and firm Specific  investments (1997) 41 Eur Econ Rev 487, 497 
61 DW Arner, and others,  ‘Property Rights, Collateral, Creditor Rights, and Insolvency in East 
Asia’ (2007) Tex Int’l LJ 515, 543 
62 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa (Washington 2009)1; DN Abdulai, 
‘Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for Growth and Development in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Policy Options and Strategic Alternatives’ (2007) 37(2) Africa Development 1, 6. The inflation 
had dropped from a peak of 121.6% in 1994 to 9.9% in 2002; UNCTAD 2008(n 29) xvii, 38-45 
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Whatever improvement made, it falls short of the level required to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015.63 The region is 
characterised by the least developed economies, which are experiencing a great 
deal of pressing problems such as poor governance, poverty and diseases. In 
comparison with other developing countries, this region has not attracted much in 
terms of commercial dealing and foreign investment. This is perhaps one of the 
reasons why the region has not experienced much activity in terms of cross-
border insolvency reform because such undertaking has not been regarded as a 
priority. The low level of economic growth and development seems to have 
rendered other aspects, such as efforts to reduce poverty and democratisation to 
be perceived as more relevant and pressing than others.64  
 
Accordingly, it can be said that the presence of an effective insolvency law that 
comprehensively addresses cross-border issues is, given the growing level of 
cross-border trade and investment involving and among SSA countries, now 
more relevant than before. In this context, the international insolvency standards 
may offer important benchmarks and starting points for amelioration of 
insolvency systems of SSA. This is notwithstanding concerns raised against the 
standardisation initiatives as a whole.   
 
Firstly, the standards offer an important base for development of modern 
insolvency systems which could be tailored to the needs and circumstances of the 
countries in the region. The development of an effective framework that caters 
for cross-border insolvency as well will play a role in mitigating the 
repercussions of financial crisis by virtue of having procedures that takes account 
of interests of all concerned parties.  It is important in this respect to note that 
most of these countries might have no practical experience of application of 
insolvency laws that reflects what pertains in the benchmarks.  In fact, the 
                                                                                                                                    
(indicating that total number of foreign direct inflow to Africa grew to by 16% to $ 53 Billion in 
2007 increasing the region’s FDI stock to 393 billion with the 47 countries of SSA attracting 58% 
of the inflow, up from 49 in 2006. And further that the growth marks the highest level in the three 
consecutive years of FDI growth in the region, though its share in the global FDI remained at 3%. 
63 Ibid 
64 IMF and World Bank (n 28) 13 
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existence of an appropriate and effective legal framework for business failure 
that specifies the rights and duties of debtors and creditors is one of the factors 
that facilitates crisis resolution and prevention of broader contagion effects which 
can occur when a large firm with an extensive international network of entities 
becomes insolvent.  
 
Secondly, since a country’s observance of insolvency standards is now 
increasingly being factored into lending and investment decisions, be it 
individually or as part of a package, having an efficient insolvency system that 
observes the international best practices and is tailored to the local needs will 
help encourage and attract domestic and foreign investors. This will in turn add 
value to the economies of these countries in general and will contribute to regard 
as trusted member of international community.65 It seems that a country that does 
not comply with the standards is increasingly becoming disadvantaged in 
attracting international capital, because it is likely to suffer lower credit ratings 
and higher risk premiums.66 The observance of the standards could also be seen 
to complement the on-going initiative by a majority of the SSA countries to 
create a conducive environment for private sector development which started 
with the liberalisation drive in the mid 1980s and early 1990s under the auspices 
of the multilateral institutions.67 It will also reinforce the efforts towards 
amelioration of their legal systems inherited from colonial powers and overcome 
any inherent limitation embedded in the legal systems from which their laws 
were based.68 
 
While it is important to preserve the universal nature of the insolvency standards 
in the process of aligning SSA’s insolvency systems to the benchmarks, it is also 
                                                 
65See n 37 above  
66 PD’s Investment, Competition and Business Development Services Team, ‘Approaching 
International Financial Standards and Codes’ 10 December 2003 < 
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/iarc/edais/word-
files/HowtoApproachInternationalFinancialStandardsCodes.doc > accessed 2/10/2009; and N 
Onder (n 18) 2  
67 WP Ofosu-Amaah, Reforming Business- Related Laws to Promote Private Sector 
Development: The World Bank Experience in Africa (World Bank, Washington 2000) 
68 It is to be noted that the foundations of prevailing insolvency law systems in most of SSA are 
based on the European countries which were their former colonial powers. This is a subject of 
extensive discussion in chapter five of this thesis. 
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appropriate to define a number of domestic priorities and frameworks to address 
issues and concerns raised. The practical question is how compliance with the 
insolvency standards can be achieved without jeopardising the local contexts and 
needs. Understandably, local context and needs are critical in insuring relevance 
and practicality of any crafted cross-border insolvency framework.69 In the 
context of cross-border insolvency, the apparent challenge is for SSA to craft 
frameworks that not only sustain the achievements made thus far and address 
interests of cross-border trade and investments but also frameworks that seek to 
contribute towards reducing poverty. It is to be noted that, despite the existence 
of many factors which may be attributed to the limited growth and development 
in SSA, many analysts argue that policy choices that restrict competitiveness are 
among major obstacles while others tend to associate the limited growth to the 
problems of the ‘one-size-fits all’ prescriptions of the multilateral institutions 
which developing countries have pursued since the mid 1980s and early 1990s.70  
 
Insofar as cross-border insolvency reform is concerned, the above observations 
seem to point to the need for SSA countries to make informed policy choices 
commensurate with local circumstances and the nature of the demand for 
economic growth and development. Perhaps one of the best ways is to approach 
the challenge in a broader context of development strategies. And thus, taking 
strategies that look for policies that ‘reduce poverty as they promote growth; that 
                                                 
69 N Martin ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 4; F Tung, ‘Fear of 
Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2000-2001) 33 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 555, 561; and L 
Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency (The 1996 Denning Lecture) < 
www.filewiz.co.uk/bacfi/1996_denning_lecture.pdf > accessed 12/3/2009. Apparently, different 
policy choices that characterise a given insolvency system are a reflection of such country’s 
norms and inclinations. 
70 A Arieff, MA Weiss, and VC Jones, ‘The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Global Policy Responses’, (US Congressional Research Service Report 2009) < 
www.crs.gov > accessed 23/01/2010; J Stiglitz (n16)16, 80-88. The prescriptions were inherent 
in the policy reform measures, prescribed by the multilateral institutions. The measures were part 
of The Washington Consensus (a consensus between the IMF, the World Bank and the US 
Treasury regarding the right policies for developing countries). They signified a radically 
different approach to economic development and stabilization.’ For the existing theories as to the 
negative effect of the Multilateral institutions’ prescriptions on developing countries see for 
instances observations made by J Hari, ‘There's real hope from Haiti and it's not what you expect’ 
The Independent (London 5/02/2010)  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-theres-real-hope-
from-haiti-and-its-not-what-you-expect-1889958.html>     accessed 10/02/2010 
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shun policies that increase poverty with little if any gain in growth, and that in 
assessing situations where there are trade-offs, put a heavy weight on impact on 
the poor.’71  
 
3.4 Appraising the Nature and Compliance’s Assessments of the 
International Insolvency Standards from a SSA Perspective 
 
All criticisms levelled against the development and dissemination of various 
international standards are equally relevant and valid to the international 
insolvency standards and the assessments for the extent of compliance with the 
standards. One such criticism is in relation to the exclusion of developing 
countries from the legislative processes for developing such standards.72 
Whatever the quality of the standards developed is, the manner in which they are 
created and directed to developing countries for compliance creates an 
‘..unfortunate perception of a new form of Western “imperialism” over 
developing…countries.’73  
 
The prevalent features that cut across the global insolvency norms from which 
the  standards emanate include specific and clearly stated policy objectives and 
goals of effective insolvency systems; non-discrimination, under a fair and 
equitable treatment principle; collectivity principle; criteria for commencement 
of insolvency proceedings; cross-border insolvency aspects; efficiency, 
transparency, and predictability principles; liquidation versus reorganisation; 
requirement and regulation of competent and ethical practitioners; and presence 
of a functional and effective judicial system.74 Other important features in so far 
as they relate to cross-border insolvency include, establishment of clear rules for 
ranking of  priority claims based on free market conditions and commercial 
                                                 
71 J Stiglitz (n 16) 82 and 83 
72 HV Morais (n 22 ) 779; and CG Paulus (n 24) 761. Paulus notes that there has been a general 
lack of involvement of these countries in international insolvency law reform initiatives. 
73 HV Morais (n 22)  806 
74 See n 17 above. Indeed, these principles especially efficiency, transparency and predictability 
elements are the bedrock of the theories on insolvency, cross-border insolvency in particular and 
are actually the central focus of the debate on competing theories in cross-border insolvency. 
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bargains, as opposed to political and social concerns;75 balancing the interests of 
the debtors’ stakeholder against the relevant social, political, and other policy 
considerations that have an impact on the economic and legal goals of insolvency 
proceedings;76 and the use of lex fori concursus in determining the applicable law 
in cross-border insolvencies to control ‘all aspects of the commencement, 
conduct, administration and conclusion,’77 of the proceeding. 
 
Essentially, the benchmarks are founded on the conventional wisdom arising 
from the Washington Consensus policies which link the rule of law with 
economic growth, sustainable development and poverty alleviation.78 They are 
based on and influenced by the so-called best practices prevailing mainly in 
developed countries.79 Scholars have argued in this connection that the 
‘pervasive and in-depth’ influence of the US in designing and crafting the 
benchmarks is overwhelming.80 The dominant consensus as reflected in 
Professor Fletcher’s contention is that the international insolvency standards 
embody ‘the necessary ingredients of a robust and efficient system for regulating 
debtor-creditor relationships and for administering and distributing the estates of 
insolvent debtors.’81 They address a whole range of procedural and substantive 
aspects of insolvency law in anticipation of ameliorating the harmonisation of 
and predictability in, the resolution of cross-border insolvency in a manner that 
supports international commerce and development.82  
 
                                                 
75 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (n 31) 10-15 
76 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency (n 31)  9 
77 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency (n 31) 73, recommendation 31 
78 J Stiglitz (n 16 ) 80-88 and 233; TC Halliday and BG Carruthers (n 34)1150; TC Halliday and 
BG Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis (Stanford University 
Press, California 2009) 
79 UNCTAD (n 18) 89;  IMF and World Bank (n 18) 18; TC Halliday and BG Carruthers (n 41) 
1185; TC Halliday and BG Carruthers, ‘Negotiating Globalization: Global Scripts and 
Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes’ (2006) 31 Law and Social 
Inquiry 521, 544-545; and N Onder (n 18); and R Tomasic (n 11) 
80 TC Halliday and BG Carruthers (n 34) 1185; TC Halliday and BG Carruthers (n 79) 544-545.  
See also N Onder (n 18) and R Tomasic (n 11) 9 
81 IF Fletcher, ‘Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global Standards and 
Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2006-2007) Brook J Int’l L 767,774 and 775 
82 R Tomasic (n 11); and IF Fletcher (n 81) 773 and  775. It is common knowledge that 
harmonisation of substantive law is critical to adoption and implementation of a universalist 
approach. 
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While the standards are meant to promote convergence and improve the quality 
of insolvency systems especially those of developing and emerging economies, 
which as earlier discussed, are believed to have weak systems that are potentially 
threatening the stability of the global financial systems,83 they are literally not 
translated to directly reflect or inform the local contexts of these countries.84 
Although they infer that they are not meant to suggest a ‘one-size-fits-all 
approach’ that is exactly what they seem to practically envision for the 
vulnerable SSA countries which, given their relation with the multilateral 
institutions, as that of a donor/lender-and-recipient, are unlikely to challenge any 
prescription suggested by such institutions.85  
 
While the standards seem to allow room for local innovation and adaptation in 
response to local policies and circumstances,86 they contain limitations that tend 
to preclude such freedom particularly in relation to matters which are so central 
to any insolvency system and cross-border insolvency regime. For example, there 
are apparent restrictions as to the extent to which local policy aspects can be used 
in formulation of local priority.87  
                                                 
83 The laws were said to be too weak to address the demands of the globalised market economy, 
withstand macroeconomic instabilities that are inescapable in a free market economy and 
guarantee predictability and transparency. In particular, they lack effective rescue procedures, and 
a predictable procedure for co-operation and co-ordination in cross-border insolvencies. See DW 
Arner and others (n 61 ) 549-550 
84 TC Halliday (n 26) 1101, arguing that ‘the concept of “best practices” is fallacious’; see also 
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85 Ibid. See also D Katona, ‘Challenging the Global Structure Through Self-Determination: An 
African Perspective’ (1999) 14 Am U Int’l L Rev 1459. The rigid implementation conditions that 
attach to the multilateral institutions’ loans make the recommendations given as a result of 
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86  For example, the introduction and executive summary for the World Bank’s ‘Principles and 
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‘Adopting international best practices to the realities of developing countries…..requires an 
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includes weak or unclear social protection mechanisms, weak financial institutions and capital 
markets, ineffective corporate governance and uncompetitive business, and ineffective laws and 
institutions. These obstacles pose enormous challenges to the adoption of systems that address 
the needs of developing countries while keeping pace with global trends and international best 
practices. The application of the principles….at the country level will be by domestic policy 
choices and by the comparative strengths (or weakness) of laws and institutions.’ This however is 
not reflected in its entirety in the assessment undertaken and examined in this study. 
87 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (n 31) 9, According to the Guide insolvency 
laws must balance the interests of the debtors’ stakeholder against the relevant social, political, 
75 
 
 
Arguably, the very foundation and attributes of the standards make any slavish 
adoption of the standards by SSA countries open to the potential risk of 
transplantation effect, rejection and consequently an implementation gap.88 The 
transplantation effect could be by virtue of a lack of ‘fitness for purpose’ of any 
legislation purporting to adopt the standards which may potentially result into the 
implementation gap problem, extensively discussed elsewhere by other scholars. 
89 It is common knowledge that a majority of these countries in their endeavour 
to adopt the standards will have the incentive to transplant foreign legislation, 
most likely from developed countries, such as the UK or US, which are regarded 
as having well developed insolvency systems which have long been tested.90 This 
poses a high risk of failure to take account of the socio-economic conditions in 
which the legal structures are situated in SSA countries, which are quite different 
from those in advanced economies.91 Thus, instead of improving domestic legal 
systems of SSA countries, a standardisation initiative may undermine 
development of effective legal systems in these countries. 92 As aptly elaborated 
by Pistor: 
 
                                                                                                                                    
and other policy considerations that have an impact on the economic and legal goals of 
insolvency proceedings. More specifically for local priority system, the Guide states that ‘[t]o the 
greatest extent possible, those priorities should be based upon commercial bargains and not 
reflect social and political concerns that have the potential to distort the outcome of insolvency.’ 
Article 12 of the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law explicitly states that while 
countries are free to make any changes they see fit, ‘…in order to achieve a satisfactory degree of 
harmonization and certainty, it is recommended that States make as few changes as possible in 
incorporating the Model Law into their legal systems.’  
88 TC Halliday, and BG Carruthers (n 84); TR Tomasic (n 11); D Berkowitz, K Pistor, and J 
Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 Eur Econ Rev 
165-195; and O Kahn Freud, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 M LR 3, 27 
89 Ibid   
90 D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard (n 88) 192. The authors notes that, ‘…. the way in which 
the law was initially transplanted is a more important determinant of legality…….[A] legal 
reform strategy should [therefore] aim at improving legality by carefully choosing legal rules 
whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is appreciated by domestic law makers, 
law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the final consumers of these rules. In short, legal 
reform must ensure that there is a domestic demand for the new law, and that supply can match 
demand.’ 
91 J Stiglitz (n 16); and TC Halliday, and BG  Carruthers (n 84). The above situation could occur 
notwithstanding that the legal systems of the countries under study are based on former colonial 
powers and that such countries have since the mid 1980s and early 1990s embraced market 
economy systems. 
92 K Pistor (n 26) 
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Instead of improving domestic legal systems 
standardization…may…undermine the development of effective legal 
systems. The reason for this can be found in two essential features of 
legal systems. First, the interdependence of legal rules and concepts that 
comprise a legal system and second, the fact that law is a cognitive 
institution. The interdependence of legal rules means that there are only 
a few rules that can be understood and applied without reference to other 
legal rules or concept. This implies that standardization rules can be 
realised and enforced only if other bodies of law already exist in the 
standard receiving legal system otherwise additional law reform efforts 
must be pursued. Without ensuring complementarities between the new 
law and pre-existing legal institutions, harmonization may distort rather 
than improve the domestic legal framework 
 
The notion that law is cognitive institution means that for law to be 
effective and actually change behaviour, it must be fully understood and 
embraced not only by law enforcers but also by those using law…The 
external supply of best practice law…sterilizes the process of 
lawmaking from political and socio-economic development. It therefore 
distances it from the process of continuous adaptation and 
innovation…….. 
 
Moreover, the imposition of rules from the outside - not a new 
experience for most developing countries as the history of colonization 
exemplifies may also lead to domestic resistance – may also lead to 
domestic resistance.93 
 
Accordingly, an effective legal reform strategy might need to include measures 
that would avoid the transplant effect.94 Thus, overcoming this risk would 
necessarily require an endeavour that takes into account knowledge of not only 
the foreign law on basis of which the global norms and standards were derived, 
and its corresponding social and political contexts among others, but also 
knowledge of the local contexts and the scope of the demands of the countries 
that contemplate reform by using the standards.95 The question is whether and to 
what extent the assessments conducted by the multilateral institutions address 
such crucial aspects. 
 
The standards’ assessments undertaken and published reveal some weaknesses 
which have the potential of tarnishing any usefulness that the international 
insolvency standards might have in amelioration of domestic insolvency systems 
of SSA countries. As discussed above, the international insolvency standards are 
now among the bases, against which the multilateral institutions’ surveillance 
                                                 
93 K Pistor (n 26) 98 and 99 
94 D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard (n 88  ) 186 and 192 
95 O Kahn Freud (n 88) 27; and D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard (n 88) 
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programmes assess the extent to which a country complies with the benchmarks 
and advise how reform should be carried.96 It is also on the basis of such 
assessments that technical assistance may be extended to facilitate observance 
and investors may decide on whether or not to invest in a particular developing 
country.  
 
Although the above shortcomings could be addressed by the assessment process 
and the policy recommendations resulting from the process, an examination of a 
handful of published reports on assessment covering insolvency systems in 
Africa both ROSCs and FSAP suggest that they do not characteristically provide 
an insight into and consideration of what is available in such countries in the 
context of their socio-economic circumstances.97 The following are among the 
outstanding weaknesses noted, especially with regard to ROSCs. 
 
Firstly, there is neither adequate treatment of cultural and local contexts, nor a 
thorough consideration of the level of developments of such countries and their 
potential impact on the reform process. This weakness contradicts the claim by 
the multilateral institutions that the assessments do consider the different stages 
of economic development and different cultural and legal traditions across 
different countries.98 It also contradicts the consensus that insolvency laws ‘have 
to be in harmony with relevant local legal, business and cultural frameworks 
[among other local contexts], and as such reflect a diversity of functions, national 
purposes and public policy objectives.’99 For instance, although the Mauritius 
insolvency ROSC maintains that the existing legal framework is weak, out-dated 
                                                 
96 Surveillances are undertaken by IMF as a part of Article IV consultations, or through joint 
missions with the World Bank. See IMF and World Bank (n 28); B Schneider (n 21); IMF and 
World Bank (n 18) 
 
97 World Bank, Report on Observance of Standard & Codes(ROSC):Mauritius 2004 (Prepared by 
a Staff Team of the World Bank from information provided by the Mauritian authorities) < 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/Mauritius-ICR%20ROSC.pdf > accessed 2/10/2009; World Bank, 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Insolvency and Credit Rights 
Systems: Morocco 2006 (Prepared by a World Bank Staff Team based on information provided 
by the Moroccan authorities ) < http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_icr_mor_eng.pdf > accessed 
2/10/2009; IMF and World Bank (n 18) 
98 IMF and World Bank (n 18); and IMF and World Bank (n 28) 
99 R Harmer (n 45) 123 
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and not observed in practice, it does not go as far as revealing and assessing the 
prevailing practice in relation to the insolvency benchmarks. It is common 
ground that the local policies reflecting the historical, socio-economic, political 
and cultural contexts of a given country, among others, tend to have significant 
influence in shaping the country’s insolvency law and practice.100  
 
Secondly, the reports seem not to have an explicit regard to the extent to which 
the laws in such jurisdictions address cross-border insolvencies. And thirdly, not 
only have the ROSCs not provided an overall view of the extent and degree of 
observance of the standards, but also they do not provide a principle-by-principle 
analysis of observance and recommendations against relevant local 
circumstances. One such recommendation for reform from Mauritius’s 
insolvency ROSC which is worth considering reads: 
 
A global reform of the insolvency procedures should be pursued in order 
to provide Mauritius with a modern and efficient commercial insolvency 
law. This should include integrated procedures for insolvency, as well as 
a procedure for rehabilitation that are consistent with international best 
practices, as set forth in the World Bank’s Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems. Areas of particular 
consideration for the new law should take into account, without 
limitation, the following: necessary amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 
and Bankruptcy Rules to take care of both traders, non-traders and 
companies insolvencies; harmonious and uniform recovery procedures 
for all debts, including amounts due to the state; explicit provisions 
relating to outstanding claims of the State and private sector claims, e.g 
VAT, Income Tax, National Pensions Fund etc.; appropriate rankings 
for creditors; [and] the abolition of the Zero-hour rule in respect of 
payment system participants.101 
 
The implication is that the recommendations to modernise the law will not have 
the benefit of taking into account existing practices which may reflect cultural 
and local circumstances, norms and needs. This poses unique challenges, as the 
global insolvency norms that have emerged might not necessarily be directly 
relevant to the context of the developing countries in SSA. And where such is the 
case, it is not likely that any reform that mechanically adhered to the stipulations 
of the international insolvency benchmarks would result in achieving the 
                                                 
100 See n 69 above 
 
101 World Bank, Report on Observance of Standard & Codes (ROSC): Mauritius (n 97) 14 
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objective of improving the quality of the law and practice of insolvency and 
cross-border insolvency in particular.  
 
The role of local experts and stakeholders is undoubtedly critical. This is 
particularly so in ensuring assessment and compliance processes that reflect the 
contexts and needs of SSA, as opposed to mechanical acceptance of templates 
designed by and from advanced economies’ models and perspectives for the sake 
of impressing multilateral institutions and advanced countries in order to attract 
foreign investments, financial loans, aids and technical assistances.102 On the 
contrary, the assessments are merely undertaken by the multilateral institutions’ 
members of staff103 who are deployed to a country being assessed for a particular 
period, only involving local government officials and stakeholders just as 
interviewees and respondents with very little if anything that could have capacity 
building impact for the local officials in the long run.  
 
In this regard, the local officials and stakeholders do not necessarily have 
ultimate ownership and control in crafting the reports and charting out the way 
forward, although the relevant governments’ authorities are subsequently asked 
whether they accept the report, and whether and how much of the report should 
be published.104 The chances are that the recommendations given would naturally 
insinuate the member of staff’s way of doing things- reflecting their own foreign 
experiences and models into local laws. To be sure this endeavour reflects the 
colonial processes that the laws were superimposed by and which were 
transplanted from the colonial powers into the colonies without thorough 
consideration of local circumstances and if at all was through the eyes of the 
colonial officials who by and large were not that knowledgeable about the local 
contexts which reflected such countries’ cultural, psychological, philosophical, 
economic, social, political, and institutional aspects. Nevertheless, there are still 
traces of commendable efforts,105 in attempting to legislate in a manner that 
                                                 
102 J Stiglitz (n 16) 251 
103 The staff includes outsourced consultants 
104 IMF and World Bank (n 18); and IMF and World Bank (n 28) 
105 The dominant criticism is however that such efforts were pursued as long as they were 
compliant with the interests of the colonisers 
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conforms to local circumstance, an attempt that was also evident in the 
immediate post-independence SSA governments.106 Arguably, the current 
endeavours of a standardisation initiative however reflect the movement towards 
neo-economic imperialism led by the US.107 
 
It is typical for such assessment reports to have a phrase to the effect that the 
report was ‘Prepared by a staff team
 
of the World Bank/IMF from information 
provided by the [assessed country’s] authorities.’ For example, the Mauritius 
ROSC on Insolvency (2004) reads: the ROSC was ‘[p]repared by a staff team
 
of 
the World Bank from information provided by the Mauritian authorities’.108 It 
has been argued that it would have been important for the assessment to be 
conducted by different organs or personnel that are independent from the 
multilateral institutions for the sake of fairness and independent opinion whilst 
involving the local people as equal partners in the whole process.109 Although it 
is not publicly available, there is probably some evidence that the assessments 
have potentials to produce significant impacts on developing countries.110 This 
appears possible and likely because of the involvement of governments,111 which 
as mentioned above are, as far as SSA is concerned, too vulnerable to withstand 
the indirect pressures arising from such programmes; let alone the courage of 
challenging any direction for pursuing reform which is seemingly not in harmony 
with the local contexts. 
 
The basic methods employed are questionnaires, interview, and focus group 
discussion.112 However, the analysis, interpretations, inferences and 
recommendations are entirely made by the staff team. Given the potential for lack 
                                                 
106  The efforts to translate or customise insolvency law to reflect the local needs and context 
have been undertaken in the past as reflected in Ghana’s Insolvency report entitled ‘Report of the 
Commissioners appointed to enquire into the insolvency law of Ghana’ (Government Printing 
Department,  Accra 1961) 153. Recommendations of the report took account of the inherently 
peasant agriculture based system which was an important feature of Ghanaian economy. For 
details on this, see, ‘Notes and News- Insolvency Law in Ghana’ (1962) 6 JAL 2, 3. 
107 D Katona (n 85); and  text to n 73 above 
108 World Bank, Report on Observance of Standard & Codes (ROSC):Mauritius (n 97) 1 
109 J Stiglitz (n 16) 
110 R Harmer (n 45) 
111 R Harmer (n 45) 
112 See appendix attached to R Harmer (n 45) 
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of expertise in SSA countries’ problems and the prevalent influence of cultural 
mores, it is quite unlikely for the staff within a limited time frame to really 
develop appropriate policy recommendations for the country being assessed. This 
is because such policy recommendations could only well be made by highly 
qualified people, ‘already in the country, deeply knowledgeable about it and 
working daily on solving that country’s problems.’113 Furthermore, an 
examination of the insolvency ROSCs for Mauritius and Morocco suggests some 
similarities, especially in their executive summaries, almost word for word, 
sentence for sentence and paragraph for paragraph.114 This, perhaps, supports the 
claim that the practice of multilateral institutions is to write a draft report of a 
country under assessment (based on a report of another country) ahead of the 
actual visit which would only serve ‘to fine-tune the report and its 
recommendations and to catch any glaring mistakes.’115 
 
                                                 
113 J Stiglitz (n 16) 34-36. Furthermore, Stiglitz is of the view that ‘[t]he outsiders can [only] play 
a role in sharing the experiences of other countries and in offering alternative interpretations of 
the….. forces at play.’  
114 A comparison of two paragraphs drawn from the two reports, namely, ROSC: Morocco (n 
103) and ROSC: Mauritius (n 103) serves to illustrate the strength of this observation. The last 
paragraph from the executive summary of the Morocco Insolvency ROSCs which reads:  
 
‘Nearly all corporate lending in Morocco is secured, with unsecured lending accounting for 
minority of total corporate advances. Large domestic and foreign banks maintain advanced 
procedures for managing credit defaults, and use a wide-range of techniques for recovery and 
resolution. While workout procedures have not been formalized, banks and financial institutions 
routinely employ workout techniques to reach amicable arrangements to reschedule debts and 
restructure businesses. Still banks complain about low recoveries, slow and inefficient court 
processes, encumbered by the excessive use of experts whose mission is not always justified and 
properly handled’  
 
corresponds almost word for word with  
 
‘Nearly all corporate lending in Mauritius is secured, with unsecured lending accounting for 
about 2% to 7% of total corporate advances. Large domestic and foreign banks maintain 
relatively advanced procedures for managing credit defaults, and employ a wide-range of 
techniques for recovery and resolution. Smaller banks tend to have only a small or no recovery 
department and outsource most of the recovery work. While workout procedures have not been 
formalized, banks and financial institutions routinely employ workout techniques to reach 
amicable arrangements to reschedule debts and restructuring businesses. Banks prefer informal 
resolutions where possible, but exercise their power to appoint a receiver or liquidator under the 
floating and fixed charge instruments. Still banks complain of low recoveries and a slow court 
process;’  
 
which is the last paragraph of the executive summary of the Mauritius ROSC. 
115 J Stiglitz (n 16) 47 
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It is generally considered that the region has weak, archaic and outdated 
insolvency laws. The concern is reflected from what emerges from a cursory 
assessment of insolvency systems in some SSA countries undertaken within the 
context of the Financial System Stability Assessment Programmes (“FSAP”)116 
and other assessments conducted as part of periodic consultations with the 
multilateral institutions’ member countries.117  The weaknesses are described as 
‘symptoms of deeper structural impediments to private lending’. In particular and 
with reference to East African countries, the 2008 IMF Report for Selected issues 
in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania noted: 
 
14. A foremost obstacle in each EAC [East Africa Community] country 
is a poor legal system that does not adequately protect property and 
creditor rights. In particular, an inefficient corporate bankruptcy process 
is detrimental to increased private lending. An efficient bankruptcy 
process will decrease borrower moral hazard, increase bank willingness 
to lend, and decrease the interest charged on loans, which currently must 
be high enough to cover the onerous costs of collection. Bankruptcy 
bottlenecks in the EAC, particularly Kenya, are associated with a 
protracted and costly judicial process. It takes on average 4.5 years to 
resolve a bankruptcy case in the EAC, compared with 1.8 years in high-
income countries and 3.5 years in middle-income countries….. It also 
takes 30 percent of the bankrupt estate to resolve a bankruptcy case, 
compared with an SSA average of 19.5 percent and a world average of 
16.4 percent.118 
 
While making reference to findings from other assessments conducted, the report 
further observed and recommended thus: 
 
                                                 
116 The Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) was introduced in May 1999 by the 
multilateral institutions to strengthen the monitoring of financial systems. It is designed to help 
countries prevent, or increase their resilience to, crises and cross-border contagion and to foster 
sustainable growth by promoting financial system soundness and financial sector diversity 
undertaken under FSAP. See IMF, 2005 Annual Report: Surveillance in Action during Financial 
Year 2005 (IMF, Washington 2005) 
117 See for instance IMF, ‘Tanzania: Financial System Stability Assessment’ (Report) (August 6, 
2003) Country Report No. 03/24; IMF, ‘Uganda: Financial System Stability Assessment’ 
(Report) (April 2003) Country Report No. 03/97; IMF, ‘Kenya, Uganda and United Republic of 
Tanzania: Selected Issues’ (Report) (October, 2008) Report No. 08/353; and World Bank, 
‘Investment Climate Assessment Kenya: Enhancing the Competitiveness of Kenya’s 
Manufacturing Sector: The Role of the Investment Climate’ (Report) (November 2004) 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/attachmentsbytitle/ic-kenya.pdf/$file/ic-kenya.pdf>  
accessed 5/10/2009 
 
118 IMF, ‘Kenya, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania: Selected Issues’ (Report) (October, 
2008) Country Report No 08/353 
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25. In Tanzania, in an attempt to create an environment more conducive 
to lending and financial sector development …..the authorities have 
introduced reforms in the areas of legal, judicial and information 
infrastructure, including the Land Act 1999 and the Companies Act 
2002. However the reforms have not been comprehensive and their 
implementation takes time……..Uganda has focussed on similar issues, 
but the 2005 Financial Sector Assessment found a number of 
weaknesses….. [including] the corporate insolvency regime. Kenya has 
seen no major reforms to improve the lending environment recently. 
31. All three countries need to continue improving and enforcing 
creditor rights. The FSAP suggested that Tanzania should give the 
commercial sector more resources for rapid settlement of cases and 
undertake to strengthen the judicial system generally. Kenya should 
modernise the insolvency procedures set out in the Company and 
Bankruptcy Acts, [and] strengthen the commercial court…….Uganda 
should overhaul its corporate insolvency regime…..and strengthen the 
capacity of the commercial court.119 
 
Although the report seems to suggest that within East Africa, Tanzania’s 
insolvency system is far better than that found in Uganda and Kenya,120 a study 
recently conducted by the USAID observed that the new insolvency regime in 
Tanzania was still not well known, unclear to its users and not made in 
accordance to the best practice.121 Similar assessments for the Central Africa 
Economic Community and Monetary Community noted pertinent weaknesses of 
insolvency systems in the respective member countries and the regional 
insolvency framework under the OHADA Uniform Act, though the latter has 
long been praised as an effective system worthy to be joined by other SSA 
countries.122 The report in part observed the following weaknesses whilst also 
suggesting what needs to be done:  
                                                 
119 Ibid 
120 Uganda has recently been reported to have tabled an Insolvency Bill before the parliament. 
The bill seeks to enact a law that among other things will provide for cross-border insolvency law 
and will do away with the current approach which treats individual and companies insolvencies 
in different and separate legislation. See ‘Uganda Tables an Insolvency Bill before the 
Parliament’ 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T751837676095&randomN
o=0.753109278650188> accessed 6/10/2006. Kenya has also very recently tabled before the 
parliament an Insolvency bill. See The Insolvency Bill 2010 < 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2010/Insolvency_Bill_2010.pdf > 
accessed 02/03/2011; and M Whitehead, ‘A New Insolvency Act is Coming……So Lenders, 
Borrowers and Insolvency Practitioners Get Ready’  (2009) Financial Focus 1, 8 <   
http://www.pwc.com/en_KE/ke/pdf/pwc-financial-focus.pdf  > accessed 17/08/2010 
121 USAID, Tanzania’s Agenda for Action Executive Summary, February 2008 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ024.pdf > accessed 7/10/2009 
 
122 IMF, ‘Central African Economic and Monetary Community: Financial System Stability 
Assessment’ (Report) (August, 2006) Country Report No. 06/321; and IMF, ‘Cameroon: 
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11……complex procedures established by OHADA, uncertainties in 
each country’s civil procedure, and weak capacity and problems of 
governance in the judicial systems. OHADA framework could be 
enhanced in the areas of secured transactions and collaterals as well as 
enforcement and insolvency procedures. 
51. Debt collection and insolvency proceedings suffer from the 
complexity of OHADA mechanisms and governance problems in the 
national judicial systems.......Insolvency procedures are rare and 
inefficient mostly due to the unreliability of insolvency administrators, 
who are neither regulated nor properly supervised. 
53. Enforcement procedures, especially fast-track measures for debt 
collection and foreclosure need to be revisited in light of best 
practices…….the insolvency regime should be reviewed with a view to 
buttress creditor rights and market discipline.123   
 
Other recommendations focus on legal institutions’ capacity building and good 
governance. They accordingly entail specialised training to judges of commercial 
courts, enforcement of disciplinary measures and introduction of a framework 
for registration and monitoring of insolvency practitioners. Unlike the ROSCs, it 
is noteworthy that these reports are not confined to insolvency standards, and 
their observation and recommendations are therefore broad covering other areas 
of law relevant to the effective adoption, and observance of insolvency laws. 
They lack details in a number of respects including a lack of consideration of 
local contexts which might need to be reflected during reform. They also fail to 
link the observations and recommendations in a comparative manner with the 
international insolvency benchmarks. Of significance, the assessments do not 
provide special treatment to cross-border insolvency. This is notwithstanding the 
potentials for insolvencies involving multinational enterprise having assets and 
business interests in more than one SSA country. They therefore do not offer a 
direct guidance as to reform of cross-border insolvency law in SSA countries. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Financial System Stability Assessment—Update’ (Report) (February 2009) Country Report No. 
09/51  
123 IMF, ‘Central African Economic and Monetary Community: Financial System Stability 
Assessment’(n 122) 6 and 21 
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3.5 The Recent Global Crisis and the Continued Influence of 
Multilateral Institutions for SSA Insolvency Reform Process 
 
Starting from mid 2007, the world began to experience a financial crisis that led 
to what has commonly been referred to as the ‘credit crunch’.124 The 2009 World 
Development Indicator portrays the crisis, which has its origins in the US, as 
‘unlike anything the world has seen since the Great Depression nearly eight 
decades ago;’125 as it simultaneously involves housing, equity, and financial 
market crises which provide a potential basis for world recession. The 
developing world, SSA in particular, has not been completely isolated from the 
impact of the crisis whereby international trade and capital flows served as a 
transmission mechanism.126 This impact is contrary to the initial expectation that 
these economies will be isolated from the crisis because of their less developed 
financial systems which are less integrated into the global financial market.127 
Indeed, the consequent economic slowdown was responsible for the increased 
credit risk and nonperforming assets, weakening the balance sheets of financial 
institutions and corporations. 
 
The immediate implication of the crisis for SSA is on the potential loss of 
financial aid, fallen demand for SSA exports and decline in foreign direct 
investment. The potential implication of the crisis for the standardisation 
initiative is on the increased pace of compliance with the standards as SSA 
countries prioritise measures to contain the impact of the crisis on economic 
growth and poverty.128 The incentive to comply with the standards is seemingly 
based on the desire to enhance their chances of attracting financial aid from the 
multilateral institutions and as a means of strengthening their competitiveness 
against others in attracting more foreign direct investments and trade. 
Furthermore, as the crisis weakens the position of these countries, it strengthens 
the multilateral institutions power and pressure over them for convergence.  
                                                 
124 UNCTAD (n 18) 
125 World Bank (n 5) 
126 IMF (n 62) 1-25 
127 IMF (n 62) 5; C McCarthy, ‘The Global Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Sub-
Saharan Economies’ (2009) Tralac Trade Brief 1 < www.tralac.org  > accessed 7/10/2009 
128 IMF (n 62) 1 
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To be sure, since the 1980s debt crisis, the multilateral institutions’ power over 
developing countries such as those of SSA has been on a significant increase. 
This has the potential of culminating into wholesale adoption and observance of 
the standards without thorough consideration of their compatibility and 
suitability to the local circumstances.129  Indeed, recent studies show that SSA 
countries were among a very few countries which did not resort to protectionist 
measures as a reaction to the impact of the current crisis; but they further 
increased the liberalisation of trade and investment in a bid to boost trade and 
capital inflow.130 
 
Having its origin in the US, the crisis raises challenges to the underlying policy 
objectives of the international financial architecture within which the 
international insolvency standards are situated. One may wonder whether the 
standards are really better placed to prevent or resolve financial crises given that 
the recent crisis has its origin from advanced economies (the US in particular) 
which provided the best practices for the international insolvency standards. 131 
Although the crisis potentially helps to, arguably, ‘dissolve any notion that 
prevailing practice[s] in high income countries [are] appropriate standards for 
emerging markets [and developing economies],’132 it is unlikely that this may 
have a significant impact of militating the observance of the standards of the best 
practices given the vulnerability of the SSA economies and the fact that the crisis 
has had the effect of worsening their situations even further. 
 
 Indeed, any impact that militates compliance with the standards could be a result 
of the likelihood of the governments of SSA to be more inclined to resolving the 
immediate consequences of the crisis which may render cross-border insolvency 
                                                 
129 D Katona (n 85) 1458 
130 B Eichengreen, ‘From the Asian Crisis to the Global Credit Crisis: Reforming the 
International Financial Architecture Redux’ (2009) 6 Int’l Econ & Econ Policy 1, 2,18 & 19 
131 V Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue in a World of Debt’ [2008] JBL 756; H Hu and B Black, ‘Equity 
and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 11: Importance and Extensions’ (2008) 156 Univ Penn 
LR 625; B Eichengreen (n 130) 2. See also, LC Ho, ‘UK Bank Insolvency Reform’ (2008) 3 
Capital Market Law Journal 320; J Harris, ‘International Regulation of Hedge Funds: Can the 
Will find a Way?’ (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 277 
132 B Eichengreen (n 130 ) 2, 18 & 19 
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reform undertaking to be regarded as of less significance than other pressing 
problems. While it is true that the crisis may have diminished the confidence 
developing countries have had on such standards, they still lack the capacity to 
abandon the standardisation initiatives and exercise their policy choices in 
approaching recommendations given from assessments. This is on account of the 
countries’ weakened economic power as already discussed.133 In the final 
analysis, the crisis contributes in leaving SSA governments with little policy 
choices over reform options for their countries’ economies. 
 
3.6 Towards Adoption of and Compliance with International Insolvency 
Standards: Which Approach? 
 
There are two approaches that are emerging, suggesting how effective adoption 
and implementation of the standards by low income countries, such as SSA 
countries, could be effected without jeopardising the interests of such countries, 
and the potential benefits of economies of scale and poverty reduction effects 
that may accrue from compliance and observance of the standards.  
 
                                                 
133 B Eichengreen (n 130) 2,18 & 19 states that ‘[t]he 2008 crisis clearly shattered [the] 
presumption [of best practices from advanced economies]. It revealed the inadequacy of 
transparency in the high-income countries. It laid bare the inadequacy of supervision and 
regulation, failures in the co-ordination of macroeconomic and regulatory policies, the 
pervasiveness of regulatory arbitrage, and incentive problems associated with compensation 
practices in the financial-services industry. It dissolved any notion that prevailing practice in the 
high-income countries is an appropriate standard for emerging markets.’ Noting the weaknesses 
of the multilateral institutions to oversee the standardization drive and compliance Eichengreen 
writes ‘The IMF’s inability to say anything critical about its large members is a weakness in the 
architecture. The Fund was notable for its silence when the U.S. Treasury rolled out a flawed 
bank rescue plan in September 2008 that emphasized purchases of troubled assets at something 
resembling market prices rather than capital injections….Meaningful reforms require changing 
the composition of the [Fund’s] Management and Executive Board responsible for priorities and 
policies.’ A wide variety of discriminatory state measures (such as ‘bailouts’/state aids) 
undertaken by developed countries in the midst of the crisis whilst developing countries through 
the standardization initiative were being pressed to avoid such practices may discourages the 
developing countries’ commitment to standardization initiatives since, as far as they are 
concerned, they have been faithfully ‘lowering tariff on imports…..and [continued] 
..liberalization of foreign direct investment…’. See for instance, International Monetary Fund (n 
42) 19-21for such advice given to SSA in a bid to meet the challenges of the crisis which include 
‘reduction in taxes or additional increases in expenditures…’ Perhaps this practice serves as a 
pointer to how states desire not to be bound by international standards when the stakes for their 
economies at home are so high. For details on such practices in the midst of the crisis see, SJ 
Evenett, ‘The Role of the WTO During Systemic Economic Crisis’ Inaugural Conference of 
Thinking Ahead on International Trade (TAIT), Centre for Trade and Economic Integration in 
collaboration with WTO, Geneva, 17-18 September 2009 <  
www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/tait_sept09_e/evenett_e.doc  >   accessed 23/2/2010 
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The first approach insists on the importance of ensuring that standards adoption, 
implementation and assessment give due consideration to the domestic focus, 
experience, needs, and capabilities of a low income country with the objective of 
market development and enhancing market efficiency.134 In realising this, the 
approach suggests that the prioritisation of the standards should reflect needs and 
fundamental values of the country. It is emerging from this approach that regard 
has to be had to regional needs and dimensions of economic development. This is 
ideally based on the growing phenomena of regionalism which underpins intra-
region commerce and raising low income countries’ ownership of the standards 
and assessment of their observance.  
 
In view of this approach, customisation of the insolvency standards to reflect 
local contexts is important because the standards are essentially modelled on the 
institutions and practices prevailing in the developed countries which may not be 
directly relevant to the specific problems and needs of the developing countries 
in SSA.135 Customisation therefore emphasises promotion of innovation and 
accommodation of local contexts that seem to be embedded in the standards, 
though with some reservation in some respects as identified above.  
 
Regional initiatives such as Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism (“APRM”) under 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”) devised to facilitate 
the design, implementation and monitoring of standards to complement ROSCs 
is supposedly one example of such approach, undertaken at regional level.136 
                                                 
134 YV Reddy (n 43); PD’s Investment (n 66); M Cardona and M Farnoux, ‘ International Codes 
and Standards: Challenges and Priorities for Financial Stability’ , (2002) FSR 143 , 147-149 
<http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2002/et8_1102.pdf>  accessed 
23/10/2009; TC Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: 
Between Global Norms and National Circumstances’, (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, 
Beijing, 27-28 April 2006)  <http://www.oecd.org/DAF/corporate-affairs/ > accessed 17 July 
2009 [33] 
135 TC Halliday, and BG Carruthers (n 84); TC Halliday (n 26); N Onder (n 18) 2; J Stiglitz (n 
16); and  D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard (n 88) 
136 See African Union, ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development  Declaration on Democracy, 
Political, Economic, & Corporate Governance’, AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I 2002 
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/july2002/declaration/declaration.pdf>  accessed 31/07/2009;  
PD’s Investment (n 73). NEPAD’s Declaration reflects African leaders’ commitment to adhere to 
international standards in the conduct of policy. In terms of para 166, NEPAD’s Capital Flows 
Initiative has three objectives on promoting the private sector, namely: ‘To ensure a sound and 
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This is important given the complexity and origins of the issues involved in the 
standards as well as historical, political, philosophical and socio-cultural policy 
dimensions attached to insolvency.137 To ensure ownership and wide public 
acceptance, the mechanism allows for wide public discussion and citizenry 
involvement at national levels. It is however a pity that APRM under NEPAD 
does not presently cover the insolvency standards,138 although it recognises ‘the 
need for appropriate insolvency systems [which] became most apparent with the 
financial crises that hit emerging economies especially in Asia in the mid 
1990s’.139 Nevertheless, NEPAD APRM has been criticised for embracing the 
Washington Consensus prescriptions of market centred reform approaches and 
for its failure to engage with the unfairness of standards inimical to Africa.140 
Notwithstanding the NEPAD’s shortcomings, it still serves ‘as a useful model of 
an African-driven initiative; rather than contorting the African agenda to fit the 
                                                                                                                                    
conducive environment for private sector activities, with particular emphasis on domestic 
entrepreneurs; (b) to promote foreign direct investment and trade, with particular emphasis on 
exports; (c) to develop micro, small and medium enterprises, including the informal sector.’ 
137 Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism (“APRM”) seeks, with the support from the standard setting 
bodies as well as multilateral donors and African regional institutions, to foster compliance with 
standards by inter alia helping African countries to identify the constraints that they face in 
implementing the standards and facilitate formulation of credible and action-oriented 
programmes towards addressing the constraints and implementing the standards. See for instance 
Africa Development Bank Group, ‘Framework for Implementation of Banking and Financial 
Standards in Africa’ < http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/00473846-EN-PAPER-NEPAD-BANKING-AND-FINANCIAL-STANDARDS-
FRAMEWORK.PDF  > accessed 31/07/2009  [6] &[ 7] 
138 See for instance, Article 8 of the NEPAD Declaration (n 142) which provides thus:  ‘…the 
eight prioritized and approved codes and standards set out below [which the African Union 
believe to] have the potential to promote market efficiency, to control wasteful spending, to 
consolidate democracy, and to encourage private financial flows - all of which are [regarded to 
be] critical aspects of the quest to reduce poverty and enhance sustainable development. These 
codes and standards have been developed by a number of international organizations through 
consultative processes that involved the active participation of and endorsement by African 
countries. Thus, the codes and standards are genuinely global as they were agreed by experts 
from a vast spectrum of economies with different structural characteristics. They are the 
following: a. ‘Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies’; b. 
‘Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency’; c. ‘Best Practices for Budget Transparency’; d. 
‘Guidelines for Public Debt Management’; e. ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’; f. 
‘International Accounting Standards’; g. ‘International Standards on Auditing’; and h. ‘Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’. Nevertheless, as SSA countries are increasingly 
reforming their insolvency systems they miss the assistance that they could have obtained if 
insolvency standards were within the standards covered within the NEPAD APRM.   
139 Africa Development Bank Group (n 137) 37 
140 J Gathii,  ‘A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World 
Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development’(2003) 13 Transnat’l L. & Contemp 
Probs 179, 180-81; and  I Taylor, ‘NEPAD Ignores the Fundamental Politics of Africa’, (2004) 
Contemp Rev 29, 32  
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needs of developed countries, NEPAD and measures like it can guide both Africa 
and the West to create technical assistance programs that fulfil the African 
agenda.’ 141 
 
Perhaps one recent example that comes closer to this approach, is the 
‘Declaration on Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems for the Middle East and 
North Africa’ (“MENA”) promulgated on 27 May 2009 with the object of 
forging a reform and harmonisation of insolvency systems of member states in 
light of the international insolvency standards, whilst adhering to the needs of the 
countries in the region.142 The declaration represents commitments to 
participating and making recommendations to modernise insolvency frameworks 
tailored to the needs of the countries in the region but one that balances the local 
context with the global standards. An obvious feature of this declaration is 
insistence on local and regional needs and circumstances as well as facilitating 
benchmarking and sharing of best practices that would help elevate and advance 
the insolvency and creditor rights agenda.  
 
As the emerging consensus recognises the fundamental place of agriculture, 
natural resources, informal sector and small and medium scale enterprises and 
the need to fight poverty in SSA, this fact among others will perhaps need to be 
taken into account in modernising their insolvency systems and cross-border 
insolvency in particular.143 However, such needs ought to be balanced by the 
drive to develop the private sector and in particular trade and foreign investment. 
 
                                                 
141 M Florestal, ‘Technical Assistance Post-Doha: Is There any Hope of Integrating Developing 
Countries into the Global Trading System?’ (2007) 24 Arizona J Int’l and Comp Law 121, 130 
142 See Hawkamah-The Institute for Corporate Governance, ‘Declaration on Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems for the Middle East and North Africa’, Abu Dhabi, 27 May 2009 
<http://www.hawkamah.org/events/conferences/insolvency_declaration/files/hawkamah_declarat
ion_on_insolvency_english> accessed 7/10/2009; and Hawkamah and others, ‘Survey on 
Insolvency System in the Middle East and North Africa’ < 
https://insol.org/Projects/MENA%20Survey%20into%20Insolvency%20and%20Creditor%20Rig
hts.pdf > accessed 15/07/2011 
143 See World Bank, World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 
Washington 2007); and USAID (n 121)). Indeed, almost all UNCTAD’s reports on foreign direct 
investment shows that the large percentage of foreign direct investment flow into SSA is in the 
natural resource sector, although the financial sector and telecommunication industry are also 
reportedly on the increase. 
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Another approach insists that countries must adopt a more gradual approach to 
the implementation of the standards when a substantial amount of reform is 
required.144  This boils down to the need of assuring complementarities of the 
standardised insolvency law with the entire laws of a country’s legal system. 
This view reflects the very nature of insolvency which tends to influence nations 
to legislate for it in a manner that takes into account and reflects the nations’ 
historical, socio-economic, political and cultural needs.145 As such, different 
national policies have to be consulted in making different policy choices that will 
essentially characterise the insolvency law that is designed. This approach 
therefore makes it unrealistic to aim at achieving compliance with the standards 
of best practices and benchmarks within a short period without fixing priorities. 
Perhaps this approach seems to be preferred by some countries as is the case for 
Tanzania and more recently Mauritius, which, as will be shown in subsequent 
chapters, have enacted cross-border insolvency regimes which allow for gradual 
and perhaps cautious application. 
 
Notably, whereas the former approach reflects the theoretical view against 
transplants and a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and which encourages consideration 
of local contexts,146 the latter reflects the incrementalist theory which advocates 
for modesty and gradual reform of global insolvency law giving allowance for 
substantial deviation while also reducing the risk of outright rejection.147 
Nevertheless, both approaches complement one another in so far as their 
application to a developing country is concerned.148 It will thus seem that the best 
result mandates invocation of both approaches. Invocation of both approaches 
                                                 
144 YV Reddy (n 43); PD’s Investment (n 66); and M Farnoux (n 134). See also TC Halliday (n 
134) 28, stating that the implementation process ‘can be sharply divided between those 
approaches that are incremental, piecemeal or gradual versus those that are dramatic, systemic 
and rapid.’ See also IF Fletcher (n 81) 774 
145 See n 69 above 
 
146 See R Parry and H Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspective and Principles’ 
(2008) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113, 125; CG Paulus (n 24) 765; N Martin (n 72) 5; JJ 
Chung, ‘The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Towards Erosion of National 
Sovereignty,’ (2006-2007) 27 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 89, 107 and 108 
147 JAE Pottow, ‘Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy’, (2004-
2005) 45 Va J Int’l L 936. See also S Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, ‘Incrementalisms in Global 
Lawmaking’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 851 
148 Text to n 158-178 in chapter 2 
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will help reflect and complement the theory that the best strategy for legal reform 
must, in order to avoid transplant effect, aim at improving legality by carefully 
selecting legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is 
appreciated within the context of domestic circumstances by domestic law 
makers, law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the final consumers of 
these rules.149 And above all, it must ensure that there is a domestic demand for 
the new law, and that supply can match demand.150 The latter aspect of the theory 
closely follows the gradualism and thus incrementalism. 
 
3.7 Drivers behind the Emerging Reform Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
There is a growing trend among SSA countries to reform their insolvency laws 
including cross-border insolvency frameworks along the lines of the modern 
trends.151 It is noteworthy that the reform in these countries has been undertaken 
with a view to attraction and facilitation of foreign investments as part of 
activities in the poverty reduction strategy papers (“PRSP”).152 Indeed, reform of 
                                                 
149 D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard (n 94) 186 and 192 
150 Ibid 192 
151 To this extent, Tanzania, Burundi, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique and 
Kenya offer good examples of this trend in SSA. While Uganda and Kenya offer example of such 
countries which are at various stages of the reform process Mauritius presents an example of 
countries which have recently enacted and brought into force new insolvency legislation. See 
‘Bills proposed to ease business’ in Kenya’s Daily Nations, 2 November , 2009 
<http://www.Nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/471244/-/tkt2f1/-/index.html>  accessed 2/11/2009; M 
Whitehead,  ‘A New Insolvency Act is Coming……So Lenders, Borrowers and Insolvency 
Practitioners Get Ready’  (2009) Financial Focus 1, 8 <   
http://www.pwc.com/en_KE/ke/pdf/pwc-financial-focus.pdf  > accessed 17/08/2010 . See also 
Uganda-Bill on Commercial Justice Tabled, August 23, 2009 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T751837676095&randomN
o=0.753109278650188> accessed 6/10/2006.; The Mauritius Insolvency Act 2009 was brought 
into force in 1st June 2009. See the Mauritius’s new Insolvency Act 2009 
<www.gov.mu/portal/goc/compdiv/file/insolvact09.pdf> accessed 3 November 2009; Republic 
of Rwanda Press Release, ‘Rwanda is Doing Business 2010’s Top Reformer’, Kigali, 9 
September 2009 <http://www.gov.rw/IMG/doc/20090909_Press_Release_Doing_Business_-
_FINAL.doc> accessed 6 November 2009. See also, RN Kormo, ‘Review of 2009 Draft Law on 
Business Insolvency (Mozambique)’ (USAID Support Programme for Economic and Enterprise 
Development 2011) < http://www.speed-
program.com/library/resources/speed/2011/memoondraftbankruptcylawmozambiquespeed06221
1.pdf > accessed 26 October 2011 
152 U Miller and S Ziegler, Making PRSP Inclusive (Project Print, Munich 2006) 4, stating that 
poverty reduction strategy paper (“PRSP”) “is a concept developed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999.The idea behind this was that low-income, highly 
indebted countries should develop and formulate a national plan on how to reduce poverty in 
their country and improve the living situation of their citizens. Once a country has established a 
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insolvency law in most of these countries is clearly reflected in and regarded as 
an aspect within the respective countries’ poverty reduction strategy paper.153  
 
One important aspect is that as far as SSA countries are concerned, such a route 
is becoming more attractive to the governments and effective for bringing about 
reform.  One of the reasons is because such poverty reduction strategy papers, 
funded by the multilateral institutions, encapsulate good governance issues which 
directly link with the problems at hand which the governments of SSA countries 
are seeking to prioritise and resolve.154  But the main reason is that it is now 
becoming the practice that it is almost only through the poverty reduction 
strategy papers that such countries can qualify for funding (e.g loans, grants and 
other subventions) from the multilateral institutions based on the prioritised 
activities clearly indicated on such strategic plans and clearly linked to the way 
they contribute to poverty reduction.155 It is common place to find in such PRSPs 
long lists of laws and areas earmarked respectively as requiring reform and 
legislation which is not uncommon now to include insolvency and indeed all 
areas and aspects that seem to dominate the agenda of the multilateral institutions 
and the international community.156 It seems that the trend of commissioning 
studies by local and foreign consultants with a view of reforming the insolvency 
laws is mainly being funded by the multilateral institutions or other international 
institutions based on the prioritised and planned activities.157  
 
                                                                                                                                    
national PRSP, it can apply for debt relief from the World Bank, the IMF and donor countries, 
and may gain access to new credits, loans and grants.” 
153 See for instance Government of Ghana ‘Implementation of Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
2005: Annual progress Report 2006 < http://www.ndpc.gov.gh/GPRS/AnnualProgressReport-
2005.pdf > accessed 2/9/2010. It is however still questionable if this new trend is really consistent 
with what has been proposed by J Stiglitz (n 16) 82 and 83 and discussed in text to n 71 above. 
154 MS Grindle, ‘Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing 
Countries’ (Paper Prepared for the Poverty Reduction Group of the World Bank 2002)  < 
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD32.pdf > accessed 13 September 2010 
155U Miller and S Ziegler (n..) 4 arguing that  “[ t]he PRSP approach is becoming increasingly 
important, since it is not an isolated tool used just by the World Bank and the IMF, but is also 
supported by other international development partners…” 
156 U Miller and S Ziegler (n 152) 4, such lists “...provide a roadmap indicating the priority 
actions to be taken that will lead to poverty reduction.”  
157 n 17 above 
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Contrary to what has been said, it is very obvious that there is a clear link 
between funding from multilateral institutions and insolvency related reforms as 
is the case with other legal reforms. Although governments are deemed to have a 
leading role in the process, one can see how the multilateral institutions, whose 
role is to provide technical and financial support to the process,158 are indeed 
better placed to ensure that their agenda and recommendations emerging form 
ROSC on insolvency reform or otherwise are accommodated in the PRSPs.159 
Their role caters for the whole process from formulation and implementation, to 
monitoring and evaluation. In fact such endeavour can be achieved whether or 
not there is a ROSC so far undertaken for a particular country. 
 
Indeed, the reforms are, by and large, not pushed by and undertaken as a direct 
result of, involvement of the countries under study in the growing number of 
insolvency cases affecting these countries.160 As such, the emerging reforms are 
not undertaken as a measured approach to address an immediate and pressing 
demand arising from the surge in incidences of cross-border insolvency affecting 
such countries. Rather, it seems that, as far as such countries are concerned, the 
drive and primary pre-occupation is ‘adopt[ing] a new insolvency law system 
just for the sake of the supposed economic advantage’161  
                                                 
158 U Miller and S Ziegler (n 152) 4 
159In many countries the different donor organisations form groups that meet regularly (e.g. 
monthly) to discuss the state of progress of the PRSP. On this observation see U Miller and S 
Ziegler (n 152 ) 5 
160 See for instance, C Manuel, ‘Consultative Paper on Key Proposals for the Reform of 
Insolvency Law’ ( Commercial Law Project Report) (1999); Uganda, ‘A Study Report on 
Insolvency Law’ (Report) (2004) Law Com. Pub. No. 13 of 2004. See also the statement reported 
to have been made by the Mauritius government in relation to the enactment of the new 
Insolvency Act 2009 that ‘the…..Act will  secure reputation of Mauritius as a well governed 
business and financial services centre and a trustworthy investment destination.’ See Government 
Information Service, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Insolvency Act 2009: Shoring Up Corporate 
Goodwill and Protecting Stakeholders’ 
<www.gov.mu/portal/site/Mainhomepage/menuitem.a42b24128104d9845dabddd > accessed 
3/11/2009 
161IF Fletcher, ‘Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global Standards and 
Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2006-2007) Brook J Int’l L 767, 774. See also 
HE Hon President M Kibaki, ‘Speech During the Official Opening of Parliament’ (the Fourth 
Session of the Tenth Kenyan Parliament 23rd February 2010) <  
www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task > accessed 12/04/2010 
President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya in his Speech to the parliament made the following statement 
with regard to inter alia the Insolvency Bill that was to be tabled before the Parliament: the 
Insolvency Bill will ‘provide an enabling legal environment to make Kenya more competitive for 
business and investment.’ < 
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The looming risk is that the desire to attract investments and businesses in order 
to impress the international community and investors may override or 
marginalise other local needs and contexts which are equally relevant and 
important in enabling effective implementation of the law possible. This is 
critical in two ways. On the one hand, a majority of these countries lack a 
practical experience of the application of cross-border insolvency law, let alone 
the domestic insolvency practical experience. On the other hand, whilst it is a 
generally accepted view that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to insolvency 
law,162 as each country has its diverse values and norms, which require different 
policy choices for its insolvency system and thus cross-border insolvency 
regime; the trend is that the reforming countries have to a large extent tended to 
adopt systems that have seemingly worked well elsewhere and preferably from 
their former colonial powers.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The development of effective cross-border insolvency systems is now more 
relevant in SSA countries than it was before. This is particularly so in view of the 
extent to which SSA countries are increasingly being integrated to the global 
economy through trade and foreign direct investments. The relevance is 
underpinned by the efforts that these countries have over the years been making 
to compete in promoting and attracting cross-border trade and investment 
through liberalisation of their economies and the creation of conducive legal 
environments with the support from the multilateral institutions and conclusion 
of cross-border trade and investment arrangements.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.parliament.go.ke/parliament/downloads/tenth_forth_sess/SPEECH%20BY%20HIS%
20EXCELLENCY%20HON.pdf  > accessed 23/03/2010 
162 See R Parry and H Zhang ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspective and Principles’ 
(2008) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113, 125; CG Paulus, ‘Global Insolvency Law and the 
Role of Multinational Institutions’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 755,765; N Martin ‘The Role 
of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal 
Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 5; JJ Chung (n 146) 107 and 108 
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The growing number of cross-border trade and investment arrangements implies 
a further challenge to the SSA countries to align their insolvency regime with 
their entire legal environment for facilitation of trade and investment and the 
international insolvency benchmarks. Despite the relevance as above stated, the 
approach for reform need not be rapid as incidences of cross-border insolvencies 
are still if at all very limited, though the pre-conditions for their occurrences are 
in place and building up. However, the major limitation inherent in this process 
is the fact that the assessment initiative for the extent of compliance with the 
international insolvency standards does not seem to delve into the details of the 
local contexts and needs that may influence the shape and implementation of 
insolvency law for a particular country. This is critical given that the insolvency 
standards do not contain a version translated into the contexts of circumstances 
pertaining to developing countries such as those in SSA, though they ostensibly 
allow innovations to reflect local circumstances. The other limitation is perhaps 
in the extent and manner in which local experts are employed in the process, 
which limits their role in the assessment exercise in terms of ownership and 
control. The relationship between SSA countries with the multilateral institutions 
which conduct the assessments is also critical. The risk is that SSA countries 
seem to face a potential risk of succumbing to prescriptions of the multilateral 
institutions as to the manner in which they should carry out reform which might 
not have sufficient regard to the local contexts. 
 
The most critical challenge is to identify the relevant local contexts that reflect 
SSA countries’ historical, cultural, philosophical, psychological, political, 
economic, political, institutional and social aspects and needs and balance them 
against the insolvency benchmarks in a manner that will improve and modernise 
their cross-border insolvency frameworks.  The danger is looming that these 
countries may adopt the benchmarks in their laws to please the international 
community without necessarily having them complied with in actual practice. 
The emerging approaches for reform, if integrated with the theories against 
transplant effect and enhancing effectiveness as above discussed, stand a better 
chance to allow crafting of an appropriate framework for regulation of cross-
97 
 
border insolvency in the countries under study. The next chapter explores further 
the existing cross-border trade and investment arrangements with a view to 
determining the nature of a possible cross-border insolvency framework to which 
such arrangements point for SSA countries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
EXTENT OF FACILITATION OF CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY REGULATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
There is extensive scholarship acknowledging that globalisation of trade and 
investment and the consequent increase in international business have enhanced 
the challenges for cross-border insolvencies in the world. However, there is a 
dearth of empirical or descriptive scholarship that has delved into the relationship 
between the two. In the same vein, while it is well known that the growth and 
expansion of international business in the recent times has largely been enabled 
by liberalisations of markets and investments, there is no scholarship that has 
dealt with the linkage between the prevailing arrangements for facilitation of 
trade and investment and cross-border insolvency; and explored the extent to 
which such arrangements implicates cross-border insolvency regulation. 
 
This chapter examines various arrangements for facilitation of cross-border trade 
and investment in which SSA has been involved. It considers the extent to which, 
and how, they implicate cross-border insolvency regulation in SSA countries. It 
points to the policy space available to SSA countries in making policy choices 
commensurate with their situations, before considering a framework for cross-
border insolvency regulation to which the implications of the arrangements for 
cross-border insolvency regulation point.  
 
The chapter invokes theoretical aspects of the cross-border insolvency landscape 
in considering the nature and type of regulatory approach to which the prevailing 
situation points and issues for consideration that emerge. It consequently argues 
that the facilitation of cross-border trade and investment through such 
arrangements effectively pulls cross-border insolvency frameworks in SSA 
countries towards a universalist stance and away from territorialist approaches. 
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The key finding of this study is that, although such arrangements do not 
explicitly provide for cross-border insolvency, their implications for cross-border 
insolvency regulation are essentially twofold. Firstly, they embody general 
principles of law which inform and determine the nature and content of SSA 
countries’ cross-border insolvency frameworks. This implication is reinforced by 
the requirements explicitly advanced by interregional economic arrangements for 
undertaking and maintaining liberalisation, rule of law and good governance. 
And secondly, the arrangements effectively enhance the interactions of SSA 
countries with the multinational enterprises involved in international business 
and hence the potential of SSA countries being involved in cross-border 
insolvencies. 
    
4.2 Overview of the Linkage between Cross-Border Insolvency and 
Facilitation of Trade and Investment 
 
Insolvency law has traditionally evolved and developed as a means of facilitating 
trade and investment.1 The underlying policies and approaches have seemingly 
however tended to vary from time to time and from one jurisdiction to another. 
This historical fact is in itself evident of the link between insolvency and 
facilitation of trade and investment. The multitude of bilateral treaties concluded 
in the past to regulate cross-border insolvencies arising between jurisdictions 
with close cross-border trade and investment relations and the recent 
international initiatives reflect this fact.2 
 
In modern times, the linkage is more pronounced and strengthened by the 
globalisation of trade and investment such that the role of cross-border 
insolvency regulation in the facilitation of cross-border trade and investment is 
considered in the global context.  The underlying views are twofold. Firstly, that 
the absence of an orderly and effective insolvency system can exacerbate crises 
and render creditors unable to collect on their claims, which will consequently 
                                                 
1 See generally, for instance, B Wessels, BA Markell and JJ Kilborn, International Cooperation 
in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters (Oxford, OUP 2009) 
2 Ibid 
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affect the future availability of credit.3 Where there are cross-border trade and 
capital flows, the lack of an effective system, applied in a predictable manner, 
may render foreign creditors inadequately protected as they may be inequitably 
treated. Secondly, that an effective insolvency law that addresses the interests of 
all involved notwithstanding their nationality has the potential for fostering 
growth and competitiveness in cross-border trade and investment.4 It facilitates 
free trade and capital movements, and consequently enables allocation of savings 
and channelling of resources into productive uses. 
 
It is not in dispute that SSA countries would need an effective cross-border 
insolvency regime to contribute towards facilitation of cross-border trade and 
investment.5 Rather, the debate seems to be focused on what is the best and 
appropriate approach commensurate with the level of development of SSA 
countries. Linked with the debate is the relatively limited involvement of SSA in 
cross-border trade and investment.6 Whilst the argument inherent in such a focus 
might be valid, the implication arising from market liberalisations and 
implementation of other trade and investment facilitation arrangements may 
suggest a different conclusion. Although SSA countries may not be seen to be in 
favour of universalist approaches to cross-border insolvency regulation, as it is 
                                                 
3 See generally S Hagan, ‘Insolvency Reform and Economic Policy’ (2001-2002) 17 Conn J Int’l 
L 63; and IMF, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures –Key Issues (IMF, Washington 
1999) 
4 Ibid 
5 See J Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents (Penguin Books, London 2002) 130-131 and 
237, who maintains that ‘What is required is bankruptcy reform that recognizes the special nature 
of bankruptcies that arise out of macroeconomic disturbances….what is needed is a bankruptcy 
provision that expedites restructuring and gives greater presumption for the continuation of 
existing management.  Such reform will have the further advantage of inducing more due 
diligence on the part of the creditors, rather than encouraging the kind of reckless lending that has 
been so common in the past. Trying to impose more creditor friendly bankruptcy reforms, taking 
no note of special features of macro-induced bankruptcies, is not the answer. Not only does this 
fail to address the problems of countries in crisis; it is a medicine which likely will not take hold 
– as we have seen so graphically in East Asia, one cannot simply graft the laws of one country 
onto the customs and norms of another.’ Indeed, this view looks like an attempt to export debtor 
in possession from the US to the developing economies. It shows the ‘one-size-fits all approach’ 
mentality that is found even among those who are ostensibly critical of the approach. 
6 L Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective’ (1995-1996) 64 Fordham L Rev 
2507, 2510; F Tung, ‘Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2000-2001) 33 Geo 
Wash Int’l L Rev 555, 576-577; JAE Pottow, ‘Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The 
Problems of and Proposed Solutions to Local Interests’(2005-2006)104 Mich L Rev 1899, 1902; 
and IF Fletcher, ‘Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global Standards and 
Principles to Govern Cross-border Insolvency’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 767, 774 
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likely they will have no local traders and investors beyond their borders, they 
have, over the years, been involved in massive liberalisations of their markets 
and investment, both domestic and foreign, which may be regarded as 
reaffirmation of their support for a universalist approach.7 Indeed, this may make 
it difficult for them to intelligently object to the universalist approach in the 
regulation of cross-border insolvency, which basically encapsulates standards 
they have already accepted. The following part looks at the market liberalisation 
strategies and how they potentially implicate regulation of cross-border 
insolvency in SSA countries. 
 
4.3 Liberalisation and Reform of the Supporting Legal Environment  
The market liberalisation of the SSA countries undertaken since the mid 1980s 
and early 1990s significantly enhanced integration of the economies of these 
countries to the global market. The liberalisation was implemented under the 
structural adjustment programme sponsored by the IMF and World Bank. The 
debt crisis of 1980s which had its origins in the oil crisis of 1970s facilitated 
implementation of the liberalisation measures within the broad context of the 
Washington Consensus policies pioneered by the World Bank and the IMF.  
 
The implementation of the reform prescriptions by the SSA countries, which has 
since provided policy and legal infrastructure that facilitates a flow of 
multinational enterprises into SSA resources and forces significant redeployment 
of regional resources from domestic to specialised foreign uses, was a pre-
condition for obtaining loans from the Multilateral institutions.8 The main 
aspects of the liberalisation initiatives are privatisation, deregulation in import 
and export and domestic commodity price, and liberalisation of capital flows. 
Realisation of such aspects in SSA countries has opened their economies for 
international trade and foreign investment through multinational enterprises from 
                                                 
7 See BS Masoud, ‘Transnational Aspects of Tanzania’s Corporate Insolvency Law: Challenges 
and Prospects’ (2006) 14 IIUMLJ 119; and JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to 
Emerging Markets: A Changing Role of Law in Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875 
8 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, CUP 
2004) 245, 258-262 
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the developed countries and more recently emerging economies. In this sense, 
the SSA economies were opened for challenges of potential cross-border 
insolvencies. 
 
4.3.1 Market Liberalisation 
The radical changes resulting from the liberalisation drive meant that SSA 
countries have to embark on enhancement of the role of the market, especially 
the participation of, and dependence on, private sector and in particular foreign 
investment. Accordingly, SSA countries have now to seriously and competitively 
attract and promote foreign investment which had, prior to the liberalisation, 
been regarded as a threat to national independence and development.9 
Unsurprisingly, such countries have been involved in putting in place a wide 
range of measures ranging from institutionalising tax incentives for foreign 
investment to machinery for property rights protection and enforcement. It would 
seem that this endeavour also reflected the need for SSA countries to do much to 
create a good impression and ‘overcome the perceptions that they are “unsafe” 
destinations for foreign capital.’10 It is in this context that there has been a 
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties concluded by SSA countries with 
mainly developed countries in their attempt partly to remedy local institutional 
deficiencies and governance.11 The need for foreign capital was considered 
significant given the low level of technological and industrial development, 
                                                 
9 BS Masoud (n 7) 125; TJ Moss, V Ramachandran and MK Shah, ‘Is Africa’s Skepticism of 
Foreign Capital Justified? Evidence from East African Firm Survey Data’ (2004) Centre for 
Global Development Working Paper 41/2004 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112683   > accessed 15 
August 2011[12]; and D Himbara, ‘The Failed Africanization of Commerce and Industry in 
Kenya’ (1994) 22(3) World Development 469-482; and B Mihyo, Non-Market Controls and the 
Accountability of Public Enterprises in Tanzania (Macmillan, London 1994) 127 & 128. Notably, 
concerns of developing countries on foreign investment and their demand that their particular 
needs and circumstances be taken into account as to the manner in which they would deal with 
foreign investment was in 1970s incorporated into the United Nations Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States 1974,  Art 2 
10 V Mosoti, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on 
Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?’ (2005-2006) 26 Nw J Int’l L 
& Bus 95, 114 
11 T Ginsburg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Governance’ (2005) 25 Int’l Rev L & Econ 107 
 103
dependence on primary commodity export, and slow long term growth 
characterised by price instability.12  
 
4.3.2 Reform Challenges and Problems  
Notably, the creation of the supporting and conducive environment for the 
liberalised market has largely been characterised by importation of programmes, 
Western legal rules and standards which in some instances have arguably tended 
to have adverse impact on the societies that have been required to embrace them, 
mainly because they are designed and implemented with little, if any, regard for 
specific needs and context of the countries concerned.13 Consistent with such 
adverse effect is the divergent opinions as to whether or not the liberalisation 
programme as a whole has been beneficial to SSA economies.14 One view is that 
the market liberalisation has had its achievements in SSA albeit to a limited 
extent and accordingly the recent gains have been claimed to be a result of 
market liberalisations in the region.15 This view argues that the limited economic 
growth attained thus far in SSA is however largely due to scepticisms and policy 
choices that restrict competitiveness.16  
 
Other scholars who subscribe to the second view have labelled the market 
liberalisations in SSA countries as a complete failure. They argue, inter alia, that 
the limited growth in SSA is due to the problems of the ‘one-size-fits all’ 
prescriptions of the multilateral institutions which the developing countries have 
                                                 
12 KJ Vandevelde, ‘Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1998) 36 Colum J Transnat’l L 501; and JMM Akech, ‘The African 
Growth and Opportunity Act: Implications for Kenya’s Trade and Development’ (2001) 33 
International Law and Politics 651, 656 
 
13See text to n 23 in chapter 1.  See also, TA Kelley, ‘Exporting Western Law to the Developing 
World: The Troubling Case of Niger’ (2007) 7 Global Jurist  (Frontiers) Article 8 < 
http://wwwbepress.com/gj/vol7/issu3/art8 > accessed 01/06/2010, noting that this trend ‘has the 
potential to create at least as much social unrest as economic policies’ and that it is wrong to 
maintain that poor countries must reshape their legal systems to make them compatible with 
Western conception of law and justice.’ 
14 Text to n 23-26  in chapter 1 
15 A Arieff, MA Weiss, and VC Jones, ‘The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Global Policy Responses’ ( Congressional Research Service Report  24 August  2009) 
< www.crs.gov > accessed 23/01/2010; J Stiglitz (n 5 ) 16, 80-88 
16 TJ Moss, V Ramachandran and MK Shah (n 9 ); and A Arieff, MA Weiss, and VC Jones (n 15) 
5 
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pursued since the mid 1980s and early 1990s.17 This view, considers the success 
of the East Asian countries as a result of effective state intervention during East 
Asia’s early development.18 It is accordingly argued that ‘the state directed 
policies helped mobilize and effectively allocate resources in the calculated 
direction of domestic industry, while extracting high performance through 
incentive schemes.’19 Insofar as cross-border insolvency reform is concerned, the 
above observations seem to point to the need for SSA countries to make 
informed policy choices commensurate with local circumstances and the demand 
for economic growth and development. 
 
This debate is beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, what is crucially 
relevant here is twofold. First is the fact that the market liberalisation has 
increased the interaction between the SSA economies and the multinational 
enterprises through trade and foreign investment. This interaction means 
potentialities for cross-border insolvency which has grown as a result of 
globalisation. Clearly, the involvement and operations of multinational 
enterprises in SSA means that they will potentially have assets and creditors in 
several countries and in their home countries. Such situation places SSA 
countries in a fertile environment for the challenges of potential cross-border 
insolvencies. Additionally, the commercial activities of the multinational 
enterprises in SSA countries provide a possibility of their interaction with local 
entrepreneurs and creation of interdependence and possibly debtor-creditor 
relationships. All these add towards exposing SSA countries to the problems of 
cross-border insolvencies. The second is the fact that the liberalisation has 
contributed in constraining the policy space of SSA countries in making choices 
corresponding with their own needs, priorities, culture, history and political and 
socio-economic situations. 
                                                 
17 J Stiglitz (n 5) 16, 80-88; A Anghie (n 8) 259;  Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: 
Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms (London, Zed Books 1997) and  J Hari, ‘There's real 
hope from Haiti and it's not what you expect’ The Independent 5/02/2010 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-theres-real-hope-
from-haiti-and-its-not-what-you-expect-1889958.html> accessed 10 February 2010  
18 D Katona, ‘Challenging the Global Structure Through Self-Determination: An African 
Perspective’ (1999) 14 Am U Int’l L Rev 1439, 1451 
19 D Katona (n 18) 1451, 1452 & 1453 
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4.4 Multilateral Institutions’ Role in Facilitation of Cross-Border Trade 
and Investment 
 
Apart from the IMF and the World Bank’s involvements in the liberalisation of 
SSA markets, regulatory activities of the other multilateral institutions such as 
the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) significantly affect SSA.20 The WTO, of 
which a majority of its members are among the developing countries, is 
responsible for regulation of the multilateral trading arrangements amongst 
member countries. The main preoccupation is to see to it that multilateral trade is 
rule-based and ensures equal rights and obligations, non-discrimination and co-
operation as equals of many countries regardless of their size or share in the 
transactions. Such responsibility is attained through negotiation and conclusion 
amongst members of agreements as regards regulation of particular aspects of the 
trading system. Since such activities affect trade and investment, they potentially 
have indirect implications for the policy choices available to SSA countries in 
cross-border insolvency endeavours. 
 
One obligation of members is that they have to ensure conformity of their 
policies, laws and regulations with the WTO regime. The implication is that the 
domestic laws and regulations of a member state, for instance, could only be 
retained as long as they do not contradict the WTO regime which restricts 
excessive government intervention and all types of trade barriers such as 
protectionism policies.  
 
The WTO regime does not provide for or directly deal with cross-border 
insolvency which is in many instances a direct consequence of engagement in 
commercial undertakings, but it is arguably presumed to have such potentials.21 
                                                 
20 The existing multilateral trading system traces its origin from 1947 when the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) established the GATT/WTO multilateral trading 
system that exists today, though GATT was meant to be a provisional arrangement. 
 
21 JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 
2296, noting the leverage of WTO regime and contending further that ‘[i]f insolvency law were 
to follow intellectual property law in being tied to the GATT, it would have similar international 
leverage.’; JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (1998) 33 Tex Int’l L J 27, 35, contending that 
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UNCITRAL’s work on insolvency undertaken within its obligation of fostering 
progressive harmonisation, unification and modernisation of international trade 
law augur well for the WTO’s endeavours of facilitating trade and investment 
and the reverse is also true.22  Indeed, UNCITRAL’s undertakings aim to 
facilitate international trade through elimination of such obstacles as divergences 
arising from the laws of different states in matters relating to international trade. 
The WTO, as is also for UNCITRAL, is mandated to cooperate and work closely 
with other multilateral institutions to achieve greater coherence in global 
economic policy making and implementation.23Accordingly, cross-border 
insolvency implications abound, but only a few merit the attention of this study. 
 
Firstly, the effectiveness of the WTO regime would potentially expect member 
states to comply with international insolvency standards administered by the 
other multilateral institutions. The potential is that a WTO member state with 
obstructionist domestic policies that shun the internationally accepted standards, 
such as the international insolvency standards, might in future run the risk of 
corporate flight as the very nature of the multinational enterprises is to be 
internationally mobile and adaptable. This effectively provides an incentive for 
states to have most favourable and competitive policies that are compliant with 
international standards as a means of attracting cross-border trade and 
investment. Thus, in addition to the incentives from such institutions as the IMF 
and World Bank, SSA countries may unsurprisingly also experience some kind 
                                                                                                                                    
‘[b]eyond [BITs’] obligations non-discrimination on basis of citizenship [in insolvency 
proceedings] is a general principle that has evolved in modern international law, especially in 
international trade under GATT (now the WTO). Thus, at a minimum…discrimination on the 
basis of foreignness would be presumptively wrong.’ 
22 See General Assembly Resolution 2205(XXI),U.N. Doc. A/RES/2205 (Dec. 17, 1966); and S 
Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, ‘Incrementalism in Global Lawmaking’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J 
Int’l L 851, 856 
23 DK Mbogoro, Global Trading Arrangements and Their Relevance to Tanzania Economic 
Development: Challenges and Prospects (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, London 1996) 17; and S 
Block-Lieb and TC Halliday (n 22) 857-859. Two of the eight ways through which UNCITRAL 
is to further the progressive harmonisation and unification of the law of international trade which 
is in the Resolution establishing UNCITRAL provides that UNCITRAL may proceed by ‘(a) Co-
ordinating the work of organisations active in this field and encouraging co-operation among 
them; ………..(g) Maintaining liaison with other United Nations organs and specialized agencies 
concerned with international trade.’ 
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of ingenious pressure from the WTO and its member states for compliance with 
the international insolvency best practices.  
 
Secondly, the capacity of member states (including SSA member states) to make 
policy choices commensurate with their circumstances is arguably circumscribed 
by the WTO obligations.24 Such obligations could effectively be construed to 
accommodate insolvency and especially cross-border insolvency regulation as 
reflected in the existing international insolvency standards.25  Consistent with 
this argument is that insolvency laws are known for having discriminatory 
measures based on protectionism and inward stance which would ordinarily 
affect foreign commercial interests in a cross-border insolvency scenario.26 
Indeed, the requirement to refrain from resorting to a wide variety of 
discriminatory state measures -such as bailout/state aids, tariff increases, trade 
defence measures, and if one were to add ‘grab rule’-some of which have been 
used in SSA to protect local industries or public enterprises, would mean that 
SSA countries need to have effective insolvency system. Such a system could 
effectively be used to rescue a viable business in financial difficulties as opposed 
to protecting it through discriminatory state measures and other politically 
motivated initiatives.  
 
4.4.1 The Proposed Role of WTO in Financial Crisis Resolution and the 
Cross-Border Insolvency Implications Involved 
 
Some considerations that have been given on the role that WTO can play during 
economic crises suggest a number of measures. The suggested measures seem to 
have the potential to strengthen the implication of the WTO regime for cross-
                                                 
24 SJ Evenett, ‘The Role of the WTO During Systemic Economic Crisis’ (A Background paper 
for Round Table 4: WTO rules  at the Inaugural Conference of Thinking Ahead on International 
Trade (TAIT) organized by the Centre for Trade and Economic Integration 17-18 September 
2009) <  www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/tait_sept09_e/evenett_e.doc  >  accessed 23/2/2010 
25 Ibid. In line with this reasoning, see also, R Parry and H Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate 
Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles’ (2008) 8 JCLS 113, 123 observing how China’s 
insolvency law reform process ‘escalated in recent years, with the requirements associated with 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)’ 
26 SJ Evenett (n 24)  
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border insolvency regulation.27  The measures seek to facilitate trade and 
investment during crises by ensuring that member states do not resort to 
discriminatory state measures. One such measure proposes negotiation to be held 
among members and agreement to be concluded as to the best practices when 
implementing measures that are not directly subject to the WTO accords but have 
potential implications for foreign commercial interests. Another measure 
proposes that member states should be compelled to adopt principles of 
accountability, transparency, and evidence-based policymaking in any regulatory 
measures taken that may implicate foreign commercial interests. Among the long 
term measures proposed is negotiation of the WTO disciplines that would limit 
resort to murky protectionism. Naturally, policies that limit foreign creditors 
participation in local insolvency proceedings; or deny co-operation and co-
ordination in cross-border insolvencies which might preserve rather than destroy 
going concern value,28 could all amount to instances of discriminations covered 
by the proposed measure. 
 
It is arguable that when SSA countries consider how to regulate cross-border 
insolvencies, they should necessarily take account of their obligations and key 
principles that characterise the multilateral trade arrangements under the WTO. 
Although such obligations may help SSA countries to determine their priorities, 
they effectively limit their scope of policy choices. The least developed countries 
in SSA are not, under the WTO, expected to reciprocate. Nevertheless, they are 
necessarily not expected to entertain domestic policies that will not be preferred 
by the investors from their trading partners in the WTO regime.29  
4.4.2 An Example of Cross-Border Insolvency Implication Arising from 
Activities of other Multilateral Institutions  
 
The UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention on International Interest in Mobile 
Equipment (the Convention)30 potentially implicates the international character 
                                                 
27 Ibid 
28 Text to n 61 in chapter 3 
29 Notably such countries have already bound themselves in BITs which do not offer them such 
differential treatments  
30 It came into force on  01 March 2006 
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of SSA states’ insolvency legislation.31 As SSA countries are increasingly 
ratifying and implementing the Convention, the move is directly transforming 
their insolvency law towards the direction of universalism and in particular the 
priority ranking of creditors in the international context.32  The Convention offers 
contracting states the choice of two alternative approaches as to the status of 
creditor’s rights during the insolvency of a debtor that is a subject of a contract of 
sale of aircraft equipment creating or providing for an international interest.33 
The approaches aim at enabling creditors with interests in aircraft objects to 
exercise their remedies in insolvency proceedings.34 This potentially accords 
super priority to those who engage in financing or leasing aircraft objects during 
insolvency proceedings compared to persons who finance or lease other types of 
equipment. 
 
The first approach provides that, upon the debtor’s insolvency, the insolvency 
administrator or the debtor must within a specified time, either cure all defaults 
and agree to satisfy all future obligations or allow the creditor to take possession 
of the aircraft. During such period the creditor may seek any interim relief 
available.35  The second approach provides that, upon insolvency, the creditor 
can demand that the insolvency administrator gives notice within a prescribed 
time, either that it will cure all defaults and agree to satisfy all future obligations 
or that it will permit the creditor to take the aircraft object. For either of the 
                                                 
31 JL Westbrook and others, A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (World Bank, 
Washington 2010) 264, stating that this convention provides mobile equipment ‘industries with a 
worldwide applicable super-priority under any national insolvency law.’; KV Proskurchnko, 
‘Chapter 15 Cross-Border Insolvency: Is It True to Its Universalism Aspirations?’ (2008) 5 
Rutgers Bus LJ 96, 109; and SJ Roberts, J Carruth, WD Stuber, and MJ Sundehl, ‘International 
Secured Transactions and Insolvency’ (2006) 40 Int’l L 381, 388- 392 
32 SSA countries that have  implemented the convention are, Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Republic of South Africa, Togo, 
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. See < http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2001-
convention.pdf > accessed 13 October 2010 and also < http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/capetown-
conv.pdf  > accessed 13 October 2010. 
33 It is to be noted that the US did not subscribe to any of the two approaches but chose to utilise 
its insolvency system which has been put to test and widely used as a model in the reform of 
many of insolvency systems in the world. 
34 DG Mayer and FL Polk, ‘A Test of the Cape Town Convention: Useful Tool in Debtor 
Insolvencies and Defaults or Trap for the Unwary?’(2009) 2.5 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 
237 
 
35 UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention , Art XI (5) 
 110
approaches to be applied, it is a requirement that there should be co-operation ‘to 
the maximum extent possible’36 between courts of the relevant contracting states.  
 
The international interests involved must have been registered in the international 
registry created under the Convention and the contracting states should have 
made and lodged a declaration to the registry as to the alternative approach it has 
chosen.37 Additionally, the remedies apply only where a contracting state 
involved is ‘the primary insolvency jurisdiction.’38 And what is critically crucial 
is the priority of interests that the convention establishes which directly affect the 
contracting state’s priority ranking in insolvency proceedings. This is to the 
effect that a registered interest has priority over any other interest registered 
subsequently and over a non-registered interest. 
 
In their respective declarations for implementation of the Convention, Tanzania 
and Kenya opted to apply the first approach in its entirety to all types of 
insolvency proceedings.39  The implication is that it is now imperative to 
consider the ramification of the Convention and its protocol in any examination 
of cross-border aspects of insolvency law systems of SSA countries. One 
significant implication is that one must read such declarations into a SSA 
country’s cross-border insolvency regime. This again effectively contributes 
towards pulling the cross-border insolvency regime of contracting states in SSA 
                                                 
36 See UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention,  Arts X (6) (b) and  XII (2) 
37 UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention, Art XXX (3). As to whether or not the Convention is 
meant to be self –executing, credence has been given to the view that, at a minimum, the 
remedial provisions of the convention were intended to be self-executing. In support of the view, 
reference has been given to article 5(2) of the Convention which arguably provides guidance on 
this aspect, as it points out how the Convention should be interpreted. For details on this see, E 
Gewirtz, ‘The Cape Town Convention: Similar is not the Same and Says Who’ (2006/2007) Air 
Finance Journal < www.milbank.com > accessed 16/11/2009.  
38 Article I of the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment defines the primary insolvency jurisdiction as ‘the 
contracting state in which the centre of the debtor’s main interests is situated, which for this 
purpose shall be deemed to be the place of the debtor’s statutory seat or, if there is none, the place 
where the debtor is incorporated or formed, unless proved otherwise.’ 
39 For Declarations lodged by Tanzania and Kenya, see < 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-
equipment/depositaryfunction/declarations/bycountry/unitedrepublicoftanzania.htm > and < 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-
equipment/depositaryfunction/declarations/bycountry/kenya.htm > respectively accessed 
12/4/2009 
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towards the direction of universalism. But this time, it is through harmonisation 
of applicable law rather than by a universal application of lex concursus. Such 
implication is at best incremental given that the convention is limited to very 
specific categories of mobile asset such as aircraft, railway rolling stock and 
space assets. 
 
Clearly, the implementation of the Convention in SSA countries poses a potential 
conflict with the whole endeavour of implementing bilateral investment treaties 
and other international commitments which envisage realisation of the most 
favoured nation principle, national treatment, and fair and equitable treatment for 
all investors. It provides a priority ranking in insolvency proceedings to creditors 
whose interests against debtors in aircraft objects are registered in the 
international registry. An apparent challenge for SSA countries is to balance such 
interests with their priorities and needs, and perhaps to have an equally effective 
and efficient framework for dealing with creditors from all business sectors and 
industries in the event of insolvency proceedings.  
 
 
4.5 The Bilateral Investment Arrangements and their Linkage to Cross-
Border Insolvency 
 
There is a clear nexus between the bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) which 
provide for cross-border investment arrangements on the one hand and cross-
border insolvency regulations on the other.40 This part takes this point further by 
examination of principles and standards of the bilateral investment treaties as 
they link and implicate cross-border insolvency regulation for a host country in 
SSA. With the liberalisation of markets, there has been a growing number of 
BITs concluded by developing countries in SSA with developed countries. Quite 
recently, there has been an emerging pattern of cross-border investment 
arrangements among developing countries. This new pattern signifies the 
emergence of emerging economies in East Asia.41  
                                                 
40 Text to n 57, 58 & 59 in chapter 3 
41 It is interesting that there have emerged a more or less standardised format of bilateral 
investment treaties. As such, even the treaties concluded between SSA countries and the 
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Over the last few years African countries had concluded a total of 11 new 
bilateral investment treaties. They were party to 27% of all BITs in the world by 
2007 while in 2006 alone they concluded 21 new agreements.42 An interesting 
development is the new interest of the US in SSA as reflected in the conclusion 
of the bilateral investment agreements between the US and several SSA countries 
and regional groupings.43 By the end of 2008 there were treaties covering 
investment and trade concluded by the US with COMESA, WAEMU, EAC, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Ghana, Mauritius, and Nigeria.44   
 
While European countries remain the dominant contracting partners in the 
majority of the BITs concluded by SSA countries, the emergence of China and 
other countries from Asia such as India, Malaysia and Indonesia is noteworthy.45 
China alone accounts for a large share of the ‘South-South’46 agreements. In fact, 
about 60% of the Chinese BITs concluded from 2002 to 2007 were with other 
developing countries, mainly from SSA. Indeed, 8 of the 16 BITs China signed 
from 2003 to 2007 were concluded with SSA countries, namely Benin, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Namibia, Seychelles, and Uganda.47 
The new trend of ‘treatification’ is one that combines trade, and investment 
                                                                                                                                    
emerging markets have tended to be a replica of those concluded with developed countries. See 
generally, JW Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford, OUP 2010) 
42 M Malik, ‘Recent Developments in Regional and Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (A 
Background paper for the 2nd Annual Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators, 
Marrakech, Morocco 2-4 November 2008)[1]-[5]; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: 
Transnational Corporations and Infrastructure Challenge (United Nations, New York 2008) 15-
17 and UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening Regional 
Economic Integration for Africa (United Nations, New York 2009) 
43 See UNCTAD, Economic development in Africa Report 2009 (n 42) 50 
44 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009 (n 42) 50 
45 The leading European countries in concluding such treaties are the UK, Germany, Switzerland, 
Italy, France, Netherland, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
46 South-South is a phrase coined to describe co-operation between developing countries 
otherwise known as countries of the global South. See UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation in 
International Investment Arrangements (UN, New York 2005) 1-48; and Marrakech Declaration 
of South-South Co-operation December 2003 < www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-
Declaration.html > accessed 5 August 2011 
47 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42) 15 and 34; M Malik (n 42) 
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liberalisation whilst also involving SSA regional groups as contracting partners 
instead of individual SSA countries.48  
 
There are various reasons that have been attributed to the surge in bilateral 
investment treaties starting from the 1990s. While the growth of the use of such 
agreements reflects both trade liberalisation and in particular co-operation with 
preferred partners on ‘behind the border policies,’49 the impetus behind the 
expansion of these agreements rests on the desire of multinational enterprises to 
invest safely and securely in developing countries and the need to create a stable 
and predictable international legal framework to facilitate and protect the cross-
border trade and investments.50 Such desire reflects the absence of multilateral 
investment agreement to regulate foreign investments which meant that 
international regulation of foreign investment was a subject of great uncertain 
and controversy. 51 Accordingly, there was no effective mechanism for investors 
to pursue their claims against host countries that might have injured or 
appropriated their investments or refused to respect their contractual obligations. 
This was particularly important given that SSA countries are not only believed to 
have weak institutional and legal support for property rights and contract 
enforcement but also had a record of appropriating and nationalising foreign 
investments. 52  
                                                 
48 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008(n 42)17; UNCTAD, Economic Development  in 
Africa Report 2009 (n 42) 54; M Malik (n 42) 2. The on-going negotiations for investment and 
trade agreements between Africa’s regional trade agreements and the EU undertaken in the 
context of EPAs are illustrative, so is the Trade and Investment Development and Co-operation 
Agreement (“TIDCA”) between the US and the South Africa Custom Union (“SACU”) signed in 
16 July 2008 and several Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (“TIFAs”) that the US 
has signed by the end of 2008 with RTAs in SSA such as EAC, COMESA, and WAEMU.  
49 This is a terminology used to refer to facilitation measures regarding trade and investment 
competitiveness that a country might adopt in guiding its cross-border co-operation in trade and 
investment. They ‘..include regulations and institutions overseeing local and foreign investment, 
capital markets, customs, taxation, labor, private ownership, legal recourse, and so on’ See, 
World Bank, ‘Regional Challenges’ <   http://go.worldbank.org/E96ILDA2Y0  >  accessed 17 
August 2011 
50JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harv Int’l LJ 67, 75. It is the same impetus that 
exerts pressures for convergence of development of effective cross-border law systems across the 
globe and in developing countries in particular in order to create predictable and efficient 
machinery that seeks to maximise values of the estates of an insolvent debtor.  
51 V Mosoti (n 10) 95, 113 
52 A Akinsanya, ‘International Protection of Direct Foreign Investment in the Third World’ 
(1987) 36 ICLQ 58, 58-77; M Sornarajah, ‘Protection of Foreign Investment in the Asian pacific 
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Therefore individual countries (especially the developed ones) negotiated and 
concluded BITs with specific developing countries in order to protect their 
investors in those countries. Such protection is by firstly, subjecting host 
countries to set international legal rules that they had to observe in dealing with 
investors; and secondly by providing investors themselves the right to bring a 
claim in international arbitration against host country governments which 
violated those rules. In general terms, it is the intention of a BIT to restrain host 
country action against the interests of investors and thus providing assurance to 
the investors regarding their property rights. The conventional wisdom is that 
BITs help to remedy local institutional deficiencies, primarily in developing 
countries where fear of expropriation, among other things, might otherwise deter 
foreign investment.53  
 
As far as SSA countries are concerned, the argument is that FDI plays an 
important role in fostering economic growth and development of developing 
countries. It contributes to a rise in domestic investment as well as skills, 
technology transfers and capacity. The impetus of SSA countries therefore 
derives from the desire to overcome the perception that they are an insecure 
destination for foreign capital.54  
 
It has been argued that the desperation of SSA countries ‘for FDI 
overwhelmingly precludes them from making thorough analysis of economic, 
political, and social or other gains that may come from such inflows, and the 
laws and treaty they need to realise such gains.’55 Such observation owes from 
the nature of the obligations that the host countries take in relation to protection 
and treatment of foreign investments which constrain the host countries’ 
                                                                                                                                    
Economic Co-operation Region’ (2005) 29 J World Trade 105, 126; and V Mosoti (n 10) 113-
114 
 
53 See n 11 above 
54 See M Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit…and 
they could Bite’ (2003) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 3121 < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636541 > accessed 15 April 2011 [2] 
55 V Mosoti (n 10) 95, 99 
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sovereignty and the ability to regulate. In reality the bargain that is reflected in 
these treaties is such that the host countries are not expected to export capital to 
the developed country.56 Rather, they are expected to live up to the promise of 
protection of the foreign capital in return for the prospect of more capital in 
future.57 These agreements therefore seek to establish binding rights and 
responsibilities for the contracting parties with regard to co-operation, trade 
access, and admission, promotion and protection of foreign investment.58 
 
4.5.1 The Implications of the Bilateral Investment Treaties for Cross-
Border Insolvency Regulation 
 
The surge in the growth of BITs involving SSA countries underlies the growing 
global importance attached to, and the role states play in competitively affording, 
a reliable legal environment to attract foreign investment and promote 
commercial activities in general.59  It is in this context that it becomes important 
to consider the involvement of SSA in facilitation of capital flow and how such 
involvement may require or influence cross-border insolvency regulation in SSA. 
 
As SSA countries are increasingly becoming interdependent and connected to the 
global market through the facilitation and thus growth of capital flow, they face 
the challenge of reflecting in their insolvency regimes, the demands of the global 
market, which consists of various players from different jurisdictions and 
addressing financial fluctuations that are inherent in market economies.60 The 
cross-border investment arrangements involving SSA,61 thus, imply a challenge 
                                                 
56 JW Salacuse, ‘The Treatification of International Investment Law’ (2007) 13 Law & Bus Rev 
Am 155, 157 &158; and  JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan (n 50) 78 
57 Ibid 
 
58 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42) 16 
59 AT Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1997-1998) 38 Va J Int’l L 640, 652 
60 J Stiglitz (n 5) 120; and JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan (n 50) 115; JW Salacuse (n 56) 165 
stating that ‘as BITs proliferate, more and more countries incorporate BITs into their domestic 
legal systems. Thus, there is scope for arguing that BITs manifest certain concepts on the 
treatment of investors and investments that represent general principles of law’; and B 
Kishoiyian, ‘The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary 
International Law’ (1994) 14 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 327, 329 
61  V Mosoti (10); M Malik (n 32); UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42) 15 and 34; 
JW Salacuse (n 56) 163, discussing the consequences and challenges of treatification of 
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to the SSA host countries to align their insolvency regimes and in particular 
cross-border insolvency law system with their entire legal environment for 
facilitation of investment, as well as standards and principles envisaged in such 
arrangements of which SSA countries are contracting parties.62 Addressing such 
a challenge in a manner that is legitimately expected by the investors is critically 
important in enabling such countries to honour their treaty obligations even 
during cross-border insolvencies. This may perhaps also entail adopting ‘best 
practices’ common to most of its trade and investment partners’ insolvency law 
systems.63 In so doing, such countries will avoid any potential arbitration claim 
for failure to properly regulate cross-border insolvencies.64 Contemplating the 
risk a host country may find itself in for failure to meet treaty commitments in 
the event of an insolvency situation, Salacuse argues that: 
The issue……is an interesting and potentially important one. As 
financial crisis strike[s] countries, they will seek to deal with 
[insolvency issues], often without regard to the treaty commitments they 
have made. One can imagine a variety of situations in which a 
governmental measure or failure to act adversely affects the rights of an 
investor or creditor, leading that person to claim that his or her 
investment was expropriate[d], denied full protection and security, or 
fair and equitable treatment. Other treaty provisions may also be 
relevant. 65 
 
                                                                                                                                    
investment law contends that ‘…..unlike the situation that prevailed thirty years ago, government 
officials, international executives, lawyers, and financiers increasingly must take investment 
treaties into account in planning, negotiating, undertaking, and managing international investment 
transactions.….[T]he process of treatification of international investment law has also resulted in 
the creation of an emerging global regime for international investment…… [that] …constrains 
and regularize the behaviour [of] participants, affect which issues among protagonists move on 
and off the agendas, determine which activities are legitimized or condemned, and influence 
whether, when, and how conflict are resolved. Taken together the network of international 
investment treaties do all of the things.’ 
 
62 Text to n 57-60 in chapter 3. It is to be noted that these arrangements as represented by bilateral 
investment treaties have been described by analysts and scholars as having the effect of 
constraining the sovereignty of a host country in its ability to take legislative and administrative 
action to advance and protect national interests. See JW Salacuse (n 56) 155, 158 & 163. For a 
comprehensive list of bilateral investment treaties involving SSA countries visit < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 > accessed 22/02/2010 
63 Ibid 
64 This will restrict the ability of an investor to complain against discriminatory treatment in 
insolvency proceedings involving his investment, his debtors and his creditors. See O Chung, 
‘The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-
State Arbitration’ (2006-2007) 47 Va J Int’l L 953, 960, arguing that the bilateral ‘[i]nvestment 
treaties have become an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a 
financial and business failure was due to improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic policy 
or discriminatory treatment by the host government…’ 
65 Statement by Professor JW Salacuse (Personal  email correspondence 27 May 2010)  
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 Much as historical, socio-economic, political and cultural norms and needs of a 
given country have significant influence in shaping the country’s insolvency law 
and practice,66 the normative nature and breadth of the matters covered in the 
BITs,67effectively circumscribe the policy choice space of the host countries in 
SSA for cross-border insolvency regulation.  
 
4.5.2 Linking Tools between Bilateral Investment Treaties and Cross-
Border Insolvency Regulation 
 
The linkage between the cross-border investment arrangements and the host 
country’s cross-border insolvency regime is clearly apparent in FDIs expected to 
flow from the home country to the host country. The capital inflows to a host 
country may thus require an insolvency legal regime that is in harmony with the 
policy objectives of the prevailing arrangements.68 A regime that will take into 
account the foreign element that is apparent in such investments and the 
possibility of such investments being one among many operations of the home 
country entity scattered in SSA countries and the rest of the world, but connected 
to one another.69 It is common knowledge that the growth of international 
business and investment tends to enhance the potential for occurrence of cross-
border insolvency and its associated challenges.70  
                                                 
66 N Martin ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 4; F Tung (n 6) 561; 
and L Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency- The 1996 Denning Lecture’ < 
www.filewiz.co.uk/bacfi/1996_denning_lecture.pdf > accessed 12 March 2009. Apparently, 
different policy choices that characterise a given insolvency system are a reflection of such 
country’s norms and inclinations. 
67 Despite the diversity in the nature of the bilateral investment treaties, there is consensus in the 
existing scholarship that the bilateral investment treaties underline some common features that 
potentially contribute towards development of international investment law. See JW Salacuse and 
NP Sullivan (n 50), noting how negotiation of bilateral investment Treaties  has progressively 
resulted into standard BIT, aiming at according higher standard of protection and guarantee for 
the investments of the capital exporting country, from which countries are reluctant to depart 
especially with regard to objectives, and major provisions. See alsoV Mosoti (n 10) 115 
68 See n 60-62 above 
69 I Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (OUP, Oxford 2009) 
70 See R Mason, ‘Hotchpot and Other Tasty Morsels in International Insolvency’ (1995) 3 Insolv 
LJ 149, contending that ‘[a]s international trade and investment increases, so does the likelihood 
of there being insolvent corporations with cross-border links. These connections with other 
jurisdictions often raise problems……An obvious example is in the repatriation of foreign assets, 
while another may be in the processing of claims and distribution of assets where local creditors 
are joined by foreign claimants. What policies and principles should a particular jurisdiction 
apply in resolving issues [relating to the] foreign elements?’ 
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Studies have been undertaken on whether the strength of the rights enshrined in a 
BIT would provide adverse incentives to potential investors and whether they 
have actual impact on enhancing capital inflows to a host country. Divergent 
opinions and conclusions have so far been given.71 However, the dominant view 
is seemingly that the potential impact is high where the BITs are complemented 
by liberalised foreign investment regime with reasonably strong domestic 
institutions. Despite the fierce debate among scholars on whether or not the BITs 
have the impact of attracting foreign investors and FDI into a host country,72 it 
seems that the dominant scholarship, including the first rigorous quantitative 
study undertaken in the recent past,73 suggests that a higher number of bilateral 
investment treaties raise the FDI that flows to a developing host country.  
 
The connection between the BITs and cross-border insolvencies is also evident in 
the standards and principles contained in the treaties and in the entire 
commitment undertaken by the host countries to ensure favourable environment 
for foreign investments.74  As it will be shown in the subsequent discussion, 
these standards and principles, which include the fair and equitable principle, 
national treatment, most favoured national retreatment and right to repatriation of 
funds, envision those that characterise the cross-border insolvency landscape. 
They therefore stand a better chance, in the course of time, to potentially 
                                                 
71 M Hallward-Driemeier (n 54) 18-23 (noting that although her findings suggest that BITs do not 
serve to attract additional FDI, it is possible that this is due to its being obscured by other changes 
that are occurring between the two signatories’); JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan (n 50) 111, 
concluding that ‘there is strong evidence to show that [bilateral investment treaties] both protect 
and promote FDI in developing countries…..although the effect…is…realised slowly.’); and KJ 
Vandevelde (n 12) 504 noting that BIT have had only a limited impact on economic 
liberalisation. 
 
72 KP Sauvant, and LE Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment Treaties, 
Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP, Oxford 2009) 
73 E Neumayer and L Spess, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing countries?’ (2005) 33 World Development 1567-1585. For the updated 
version of this paper see <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=616242> , or 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_(BITs).pdf > accessed 22/3/2009 
74 See text to part 4.5.2.1 through 4.5.2.7 below where the standards and principles are discussed. 
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influence not only policy considerations that would shape cross-border 
insolvency regulation in the host countries but also their entire legal systems.75  
 
The most significant argument is that BITs embody catch-all clauses 
characterised by general principles of law. They are, arguably, intended to 
protect foreign investors in any circumstances at the expense of the host 
countries. It is therefore not surprising that BITs have traditionally not been 
according explicit and specific reference to insolvency or cross-border 
insolvency as it is also the case for many other relevant aspects to foreign 
investors and investments. However, this does not mean that BITs are not meant 
to cover matters related to regulation of insolvencies as they affect foreign 
investors.76 Perhaps the only exception, which is arguably consistent with the 
surge in the cases of insolvencies in recent years, is the new emergent US treaty 
practices which, albeit briefly and in general terms, provide explicitly for 
treatment of insolvency aspects as they relate to transfer of funds and profits and 
repatriation of capital of an investor from the host country.77  
 
The failure to explicitly and comprehensively provide for insolvency involving a 
foreign investor in a detailed manner could be associated with the recognition of 
difficulties involved in negotiating such insolvency issues and diversities 
available across jurisdictions with regard to regulation of insolvency. The other 
plausible explanation is the consideration that the BITs embody catch-all clauses 
and general principles of law constituting sources of international insolvency 
                                                 
75 JW Salacuse (n 56) 165 
76 JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’(n 21) 35; and JW Salacuse (n 56) 165  
77 An example of such emergent practice can be afforded by Treaty between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 2008 accessed < 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/US-Rwanda_BIT.pdf >  , also at  < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779  > accessed 22/02/2010. The relevant 
provision reads as follow. Art 7 (1) (b) provides that ‘Each Party shall permit all transfers relating 
to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such 
transfers include ( a)……(b) …..proceeds from the sale of all or any part of the covered 
investment or from the partial or complete liquidation of the covered investment…’ Art (4) (a) 
further provides that ‘ ‘Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 through 3,a party may prevent a transfer 
through the equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith application of its laws relating to: (a) 
bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors…’ 
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regulatory frameworks for contracting parties.78  The new trend of revisiting and 
renegotiating the BITs in order to reflect new concerns seem to focus on 
transparency, environmental and social issues and the host country’s right to 
regulate. It is yet to be seen whether this trend of renegotiating the BIT among 
contracting states might result in particularity in the way cross-border insolvency 
is treated. 79  
  
The examination of the standards and principles contained in the BITs’ clauses 
below demonstrates the extent to which SSA countries have bound themselves in 
obligations that potentially affect and shape their policy choices as to cross-
border insolvency regulation.80  
 
4.5.2.1  Scope and Definition of ‘Investment’ and ‘Investor’ 
With a view to ensuring comprehensive protection and promoting investment, 
the BITs that SSA countries have concluded with developed countries have, 
albeit to a varying degree, adopted a wide and open ended meaning of a foreign 
investment. A typical scope of what amount to a foreign investment includes 
foreign direct investment, financial and other portfolio investments. Among the 
commonly mentioned examples of such investments include movable and 
immovable property, shares of companies, and ‘other kind of interests in 
                                                 
78 JW Salacuse (n 56) 165, stating that the ‘notion that principles embodied in BITs could 
represent general principles of law and thus constitute a source of international law has not 
received extensive consideration by scholars. But as BITs proliferate, more and more countries 
incorporate BITs into their domestic legal systems. Thus, there is scope for arguing that BITs 
manifest certain concepts on the treatment of investors and investments [in all aspects including 
in insolvency] that represent general principles of law.’; JW Salacuse, ‘Direct Foreign Investment 
and the Law in Developing Countries’ (2000) 15 ICSID Rev –Foreign Inv LJ 382, 382-400;  and 
FA Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (1981) 52 Brit YB 
Int’l L 241, 249 
79 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42)15 and 34; and JL Westbrook, ‘A Global 
Solution to Multinational Enterprise Default’(n 21) 2296 
80 See JW Salacuse (n 56) 163 contending that ‘…..unlike the situation that prevailed thirty years 
ago, government officials, international executives, lawyers, and financiers increasingly must 
take investment treaties into account in planning, negotiating, undertaking, and managing 
international investment transactions. 
….the process of treatification of international investment law has also resulted in the creation of 
[international] regime of international investment [which] …constrain and regularize the 
behaviour participants, affect which issues among protagonists move on and off the agendas, 
determine which activities are legitimatized or condemned, and influence whether, when, and 
how conflicts are resolved.’ 
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companies’ and ‘claims to money which have been used to create an economic 
value or claims to any performance having an economic value.’81 The BIT 
between Germany and Tanzania includes copyrights, industrial property rights, 
technical process, trade names and goodwill including ‘business concessions 
under public law, concessions to search for, extract or exploit natural resources’. 
It provides further that ‘any alteration of the form in which assets are invested 
shall not affect their classification as investment.’82  
 
This kind of broad definition and coverage of investment is similarly found in 
other BITs to which SSA countries are party. The broad definition for a foreign 
investment has been justified by the nature and character of investment. It is 
argued that an investment has potentials of taking a wide variety of forms that 
constantly evolve in response to the creativity of investors and the rapidly 
changing world of international finance. They include tangible and intangible 
assets, property, and rights.83 Indeed, the scope of such definition seems to be 
broad enough to include, the interests of lenders, such as international financiers 
to multinational enterprises and other investors’ undertaking in a host country. 
The implication of this is that it not only broadens the scope within which cross-
border insolvencies may occur, but also widens the obligations of the host 
country in insolvency proceedings that involve a foreign investment.84   
 
Given that SSA countries are the hosts, hosting such investments exposes 
themselves to involvement in contentious incidences of cross-border insolvency 
in either of the following scenarios. Firstly, in the event of insolvency of a 
foreign investor covered by a BIT, there is potential for having a great deal of 
claims from foreign countries that would need to be dealt with along with local 
claimants. Consistent with this is the fact that the investment may be a subsidiary 
of a multinational enterprise in a home country with other subsidiaries in other 
                                                 
81 For instance Bilateral Investment Treaties between SSA countries and Germany available at  < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 > accessed 22 February 2010 
82 BIT between  Germany and the United Republic of Tanzania, Art 8 
83 JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan (n 50 ) 80 
84 Ibid 
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countries including in other SSA countries.85 Thus, issues regarding co-operation 
and co-ordination which could preserve rather than destroy going concern value 
abound.86 Secondly, the foreign investor may have claims in a domestic 
investment undergoing insolvency proceedings which raise questions of their 
treatments and ranking of their claims in such proceedings. This scenario raises 
questions of the fairness and effectiveness of the domestic insolvency law which 
ought to be dealt with in a manner that is consistent with the relevant BIT. 
 
The broad definition of investment may play a role in exposing SSA to ‘hot 
money’ and a potential risk for financial crisis and hence insolvency. The risk for 
the crisis requires a country to have an effective insolvency laws system that is 
capable of acting as a crisis resolution tool whilst at the same time preventing 
closure of a business which would otherwise be rescued. It is to be noted that 
‘hot money’ played a key role in the occurrence of the East Asia financial crisis 
of 1990s which led to international attention for reform of insolvency systems in 
this region.87 
 
4.5.2.2 Standards of Treatment of Foreign Investors and Foreign 
Investments 
The BITs that developing countries in SSA have concluded mostly with 
developed countries specify standards for treatments of foreign investors and 
foreign investment from a home country in a host country. These standards are 
fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, and most-favoured-nation 
(“MFN”) treatment to be discussed in this section. Some BITs combine such 
standards in one article as is the case for the treaties concluded between the 
Netherlands and some of SSA countries.  
 
In addition to the requirement for ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the 
investment of investors of a contracting party, such article would normally 
further provide that ‘[e]ach contracting party shall accord to such investments 
                                                 
85 I Mevorach (n 69) 
86 See n 28 above 
87 T Ginsburg  (n 11) 107.  See also text to n 120 below 
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treatment which in any case shall not be less favourable than that which it 
accords to investments of its own investors or to investments of investors of any 
third state, whichever is more favourable to the investor concerned.’88 The 
requirement to accord such investments full physical security and protection is an 
additional aspect that characterises such provisions. Furthermore, other BITs 
would stipulate that parties must extend fair and equitable treatment ‘in 
accordance with the principle of international law.’89 The significance  of these 
standards as well as the obligations they entail to the host country is that an 
investor is entitled to the best treatment accorded by a host country to its or other 
countries’ investors, and at a minimum, to be treated fairly and equitably- free 
from unreasonable demands or actions of a host government. 
 
Arguably, the extension of these standards to insolvency situations would require 
a host country to deal with an insolvency involving a foreign investor in a 
manner that is not inconsistent with the provisions of the relevant BIT between 
the home country of the investor and the host country.90 That is to say, the 
treatment of the foreign investor’s investment in the insolvency proceedings 
would be expected to be fair and equitable, and under no circumstances should 
the treatments be less favourable than those accorded to the host country’s or 
third country’s investor.91  
 
The import of the national treatment standard is that foreign investors are entitled 
to enjoy the same rights and privileges as national local investors. This means 
that domestic business entities and foreign entities (as well as any form of 
foreign investment) from a home country in a host country should be treated in 
the same manner in insolvency proceedings.92 
                                                 
88 Agreement on Encouragement of Investments Between the United Republic of Tanzania and 
the Kingdom of Netherland 2001, Art 3(1) & (2) < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 > accessed 22 February 2010.  Similar 
provisions are found in the treaties concluded by SSA with other developed countries.  
89 See Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments Between Uganda 
and France 2002, Art 3 < http://www.unctadxi.org/templetes/docsearch/aspx?id=779   > accessed 
22/02/2010. 
90 JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’(n 21) 35; and JW Salacuse (n 56) 165  
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
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 It is noteworthy that an insolvent domestic entity may have a far greater chance 
of maximisation of the values of its assets and an increased chance for rescue 
where most, if not all, of its interested parties are within the host jurisdiction. On 
the contrary, an insolvent foreign entity in a host jurisdiction may not be able to 
effectively maximise the value of its assets and increase the chance for rescue 
because of failure of co-ordination and co-operation with other jurisdictions 
where the entity may have assets and creditors as well. This situation may be 
construed as running counter to the requirement of according not only fair and 
equitable treatment but also national treatment.93  
 
Implementation of the MFN treatment standard would mean that a host country 
may not, in a cross-border insolvency context, treat an investor or investment 
from a home country partner state any less favourably than it treats investors or 
investment from any third country. Consequently, this principle would allow the 
foreign investor to take advantage of best treatment provided to another investor 
from a third country under a different arrangement, such as a cross-border 
insolvency regime operative within a regional integration framework, to which 
the host country and the third country are members. However, the BITs 
concluded between the UK and Tanzania as well as the UK and Kenya exclude 
the possibility of an investor in a host country claiming advantage that an 
investor from a third country gets on basis of being a member of a regional 
arrangement.94 Unlike the UK-Kenya BIT, the UK-Tanzania BIT also allows 
Tanzania to temporarily implement special domestic policies designed to provide 
                                                 
93 RE Borai, ‘Cross-Border Corporate Insolvency: A Modest Proposal for An Enhanced 
International 
Approach’ (PhD Thesis, Queen Mary College, University of London 2006) 244 & 255 
94 Agreement between the Government of the UK and the Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania for promotion and protection of Investments,  Art 7 < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templetes/docsearch/aspx?id=779   > accessed 22 February 2010. The 
article provides that the MFN standard will not apply in relation to the benefit of any treatment, 
preference or privilege resulting from (a) any existing or future custom union or similar 
international agreement to which either of the contracting parties is or may become a party, or (b) 
any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to taxation or any domestic 
legislation relating wholly mainly to taxation.’ 
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incentive for growth of local industries.95 Although these kinds of stipulations 
could be argued as providing room to shape SSA countries’ policies and law in a 
manner that would take into account the local needs and developments, the way 
they are formulated tends in practice to restrict the realisation of the objective of 
such policies. This is because the host country, in pursuing such policies, is still 
required to ensure that the application of such policies is temporary and does not 
affect the foreign investment and companies.96 
 
The significance of the requirement of fair and equitable treatment in the 
regulation of foreign investment from a home country in a host country may also 
suggest that all parties, whether foreign or domestic, having interests with or in 
the foreign investor/investment should be treated fairly and equally in local 
insolvency proceedings.97 Given the scope of what constitutes an investment, 
these parties may include international lenders, creditors and a parent company to 
which the foreign investor or investment is affiliated. As far as foreign investors 
are concerned, this is critical in inducing greater confidence in creditors when 
extending credit or rescheduling their claims.  
 
The ability of international financiers to commence or fairly and equitably be 
involved in insolvency proceedings against the foreign investor in a host country 
reduces the risk of lending, and thereby increases the availability of credit and 
making of investment more generally.98 This is crucially significant in that 
foreign investors from advanced countries tend to have connections with 
international financiers from which they obtain credit. The issues that arise in 
extending the standards to cross-border insolvency regulation show how the 
bilateral investment treaties challenge and indeed shape the position of SSA 
                                                 
95 Ibid, Art 4(3) provides that ‘[t]emporary special incentives granted by one contracting party 
only to its nationals and companies in order to stimulate the creation of local industries are 
considered compatible with this Article [on national treatment and most-favoured- nation] 
provided they do not significantly affect the investment and activities of nationals and companies 
of the other contracting party in connection with an investment. Each contracting party shall use 
its best endeavour to eliminate such incentives.’ In fact, it is inconceivable that a developing 
country may have and implement domestic development policies that are not seen to be at odd 
with foreign investment.  
96 Ibid  
97 JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (n 21) 35 
98 IMF (n 3) 5 
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countries’ cross-border insolvency law and practice. Thus, apart from the cross-
border insolvency implications of the bilateral investment treaties for the host 
countries,99 it seems also true that the complementarities nature of the treaties 
pull the host countries in SSA towards shaping their insolvency systems in a 
manner that would foster the objectives of the treaties.100 
 
The import of these standards therefore is to restrict a host country in SSA from 
engaging in a cross-border insolvency regulation and practices which are unfair 
and discriminatory to foreign investors and the interested parties thereto, and 
which also counteract the mission of promoting and protecting foreign 
investments in the host country. 101 In view of the BITs, cross-border insolvency 
regulation and practice of the host country should necessarily recognise the 
international nature of the investments from the home country and the possibility 
of such investments having global interests that need to be taken into account in 
dealing with it in insolvency proceedings.  
 
Consistent with the scope of application of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard in insolvency proceedings, is its broad interpretation which renders its 
applicability not limited to conduct attributable to the host country aimed at 
undermining the foreign investor.102 Rather, it extends to placing emphasis on the 
significance of protecting the investor’s legitimate expectations with regard to 
maintenance of a stable and predictable legal and business framework.103 
                                                 
99 RE Borai (n 93) 240-250 
100 V Mosoti, (n 10) 121 
101 JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (n 21) 35; and M Hallward-Driemeier (n 54) 7 stating 
that ‘the rights given to foreign investors [under the BITs] expose policy makers to potentially 
large scale liabilities and curtail the feasibility of different reform options.’ 
102 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42) 166; and, JW Salacuse (n 41)193-194. In 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal 
concluded that a unilateral lowering of tariffs by the regulator and a prohibition to pursue 
lawsuits and enforce judgements rendered against debtors constituted an illegitimate campaign 
against the foreign investor amounting to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of 20 August 2007 at para. 7.4.39 
103 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 32) 166 and  P Muchlinsiki, ‘Caveat Investor? 
The Relevance of the Conduct of Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard’ 
(2006) 55  ICLQ 527, 530-531 ; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/8 (Lithuania/Norway BIT), Award of 11 September 2007; and PSEG Global et 
al. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 (Turkey/United States BIT), Award of 19 
January 2007 at para. 252-253 
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Indeed, ‘the application of the standard is increasingly covering a wider range of 
governmental administrative actions and judicial or other national dispute 
settlement process.’104 Its interpretation weighs heavily against the host states’ 
inherent power to regulate economic conduct within its borders.105 Notably, as it 
is the case with fair and equitable treatment, predictability, certainty and 
transparency are among key principles of an effective insolvency law system. 
 
4.5.2.3 Encouraging and Creating a Favourable Environment for 
Foreign Investments  
 
Another important feature of the BITs which SSA countries have concluded thus 
far, envisages a requirement on the part of SSA countries to ‘encourage and 
create favourable conditions for investors.’106 Indeed, this is the overriding policy 
governing the BITs which is clearly reflected in the titling and affirmations of 
these treaties, though it is not surprising to find an explicit provision in that 
respect. Equally important in this context, is the requirement to accord full 
protection and security to such investments. The import of such provision is 
meant to cover the welfare of investment, even beyond its establishment.107 The 
link between this requirement and the host countries’ legal environment is 
reflected in the special policies and laws enacted by most SSA countries to 
support the promotion and protection of foreign investment. To a significant 
                                                 
104 P Muchlinsiki (n 103)528. See also UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42) 163. It is 
worthwhile to note that the standard of fair and equitable treatment, which is a prominent feature 
of the Washington Consensus policies, has been also clearly spelt out in Goal 8 of the 
Millennium and Development Goals 2000 and the international insolvency standard benchmarks. 
Over the years, the standard has attracted a very wide interpretation. In CMS Gas Transmission 
Co. v Argentina Republic, ICSID (World Bank) Case No.ARB/01/8 Award of Tribunal 274 (May 
12, 2005) < www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cms_Award.pdf  > cited in O Chung (n 54)960, the 
standard was interpreted as ‘requiring a stable legal and business environment.’ It was further 
held in relation to this standard that: ‘The foreign investor expects the host state to act in a 
consistent manner free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor, so that it may know before hand any and all rules and regulations  that will govern its 
investment, as well as the goals of the relevant policies or directives, to be able to plan its 
investment…’  
105 See n 104 above  
106 A typical example of this formulation is evident in the  BITs between the UK and some of the 
SSA Countries available at < http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 > 
accessed 22/02/2010.  See also JW Salacuse (n 41)193-194 
107 JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan (n 50) 91; and UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008(n 42) 
162 
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extent, such laws have tended to incorporate the standards contained in the 
treaties. Therefore, by concluding a BIT, a host country is also taken not only to 
have restricted its ability to change the policies and laws that are favourable to 
foreign investment, but it is also under an obligation to improve and maintain a 
conducive environment for foreign investment.108 However, apart from the 
responsibility of the host countries to improve the overall framework for 
investment, there is an apparent lack of clear and specific measures in most of 
the BITs on improving the overall policy framework for foreign investment.109  
 
From a cross-border insolvency perspective, the implication is clear. A host 
country will be potentially expected to align its cross-border insolvency regime 
in a manner that is in harmony with the general premise of the BITs which 
require the host country to promote, protect and create a favourable, stable and 
predictable legal environment for foreign investment. The underlying assumption 
upon which the BITs rest is that ‘clear and enforceable rules that protect foreign 
investors reduce risks, and a reduction of risk promotes investment.’110 In this 
context, an effective cross-border insolvency law stands a better chance to 
protect the interests of an insolvent foreign investor as it may facilitate chances 
of maximising the values of its assets and rescue. 
 
4.5.2.4 Transfer of Funds and Repatriation of Capital and Profits  
The right of a foreign investor to repatriate capital and funds is one of the 
specific aspects enshrined in the BITs that haven been concluded between SSA 
countries and foreign countries especially the developed ones. The inclusion of 
such right in the treaties marks a radical departure, as historically, this has been 
one of the contentious and difficult areas to negotiate and agree upon.111 The way 
the relevant provision is formulated in most of the treaties presents a wide 
meaning of what could unrestrictedly be repatriated by a foreign investor from a 
host country whenever such a need arises. To a foreign investor, the freedom to 
                                                 
108 KJ Vandevelde (n 12) 522-25 
109 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (n 42) 17 
110 Ibid 95 
111 MI Khalil, ‘Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1992) 7 ICSID 
Rev Foreign Inv LJ 339; and JW Salacuse and NP Sullivan (n 50 ) 85-86  
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repatriate income and capital is crucially important. It not only helps the investor 
to meet its foreign obligations but also enables operations of an integrated 
multinational enterprise group which is critical in minimising transactional costs 
through, for instance, international division of production.112  
 
This provision may be employed by the foreign investor to transfer capital and 
funds abroad for different purposes. The transfer may be made for the purpose of 
insolvency involving the foreign investor as a subsidiary within a multinational 
enterprise group, another company affiliated to the multinational enterprise group 
or multinational enterprise group as a whole. It may therefore be useful in 
facilitating rescue and restructuring of a multinational enterprise in default 
without undue delay that could otherwise be occasioned by the host country 
procedures. It is to be noted however that this freedom, if exercised in relation to 
insolvency, has the potential of bypassing the host country’s authorities. This 
may result in inconveniences and embarrassments to local creditors and local tax 
authorities, because they may be taken by surprise as to what is happening to the 
investment entity involved.113  
 
Lack of an efficient control mechanism and an effective cross-border insolvency 
system reflecting the way multinational enterprises operate and invest in a host 
country (and above all which is not fit for the purpose of securing efficient co-
operation and co-ordination with other jurisdictions) may certainly contribute to 
subjecting local interests and claimants to losses and the hassle of struggling in 
vain for repayment as it may be long before they realise that the foreign investor 
was a subject of insolvency proceedings abroad.114 Some provisions in the BITs 
                                                 
112 I Mevorach (n 69) 13 
113 Text to  n 107 and 144  in chapter 7; JL Westbrook and others, A Global View of Business 
Insolvency Systems (World Bank, Washington 2010) 227, showing how inclusion of assets 
located abroad might be essential for success or failure of a contemplated rescue. 
114 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa 2009 (IMF, Washington 2009) 40 & 
53 noting that during the recent financial crisis SSA was at a risk of capital repatriation which 
could adversely affect its economy. It was shown that the predominance of foreign owned banks 
in SSA exposes the region to capital repatriation in that the parent banks abroad might be tempted 
to repatriate capital from SSA due to balance sheet losses in the home country. It was contended 
that such transfer could have a contagion effect in the region which could lead to failure to meet 
the demand for trade finance, thereby affecting commercial activities to a point of stoppage.  The 
stoppage could mean insolvency and cross-border insolvency, especially if it involves enterprises 
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expressly provide for an unrestricted transfer of funds for settlement of foreign 
debts as well as capital and income deriving from the total or partial sale or 
liquidation of an investment without undue delay and in a freely convertible 
currency.115 No doubt the import of the provision is intended to include transfers 
necessitated by insolvency proceedings which may be used to allow a global or 
separate sale or a global restructuring.116 
 
The BITs concluded between the US and Mozambique, and the US and Rwanda 
allow the host countries to prevent a transfer of capital or fund through equitable, 
non-discriminatory and good faith application of domestic insolvency law or the 
protection of the rights of creditors.117 The implication of such provision for the 
host countries’ insolvency law system is twofold. Firstly, such countries should 
have a predictable and transparent system of insolvency that does not 
discriminate against foreign interests in order to qualify for the exceptions 
stipulated in the provision. This perhaps will be by the standards of the US’s 
insolvency system which not only is acknowledged for influencing the prevailing 
international insolvency benchmarks but has also been tested in practice for quite 
a long time.118 The second implication is that the host developing country ought 
to have the resources and capabilities to oversee implementation of such system 
in a manner that is consistent to the existing best practices that are based on the 
law of developed countries.119 Short of that, such countries may not enjoy the 
benefits that the exception presents.  
 
While freedom to repatriate capital and funds is seemingly beneficial to 
investors, as it may contribute to minimising risk and transaction costs, it may, as 
mentioned above, potentially disadvantage host developing countries in SSA and 
                                                                                                                                    
with international business connections. Even though such situation could merit bailouts by state 
aid, SSA countries would not have such financial capacity.  
115 For various treaties concluded visit < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 > accessed 22/02/2010. In particular 
see Italy-Tanzania BIT; Sweden – Tanzania BIT; Germany-Tanzania BIT; Finland-Tanzania 
BIT; Denmark- Tanzania BIT; Germany-Kenya BIT;  and Indonesia-Mozambique BIT. 
116 I Mevorach (n 69) 171 
117  n 77 above   
118 Text to n 80 in chapter 3 
119 Ibid 
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expose them to financial defaults, especially where the involvement of the so-
called ‘hot money’ is at issue. Ginsburg writes that: 
 
….[R]equirements that capital be freely repatriated…. [c]an 
disadvantage developing countries, who might legitimately wish to 
avoid the disruption of “hot money”  that can leave quickly on herd 
behaviour, such as occurred during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. While developing countries freely tie their own hands with these 
restrictions, leading to distributional advantage for the investors, it 
seems unclear as a theoretical matter why such restrictions on 
investment contracts ought to be adopted ex ante rather than left to the 
individual negotiations between host state and foreign investor.120 
 
The consequences may lead to a financial crisis within a host country and 
potential for a chain of insolvencies among domestic enterprises. This situation, 
which reflects what is termed as macroeconomic disturbance, a common feature 
of a market economy, requires efficient crisis resolution tools that include a 
predictable and highly transparent insolvency system,  a system that could deal 
with enterprises facing financial difficulties in a manner that takes account of the 
following aspects: the possibility of rescue; the international elements arising 
from the liberalisation and cross-border links involving SSA countries; and the 
widely held consensus in favour of assistance, co-operation and co-ordination of 
cross-border insolvencies as a means of preserving rather than destroying going 
concern value.121 
 
4.5.2.5 Reciprocity Principle 
One of the basic principles in the BITs concluded in the recent times is 
reciprocity in facilitation of cross-border investment between the contracting 
parties. In theoretical terms, this principle pulls the contracting parties ‘away 
from aggressive territorialism’.122 The essence of this principle is that the 
                                                 
120 T Ginsburg (n 11) 107 
 
121 See n 28 above  
122 B Wessels, BA Markell, and JJ Kilborn (n 1) 71.  See also JW Salacuse (n 56) 158 and 162 
describing the bilateral investment treaty as constraining a host country’s sovereignty by limiting 
its ‘ability to take what it may judge in the future to be necessary legislative and administrative 
action to advance and protect national interests.’ And further that ‘since most investor-state 
arbitrations are judging the legality of governmental actions, they have significant public policy 
consequences relating to the ability of sovereign governments to regulate enterprises within their 
territories.’ 
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nationals and companies of either party to a treaty may invest under the same 
conditions and be treated in the same way in the territory of the other. This 
principle offers a foundation for assistance, co-operation and co-ordination in 
resolving cross-border insolvency problems between the contracting parties in a 
reciprocal manner. This foundation is consistent with the widely held consensus 
in favour of assistance, co-operation and co-ordination of cross-border 
insolvencies as a means of preserving rather than destroying going concern 
value.123 Notably, the cross-border insolvency legislation practice has to some 
extent shown that reciprocity of one form or the other is one of measures used to 
achieve co-operation where no relevant international agreements are in force.124  
 
Despite the element of the reciprocity in the BITs, the prevailing asymmetry is 
such that investments tend only to flow from the home country into the host 
countries in SSA.125 In return, SSA countries offer just the promise and 
commitment to live up to the requirements of the treaties. While SSA countries 
may practically not be expected to export capital to the developed contracting 
countries, it is implicit that the prevailing reciprocal bilateral co-operation 
presents a scope for co-operation in resolving cross-border insolvency problems 
that could arise between the contracting parties.  
 
SSA countries may consider according an automatic recognition (based on the 
BITs) of foreign proceedings commenced in the home country of a foreign 
investor in a host SSA country. However, given the nature of the BITs, it can be 
argued that the local proceedings in a host country would be governed by the 
laws of the host jurisdiction subject to the requirement of observing the relevant 
standards and principles provided in the BITs. Accordingly, the question is 
whether the host countries in SSA would have effective cross-border insolvency 
frameworks to deal with complex problems in an efficient, transparent and 
                                                 
123 See n 28 above 
124 PJ Omar, ‘The Landscape of International Insolvency Law’ (2002) 11 Int’l Insolv Rev 173; 
ML Nauta & F Bulletin, ‘Introduction to Spanish Cross-border Insolvency Law-An Adequate 
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predictable manner in the same way as their investors would have experienced if 
were to invest and become insolvent in the host developed country. In searching 
for a permanent solution, probably, consideration may need not to be given to 
just one BIT due to the implications that are likely to arise from application of 
the most-favoured nation principle. Rather, a proper permanent solution needs to 
take account of the increasingly dense network of such reciprocal BITs that SSA 
countries have entered as they ‘[represent] an important milestone in the 
evolution of international economic law’ and thus cross-border insolvency 
system.126 
 
4.5.2.6 Expropriation 
Protection against expropriation of foreign investment from a home country in a 
host country is one significant assurance provided by the BITs that is consistent 
with the protection of property rights of the foreign investors. According to the 
treaties, expropriation will be lawful and effective only if it is undertaken for a 
public purpose, non-discriminatorily and upon payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation. The trend is for such treaties to also cover measures that 
are deemed to be ‘tantamount’ or ‘equivalent’ to expropriation or actions that 
would significantly impair the value of the investment.127  
 
Interpretation accorded thus far opens the expropriation provisions to indirect 
forms of expropriations, creeping, and regulatory takings by a host country’s 
actions. Such actions may include regulatory actions that affect the value of an 
investment or render it economically not viable and hence requiring 
compensation. It is not necessary that it should be an isolated event or that the 
host country should try to take ownership of the investment.128 It is noteworthy 
that this interpretation creates an indirect link with insolvency aspects. One 
concern is that multinational enterprises may use the interpretation to protect 
themselves against many risks they would otherwise have assumed in the course 
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127 See Treaty between Germany and Kenya Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
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of normal commercial transactions.129 Critics have argued that the BITs give 
foreign investors property rights in regulations that seem to affect their going 
concerns.130Accordingly, a refusal or delay by a host country’s institutions to 
assist, cooperate and/or co-ordinate with other institutions abroad in cross-border 
insolvency proceedings potentially involving reorganisation of the investment of 
the multinational enterprise could arguably be brought within this interpretation. 
This is so, if the refusal or delay contributes to failure of the desired 
reorganisation. 131 
 
It may equally be the case where insolvency proceedings are commenced against 
a foreign investor in a host country, by the host country’s institutions or nationals 
despite claims of solvency based on its affiliation to a multinational enterprise 
group.132 It may also be the case where the proceedings have been initiated as a 
result of measures against the foreign investor such as tax claims initiated by the 
host government.133 Indeed, these scenarios may arise due to a number of such 
problems as uncertain and unpredictable cross-border insolvency framework, 
corruptions, whims and sentiments against foreign investments and invocation of 
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public policy which may render a host country wishing to transfer investment to 
a favoured local investor. 
 
4.5.2.7 Dispute Settlement 
In addition to the foregoing, BITs do also provide for dispute settlement 
mechanisms that essentially require submitting for arbitration in the event of a 
dispute between an investor and a host country. Most of the treaties provide for 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (“ICSID”) arbitration 
but ad hoc arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the UNCITRAL is also 
common. In recent years, there have been increasing numbers of disputes and a 
broadening of the character of claims instituted by foreign investors against 
developing countries on account of alleged breaches of the treaties. It is not 
surprising that now the mechanism is being employed to resolve disputes arising 
out of regulatory takings adversely affecting the investment.  
 
While the above is now the trend, the mechanism does not cater for the handling 
of insolvency proceedings involving a foreign investor, though the investor can 
use such mechanisms to claim compensation against a host state for allegation of 
discriminatory treatments in insolvency proceedings or illegal expropriation in 
the pretence of application of insolvency proceedings.134 It means that the 
conclusion of such BITs does not relinquish the need for effective insolvency 
machinery, with which insolvency proceedings involving foreign investors may 
be undertaken. On the contrary, it makes it imperative for the potential host 
countries to have an effective cross-border insolvency system that reflects the 
standards and principles provided by the BITs. It will seem that the absence of 
such machinery potentially puts the SSA countries at a risk of finding themselves 
in arbitral disputes involving the application of insolvency law or failure to put in 
place an appropriate insolvency framework that does not contradict the treaties 
they have concluded.  
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It is in in view of the above that Chung notes that ‘developing countries without 
a stable legal order present the very risks that are of concern to foreign investors, 
causing them to be disproportionately exposed to BIT-based 
claims…This…creates a great potential for conflict, especially when the host 
country’s government is deficient in the necessary characteristics of a sound 
legal system-“transparency, efficacy, accessibility, and equality.”’135 Given the 
trends of the arbitral awards with regard to foreign investment issues, it may 
perhaps not be surprising in an appropriate case, for it to be held that no effective 
insolvency law and in particular cross-border insolvency law could reasonably be 
held to be said to exist in a particular host country.136 
 
4.6 Inter-Regional and Regional Economic Arrangements 
The desire for rapid commercial expansion has created incentives for the 
formation of certain types of preferential alliances between countries from 
different regions. While each SSA country is on average a member of at least 
two SSA regional arrangements, SSA countries are also involved in several inter-
regional co-operations with other countries and particularly advanced economies 
in which their main export commodities are predominantly agriculture and 
natural resource-based products.137 These alliances, of which SSA countries are 
member states, complement and reinforce, through the free trade mechanism and 
liberalisation, the BITs that individual SSA countries have concluded with other 
countries. Such arrangements potentially generate two effects at most. Firstly, 
trade creation as the participating countries remove tariffs and other barriers and 
trade diversion as protection against non-participating countries increases. This is 
particularly so where, among other things, the member states are already major 
trading partners. In theory, the resulting effects stand to activate cross-border 
commercial transactions undertaken by modern commercial enterprises and 
hence the challenges of potential cross-border insolvencies.  
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There is a debate on beneficial effects of such economic co-operation and   
relations to developing countries and the regional economic arrangements 
between SSA countries.138 It is however a truism that such arrangements enhance 
the level of integration of the SSA countries in the global market. This 
potentially creates pre-conditions for cross-border insolvencies and aligning the 
respective national insolvency law systems. It is, indeed, in this context that 
some regional integration arrangements such as EU, NAFTA and OHADA have 
crafted regimes for cross-border insolvency regulation among member countries 
based on the recognition of the need to foster free movement of goods and 
service for trade purposes.139 Thus, ‘[i]n the shadow of these collective efforts… 
individual states have been in the position to introduce provisions related to 
cross-border insolvency or amend existing legislation in this field.’140 Such 
potential for the reform is in a bid to avail a suitable legal environment and 
further their commercial competitiveness.  
 
Although some of these arrangements, such as the inter-regional economic co-
operation, do not carry the true sense of economic integration, the cross-border 
trade co-operation that they advance requires increasing co-ordination and 
mutual assistance, if not harmonisation, of commercial laws in order to foster 
commercial predictability, especially in the event of financial default.141 Whilst 
implementation of all arrangements requires internal reform and liberalisation, 
for example in the tariff and competition policies, they will need legal 
infrastructure to deal with macroeconomic disturbances that may occur in the due 
course. Certainly, these arrangements pull insolvency systems of respective 
member states towards an approach that takes on board the objectives of the 
arrangements and an approach that  recognise the interests of all stakeholders 
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141 On this line of reasoning, see America Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Cooperation 
Among the NAFTA Countries- Principles of Cooperation Among the NAFTA Countries (Juris 
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within the arrangements. To be sure, some of these arrangements are guided by 
key standards and principles which also characterise the BITs. They include 
national treatment, most favoured nation (“MFN”) treatment, and reciprocity 
principles.142 They also include the requirements to institutionalise the rule of 
law and good governance and undertake extensive liberalisation of markets and 
investment.143 
 
4.6.1 Inter-Regional Economic Arrangements and the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Potential 
 
There are many inter-regional economic arrangements between SSA and other 
regional blocs outside SSA or individual countries from regions other than SSA 
especially among developed countries.144 Examples of  inter-regional 
arrangements operative in Africa that involve the advanced economies are 
afforded by the EU’s Everything But Arms (“EBA”), the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (“EPA”) Between SSA and the EU, the US’s African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (“AGOA”) and the Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements with the US. It is instructive to consider such inter-regional   
arrangements and determine the nature of the potential problems and 
opportunities they present to SSA in the event of a general default of 
multinational enterprises or any other enterprises conducting their commercial 
operations within the arrangements.145  
 
One important feature of the inter-regional arrangements in which SSA is 
involved is the requirement they impose for SSA countries to undertake 
extensive economic liberalisation and reform of institutional and legal 
environments. This requirement entails liberalisation of investment, 
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institutionalisation of rule of law and good governance. Such requirement 
promotes the use of the contemporary international best practices which are 
based on the Western legal rules and institutions.146  The result ensuing from 
such processes is that ‘international economic relations, as well as economic 
policies and development strategies in SSA are increasingly determined by the 
developed countries’ liberalist regimes….[which] ha[ve] become compatible 
with the policies of the IMF, the WB, and the WTO.’147 In addition to fostering 
integration of SSA into the world economy, it is believed that these arrangements 
are also meant for a series of other purposes such as cross-border problem 
solving.148 
 
Although no specific mention of insolvency or cross-border insolvency related 
reform is made in any arrangements, clearly any such reform falls within the 
broad reforms that are meant to support the massive liberalisation. More 
importantly, the scope, type and manner of the reform are always determined by 
the other contracting party other than SSA. In a way this requirement presents 
some form of pressures on the part of SSA and indeed jeopardises the scope for 
independent policy choice as is the case for the BITs. It is common that 
liberalisation strategy and the desired legal reform entails key areas for 
facilitation, promotion and protection of cross-border trade and investment and is 
also a requirement for enjoying benefits available under the arrangements. 149  
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For example, the EU (with which SSA is concluding free trade arrangement 
within the framework of the EPAs) is one of the leading regional integrations 
with not only effective cross-border insolvency regulation applicable to cross-
border insolvencies that occur within member states but it also has a long history 
of involvement in cross-border insolvency co-operation and high level of 
awareness of the impact of insolvency and the importance of having effective 
insolvency systems.150 In addition to that, the member states, some of which 
were former colonial powers of SSA countries, have long adopted effective 
cross-border insolvency systems. It would seem therefore that although the cross-
border insolvency regulation agenda is not explicitly mentioned in the strategic 
areas for liberalisation and reform, it is implicit within the broader terms of the 
strategy, especially in governance, investment liberalisation and property right 
protection. One of the most significant aspects of this arrangement is in its 
development component which entails specifying the main areas of focus of the 
parties to the agreements in order to meet developmental and regional integration 
objectives.151 
 
Another important feature of this kind of arrangements is the component of 
finance and funding which is available to respective developing countries or 
individual enterprises undertaking projects within the frameworks of such 
arrangements. This is particularly so with AGOA whose implementation is 
underpinned by equity and infrastructure funding designed to support projects in 
SSA countries through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.152 Indeed, 
this is an incentive for carrying out extensive liberalisation and legal reforms in a 
manner that will render such countries to be highly regarded as valued members 
of the respective arrangements and hence enjoy funding benefits available. 
                                                 
150 B Wessels, BA Markell, and JJ Kilborn (n 1) 71. The authors note that ‘[o]n the European 
continent, one finds a rich history of co-operation through bilateral treaties between city-states, 
principalities, nation-states for dealing with conflicts in insolvency-related matters. Beginning as 
early as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this treaty-making process accelerated in the 
nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth century before multilateral solutions eclipsed 
the earlier, more limited arrangements.’ 
151 F Söderbaum and P Stalgren (n 142)  
152 RH Edwards and others, ‘International Investment, Development and Privatization’ (2001) 35 
Int’l L 383, 390 
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Effectively, this translates into pressures for undertaking reform that is either 
meant to adopt systems that exist in the relevant developed country or in any 
manner that pleases the developed country or countries in order to meet 
eligibility criteria for the funding. 
 
Regardless of the debate on the beneficial impact of the inter-regional economic 
arrangements to SSA, it is apparent that what is crucially relevant in the present 
instance is the fact that such arrangements increasingly contribute towards 
integration of the SSA countries into the global trading system. Such integration 
intensifies the operations of multinational enterprises in cross-border trade and 
investments involving SSA and the foreign countries, which potentially exposes 
SSA to the potential cross-border effect of insolvency. 153  
 
The most significant aspect of these arrangements, especially EBA and AGOA is 
in the recognition of SSA countries as a legitimate group for special and 
differential treatment in the context of trade and investment.154 The implication 
of such initiatives is twofold. Firstly, they tend to have the potentials of 
increasing the integration of SSA countries into the global trading systems, 
thereby exposing local enterprises from these countries to cross-border effects of 
insolvency occurring in EU member states and even beyond or in the US. 
Secondly, since such arrangements have the potential of attracting investors to 
invest in SSA in anticipation of benefiting from the tariff free market access to 
the respective foreign markets, they open the door for cross-border effect that is 
not necessarily confined to SSA and the respective foreign markets. The EBA is 
particularly important given that, unlike other similar arrangements such as 
AGOA, it is not time limited. The lack of time frame means that it provides 
greater certainty and predictability for investors, traders and lenders and 
therefore stimulates greater capacity in the production of existing products and 
an environment conducive to the export of a wider range of products. 
 
                                                 
153 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa 2009 (n 42) 48; and M Farrell (n 142) 70 & 84 
154 Ibid 
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Given the lack of capacities by SSA countries to produce and supply the 
developed economies’ markets and therefore gain much from the arrangements, 
the main beneficiaries from the liberalisation initiative are likely to be the 
multinational enterprises from other countries.155 Thus, the multinational 
enterprises stand a good chance to obtain new business via expanded market 
access. Nevertheless, SSA countries may, albeit in the short term, benefit 
particularly through increased foreign capital flows, which can potentially fuel 
the foreign exchange necessary for development efforts. Again, this means cross-
border insolvency challenges to SSA countries. 
 
Studies conducted in Kenya shows that AGOA has had the impact of growth of 
foreign direct investment in the textile industry.156 This is notwithstanding the 
presence of some obstacles that signify the difficulties that SSA countries face in 
their endeavour to participate in international business. It is worth noting that the 
foreign direct investment growth is in the nature of foreign enterprise groups 
mainly from Asia with branches or subsidiaries in Kenya.157 In most cases, ‘the 
parent companies are directly providing all inputs and materials and managing 
both the sourcing and marketing ends of the production process.’158 Arguably, 
the existence of such companies in Kenya, which have other operations in Asia, 
is solely dependent upon AGOA. The major weakness noted is that most of such 
companies have one marketing source in the US.  
 
4.6.2 Regional Economic Arrangements and the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Potentials 
 
The SSA region at present has a total of about 16 regional integration 
arrangements of various forms and in their various stages of developments 
                                                 
155 D Katona (n 18) 1442 
156 NA Phelphs, JCH Stillwell, and R Wanjiru (n 145) 79; UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Review: 
Kenya (United Nations, New York 2005) 8 and 87. Kenya is one of a few countries that qualified 
for AGOA access in 2001; and  JMM Akech (n 12);  
157 UNCTAD (n 156) 8 and 87; and NA Phelphs, JCH Stillwell, and R Wanjiru (n 145). Notably, 
the way such enterprises operate presents potential challenge of  group insolvency. 
158 NA Phelphs, JCH Stillwell, and R Wanjiru (n 145) 66 and79 
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commensurate with their constitutional objectives.159 Although the economic 
benefits of these arrangements in developing countries have generally been 
doubted, other scholars have argued that economic integration is what Africa 
needs to address its problems of fragmented national economies and have indeed 
uncovered evidence of trade creation and FDI growth due to such integration.160 
It is noteworthy that the intra-trade and FDI in SSA has gradually been growing 
since 1990 which is partly associated with the deepening of the regional trade 
arrangements in the SSA region.161 Interestingly, the level of intra-regional trade 
in the SADC region and East Africa Community have been found to be higher 
than in other SSA regional arrangements, perhaps because of the long and 
common colonial history in East Africa and also due to the expansion of South 
African industry into the region.162  
 
Inevitably, the regional integrations contribute towards an increase in the number 
of enterprises with operations, creditors and assets located in more than one of 
the regional arrangements’ member states while having centres of operations in 
one member state or beyond.163 The increase in the number of enterprises  is 
partly because ‘with liberalization of economies, opportunities for intra-regional 
                                                 
159 R Shams, ‘The Drive to Economic Integration in Africa’ (2005) Hamburgisches Welt-
Wirtschafts-Archiv (“HWWA”) Discussion Paper No 316 < http://www.hwwa.de > accessed 12 
March 2009 [3] 
160 See MA McIntyre, ‘Trade Integration in the East African Community: An Assessment for 
Kenya’(2005) IMF Working Paper WP/05/143 < 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05143.pdf   > accessed 16 March 2010; and C 
Kirkpatrick and M Watanabe, ‘Regional Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of East 
African Trade Cooperation, 1970-2001’ (2005) 73 Manchester School 141 
161 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009 (n 42)18, 19&20; and C Kirkpatrick 
and M Watanabe (n 160) 142-147 
162 C Kirkpatrick and M Watanabe (n 160) 144; L Thomas and others, ‘Intra-regional Private 
Capital Flows in Eastern and Southern Africa: Findings from Mozambique, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe’ (LSE Centre for Research into Economics and 
Finance in Southern Africa and Development Finance International, 2003) < 
www.lse.ac.uk/depts/crefsa > accessed 16 March 2010 [4]. L Thomas and others report how the 
regional arrangements in Southern Africa contribute to cross-border investments in the Southern 
African region of SSA. They reports that ‘[although] South Africa is by far the most important 
source of regional investment...the smaller regional economies also have significant foreign 
assets in South Africa-these financial flows appear to be driven by trade and financial 
integration….While the stacks of regional assets and liabilities are a small fraction of the total for 
South Africa, they represent significant amounts for the smaller economies.’ They include 
Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.  
163 L Thomas and others  (n 162) 10  while categorising foreign direct investment in Southern 
Africa noted a trend of  ‘transfer of ownership of several large South African conglomerates to 
London through listings on the London Stock Exchange.’ 
 144
investment flows have expanded - the promotion of cross-border investment 
within the region is seen as an important component of integration initiatives 
such as the SADC Free Trade Area, COMESA and the Cross-Border Initiative. 
Indeed, evidence from existing data on investment approvals from investment 
promotion agencies around the region suggest that regional investment may be 
an important source of capital for many countries in Eastern and Southern 
Africa.’164  
 
Accordingly, in the event of financial difficulties leading to the insolvencies of 
the enterprises operating within SSA in the context of existing regional 
integrations, there will be problems of how best to deal with such insolvencies 
given the absence of a framework for that purpose at the regional level and the 
fact that member states may have quite different procedures. As there is, save for 
OHADA, no framework within the regional arrangements, recently crafted, to 
deal with the insolvent undertakings, each member state will seemingly have to 
apply its law and hence territorialism. This scenario may not only be destructive 
to the value of the insolvent enterprises, but also may militate against the 
measures for facilitation of trade and investment, and the poverty reduction 
strategy. Clearly, not only is the debtor not entitled to petition within the context 
of regional arrangements for rescue of businesses scattered in all member states 
or for assistance, co-operation and co-ordination of cross-border insolvencies as 
a means of preserving rather than destroying going concern value,165 but also any 
attempt to salvage the financially struggling enterprise could be blocked or 
frustrated by proceedings in the respective member states or for mere lack of any 
precise procedure.166  
 
Certainly, effectiveness in dealing with such situations is through co-ordination 
and a co-operative approach, as the logic of the regional integrations would 
                                                 
164 L Thomas and others  (n 162) 1  
165 See n 28 above 
166  As far as EAC is concerned, the only law that has been in place since the colonial days was 
based on reciprocal co-operation in cross-border insolvency matters. Though the law was based 
on the personal bankruptcy legislation and has long been forgotten in the statute books, there 
seem to be scope for arguing that the law could still be applicable and that it was meant to apply 
to corporate insolvencies as well. See text to part 6.5  in chapter 6 
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suggest. 167 As it was mentioned above, one of the principal purposes of these 
regional arrangements is to promote trade and investment on a regional basis 
without regard to national borders. The endeavour to remove regional barriers 
and harmonisation of law is clearly geared at attaining this purpose through 
enhancement of commercial predictability, transparency and reduction of 
transaction costs. Of significance here is the fact that an insolvent undertaking 
may not necessarily have its home country or its centre of main interests 
(“COMI”) within the regional arrangement. Rather, it could be a subsidiary, an 
affiliate or a branch of a multinational enterprise (within a multinational 
enterprise group set up) that was established to take advantage of the regional 
arrangements, though it may not have many assets or significant operations 
within the region.  
 
The situation is even complex if viewed in light of the agreements that are 
increasingly being concluded between regional groupings in SSA and developed 
countries.168 This situation provides new dimensions to be considered if the 
insolvent undertaking is affiliated to a multination enterprise group in one of the 
developed countries. An example in this regard is drawn from the trade and 
investment framework agreement between the East African Community and the 
Government of the United States of America signed in Washington on 16 July 
2008 and similar agreements concluded between the US and other regional 
groupings in SSA such as COMESA and WAEMU.169 Such agreements underlie 
and in fact oblige the regional arrangements to promote transparency, 
predictability, rule of law, good governance, and private investment in business. 
Using the US and EAC agreement as a case study for the present purpose, the 
                                                 
167 See n 28 above 
168 While the US is concluding such agreement with SSA regional groupings in the style of 
‘Trade and Investment Framework Agreement’, the EU is negotiating to enter into similar 
agreement under the EPA arrangement. See Office of US Trade Representative, ‘Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (“TIFA”)’ <  http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-
investment-framework-agreements  > accessed 14 August 2011; and UNCTAD, Economic 
Development in Africa Report 2009 (n 42) 47-52 
169 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the East African Community and the 
Government of the United States of America (“EAC-US TIFA”) <  http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements  .> accessed 14 August 2011.  By the end of 
2008, similar agreements had already been concluded between the US and COMESA, and the US 
and WAEMU. See also  UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009 (n 42) 47-52 
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agreement establishes a council on trade and investment (composed by the US 
and EAC representatives) to monitor trade and investment and a predictable 
environment for international trade and investment. The council is given power 
to consider specific issues of interests to parties in trade and investment between   
the US and the EAC.170  
 
Although the trade linkage among member states in the regional arrangements in 
SSA is still low, it has been found that deepening co-operation in trade 
facilitation and behind the border reforms aiming at improving transparency, 
reducing the cost of doing business and promoting trade can effectively improve 
efficiency in member countries and expand trade and economic growth as well as 
private investment.171 This means that although SSA countries have undertaken 
trade policy reforms that consisted of trade liberalisation and harmonisation of 
their trade regimes, as it is the case for EAC, which has gone as far as forming a 
custom union, much more efforts that go beyond trade liberalisation and which 
aim to achieve deep integration still need to be taken to create more predictability 
and confidence to traders and investors.172 It is within such context that an 
appropriate framework for regulation of cross-border insolvency must also be 
considered. 
 
Experience from other jurisdictions has shown that regional arrangements are an 
important base for co-operation and co-ordination in cross-border insolvencies 
affecting assets, creditors and other interested parties within a regional 
arrangement.  However, the problem of cross-border insolvency which could 
potentially arise with the bourgeoning of the regional trade arrangements has not 
been recently addressed within the context of the existing arrangements in SSA. 
The OHADA is thus an exception.173  
 
                                                 
170 See US-EAC TIFA, Art 1 & 2 
171 MA McIntyre (n150) 19&20; and C Kirkpatrick and M Watanabe (n 160)141 
172 C Kirkpatrick and M Watanabe (n 160) 157 
173 OHADA has a regime for cross-border insolvency proceedings which is to a large extent 
based on the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings and the French Insolvency regime. 
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There are several possible explanations for the lack of frameworks for dealing 
with cross-border insolvencies within the existing regional arrangements in SSA. 
Firstly, lack of awareness on the part of policymakers. Secondly, lack of 
problems of cross-border insolvency due to less integration of the SSA countries 
to the world economy and financial system in the individual economies of 
member states and within the regional groupings. Thirdly, the fact that most of 
the regional groupings are still in their infancy stage partly on account of the low 
pace they are making towards the final stage of their integration that reflects their 
objectives. Fourthly, insolvency is perhaps still regarded as a domestic issue to 
be addressed by individual member states at their own pace as per their own 
priority. Fifthly, the fact that the problem of regulation of cross-border 
insolvency has not been raised as a concern by the investors within the regional 
arrangements.174 And lastly but more importantly, the regional arrangements 
seem to have been addressing a broad range of policy issues while committing 
member states to undertake appropriate policy and legislative actions 
commensurate with facilitation of trade and investment.  
 
4.6.3 Critiquing the Inter-Regional and Regional Trade Arrangements 
Involving SSA with Cross-Border Insolvency in Mind 
 
It is argued that the conditions attached to the interregional arrangements which 
SSA countries must comply with to be eligible for duty free and quota free 
access of their products to the developed countries’ markets are stringent and 
costly to SSA countries.175 Consequently, it is the multinational enterprises and 
not local enterprises that potentially stand to benefit from such arrangements (by 
acquisition of many new resources and much new business via expanded market 
access) as they do have the resources and technology to comply with the 
                                                 
174 The concerns that have been raised include exchange rate instability, inflation and high 
interest rate. Others include infrastructure, road, water, and power supply. See for instance, L 
Thomas and others (n 162) 6 and 7. It is however a fact that the problems raised are among the 
factors that have been reported to contribute to business failure and therefore insolvency in other 
jurisdictions. See, I Blokerdyke, R Lattimore and A Madge, Business Failure and Change: An 
Australian Perspective (Median and Publication, Melborne 2000) 49- 53 
175 See for example, D Katona (n 18) 1439-1471;  and JM Akech (n 12) 663-701 
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conditions.176 There is thus potential for expansion of investment by 
multinational enterprises in SSA taking advantages of the opportunities available 
under such arrangements. This potentially enhances interactions of the 
multinational enterprises with the local enterprises, business competition and the 
challenge for cross-border insolvencies involving SSA countries which 
necessarily need to be addressed. Incidentally, the stiff competition that these 
multinational enterprises are potentially bringing into SSA countries can put the 
domestic enterprises to financial default and closure which may have cross-
border implications given the magnitude of cross-border trading links that they 
had.177 
 
The growing trends of the inter-regional and unilateral trade arrangements to 
require SSA countries to undertake market reform and institutionalise a 
conducive environment for private investment in order to qualify for preferential 
access  reinforces the opportunities the multinational enterprises have against 
domestic ones. The situation is even worse as such requirements- inspired by the 
carrots of eligibility for funding, access to further benefits and the leverage of the 
developed countries over SSA countries- have potentials to exert pressure on 
SSA countries for undertaking legislative reforms, including in cross-border 
insolvency regulation in order to ensure protection of the multinational 
enterprises in the event of financial crisis.  
 
The implication of the requirements to establish and institutionalise a market 
based system that protects private property rights, rule based trading system, the 
rule of law, right to due process, equal protection under the law, development of 
private enterprise, and minimisation of government interferences are three fold. 
                                                 
176 As trade liberalisation and creation of a stable environment for private enterprise was the goal 
of the AGOA during the processes leading to its enactment, it was not surprising that the US 
corporate sector was indeed one of this scheme’s largest proponent as evidenced by the backing it 
received from such corporations as Amoco, Caterpillar, Chevron, Enron, General Electric, K-
Mart, Mobil, Occidental Petroleum, and Texaco. For such information see, D Katona (n 18) 
1447; and UNCTAD, Global and Regional Approaches to Trade and Finance (United Nations, 
New York 2007) 82 
177D Katona (n 18) 1448 noting that ‘the corporations’ profit-maximizing motives…may prove 
quite destructive to a developing nation’s weak domestic industries.’ 
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Firstly, as is the case for the BITs, such requirements in such arrangements 
potentially circumscribe SSA countries’ space in which they could make policy 
choices and legislative actions commensurate with their development aspirations 
and context.178 This may have consequential effect of failure to implement the 
law. Secondly, such reform requirement pulls any potential cross-border 
insolvency system of SSA towards a universalist approach in order to address the 
international elements inherent in the transactions conducted under such 
interregional arrangements.   Lastly, the requirements for market reforms 
envisaged in such arrangements seem to expose SSA countries to ‘one-size-fits–
all’ prescriptions as to the reform of cross-border insolvency law; which 
approach has long been criticised.179 The likelihood  is for such prescriptions to 
be heavily drawn from and influenced by the so called ‘best practices’ 
originating from developed economies and which may not be directly relevant to 
the context of SSA countries. 180 The new trend of the developed countries to 
conclude agreement with SSA countries under their respective regional 
arrangements means also that the above implication does also hold true for the 
regional groupings in SSA.  
 
4.7 The ‘Crowding in’ and ‘Crowding out’ Effects of Cross-Border 
Trade and Investment in the Context of Cross-Border Insolvency  
 
As was noted above, the growth of cross-border trade and investments in SSA 
has been associated with the arrangements discussed above for the facilitation of 
trade and investment, though there are still divergent opinions from other 
scholars.181 Such arrangements have also been responsible for the increasing 
interaction between the local enterprises and entrepreneurs and foreign 
enterprises, especially multinational enterprises. Remaining questions concern 
                                                 
178 It has been said that the above observation runs counter to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [“ICESCR”] and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [ICCPR”]. See D Katona (n 18) 1471 
179 Ibid 1457-1458, & 1471 
180 Ibid 1457-1458, & 1471 
181 It is however generally understood that the effect tends to vary from country to country, partly 
depending on domestic policy, the types of FDI a country receives and the strength of domestic 
enterprises. See for instance, M Agosin and R Machado, ‘Foreign Investment in Developing 
Countries: Does it Crowd in Domestic Investment? (2005) 33 ODS 149, 151 
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the effect the growing trade and investment, and such interaction has on domestic 
economies of SSA countries and how such effect could be linked to insolvency. 
Although there is a dearth of scholarship on these issues,182 it is common 
knowledge that foreign direct investments lead to complementary or competitive 
effects which can consequently ‘crowd in’ (as for example, when their presence 
stimulates new downstream or upstream investments that would not have taken 
place in their absence) or ‘crowd out’ domestic investments (as for example 
displacing domestic producers or pre-empting their investment opportunities).183  
 
4.7.1 The ‘Crowding In’ and ‘Crowding Out’ and their Related Effects 
Agosin and Machado in their econometric assessment of the extent to which 
foreign direct investment in developing countries ‘crowds in or out’ domestic 
investment conclude that: 
 
The econometric exercises conducted …suggest that, over a long period of 
time (1971-2000), FDI has displaced domestic investment in Latin 
America. In Africa and Asia, on the other hand, FDI has increased overall 
investment one-to-one. If the three decades are taken separately, the results 
show CO [i.e crowd out] in Latin America in the 1970s, and in Africa in 
the 1990s. In the case of Latin America, if only 80% of FDI is transformed 
into real investment, then the effects of FDI on total investment are shown 
to have been neutral. 
 
The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that positive 
impacts of FDI on domestic investment are not assured. In some cases, 
total investment may increase much less than FDI or may even fail to rise 
when a country experiences an increase in FDI. Therefore, the assumption 
that underpins policy towards FDI in most developing countries—that a 
liberal policy toward MNEs is sufficient to ensure positive effects—fails 
to be upheld by the data.184 
 
                                                 
182 M Agosin and R Machado (n 181) 149. The authors note that ‘[i]n evaluating the impact of 
FDI on development….a key question is whether MNEs crowd in domestic investment…..or 
whether they have the opposite effect of displacing domestic producers or pre-empting their 
investment opportunities.’ 
183 M Agosin and R Machando (n 181) 149, 151; and R Jenkins and C Edwards, ‘The Economic 
Impacts of China and India on Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends and Prospects’ (2006) 17 Journal of 
Asian Studies 207, 211 - 223. In a situation where a multinational enterprise brings foreign 
investments to a developing country in SSA in an area that is new to the domestic economy, the 
investment is more likely to have a positive effect given that domestic producers do not have 
knowledge, expertise and technology required to undertake the activities and therefore foreign 
investments do not displace domestic investment.   
184 M Agosin and R Machando ibid 160 
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Whatever result the FDI of multinational enterprises may have, it serves to 
suggest strengthening of the potentiality of cross-border insolvencies. The 
‘crowding out’ effects may translate into financial difficulties and consequently 
the insolvency of a domestic enterprise.185An enterprise experiencing a crowd 
out effect may tend to adopt and implement survival plans.186 Such plans may 
entail distress borrowing from the financial sector, which may potentially 
magnify the impact of the ‘crowding out,’ especially when the financial sector 
engages in riskier lending strategies in anticipation of producing large bank 
profits.187 The macroeconomic effects of multinational enterprises’ activities in 
FDI could also lead to crowding out and consequently insolvency. This is aptly 
summarised by Agosin and Machado as thus:  
 
…[T]he entry of a MNE [i.e Multinational Enterprise] into a sector 
where there exist several domestic firms may lead to investments by 
incumbent firms in order to become more competitive. However, given 
the vast technological superiority of MNEs, their investments are more 
likely to displace domestic firms and even cause their bankruptcy….. 
 
…There are other macroeconomic externalities of MNE activities that 
could lead to CO. By raising domestic interest rates, the borrowing by 
MNEs on domestic financial markets may displace investment by 
domestic firms. Such borrowing may worsen foreign exchange problems 
during times of balance-of-payments crisis, as borrowing in domestic 
currency can be converted to foreign exchange and easily sent abroad by 
companies operating in global markets and having global financial 
connections. [This]… may be critical in small countries negotiating with 
                                                 
185 M Agosin and R Machado (n 171) 152; MJ Fry ‘Saving, Investment, Growth, And Financial 
Distortions in Pacific Asia and Other Developing Areas’ (1998) 12 Int’l Econ J  1; NB Villoria, 
‘China and the Manufacturing Terms-of-Trade of African Exporters’ (2009) 18 J Afr Econ 781- 
823; and A Zafar (n 146  ) 103-130 
186 M Agosin and R Machado (n 181) 152; MJ Fry (n 175) 1; NB Villoria (n 185); and A Zafar (n 
146) 103 - 130  
187 MJ Fry (n 185) 5. Drawing from the Pacific Asia and developing countries, the author show 
how distress borrowings are likely to be made by newly liberalised financial sectors, which are 
subject to inadequate prudential supervision and regulation. And that the effect of this is to 
compound the problem of insolvency in the real sectors of the economy. Distress borrowing 
occurs when a distressed borrower, unable to repay its loan, continuing borrowing to finance its 
losses, which borrowing will continue to increase with an increase in the interest rate. The author 
further describes the eventual effect of distress borrowing and its consequent effect on increase in 
interest rates in the following words: ‘Higher real interest rates produce an epidemic effect by 
dragging down otherwise profitable and solvent firms. Because distress borrowers push real 
interest rates to levels at which virtually no economic activity can be profitable, solvent 
businesses start to face liquidity crunches which then force them to borrow at rates that they 
know are unmanageable. Hence, the accommodation of distress borrowing propagates more 
insolvency and more distress borrowing.’ 
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large firms…..For a small country, borrowing on domestic markets by 
MNE affiliates may, under certain circumstances, be problematic.188  
 
As far as the ‘crowding in’ effect is concerned, domestic investment will 
continue to carry business notwithstanding the growth of FDI. Indeed, this has 
the potential to bolster the commercial interaction between the domestic 
enterprises, financial sectors, stakeholders, citizens, and government institutions 
on one hand, and the multinational enterprises’ FDI on the other. In this way, the 
domestic economy becomes highly integrated and dependent on the 
multinational enterprises’ FDI as well as their key international financiers. In this 
situation, the potential for insolvencies that have an international element looms 
large. 
 
What is clear from the facilitation arrangements for cross-border trade and 
investment is the opening up of SSA countries for trade and investment that 
hugely involves multinational enterprises. However, the factors that inhibit rapid 
growth of FDI in SSA countries include exchange rate instability, inflation and 
high interest rates. Another factor is poor infrastructure such as roads, water, and 
power supply.189 This also reflects the concerns of investors in this region. It is 
worth noting that such factors are among the common causes reported to 
contribute to business failure and insolvency in many jurisdictions,190 though, 
concerns on effectiveness of the insolvency law systems in these countries is not 
among the concerns normally raised, especially in Tanzania and Kenya. 
 
4.7.2 The Potential Impact of Effective Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regulation on Cross-Border Trade and Investments 
 
Most SSA countries, including Tanzania and Kenya, enjoyed periods of 
impressive and sustained economic growth, fuelled substantially by foreign 
investment, before the so-called credit crunch of 2006-2009.191 Yet it achieved 
this without the benefit of functional legal rules for cross-border insolvency 
                                                 
188 M Agosin and R Machado (n 181) 152 and 153 
189 L Thomas and others (n 162) 6; and I Bickerdyke, R Lattimore, and A Madge (n 174) 49-53 
190 Ibid 
191 IMF (n 114); and A Arief, MA Weiss, and VC Jones (n 15) 
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corresponding with contemporary neo-liberal standards of efficiency. Investors 
have apparently been sufficiently enticed by SSA's huge domestic market, 
integration arrangements with their corresponding effect of enlarging the market 
and reducing tariffs, abundance of natural resources, low-cost labour force, 
liberalisation of foreign investment laws, and tariff and taxation incentives in 
some sectors. 
 
The widely held view is that certainty as to the approach to be taken in 
insolvencies fosters confidence and may encourage investment. As most SSA 
countries have not been affected by most of the high profile cross-border 
insolvency cases, institutionalisation of an effective cross-border insolvency 
system would probably be seen as having little effect on the SSA economy as a 
whole. However, with the pace at which SSA economies are increasingly being 
integrated to the global economy and financial market, such a system is 
increasingly becoming important.  
 
The implication of the recent crisis evidences that not only the macroeconomic 
instabilities are there to stay but also that there is a glaring need of systems that 
may serve to absorb the shocks of similar crises as they occur.192 Indeed, systems 
that contribute to sustain the achievements made in terms of economic growth 
and development are imperative, though they may not necessarily have a direct 
and immediate effect of attracting cross-border trade and investment. Such 
systems, undoubtedly, include effective cross-border insolvency systems 
commensurate with SSA circumstances.  
 
Problems that could arise in the event of insolvency of some local enterprises 
with investments across SSA illustrate the point well. For example, as a result, 
partly, of the growing integration in Eastern and Southern Africa, a good number 
of enterprises especially the South African enterprises, are increasingly investing 
across the region with the result that, their creditors and assets are spreading 
                                                 
192 J Stiglitz (n 5) 
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beyond their home countries.193 Any macroeconomic instability resulting into 
financial distress to these enterprises may potentially lead to insolvencies which 
have cross-border implications across the whole region. This perhaps may take 
these countries by surprise as despite the mushrooming of the regional 
integration arrangements, they are yet to address instances of failures with 
implications across their respective regions and even beyond.194 These countries 
have not experienced cross-border insolvency incidents, the way most of the 
developed countries had. Of relevance to this point is that it is acknowledged that 
many enterprises that have large contributions in cross-border investments within 
the region have actually tended to have their investments implemented through 
subsidiaries in Europe.195 
  
 As pointed out earlier, while most of the regional cross-border investment is 
characterised by investment from South Africa and that the region has relatively 
few if any, investment beyond SSA, there is still some notable cross-border 
investment and trade which shows how failures of such investment may 
potentially affect and cause problems to the stability of the regional economy. 
Cross-border insolvency regulation ought therefore to be considered in the 
context of not only protecting interests of foreign investors and trading partners, 
but also within the context of its capability of protecting interests of domestic 
investors and traders having interests in other jurisdictions notwithstanding their 
marginal number.  
 
                                                 
193 L Thomas and others (n 162) 1-15. This study ‘generated data that suggests that regional 
investment is playing an increasingly important role in Eastern and Southern Africa [which] is in 
the context of a general increase in private capital flows to the region from the rest of the world.’ 
194 The East Africa Community in its recent Investment Conference May 2010 recommended that 
a corporate insolvency regime was among areas that member states should strive to reform and 
improve. In particular, it was emphasised that reform in the context of the international financial 
architecture is desirable given the recent financial crisis. See East Africa Community, The 2nd 
East African Investment Conference, 29th-31 July 2009 <   http://www.eac.int/inv/ > accessed 
24/05/2010 
195 L Thomas and others (n 162) 10. Noting also emerging trend in recent years of the transfer of 
ownership of several large South African conglomerates to London through listings on the 
London Stock Exchange, suggesting that such entities are no longer South African entities for 
purposes of international investment position. 
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4.8 A Case for Differential and Contextual Treatments in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulation? 
 
In the course of facilitating cross-border trade and investment, the international 
community has taken the approach of according special consideration to the 
circumstances of developing countries given their special situation in the global 
economy. Although this approach has been more pronounced in multilateral and 
bilateral trade arrangements, the trend now is to provide such treatments within a 
particular period of time, based on a certain level of development being 
reached.196  The application of the special treatment in the trading system is 
premised on the need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries ‘secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with 
the needs of their economic development.’197 The underlying justification was 
based on fostering redistributive values, for example, by fostering industrial 
capacity in non-traditional manufactures in order to reduce import dependence 
and to diversify away from traditional commodities.  198 Developing countries’ 
point of view (which has arguably survived to date despite being unsuccessful) 
centred on protection of their economic interests, positive discrimination and 
non-reciprocity. 199 
 
                                                 
196 S Grimm, ‘Towards the Global South’ in F Söderbaum and P Stalgrem (n 137) 47; P Cullet, 
‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-state Relations’ 
(1999) 10 EJIL 549,576 stating that ‘differential treatment has become a common feature of 
international law, but it is still disputed whether granting differential treatment has become 
compulsory and if so, in which situations.’ For the earliest form of special treatments, see  Article 
XVIII and XXXVI  of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 31 Oct 1947, 55 
UNTS(1950) 187 (hereinafter GATT Agreement 
197 See the preamble to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement ;  GA Bermann, and C 
Mavroidis, WTO Law and Developing Countries (Cambridge, CUP 2007) 1. The essence of 
according developing countries special treatment traces its significance from the 1950s after 
many developing countries began to join the GATT and presently the special treatment is ‘the 
cornerstone describing developing countries’ participation in the GATT/WTO.’ 
198 EA Alexander, ‘Taking Account of Reality: Adopting Contextual Standards for developing 
Countries in International Investment Law’ (2007-2008) 48 Va J Int’l L 817, 820 
199 DB Margraw, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and 
Absolute Norms’ (1990) 1 Colo J Int’l L & Pol’cy 69, 77; and P Cullet (n 186) 576-577. The 
view was contained in three UN general Assembly resolutions, namely the declaration on the 
establishment of a New International Economic Order; the programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order; and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (CERDS) 
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The commonest forms of special treatments are in the nature of differential and 
contextual standards of treatment. The differential treatment norm ‘provides 
different, presumably more advantageous, standards for one set of states than for 
another set.’200 Conversely, the contextual treatment provides identical treatment 
to all states affected by the norm but the application of which requires (or at least 
permits) consideration of characteristics that might vary from country to 
country.’201 However, they both recognise the vast differences that currently exist 
between countries and the effect that these differences have on countries’ 
priorities and capabilities.  
 
The recognition of the special treatment is not uncommon in UNCITRAL’s 
undertaking of enabling international trade within which the international 
insolvency benchmarks are also situated. Thus, the international insolvency 
benchmarks seem to implicitly and to some extent permit states to make 
adaptations responsive to the particular needs of the state.202 Indeed, unlike in the 
trade arrangements, the special treatment in the way a country may craft and 
adopt its insolvency system, based on the international benchmarks, is not 
exclusively based on the special situation and needs of developing countries in 
the global economy. Rather, it applies to all countries.  It means that, although 
the international insolvency benchmarks provide identical treatment on a 
particular aspect to all states, their observance and application would permit 
consideration of characteristics that might vary from country to country. This 
kind of special treatment therefore typically involves balancing multiple interests 
and characteristics. Of particular importance is that it provides some limits on the 
characteristics that may be considered in the course of reform.203It is however 
common knowledge that insolvency is influenced by several factors especially 
                                                 
200 DB Margraw (n 199)73 
201 Ibid 74 
202 S Block-Lieb and T Halliday, ‘Harmonisation and Modernisation in UNCITRAL’s Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2006-2007) 42 Tex Int’l LJ 475, 479. UNCITRAL has since been 
described to have  ‘historically understood the need for flexibility, diplomacy, and patience in its 
law reform projects….’  
203 Ibid 512.  The authors concludes thus with regard to UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law ‘[it] is a skilfully crafted set of norms that enabled UNCITRAL concomitantly to 
push towards an overarching global norm……while allowing significant flexibility for national 
lawmakers to modernize their own laws in ways appropriately adapted to variations in legal 
families, economic circumstances, and policy preferences, among others’.  
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the historical, cultural, political and socio-economic values of a country to 
mention but a few. 
 
The use of special treatment based on special situations and needs of developing 
countries may potentially influence SSA countries to attempt to build on such 
treatments in crafting their regulatory framework for cross-border insolvency. 
This is not surprising if it is considered in light of public policy and the 
prominence of the desire to protect legitimate local interests.204 Indeed, the desire 
for protection of local interests has long been one of ‘the principal sticking 
points’ of the debate on the two competing theories of cross border insolvency. 
205 This is as to the manner in which the local interests express serious ‘concern 
over the perils local [small] creditors and small country-sovereigns face in trying 
to design a viable [cross-border insolvency system].’206 
 
 It will be noted that despite the facilitation for cross-border trade and investment 
which has resulted in growing integration of SSA into the global economy, the 
developing countries in SSA are still by far less developed than their key trading 
partners. The issue is whether the special and in particular contextual treatment 
which characterises implementation of the international insolvency benchmarks 
is meant to adopt special standards of treatment which grant a favourable 
position to local interests or is meant to allow consideration of the relative 
development of a country or other similar factors to define the standards of 
treatment which a country may invoke.  
 
Even if it is viewed that the treatment is broad enough to cover consideration of 
the level of a country’s development and its desire to protect its local interests, it 
is of interest to note that such treatment might not be meant to allow room for 
discriminatory treatments based on foreignness. Equally important, the prevailing 
                                                 
204 JL Westbrook, ‘A Comment on Universal Proceduralism’ (2009-2010) 48 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 503, 515-516, attributing the legitimate local interests to ‘...interests that are truly local so that a 
person committed to a global approach to multinational insolvency would nonetheless agree that 
this or that sort of claim or claimant would best be governed by local insolvency law.’ 
205 JAE Pottow (n 6) 1900 
206 JAE Pottow (n 6) 1900 
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arrangements have to a large extent limited the scope of special treatment to 
developing countries. Indeed, the commitments that SSA countries have 
undertaken do not recognise their special position which has been the basis of the 
preferential treatments that they have been enjoying in GATT/WTO.207 Even 
where they offer such treatments, they are meant to be on a temporary basis. The 
implication is that there is perhaps very little basis, if any, upon which a claim 
for special treatment in cross-border insolvency regulation could be justified, 
especially, if such treatment is likely to infringe the principles and standards that 
characterise the cross-border trade and investment arrangements and the global 
insolvency norms.208  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
The foregoing examination and analysis suggest that the various cross-border 
trade and investment facilitation efforts that are being implemented in SSA 
dictate the nature of cross-border insolvency regulation to be pursued by SSA 
countries. While customarily, international initiatives involving SSA countries 
have tended to take into account the special position of SSA, there seem to be no 
space left for such undertaking in so far as cross-border insolvency regulation is 
concerned. Even if such a course is taken it might compromise the endeavour of 
attracting investment. The commitments envisaged in almost all arrangements for 
facilitation of trade and investment not only limit SSA countries in making wider 
policy choices in cross-border insolvency regulation that could not only take into 
account the desire to promote cross-border trade and investment, but also 
consideration of their local needs, priorities, history, politics, culture and socio-
economic circumstances as it is settled that insolvency systems tend to be 
seriously influenced by such factors. It would seem that interests promoted by 
the arrangements for facilitation of trade and investment would prevail over 
anything in the event of the conflict.  
 
                                                 
207 P Cullet (n 196); and  DB Margraw (n 199)  
208 P Cullet (n 196) 
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The implication is that the implementation of the arrangements effectively pulls 
any potential SSA cross-border insolvency framework towards a universalist 
stance and away from territorialist approaches.  By virtue of the arrangements, 
SSA countries have undertaken to recognise and respect interests of foreign 
actors as long as they fall within the definition of investors protected under the 
arrangements. It is only a universalist based approach that will allow room for 
recognition of those interests during insolvencies. It would seem that SSA does 
not, in view of the implication of the arrangements for facilitation of cross-border 
trade and investment being implemented need a different framework from those 
suggested by the theories and the benchmarks.  
 
The question left is how SSA countries can identify their respective broader 
policy contexts and have them reflected in cross-border insolvency regulation 
without violating their various international commitments? The increasing 
number of arbitration claims against developing countries based on the BITs 
coupled with the emerging trend of renegotiation of such treaties, perhaps point 
to how these countries have been caught in between. But this is, seemingly, a 
clear reflection of the desperation and extent of economic weakness of these 
countries which make them to enter in such arrangements whilst they do not have 
the political will and capacity for full implementation. In order to set grounds for 
an examination of the above question in later chapters, the next chapter looks at 
the nature of legal systems in SSA countries, the continuing influence of the 
colonial legacy in cross-border insolvency law to such countries and the extent to 
which such influence is consistent with the commitments relating to facilitation 
of cross-border trade and investment.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE COMMON LAW APPROACH TO CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
AND ITS APPLICABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA WITH 
REFERENCE TO TANZANIA AND KENYA 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The legal systems of almost all Sub-Saharan African (“SSA”) countries are to a 
large extent based on the systems which were first introduced by the colonial 
administrations during the colonial era.1 It is the same basis from which the 
nature and character of insolvency systems and limited cross-border insolvency 
systems which are found in these countries are traceable. It would follow that a 
fair assessment of any of such countries’ insolvency systems should necessarily 
be undertaken and considered in light of the corresponding legal families in 
which they are situated.  
 
This chapter examines the influence of the colonial legacy in SSA countries’ 
legal systems and cross-border insolvency systems in particular using mainly the 
application of the English common law in Tanzania and Kenya as case studies. 
The English common law is chosen for its pronounced influence in the common 
law jurisdictions in SSA. The chapter evaluates the common law on cross-border 
insolvency and the landscape within which it might be applied before 
consideration of the following two aspects is given. Firstly, the suitability of the 
common law in helping to address and resolve cross-border insolvency problems 
as they arise; and secondly, the potential impact of the common law in the 
positioning of the existing limited cross-border insolvency frameworks within 
the competing cross-border insolvency theories and the recently developed 
international insolvency benchmarks.  
                                                 
1 S E Merry, ‘From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalisation’ (2003) 28 Law & Social 
Inquiry 569; and W Menski, Comparative Law in Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and 
Africa 2nd ed (CUP, England 2006)  
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The key argument and conclusion in this chapter is that the application of the 
common law on cross-border insolvency pulls the cross-border insolvency 
frameworks in SSA countries towards modified universalism. However, the 
extent to which such common law would be applicable in appropriate cases is 
arguably unpredictable as it depends on several factors including legislation 
enacted by a country and the attitude of the judiciary towards the common law 
generally. In addition, despite the utility that the common law could potentially 
bring into the cross-border insolvency systems of some SSA countries, it has a 
number of limitations which affect reliance on it as a primary source of cross-
border insolvency law.  
 
5.2 A Historical Basis of Cross-Border Insolvency Frameworks in SSA’s 
Legal System 
 
Insolvency systems and in particular cross-border insolvency frameworks that 
exist in SSA countries are largely based on legal systems introduced by the 
colonial power during the colonial era.  It is common knowledge that when the 
colonial powers colonised Africa they brought their law with them. Tanzania and 
Kenya were no exception, for the law of England was first applied through 
systematic legislation by the British administration at the onset of and during 
colonial rule. This was not only the case for the British colonial power alone, but 
also for the French, the Dutch, the Italians, the Germans, Spanish and the 
Portuguese.2 Two dominant legal families, namely, the English common law and 
civil law, which vary from one another, dominated the process of consolidation 
and formalisation of formal legal orders in the colonies.3 However, it is common 
knowledge that the impact of English law is relatively far reaching given the then 
leading role of Britain in commerce and industry which determined its relatively 
large sphere of influence compared to the other European powers.4  
 
                                                 
2 S E Merry (n 1) 569 
3 D Berkowitz, K Pistor, and J Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant 
Effect’ (2003) 47 Eur Econ Rev 165-195   
4 L Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective’ (1996) 64 Fordham L Rev 2507 
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The reception of the law in these countries, as is typical among the former British 
colonies, comprised English law (in some cases as applied in India), English 
common law, the doctrine of equity and statutes of general application then in 
force in England. The imposition of the English law was effected through the so 
called reception clauses and local ordinances, some of which merely copied 
corresponding English legislation which applied English law by reference. 
Although the reception process was described as an involuntary transplant, as 
such countries received their legal orders as colonies,5 the entire colonial legal 
materials were inherited at independence by re-enactment of the reception 
clauses and the entire colonial legislation.6  Indeed, almost all countries 
irrespective of their colonial powers retained the core characteristics of the legal 
systems that were imposed on them.7 To this extent, the colonial legal systems 
survived intact notwithstanding adoption of ‘Africanisation’ and other related 
policies such as ‘African socialism’ by most of the independent SSA countries. 8 
 
 Within the landscape of Kenya’s legal system, English law is provided by 
section 3(1)(c) of the Judicature Act 1967 (Kenya) Chapter 8, which reads: 
 
The jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and all 
subordinate courts shall be exercised in conformity with: 
 
(a) the Constitution 
(b) subject thereto, all other written laws, including the Acts of 
Parliament of the United Kingdom cited in Part I of the Schedule to this 
Act, modified in accordance with PART II of that Schedule; 
(c) subject thereto and so far as those written laws do not extend or 
apply, the substance of the common law, the doctrine of equity and the 
statutes of general application in force in England on the 12th August, 
1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of justice in 
England at that date 
                                                 
5 D Berkowitz, K Pistor, and J Richard  (n 3)  
6 The reception clauses that were re-enacted at independence were almost similar word for word 
with the reception clauses during the colonial administration. See for instance, article 4 (2) of 
Kenya’s East African Order in Council 1897 (later repeated in  the Kenya Colony Order in 
Council 1921) and also article 17 of the Tanganyika Order in Council 1920 
7 D Berkowitz, K Pistor, and J Richard  (n 3) 12; RJ Daniels, MJ Trebilcock, and LD Carson, 
‘The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former 
British Colonies’ (2011) 56 Am J Com L 111; S E Merry (n 1) 578. Merry points out that 
although at independence the colonial legal system was retained, the imposition of the law during 
the colonial administration was not a simple process in most of the territories. There were spaces 
of resistance, struggles among the colonisers, and accommodation by colonised elites and 
subjects. 
8 E Cotran, ‘The Development and Reform of the Law in Kenya’ (1983) 27 J Afr L 42, 47 
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but the common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general 
application shall apply so far only as the circumstances of Kenya and its 
inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as those 
circumstances may render necessary.9 (emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, within Tanzania’s legal system, section 2(3) of the Judicature and 
Application of Law Act provides that: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the jurisdiction of the High Court 
shall be exercised in conformity with the written laws which are in 
force in Tanzania on the date on which this Act comes into operation 
(including the laws applied by this Act) or which may hereafter be 
applied or enacted and, subject thereto and so far as the same shall 
not extend or apply, shall be exercised in conformity with the 
substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes 
of general application in force in England on the twenty-second day 
of July, 1920, and with the powers vested in and according to the 
procedure and practice observed by and before Courts of Justice and 
justices of the Peace in England according to their respective 
jurisdictions and authorities at that date, save in so far as the said 
common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application 
and the said powers, procedure and practice may, at any time before 
the date on which this Act comes into operation, have been modified, 
amended or replaced by other provision in lieu thereof by or under the 
authority of any Order of Her Majesty in Council, or by any 
Proclamation issued, or any Act or Acts passed in and for Tanzania, or 
may hereafter be modified, amended or replaced by other provision in 
lieu thereof by or under any such Act or Acts of the Parliament of 
Tanzania: 
 Provided always that the said common law, doctrines of equity 
and statutes of general application shall be in force in Tanzania only 
so far as the circumstances of Tanzania and its inhabitants permit, 
and subject to such qualifications as local circumstances may render 
necessary.10 (emphasis added) 
 
Clearly, the reception clauses prescribe the hierarchy of the sources of law 
enforceable in Tanzania and Kenya, as was also the case for the other British 
colonies in SSA. Accordingly, the imported English law applies subject to 
written law. And the imported law could only be resorted to where written law 
does not extend or apply, and finally such imported law has to be applied subject 
to certain qualifications dictated by local circumstances. It has accordingly been 
held that the policy of the reception clause is such that ‘whenever there is no 
local enactment governing any matter….the courts are directed to apply the 
imported law to fill up what is lacking in …domestic legislation. Therefore, the 
                                                 
9 Judicature Act 1967 Chapter 8, s 3(1)(c) (Kenya) 
10 Judicature and Application of Law Act, s 2(3) (Tanzania) 
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imported English law is to be applied with as much force of law as the local 
legislation which it has been imported to supplement.’11 
5.2.1 The Reception and Nature of the Cross-Border Insolvency Law 
Inherited from the Colonial Administration in SSA 
 
Based on the reception clause, it would seem that insolvency and in particular 
cross-border insolvency law in SSA countries which were under the British rule, 
such as Tanzania and Kenya, could be traced from the received law through 
either introduction of English law through local legislation (i.e Ordinances) or 
the reception clause, which applied the relevant English common laws, the 
doctrine of equity and statutes of general application.12  With perhaps the 
exception of the bankruptcy legislation,13 there was neither companies’ 
legislation with explicit and elaborate provisions addressing cross-border 
insolvency incidences involving companies nor a distinct and stand-alone cross-
border insolvency legislation for companies.14  
 
                                                 
11 MN Wabwile, ‘The Place of English Common Law in Kenya’ (2003) 3 Oxford U Commw LJ 
51, 63. On this point see also, HF Morris, ‘English Law in East Africa: A Hardy Transplant in an 
Alien Soil’ in  HF Morris and JS Read (eds), Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays in 
East African Legal History (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972) 147, whose view is  such that the 
wholesale re-enactment of colonial reception clauses demonstrates the policy of Anglophone 
SSA countries, as is the case for East Africa countries, to perpetuate the inherited English 
tradition. 
12 Scholars who are critical of the introduction of the colonial powers’ law into the colonised 
states such as M Wabwile, ‘The Future of Common Law  in Kenya’ (2000) 20-27 EALR 20, 21, 
argue that the imposition of such laws was meant primarily to ‘serve the exigencies of colonial 
administration.’ In that regard, it is said that not much regard was had to the long term future of 
the imposed legal system.  
13 Bankruptcy statutes modelled on the English Bankruptcy Act 1914 have elaborate provisions 
on cross-border insolvency that required every jurisdiction in all matters of bankruptcy to act in 
aid and be auxiliary to every British Court elsewhere having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or 
insolvency. See Bankruptcy Act [Cap.25 R.E. 2002] (Tanzania) and Bankruptcy Act (Chapter 53 
of Laws of Kenya). 
14 In Tanzania insolvent companies were under colonial administration regulated by the 
Companies Ordinance which was a duplicate of the English Companies Act 1929 while 
individual insolvency was regulated by the Bankruptcy Ordinance which was largely the same as 
the English Bankruptcy Act 1914, and the Bankruptcy (Amendments) Act 1926. However, prior 
to these pieces of legislation, the colonial administration had passed the Tanganyika Order in 
Council 1920 through which the Application of Laws Ordinance 1920 was enacted. The Act 
applied the Indian Companies Act 1913, duplicate of the English Companies (Consolidation) Act 
1908. However, the Act was not put into force before the promulgation of the Companies 
Ordinance. See IR Macneil, Bankruptcy Law in East Africa (University College, Dar es salaam 
1966) xiv. 
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In this regard, one of the basic principles applicable to supply what seems to be 
lacking in the legislation were those derived from the common law as imported 
into these countries through the reception clauses. Indeed, the relevant substances 
of common law and doctrine of equity were applicable in such matters that were 
not specifically covered by the written law. And perhaps the other source was the 
provisions of the bankruptcy legislation which catered for cross-border issues 
arising in bankruptcy proceedings.15  
 
Accordingly, it is arguable that the formulation of the reception clauses, before 
and after the re-enactment on independence, was such that English common law 
is to serve as a principal repository of legal norms operating as a reserve set to 
support and complement Tanzania and Kenya’s written law, just as it was the 
case in the other colonies.16 Since cross-border insolvency law remained outside 
of direct legislative regulation, the applied English common law comes in handy 
and provides the background normative legal rules.17  
 
Scholarship on the manner in which the relevant common law principles were 
applicable in practice in relation to cross-border insolvency matters is lacking, 
perhaps due to an absence of such cases during such time. A few companies that 
existed by then were branches and subsidiaries of foreign companies; having 
colonial powers as their home countries. The existing literature has only 
documented cases on individual insolvency involving the application of 
bankruptcy legislation and individuals of Asian descent in East Africa. This is 
perhaps because of their entrepreneurial culture.18  
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. A detailed account of cross-border insolvency provisions under the bankruptcy legislation 
in Tanzania and Kenya which, it is argued, were meant to apply to corporate insolvency as well, 
is covered in  Chapter 6. See text to part 6.5 in chapter 6 
16 MN Wabwile (n 11) 69. See also Cooper v Board of Works for Wandsworth District (1863) 14 
CB (NS) 180, 194; 143 ER114, 420, Byles J stated that ‘the justice of the common law will 
supply the omission of the legislature.’ 
17 MN Wabwile (n 11) 54 
18 See generally, IR Macneil (n 14). Despite being old, this text seems to be the only piece of 
work thus far in East Africa and perhaps in the rest of SSA with the exception of South Africa, to 
document individual insolvency law and practice in the colonial and early post colonial days.  
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However, it is common knowledge that the attitude of the colonial judges to the 
administration of justice failed to adapt the English law to the local conditions 
and circumstances as they were required to do under the proviso to the reception 
clauses of the Order in Councils.19 Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal of 
England in 1955 had to remind them to do so when he said: 
 
The next proviso says, however, that the common law is to apply 
‘subject to such qualification as local circumstances render necessary.’ 
This wise provision should, I think, be liberally construed. It is 
recognition that the common law cannot be applied in a foreign land 
without considerable qualification. Just as with an English oak, so with 
the English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African 
continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in 
England. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending. So with the 
common law. It has many principles of manifest justice and good sense 
which can be applied with advantage to peoples of every race and colour 
all the world over; but it has also much refinement, subtleties and 
technicalities which are not suitable to other folk. These off-shoots must 
be cut away. In these far-off lands the people must have a law which 
they understand and which they will respect. The common law cannot 
fulfil this role except with considerable qualifications. The task of 
making these qualifications is entrusted to the judges of these lands. It is 
a great task. I trust that they will not fail therein.20 
 
The question is whether or not such qualification could well be applied in 
insolvency related cases to make the law more responsive to the needs of the 
society which it serves. Writing on bankruptcy law in East Africa way back in 
1960, Macneil had it that ‘..bankruptcy law, given the [then] ….commercial 
structure, probably requires as little jurisprudential East Africanisation as any 
field of law.’21 
                                                 
19 E Cotran (n 8) 44 noting that although there was room for local adaptation in the application of 
English law, such opportunity was not utilised. As such the standard of justice applicable 
remained entirely the British standard. Adaptation of English law to local situations was, if any, 
very minimal. 
20 Nyali Ltd v Attorney-General [1955] 1EAR 646, 653  also quoted in E Cotran (n 8 )44. KK 
Mwenda, ‘ “Presumption of Innocence” Doctrine: Relevant in Corruption Fight?’ Zambia Post  
(Zambia 4 November 2009) <  http://www.scribd.com/KKMwenda-Zambia-Post-
Newspaper/d/22286407 >    accessed 01 September 2011,  reflecting on Lord Denning’s dictum 
in Nyali’s case  in the present contexts of developing countries observes that ‘Implicit in Lord 
Denning’s dictum is the notion that developing countries that import or transplant model laws 
from abroad to their own local environments, should consider not only the wisdom of foreign 
technical experts from abroad, but also the local insights and peculiarities articulated by some 
local expertise.’ It is important to note that Lord Denning’s pronouncement is still valid to date, 
as courts across Africa have kept on referring and making use of its import. 
21 IR Macneil (n 14) ii 
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5.2.2 A Brief Survey of the State of Cross-Border Insolvency at Common 
Law 	
Much has been written and discussed in recent decades on the position of cross-
border insolvency at common law.22 This, partly, follows the surge in cross-
border insolvencies in the recent times and the corresponding quest for 
cooperation and coordination among jurisdictions. It is clear from the scholarship 
on this area that the English common law has long developed principles 
governing regulation of cross-border insolvency which are highly inclined to 
universality of insolvency as opposed to territoriality. The British history and 
supremacy in the world of trade and commerce as well as in occupation of 
foreign territories before and during the 19th century are among the reasons 
which attributed to such early development, and indeed necessitated the law to 
reflect the needs of the then British Empire and in particular the mercantile 
community.23  
 
Despite such early development of the law and its seeming usefulness in a 
number of commonwealth jurisdictions, the further development of the common 
law approach to cross-border insolvency has been much curtailed by the 
intensive legislation efforts undertaken within the UK.24 It is against this 
background that the Privy Council’s decision in Cambridge Gas Transport Corp 
v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc25 has 
                                                 
22 For an example of some recent works in this regard, see PJ Omar, ‘Developments in Cross-
Border Insolvency Practice in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 14 Bond L Rev 347; LC Ho, 
‘Navigating the Common Law Approach to Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2006) 22 Insolv L & 
Practice 217; P Hayden, ‘The Continuing Role of  the Common Law in Cross-Border 
Insolvency- A Cayman Islands Perspective’ (2009) 2 Corporate Rescue and Insolv 108; E 
Sjostrand, ‘Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvency- Common Law Implications of 
Cambridge Gas Transportation and Phoenix and Kapital’ (2009) 2 Corporate Rescue and Insolv 
105; A Walters, ‘Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvency  at Common Law’ (2007) 28 
Comp Law 73;  G Moss, ‘Common Law Judicial Assistance Comes of Age’ (2006) 19 Insolv Int 
123; G Moss, D Bayfield and G Peters, “Recognition and Enforcement” in G Moss, IF Fletcher & 
S Isaacs (eds), The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings(OUP, New York 2009)79; L 
Hoffmann (n 4)2507; and N Martin, ‘Common Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and 
Differences’ (2003) 11 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 367. Notably, the discussion on common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency gained momentum following the landmark decision of the 
Privy Council in Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of 
Navigator Holdings Plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC(IoM))  and later Re HIH 
Insurance [2008] 1 UKHL 21; [2008] 1 WLR 852   
23 L Hoffmann (n 4) 2507 
24 G Moss, D Bayfield and G Peters (n 22) 79 
25  [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC(IoM)) 
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attracted attention of many scholars as it demonstrates that there are still cases 
which will have to be decided on general principles of private international law’, 
and the significance of the ‘..wide-reaching powers of judicial assistance for 
foreign insolvency proceedings under common law… particularly ….in English 
law based offshore jurisdictions’,26 and if one were to add, other Anglophone 
countries, such as those of SSA, whose legal systems are still largely dependent 
on the English common law in certain respects.27 The decision, viewed as a 
whole, champions universalism theory as the basis of the common law approach 
to cross-border insolvency.28 In this case, the Privy Council, having emphasised 
the centrality of universality of insolvency, expressed the significance of various 
measures and principles, as signified by recognition of foreign proceedings and 
judicial assistance, in attaining universality. While citing Re African Farms29 as 
per Innes CJ, Lord Hoffmann on behalf of the Privy Council stated: 
 
The English common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness 
between creditors requires that, ideally, bankruptcy proceedings should 
have universal application. There should be a single bankruptcy in 
which all creditors are entitled and required to prove… 
 
[U]niversality of bankruptcy has long been an aspiration, if not always 
fully achieved, of United Kingdom law…[T]he underlying principle of 
universality is … given effect by recognising the person who is 
empowered under the foreign bankruptcy law to act on behalf of the 
insolvent company as entitled to do so in England. In addition, as Innes 
CJ said in the Transvaal case of Re African Farms 1906 TS 373, 377, in 
which an English company with assets in the Transvaal had been 
voluntarily wound up in England, “recognition carries with it the active 
                                                 
26 G Moss (n 22) 1 
27 Indeed, as observed by MN Wabwile (n 11) 69, in most of these jurisdictions ‘the sphere of 
administrative, commercial and many aspects of procedural law lack comprehensive local 
legislation. They are governed by scattered pieces of legislation which….also provides for 
reception of English common law to supply that which seems to be lacking in the local 
legislation.’ 
28 A similar trend was later maintained and reflected in Re HIH (n 22) as per the opinion of Lord 
Hoffmann which relied on the common law to turnover assets from an English ancillary 
liquidation to an Australian ‘main’ liquidation. This was arguably notwithstanding that the rules 
of distribution in Australia differed from those in an English liquidation. More importantly, it is 
not clear whether Lord Hoffmann’s opinion can be regarded as the majority opinion. Equally 
important to note is the most recent English Court of Appeal decision in Rubin v Eurofinance 
[2010] EWCA Civ 895 ( in which resort was had to Cambridge Gas) to recognise and enforce in 
England and Wales default judgments obtained in the US Bankruptcy court under the US 
Bankruptcy Code. It has so far been argued that the decision would not otherwise be enforceable 
under ordinary conflict of laws rules. Being controversial as it is, the decision is on appeal to the 
English Supreme Court.  See LC Ho, ‘Recognition Born of Fiction- Rubin v Eurofinance’ (2010) 
J Int’l Banking L & Reg 579 
29 1906 TS 373 
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assistance of the court”. He went on to say that active assistance could 
include: “A declaration, in effect, that the liquidator is entitled to deal 
with the Transvaal assets in the same way as if they were within the 
jurisdiction of the English courts, subject only to such conditions as the 
courts may impose for the protection of local creditors, or in 
recognition of the requirements of our local laws.”30 
 
The common law approach to cross-border insolvency has traditionally provided 
jurisdiction for the English Court to subject a foreign company in insolvency 
proceedings, commencing ancillary proceedings, granting recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings, and provision of judicial assistance and co-operation. 
However, consideration of local interests has always been at the centre of judicial 
discretion that involves realisation and implementation of the common law in 
cross-border insolvency aspects. The other point worth noting at the outset is the 
fact that the development of these principles have much been associated with 
winding up procedures as by then such procedures were the only avenue through 
which an insolvent company could be dealt with. The Cambridge Gas case 
marks a very significant development in the common law as it concerned 
reorganisation and thus explicitly provided for cross-border insolvency at 
common law in relation to reorganisation.  
 
It is also worth noting at the outset that the principles available at common law 
with regard to cross-border insolvency are interlinked and reinforce each other in 
such a way that it is hardly possible to talk of one principle without touching the 
other principles.31 While the cross-border insolvency approach at common law 
has been praised for its inherent flexibility, it has been argued that such 
flexibility ‘can...lead to unpredictability of results and is neither well-suited to 
                                                 
30  [2006] UKPC 26; [2007]1 AC 508(PC(IoM)), para16, 17, & 20 
31 It is perhaps this reason why in analysing the decision in Cambridge Gas, G Moss (n 22) 125 – 
126, found that ‘The judgment itself is a tremendous achievement which is only slightly 
diminished by some confusion of analytical terms,…… in failing to differentiate between 
“recognition”, i.e. giving effect directly to the foreign law, and “judicial assistance”, using local 
law to assist the foreign insolvency proceedings without giving direct effect to the provisions of 
the foreign law. …[D]espite this, the great advance in the scope of common-law judicial 
assistance is greatly to be welcomed. 
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the code oriented nature of civil law jurisdiction nor does it provide a basis on 
which to anticipate recovery risk.’32 
5.2.2.1 Jurisdiction for Initiating Insolvency Proceedings Regarding a 
Foreign Company 
 
The first principle that characterises the English common law approach to cross-
border insolvency is that the common law vests jurisdiction to an English court 
to subject a foreign company to insolvency proceedings.33 This however is 
dependent on existence of some preconditions that have historically evolved over 
time at common law.34  The historical basis for the development of such 
preconditions shows how the English court has been exercising its jurisdiction to 
wind up foreign companies.35One such criterion that has over time been 
employed is the existence of a sufficient connection between the foreign 
company and the English jurisdiction.36 Historically, existence of the foreign 
company’s assets in England was one factor that the court would consider when 
ruling that it had jurisdiction to commence proceedings against the foreign 
company.37  
 
However, it must be pointed out that with further evolution and development it 
was no longer necessary at common law that there should be assets in England to 
establish sufficient connection for the purpose of gaining jurisdiction.38 It would 
accordingly be sufficient for the court to exercise its discretionary power to 
subject a foreign company to insolvency proceedings if, notwithstanding an 
absence of assets known to exist in England, there were persons in England 
                                                 
32 HS Burman, ‘Harmonisation of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective’ 
(1995-1996) 64 Fordham L Rev 2543, 2552 
33 For a discussion of this principle see, L Hoffmann (n 4)2509-2510. 
34 R Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 285-286; IF Fletcher, Insolvency 
in Private International Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005). See also Re Eloc Electro Optiek and 
Communicatie BV [1982] Ch. 43; and Re A  Company (No.00359 of 1987);  and  International 
Westminster Bank v Okeanos [1988] 1 Ch. 210 
35 L Hoffmann (n ) 2510, 2511; PJ Omar (n 22) 349, 357-362. See also cases that arose as a result 
of the Russian revolution. For example, Russian and English Bank v Baring Bros &Co [1936] 
AC 405; Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] 1 Ch 647; and Banque des Marchands de 
Moscou (Koupetschesky) v Kindersley [1951] Ch 112 
36 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latreefers Inc, Re Latreefers Inc [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 116, 140, CA 
37 Re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884)  27 Ch D 225; and Re Real Estate Development Co  [1991] 
BCLC 210 
38 Re Real Estate Development Co  [1991] BCLC 210 
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concerned or interested in the proceedings, or creditors who hoped to benefit 
from the proceedings and to uncover the company’s assets through the use of the 
court’s inquiry procedure.39 One view is that the court has generally tended to 
take a more liberal approach in exercising its discretion as to whether or not it 
has jurisdiction.40 Describing the approach, Lord Hoffmann is of the view that: 
 
[s]uch wide power [is] useful when the company is incorporated in a 
foreign tax haven like Liberia or British Virgin Islands and there are no 
known assets in England, but the creditors hope that some may be 
unearthed by using the inquiry procedures of the court against officers 
or directors or bringing proceedings to set aside pre-bankruptcy 
preferences or fraudulent disposals.41 
5.2.2.2  Recognition of Foreign Proceedings 
The second principle is that of recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings 
commenced in a home country of a company. This is regarded as one of the 
oldest principles at common law tracing its origin from personal bankruptcy.42 
The principle calls for recognition by the English court of the order of the foreign 
insolvency proceedings granted by the foreign court in the home jurisdiction, or 
domicile of the company (i.e the country of incorporation). 43 It is implicit that 
recognition of the foreign order would mandate recognition of all that is inherent 
in the order such as the representatives of the foreign proceedings and their 
                                                 
39 See for instance, Re A Company (No 00359 of 1987) [1988] 1 Ch 210 involving a company 
incorporated in Liberia but mainly operated from London. The holding of the court was that it 
was not necessary to show that the company had assets within a jurisdiction but that there was a 
close link with the jurisdiction; Banques  des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetchesky) v Kindersley 
[1951] Ch 112, 125-126 where apart from the English Court of Appeal emphasising on criteria to 
be considered by the court, concluded that the exercise of the jurisdiction remains discretionary 
notwithstanding presence of the criteria; and Stocznia Gdanska SA (n 36)  
40 See n 24 above. See also for instance in the old case of Re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884)  27 Ch D 
225, where inter alia, it was contended that even though a foreign company had already been 
placed in liquidation, such process in itself does not take away the right of the English court to 
make a winding up order in England. It was also contended that commencement of foreign 
proceedings may however exercise an influence upon the jurisdiction. 
41 L Hoffmann (n 4) 2509 
42 Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 H BI 131 where English creditor had to surrender to the Dutch 
bankruptcy assets realised out of the garnishee proceedings and prove in such  proceedings, 
following recognition by the English court of such proceedings. See also K  Nadelmann, 
‘Solomons v Ross and International Bankruptcy Law’ (1947) 9 MLR 154 
43 IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (2nd ed Sweet & Maxwell, London1996) 760-761; PJ Omar, 
‘Cross-Border Jurisdiction and Assistance in Insolvency: The Position in Malaysia and 
Singapore’ (2008) 1 PER 2/55, 8/55; PJ Omar (n 22)349. See also Lazard Bros & Co v Midland 
Bank Ltd (1933) AC 283 
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authority in the foreign jurisdiction to manage or administer the insolvency 
proceedings.44 This should entail not only granting recognition, but also granting 
the foreign office holder appointed by the foreign corporation’s home country ( 
place of domicile) the remedies to which they would have been entitled if the 
equivalent proceedings had taken place in the domestic forum.45 In view of the 
Cambridge Gas case, it seems that it is now possible at common law for the 
recognition to be achieved even though the proceedings did not emanate from the 
home country of the foreign company. 
 
As with the previous principle, implementation of this principle underpins the 
exercise of judicial discretion on whether or not to grant recognition or adopt the 
foreign orders as those of the local court.46 Criteria that are said to have long 
emerged as exceptions to determine whether or not to grant recognition are, 
according to Wood,47 and as cited in support by Omar, firstly, whether the 
foreign proceedings are final in nature; secondly, whether they conform with 
prevailing conceptions of natural justice; thirdly, whether the jurisdiction has 
validly been exercised; and lastly, whether recognition will be contrary to public 
policy.48 In Cambridge Gas case,49 the Privy Council noted that although it may 
be that the criteria for recognition should be wider, that question did not arise in 
the case.50 It seems therefore that to gain recognition through this principle that 
creates obligation on the part of the English court to recognise, there should be 
instituted proceedings for the foreign representative to gain consent of the local 
court and capacity to act and enforce the foreign order.  Moss, Bayfield and 
Peters note that recognition mainly involves giving direct effect to foreign 
proceedings, orders and appointments.51 However, it is to be noted that, although 
at common law the court is entitled to recognise foreign insolvency proceedings 
                                                 
44 PJ Omar (n 43); PJ Omar   (22) ; and Macaulay v Guaranty Trust Company of New York 
(1927) 40 TLR 99 
45 See Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator 
Holdings Plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007]1 AC 508(PC(IoM)); LC Ho (n 22) 217-; and G Moss, IF 
Fletcher and S Isaacs (n 22)  83 
46 See for instance Re HIH case (n 22); LC Ho (n 22) 
47 PR Wood, Principles of International Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1995) 250 
48  PJ Omar (n 43) 8/55; and PJ Omar (n 22) 349 
49  [2006] UKPC 26; [2007]1 AC 508(PC(IoM)), para 19 
50 For commentaries on this case, see LC Ho (n 22) 217 
51 See n 63 below 
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and allow a foreign representative to act, it still has wide discretionary powers to 
make an order for insolvency proceeding under its broad jurisdiction.52 Such 
proceedings, if so made would be designated as ancillary as discussed below. 
5.2.2.3  Ancillary Proceedings 
Ancillary insolvency proceedings are employed at common law to govern 
proceedings commenced in a jurisdiction other than one which is the home 
country or domicile of the insolvent company. This is due to the fact that at 
common law a foreign company may be placed under insolvency proceedings 
locally even though it is or it is not a subject of foreign insolvency proceedings 
elsewhere. Ancillary proceedings refer to proceedings that are secondary to the 
main proceedings. The general principle at common law is for ancillary 
proceedings to arise from jurisdiction which is not the home country or domicile 
of the insolvent company. Its primary function is essentially to assist the main 
proceeding in collection and protection of local assets for the benefits of the 
company’s creditors wherever they are located.53 Of significance is that despite 
the proceeding being ancillary to the main proceedings, the proceedings 
including the administration of the assets are undertaken by the local laws.54 
Among the most cited early English cases which envisaged the concept of 
ancillary proceedings at common law are Re Matheson Brothers55 and Re 
English Scottish & Australian Chartered Bank.56 In the latter case Vaughan 
William J has been quoted, by different scholars,57 as saying: 
 
                                                 
52 Re Matheson Brothers (1884) 27 Ch D 225, 230 where the court (as per Mr Justice Kay ) has 
been quoted as saying  that a foreign order ‘does not take away the rights of a court of this 
country to make a winding-up order here, though it would no doubt exercise an influence upon 
this court.’  See PJ Omar (n 43) 10/55; and PJ Omar  (n 35) 351 
53 See Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213, 246 where 
Scott VC among other things pronounced that: ‘Nonetheless, the ancillary character of a local 
winding up does not relieve the court of the obligation to apply local law, including local 
insolvency law, to the resolution of any issue arising in the winding up which is brought before 
the court. It may be, of course that local conflicts of law rules will lead to the application of some 
foreign law principles in order to resolve a particular issue.’  
54 See Re Suidair International Airways Ltd [1951] Ch 165, which was favourably cited in Re 
Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (N 10) [1997] Ch 213, 241 
55 (1884) 27 Ch D 225, 230 
56 [1893] 3 Ch 385, 394 
57 See A Keay (ed), McPherson: The Law of Company Liquidation (4th edition Lawbook Co., 
Australia 2000) 689-690; and PJ Omar (n 22) 352 
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One must bear in mind the principles upon which liquidations are 
conducted, in different countries and in different courts, of one concern. 
One knows that where there is a liquidation of one concern the general 
principle is-ascertain what is the domicil of the company in liquidation; 
let the Court of the country of domicil act as the principal court to 
govern the liquidation, and let other Courts act as ancillary, as far as 
they can, to the principal liquidation.58 
 
Seemingly, the effect of ancillary proceedings is neither to render issues in the 
proceedings to be determined by rules of the main proceedings nor is it to bind 
the ancillary jurisdiction by the effects of the main proceedings.59  
 
The application of this approach would, subject to the wide discretion of the 
court, permit representatives in a foreign proceeding to operate in the ancillary 
jurisdiction following recognition of the foreign proceedings. However, this 
would depend on existence of such factors as the connection between the 
company and the jurisdiction in which the representative is appointed,60 the just 
merits of creditors’ claims and fairness of their position61  and whether or not 
there is an appropriate jurisdiction before which the claim might be heard. It is 
thought that the costs of ancillary proceedings, in terms of the opening of 
ancillary proceedings and the pursuit of claims within the proceedings, are also a 
factor that influences courts in deciding whether to permit further litigation in 
ancillary proceedings.62 
 
5.2.2.4  Judicial Assistance and Cooperation  
Judicial assistance and cooperation is another measure that characterises the 
common law approaches to cross-border insolvencies.63 It involves the use of 
local laws to assist a foreign insolvency proceeding without giving direct effect 
to the provision of the foreign law.64 Notably, this principle seems to be implicit 
                                                 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 Schemmer and Others v Property Resources Ltd and Others [1975] 1 Ch 273 
61 See Re Suidair International Airways Ltd [1951] Ch 165 
62 PJ Omar  (n 22) 353 
63 G Moss, IF Fletcher and S Isaacs (n 22) 81, note that judicial assistance is technically not 
recognition which involves giving direct effect to a foreign office holder. The latter is however 
loosely used to cover such matters as the former. 
64 See n 31  above quoting  G Moss  (n 22) 125 – 126 
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within the other principles discussed above and its operations reinforce the other 
principles. Given its significance in so far as cross-border insolvency is 
concerned, as well as the recent developments in cross-border insolvency at 
common law, it deserves a separate treatment in its own rights. 
 
This principle is based on the wide common law court discretion to act in aid of a 
foreign court that has jurisdiction in insolvency.65 When acting in aid of the 
foreign court, the common law court has discretion to exercise such powers with 
respect to the matter as it could exercise if the matter had occurred within its own 
jurisdiction. In the words of the Privy Council in the Cambridge Gas case, ‘the 
domestic court must at least be able to provide assistance by doing whatever it 
could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency’ in order to avoid the need 
for parallel proceedings. In this case, the Privy Council ‘agreed to assist the US 
court by giving effect to the US Chapter 11 plan, reasoning that as a matter of 
common law the court has power to declare that the chapter 11 plan should be 
carried into effect.’ While the same results could have been achieved by parallel 
proceedings under the Isle of Man law on schemes of arrangement, the Privy 
Council found it unnecessary as the confirmed Chapter 11 plan could be given 
direct effect and by so doing it would save the creditors the trouble of parallel 
proceedings.66 Indeed, this principle reflects ‘a long tradition in the common law 
of courts extending aid for the collection of assets located in the jurisdiction of 
the courts and that belong to foreign debtors.’67  
 
It is now clear from the Cambridge Gas case that as far as the common law is 
concerned the grant of assistance is not solely dependent on the foreign 
insolvency proceedings taking place in the insolvent company’s home country.68 
                                                 
65 In the Cambridge Gas case (n 22) for example, the Privy Council held inter alia that at 
common law the Isle of Man court   has a broad discretion to assist in the implementation of that 
Chapter 11 plan, notwithstanding that it involved the transfer of shares in an Isle of Man 
company. 
66 G Moss (n 22) 126 
67 PJ Omar (n 43) 32/55. See also Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 Hy BI 131n; 126 ER 79 
68 A Walters (n 22) 74; G Moss, IF Fletcher and S Isaacs (n 22) 82 noting that ‘[t]he domicile of a 
corporation has traditionally been regarded as the place of incorporation but it may be time to 
adopt the approach of the [EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings] and regard “domicile” as 
the “centre of main interests” subject to the assumption in favour of the place of incorporation.’ 
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Indeed, in Re Phoenix Kapital Dienst GmbH,69 the English court having 
mentioned various aspects that establish the connection between a company that 
is a subject of insolvency proceedings and the jurisdiction where the foreign 
representative was appointed, stated that there may exist other grounds for 
jurisdiction such as, for example, where the office holder was appointed by the 
courts of the country where the company in question carried on business.70 
Furthermore, in Re HIH Casuality and General Insurance Ltd 71 which came to 
the House of Lords shortly after the Cambridge Gas case, Lord Hoffmann, in the 
midst of the divergent opinions as to the position of common law on remission of 
English assets to Australian liquidators, noted that the home country of the 
company may not be the most appropriate jurisdiction and referred to the COMI 
test applied under the UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency.72  
5.2.2.5  Fair and Equitable Treatment of Local and Foreign Creditors  
At common law foreign creditors are treated the same way as local creditors in 
insolvency proceedings. Indeed, this is consistent with the fact that traditionally 
the common law has recognised the universality of insolvency proceedings.73 
With regard to proof of debts and claims, it is generally accepted that in a local 
winding up for instance, foreign creditors are admitted to proof in the winding up 
along with local creditors. The proof of debts in a local winding up is regulated 
by the local winding up laws of the place in which the claim is submitted.74 That 
is to say, the general principle applies to the treatment of foreign creditors. They 
                                                 
69 [2008] BPIR 1082. This case is significant to English law based offshore jurisdictions’, and 
Anglophone countries, such as those of SSA, whose legal systems are still largely dependant on 
English common law in certain respects. As in the Cambridge Gas case, in the Phoenix case, it 
was only common law principles on cross-border insolvencies that were applicable. It was found 
that neither the EC Regulation on Insolvency No 1346/2000 nor the UNICITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency as reflected in the Cross-border Insolvency Regulations 2006(SI 
2006/1030) was applicable.  
70 See E Sjostrand (n 22) 105, 107 
71 [2008] 1 WLR 852 
72 Cambridge Gas case (n 22); and P Hayden (n 22) 109. See also n 28 above as to the 
controversy surrounding Lord Hoffmann’s opinion. 
73 See Cambridge Gas Case (n 22) citing in support  Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 H BI 131 where 
English creditor had to surrender to the Dutch bankruptcy assets realised out of the garnishee 
proceedings and prove in such  proceedings, following recognition by the English court of such 
proceedings. See also K Nadelmann (n  42) 154 
74 Re Vocalion (Foreign)  Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 196, 206; Re Trepca Mines Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 1273 
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are given equal status to local creditors in their ability to lodge proofs of debts 
notwithstanding their home country or location. 75   
 
Mason argues that this principle is largely inspired by the long standing principle 
of insolvency law that all creditors are prima facia treated equally.76 Perhaps the 
Cambridge Gas case has significantly served to clarify the position of the 
common law in this area. In this decision, the Privy Council stated that ‘the 
English common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness between 
creditors requires that, ideally, bankruptcy proceedings should have universal 
application. There should be single bankruptcy in which all creditors are entitled 
and required to prove. No one should have advantage because he happens to live 
in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors are situated.’77 
5.3 Considering the Common Law Approach in Light of Cross-Border 
Insolvency Theories and the International Insolvency Benchmarks 
 
The common law offers an important framework for dealing with cross-border 
insolvency especially for countries that lack comprehensive legislation capable 
of addressing current challenges of cross-border insolvencies.  However, the 
common law approach is not as certain and predictable as required by the 
international insolvency standards. As such, its position over a particular issue 
would not be clear if the court has never before had an opportunity to deal with 
and address it. It is, for instance, in this regard that it has been doubted as to 
‘whether assistance could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign 
insolvency law which form no part of the domestic system.’78 Despite such 
                                                 
75 R Mason, ‘Globalisation of Bankruptcy Practice-An Australian Perspective’ (1997) 5 Insolv LJ 
12, 22, and R Mason ‘Hotchpot and Other Tasty Morsels in International Insolvency’ (1995) 3 
Insolv LJ 149, 150, citing in support Azoff-Don Commercial Bank [1954] Ch 315 at 333; and 
Sedgwick Collins & Co. v. Rossia Insurance Co. [1926] 1 KB 1 at 13 per Scrutton L.J, and Re 
Kloebe (1884) 28 Ch D 175 
76 R Mason (n 75) 21, and R Mason (n 75)150, citing in support Phillips v. Hunter (1795) 2 H BI 
402, 405; (1795) 126 ER 6 18, 620 where it was stated that ‘the great principle of bankrupt laws 
is justice founded on equality.’ 
77  [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC(IoM)), para 16 
78 See Lord Hoffmann’s dicta  in this regard in para 22 of Judgement  in Cambridge Gas Case (n 
22); LC Ho, ‘Applying Foreign Law under the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency’ (2009) 24 J Int’l Banking and Financial L 655, Ho’s view is that judicial assistance 
can take the form of applying foreign insolvency law. In his view in Cambridge Gas case the 
Privy Council did actually apply foreign law, i.e the US Bankruptcy Law. 
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doubts, other scholars are certain that at common law judicial assistance can take 
the form of applying foreign insolvency law and as far as they are concerned the 
Cambridge Gas case did actually apply foreign law (i.e the US Bankruptcy 
Law).79  
 
It is nevertheless notable that one aspect that is common to both the common law 
and the international insolvency benchmarks is the flexibility and adaptability to 
local circumstances, though such scope is, under the international insolvency 
benchmarks, only allowed with some restrictions on matters of particular 
importance to a cross-border insolvency system.80 This is clearly implicit in the 
benchmarks and the exercise of discretionary powers at common law. The 
flexibility is in Anglo-phone SSA countries, bolstered by the fact that the 
common law is applicable subject to such qualification as local circumstances 
render necessary.81  
  
Although it has been contended that the common law approach to cross-border 
insolvency aligns with the universalism theory, the element of discretionary 
power on the part of the court to decide whether or not to grant recognition and 
assistance render the approach, while retaining territoriality, to be much closer to 
modified universalism than the pure universalism advocated in the debate.82 
Indeed, what amounts to a modified universalism corresponds to the true nature 
of the application of the common law approach to cross-border insolvency.83 
Clearly, the criteria which are in place thus far, and the manner in which the 
court is entitled to exercise its discretion centre on the local interests as opposed 
to universal ones.84 Indeed, this is the very feature that brings the common law 
approach closer to modified universalism for, despite its recognition of the 
                                                 
79 LC Ho (n 78) 655 
80 See text to n 86 and 87 in chapter 3;and  n 83 and 176  in chapter 7 
81 See text to n 9 and 10 above 
82 See text to part 2.5 and all its sub-parts in chapter 2 
83 Modified universalism allows countries other than the foreign main jurisdiction to evaluate the 
fairness of the foreign main proceedings and protect the legitimate local interests. See JL 
Westbrook, ‘A Comment on Universal Proceduralism’ (2009-2010) 48 Colum J Transnat’l L 
503, 515-516; and JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (1999-2000) 98 
Mich L Rev 2276, 2302 and 2324. See also text to part 7.4.3.5 in chapter 7 and part 2.5.3.2 in 
chapter 2 
84 Re African Farms 1906 TS 373; see also n 28 above and  G Moss (n 22) 125 
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universalist nature of an insolvent debtor’s estate and its willingness to 
cooperate, it still vests the court with a very wide space in which it may decide 
whether to cooperate or not taking into account different factors that are at its 
disposal. Apparently, the existence of the criteria which have emerged over time 
does not guarantee an automatic recognition and cooperation and provision of 
judicial assistance.85   
 
Critics may argue that the predictability element which universalism and 
territorialism theorists claim to be achieved in their respective theories can hardly 
be achieved at common law where no one can be certain about the outcome 
given the unfettered discretion which judges enjoy.86 While such operational 
realities of the common law approach may be held to militate against 
predictability and certainty which, in view of the international insolvency 
benchmarks, are among the principal indicators of efficiency in any given 
insolvency system, they are instrumental in assessing a country’s interests before 
according assistance or deferring to a  foreign insolvency proceeding. This is 
critical in ensuring results that conform to the policy objectives of the insolvency 
system of a given country and which do not violate such country’s public policy. 
For SSA countries could always be deferring to foreign proceedings, such an 
approach may be necessary and unavoidable. 87 The suitability and relevance is 
based on the flexibility and adaptability which allow space for conformity to 
local policies and to respond accordingly to the potential consequences of the 
huge divergence in the insolvency systems among countries and its potential 
divergence as to treatment of foreign creditors.88 
 
                                                 
85 See Banques des Marchands de Moscou case (n 39)  
86 See DA Ailola, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Its Efficacy and 
Suitability as A Basis for A SADC Convention’ (2000) 11 Stell L Rev 215, 216 where he names 
‘unfettered discretion as one of problems that bedevil the value of common law as a tool of 
resolving cross-border insolvency matters.’ 
87 F Tung, ‘Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2000-2001) 33 Geo Wash Int’l L 
Rev 555, 576, & 577; and JAE Pottow, ‘Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The 
Problems of and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”’ (2005-2006) 104 Mich L Rev 1899 
88 JL Westbrook, ‘JL Westbrook, ‘Priority Conflicts as a Barrier to Cooperation in Multinational 
Insolvencies’ (2008-2009) 27 Penn St Int’l L Rev 870; and JL Westbrook, ‘A Comment on 
Universal Proceduralism’ (2009-2010) 48 Colum J Transnat’l L 503 
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As in the case of the common law, one of the distinctive features of modified 
universalism, which makes it different from universalism, is the element of 
discretionary power in deciding whether and in what form to comply with 
universality of insolvency proceedings of an insolvent enterprise as the local law 
would permit.89  This means that under modified universalism, as it is at common 
law, cooperation may be refused for a number of reasons, for example, in 
circumstances where it would, firstly, infringe on the local law and secondly, 
unfairly prejudice the interests of local creditors.90  
The other key feature of the modified universalism which is also more or less 
similar to the common law approach is its reliance and use of local laws to 
realise the universality of insolvency proceedings.91 The advocates of modified 
universalism adopt similar methods as the common law in giving effect to 
universality. One such method is the use of ancillary proceedings which is under 
modified universalism commonly referred to as secondary proceeding. Notably, 
the recent development at common law seems to be greatly inspired by the recent 
debate on the competing theories of cross-border insolvency.92 Such inspiration 
seems to have contributed markedly in a recent modern attempt of clarifying the 
position of the common law approach within the continuum of the cross-border 
insolvency theories as characterised by the two dominant theories, namely 
universalism and territorialism, on the two opposing ends.93 
                                                 
89 Ibid  
90 See Cambridge Gas case (n 22) where the Privy Council held  that there was no discretionary 
reason to withhold  assistance as there were no suggestion of prejudice to creditors in the Isle of 
Man and infringement of local law; and see JL Westbrook, ‘Choice of Avoidance Law in Global 
Insolvencies’ (1991) Brook J Int’l L 499, 517, stating that  under modified universalism ‘local 
courts [have] discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home country procedures and to protect the 
interests of local creditors.’ 
91 It seems that modified universalism was advocated with the common law approach to cross-
border insolvency in mind, though the major advocates of this theory tended to a large extent to 
link it with the then section 304 procedure under the US Bankruptcy Code. See JL Westbrook, 
‘Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies’ (1991) 17 Brook J Int’l L 499, 517 
92 See Cambridge Gas case (n 22) as per Lord Hoffmann on behalf of the Privy Council; L 
Hoffmann (n 4) 2507; and LC Ho (n 22) 217 describing universalism as ‘no more than a 
convenient label’ which is only used ‘when the court feels inclined to grant the assistance 
sought.’ 
93 Ibid 
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5.4 Fitting the Common Law Approach into Cross-Border Trade and 
Investment Facilitation Arrangements 
   
The initiatives for the promotion and protection of trade and foreign investment 
manifested by the conclusion of BITs and other regional and interregional 
arrangements raise important questions regarding the significance of the common 
law approach to cross-border insolvency in facilitating co-operation in trade and 
capital flow between countries and in particular to a host developing country 
such as those in SSA.94 When viewed in the context of the cross-border trade and 
investment arrangement to which SSA countries such as Tanzania and Kenya are 
contracting parties, the approach potentially offers a basis for dealing with cross-
border insolvency problems between contracting parties and even beyond as it 
fills up what is lacking in any relevant domestic legislation.95  The approach also 
stands a chance for its application and future course of its development to be 
shaped and influenced by the standards and principles that characterise the cross-
border trade and investment facilitation arrangements.96 This is particularly the 
case given that international law, as expressed in treaties and in customary law, is 
becoming an increasingly significant influence on the development of the 
common law across commonwealth jurisdictions.97 It remains to be seen if and 
when a similar trend is going to be replicated in SSA.98 
 
The recent development in cross-border insolvency at common law brought by 
the decision in the Cambridge Gas case effectively means that tools for 
extending any assistance and co-operation needed in foreign insolvency 
proceedings involving an investor in a host SSA country will no longer be 
                                                 
94 For the in-depth discussion of the cross-border trade and investment facilitation arrangements 
and how they implicate cross-border insolvency regulation see text to section 4.5 through 4.7 of 
chapter  4; and M Kirby, ‘The Common Law and International Law-A Dynamic Contemporary 
Dialogue’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 30, discussing how the application of common law in the 
common law  jurisdictions takes  account of   and recognise relevant international law (as 
expressed in treaties and in customary law) in appropriate cases. 
95 Text to n 11 above 
96 Notably, this is when it involves countries that are partner states in a BIT or any other similar 
arrangements that tend to impose binding standards and principles to the contracting states. 
97 M Kirby (n 94) 31 
98 RJ Daniels, MJ Trebilcock, and LD Carson (n 7) 125, 173-177 suggesting that the extent of 
legality and rule of law commitment in former British Colonies is to a considerable extent 
dependant on the colonial institutional environment. Further that such environment explains 
existence of significant diversity among   commonwealth jurisdiction in regard to such element.  
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conditional on the foreign proceedings taking place in the insolvent investor’s 
place of incorporation.99 This is in addition to the possibility of making use of 
any remedy that could be applied in a domestic insolvency proceeding to avoid 
the necessity of having parallel proceedings which translate to costs, delays and 
difficulties in preserving rather than destroying going concern value. There is 
scope for the court in a host country to consider the existence of arrangements 
such as BITs as one of the factors when ruling in favour of, for instance, granting 
recognition to foreign proceedings involving an investor from the home country 
or granting remedies which could have been extended if equivalent proceedings 
had been taken in the host forum.100 In the same vein, the existence of such 
arrangements could be construed as a firm acceptance by a host country that any 
proceeding commenced in respect of a foreign investor in the host country must 
be ancillary to those commenced in a home country which is a partner state to the 
arrangement if it involves the same investor.101    
 
The approach also seems to offer a framework within which a host country could 
assess its situation and circumstances as a yardstick of deciding whether or not it 
is appropriate for it to recognise, co-operate and provide assistance to foreign 
proceedings originating in the home country of an investor having an investment 
or commercial operation in a host country. The crucial element in this connection 
is the emphasis which the recent development at the common law places on the 
importance of the protection of local creditors and compliance with local laws.102 
However, the cross-border trade and investment arrangements, as signified by the 
BITs, strictly limit the scope for protection of local interests. As such, in relation 
to countries with which SSA countries maintain cross-border co-operations in 
trade and investment, as is the case with BITs, there seems to be little space for 
such endeavour to be invoked in cross-border insolvency matters.  
 
                                                 
99 Text to n 68 -72 above 
100  M Kirby (n 94).The trend is such that among common law jurisdictions international law is 
becoming an increasingly significant influence on the development of the common law 
101 M Kirby (n 94) 
102 G Moss (n 22) 125 
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Accordingly, the discretionary powers that characterise the approach to cross-
border insolvency at common law would perhaps need to be exercised in a 
manner that is consistent with the treaty commitments of the contracting states 
and especially the obligations of promotion and protection of foreign investments 
and investors.  One implication, for instance, of BITs would arguably be to 
restrict and confine the scope of discretionary powers which the court could 
exercise at common law within the context of the treaties and indeed, the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments and investors. Such implication 
could, for example, be taken to mean that a host country would be expected to 
co-operate by granting recognition and extending judicial assistance in respect of 
foreign proceedings that involve an investor in the host country from a foreign 
country, where such proceedings originate from the foreign country that is a 
party to a BIT.  
 
It might be considered to be contrary to the host country’s treaty commitments 
for such a court in such a country to exercise its discretion in a manner that 
refuses co-operation and assistance or destroys rather than preserves going 
concern value, whilst its treaty commitments require it to ensure and strive to 
promote and protect foreign investments and investors.103 This may also be taken 
to extend even to third countries as long as the foreign investor in a host country, 
who is a subject of insolvency proceedings, has an interest in such third 
countries. Furthermore, various tools that characterise the approach to cross-
border insolvency at common law may reinforce the commitments of the host 
countries. For example, the standards of treatment of investors, such as equitable 
and fair treatment, most favoured nation treatment, national treatment, and right 
to repatriation of capital and transfer of funds reinforce the common law 
recognition of universality of insolvency proceedings and all that they entail, 
such as equality of treatment in the proof of debts, requirement of fairness 
between creditors irrespective of their nationality or location and turnover of 
assets in appropriate cases.   
 
                                                 
103 Text to  n 58  in chapter 4 
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However, since the nature of the applicability of the common law approach to 
cross-border insolvency is, generally speaking, dependent on the way the 
discretionary power will be exercised by the domestic court in an appropriate 
case, there is scope for arguing that the application of such an approach in the 
context of the arrangements for backing up the development of foreign 
investment and trade may in practice be haunted by unpredictability and 
uncertainty which such arrangements essentially seek to eliminate in the first 
place. This is notwithstanding the fact that such arrangements might have been 
concluded with complete awareness of the entire legal system of a country which 
allows the application of the common law at which the domestic court must 
provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done in the case of a 
domestic insolvency to avoid the need for parallel proceedings and to preserve 
rather than destroy going concern value. Nevertheless, the status, application and 
usefulness of the common law, irrespective of its appropriateness, will largely 
depend on the extent and manner into which it is allowed to apply and function 
in a host country.104 This again raises the issue of uncertainty and 
unpredictability, which is the key aspect in the debate on the competing cross-
border insolvency theories and international insolvency standards. It is the very 
problem which the arrangements, as characterised by the BITs, seek to 
eliminate.105  
5.5 Utility and Limitations of the Common Law Approach in SSA 
The common law’s approach to cross-border insolvency has been described as 
being potentially useful to ‘a number of present and former colonies and 
commonwealth countries.’106 This undoubtedly is inclusive of the common law 
jurisdictions in Anglo-phone SSA.107 The usefulness of the common law 
approach is based on two reasons. Firstly, the nature and background of the legal 
systems in such countries trace their origin from England;108 and secondly, a 
large number of these countries are still considered to have less developed legal 
                                                 
104 Text to n 9 and 10 above 
105 HS Burman  (n 32) 2552 
106 G Moss, D Bayfield and G Peters (n 22) 82 
107 RJ Daniels, MJ Trebilcock, and LD Carson (n 7) 111 
108 S Merry (n 1); and MN Wabwile (n 11) 
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systems and insolvency systems in particular.109 Indeed, the way the common 
law is designed to apply in most of such jurisdictions is that the more a country 
legislates, the more it reduces gaps which could justify and require adoption and 
application of the common law.110 Its contribution is that it fills up the gaps on 
matters on which relevant local legislation is silent and does not cover matters 
that would otherwise be the subject of statutory provisions, for example, 
recognition, assistance, co-operation, enforcement of foreign insolvency orders 
and fair and equitable treatment of all creditors.111 This means that SSA countries 
which have less developed cross-border insolvency systems have a greater space 
for adoption and application of the common law in appropriate cases.  
 
To be sure, even before the clarification of the common law position on cross-
border insolvency afforded by the Cambridge Gas case, most common law 
jurisdictions in the developing world have long been relying on and adopting 
English common law principles to decide insolvency matters.112 These have 
included affording recognition and assistance to foreign office holders in foreign 
insolvency proceedings. In Autland Heavy Equipment & Construction v Phillip 
Holzmann International/Nord France EI JV,113 the British Virgin Island (“BVI”) 
High Court has had an opportunity to consider the issue of the international 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings conducted in Germany.114  The 
BVI High Court stated:   
 
“Whether this Court would recognize the insolvency proceedings in 
Germany is a matter of our law. We have no provisions for the 
                                                 
109 IF Fletcher, ‘Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global Standards and 
Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2006-2007) Brook J Int’l L 767, 774. See also 
text to n 42 in chapter 3 
110 MN Wabwile (n 11) 63 
111 Ibid 
112 E Sjostrand (n 22) 107 
113 Claim No. BVIHCV 2002/0111 (16th April 2004) (Rawlins J) Para 14 
114 HA Rawlins, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgements and Arbitral Awards in the Eastern 
Caribbean’ (Paper Presented at the 5th Regional Law Fair of the OECS Bar Association in St 
Lucia 2008) <  
http://www.eccourts.org/jei_doc/2008/managing_international_commercial/EnforcementofForeig
nJudgmentsandArbitralAwardsbyChiefJusticeHughRawlins.pdf    > accessed 21 August 2011 
[11]. According to Rawlins ‘The approach of Eastern Caribbean courts in extending comity in 
insolvency cases tend to be quite facilitating and in keeping with statements which the Privy 
Council made in [the] Cambridge Gas[ case].’ 
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reciprocal recognition and/or enforcement of Orders that issue from a 
German Court…..[nor] …. any relevant [t]reaty provisions …….. This 
Court recognizes the importance of extending and accepting recognition 
of Judgments by comity, particularly in commercial cases... I would be 
willing to extend it, once there was sufficient evidence to satisfy me 
that, under German law, the assets of Holzmann, including its foreign 
assets, vested in the insolvency trustee prior to the institution of the 
claim…”115 
 
Although there might be no illustrative case as to the adoption of the relevant 
common law on cross-border insolvency in SSA countries, such as those of 
Tanzania and Kenya, examples abound where respect and reliance have been 
given to the English common law.116 Indeed, examples of cases where English 
case law has been used in respect of specific aspects of insolvency, whether or 
not they are entirely based on English common law are not uncommon.117  
                                                 
115Autland Heavy Equipment & Construction v Phillip Holzmann International/Nord France EI 
JV Claim No. BVIHCV 2002/0111 (16th April 2004)(Rawlins J.) as quoted in HA Rawlins (n 
120) 11 
116 See Re Fahari Bottlers Ltd Misc Civ Case No. 155/1998 (a Tanzanian case) where the court 
noted that: ‘the concept of hive-down is not expressly provided under our [statutory] law. It 
however has its feet unto our land under the Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance (Cap. 
453). Thus we have to follow the English common law as applicable in England…..Under 
common law a hive-down is an exercise by which the business of a company in serious financial 
problems is transferred to a newly formed company….The exercise can be put into motion by a 
receiver with the court’s approval or by a company itself in agreement with the creditors. It can 
not be initiated and executed by the financially distressed company alone because, naturally, 
being on a death-bed, it would only consider its own interests to the detriment of the creditors.’ 
Notably, apart from stressing the applicability of the common law, no relevant case law was cited 
in that regard. 
117 See Re Muddu Awulira Enterprises Limited Companies Uganda High Court (Commercial 
Division) Cause No. 14 of 2004 [2004] UGCommC 5 < 
http://www.ulii.org/ug/cases/UGCommC/2004/5.html  
> accessed 3/8/2010, where there was a heavy reliance on English case law based on English 
statutory laws. The matter before the court involved the winding up of an insolvent company in 
accordance with the winding up procedure as contained in the Uganda’s Companies Act Cap 85 
Laws. This Act is based on the UK Companies Act 1948; Credit Africa Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) 
v Aliasi Namo Kundiona Supreme Court of Zambia, Judgment No. 9 of 2003 (Unreported) where  
the case of Langey Constructions (Brixham) Limited v Wells, Wells Estate (Dartford) Limited (4) 
was used as an authority. In that case the English  court  stated that: -  
‘…. The purpose of Section 231 is to ensure that when a Company goes into liquidation the 
assets of the company are administered in an orderly fashion for the benefit of all the creditors 
and that particular creditors should not be able to obtain an advantage by bringing proceedings 
against the company. What is contemplated is that the Companies Court shall be seized with all 
these matters and shall see that the affairs are wound up in a dignified and orderly way.’ Per Lord  
Widgery. In some other cases the courts have been prepared to decline from following English 
authority where it appears that the domestic law had not been amended in line with the 
development taking place in the UK. In a Kenyan case, Jasbir Singh Rai and 3 Others v 
Tarlochan Singh Rai and 13 Others Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 63 of 2001 
(unreported) <   http://www.kenyalaw.org/Articles/show_article.php?view=9&cat=7   > accessed 
31/08/2010, it was held that ‘[i]t would be wrong to think that Kenyan courts could blindly 
follow English provisions, which had since been amended to revise an earlier position that was 
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Despite the validity of the historical debate as to the application of post reception 
clauses concerning English law,118 it is a fact that among the SSA common law 
jurisdictions English law is being adopted without consideration of the reception 
clause as the jurisdictions continue to borrow substantially from English law.119 
It is thus no wonder that, in appropriate cross-border insolvency matters, such 
countries which still maintain reception clauses that recognise the common law 
as one of their sources of law, would not hesitate to invoke the common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency to resolve the outstanding issues of cross-
border insolvency in relevant cases.120 This, as is the practice in other cases, 
would entail digging and looking for relevant English decisions where relevant 
common law principles were judicially pronounced.121 It is thus usual for the 
courts to even rely on text books written by English authors.122 
                                                                                                                                    
similar to the present Kenyan law.’ The case concerned joinder of third parties in winding up 
proceedings and the petitioners sought to argue their case based on sections 459 and 461 of the 
UK Companies Act 1985 (which re-enacted similar provisions as those of Kenya with some 
amendments).  
118 For details of this historical debate see MN Wabwile(n 11) 74 citing AN Allot, ‘The Authority 
of English decisions in Colonial Courts’ in AN Allot, Assays in African Law (Butterworths, 
London 1960); TO Elias, ‘Colonial Courts and the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent’ (1955) 18 
MLR 356; K Robert-Wray, ‘The Adoption of Imported Law in Africa’ (1960) 1 J Afr L 66, 69; 
and AEW Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1963). Notably one 
theory is that the reception clause is meant to adopt the law as it stood on the reception date. The 
other theory is that the reception clause is meant to adopt the current English Common Law and 
that the reception date is only applicable to the statutes of general application because only 
legislation can bear precise dates of enactment and commencement. The second theory seems to 
be more plausible and realistic. 
119 See n 115-117 above.  In fact, this has been the trend from the colonial and early post-
independence days up to the present. What is interesting is that the trend seems to have not been 
affected by the early ‘Africanisation’ movements and policies that were pursued by many SSA 
countries. See GEA Sawyerr, ‘Internal Conflict of Laws in East Africa’ in GFE Sawyerr (ed), 
East African Law and Social Change (East African Publishing House, Nairobi 1967) 123 
120 South Africa is perhaps the exceptional case in SSA as it has long been extensively applying 
the common law on cross-border insolvencies. This is understandable given its significant share 
of involvement in foreign investments activities. See DA Ailola (n 86) 215-218 citing some 
South African cases where the common law principles on cross-border insolvency were invoked 
to resolve cross-border insolvency matters. The common law applicable to South Africa has been 
described as having Roman-Dutch influence as opposed to the common law applicable in such 
countries as Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius and Zambia. On the nature of South Africa’s 
legal System and the common law influences, see also, AN Allott, ‘Towards the Unification of 
Laws in Africa’(1965) 14 ICLQ  366 , 377, describing the South African system as  based on 
Anglo-Roman-Dutch law, being a hybrid of Roman law principles with Germanic customary law 
of the Dutch and English common law. 
121 It is also not uncommon for common law jurisdictions to look for authorities from other 
common law jurisdictions. See for instance s. 180 of the Tanzania’s Land Act 1999 which seeks 
to apply not only the substance of the common law and the doctrines of equity applied in 
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There are powerful reasons, based on the history and the set-up of the post-
independence legal frameworks in the countries under study, why in matters of 
cross-border insolvency, the courts in these jurisdictions would inevitably default 
to the English common law. This is a fortiori as there is currently limited 
experience of cross-border insolvencies. Thus any application of the common 
law approach to cross-border insolvency will potentially have an impact of 
rendering the cross-border insolvency legal framework of these countries more 
of a modified universalism nature than otherwise. This impact is perhaps 
contrary to what many would have thought. The extent to which such legal 
frameworks would be categorised as such would very much depend on how the 
courts in such countries will exercise their judicial discretionary power - a 
fundamental aspect of the common law on cross-border insolvency - to afford 
recognition and assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. This becomes 
more complex when one takes into account the qualifications which are explicit 
in the framework within which the said common law is to be adopted; that is  ‘so 
far as the circumstances of [such countries] and [their] inhabitants permit, and 
subject to such qualifications as local circumstances may render necessary.’123   
 
The effect of the above mentioned qualification is seemingly to broaden even 
further the unfettered wide discretionary powers that the courts enjoy and 
consequently to add to the uncertainty and unpredictability of results that 
characterise the system.124 It has been judicially pronounced that there are two 
                                                                                                                                    
England, but also the substance of common law and the doctrines of equity as applied from time 
to time in other countries of the commonwealth which appear to the court to be relevant to the 
circumstances of Tanzania. 
122 See Fahari Bottlers Ltd and Southern Highlands Bottlers Ltd v The Registrar of Companies 
and The national Bank of Commerce (1997) Ltd Civil Revision (Court of Appeal of Tanzania) No 
1 of 1999 [19] and [20] where JJ Charlesworth and G Morse, Charlesworth and Morse Company 
Law (15th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1995) 752 was used and cited in support of the Court of 
Appeal’s view that ‘[n]ormally no person resident outside the jurisdiction of the court is qualified 
for appointment as a liquidator.’; and in Fahari Bottlers Ltd v  The Registrar of Companies and 
The national Bank of Commerce (1997) Ltd and Others Miscellaneous Civil Cause No, 155 of 
1998 (High Court of Tanzania) where RR Pennington Pennington’s Company Law ( 5th edn 
Butterworths, London 1985) 394 was cited in relation to treading on common sense in giving 
consideration to reasonableness of a scheme of arrangement. 
123 Text to n 9 and 10 above 
124 HS Burman  (n 32) 2552 
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tests which should be applied in determining the application of the substance of 
common law in relation to local circumstances.125  Firstly, whether there is an 
established body of local law with which the application of a relevant common 
law principle would be inconsistent.126 And secondly, whether there is anything 
in the circumstances of the jurisdictions involved and their people which makes 
the application of that principle undesirable.127 Arguably, if such tests were to be 
universally applied in all Anglophone SSA countries, while paying regard to the 
massive liberalisation of trade and investments that has been taking place since 
the mid 1980s and early 1990s, the bilateral investment treaties as well as the 
regional and interregional arrangements concluded thus far, it is unlikely that 
such jurisdictions would invoke the common law on cross-border insolvency in a 
manner that would deny recognition and assistance.128 However, be that as it 
may, one cannot argue with certainty that application of the relevant common 
law can always be predictably invoked to the best interest of universality of 
insolvency proceedings and the foreign investors.  
 
The ‘underdeveloped state of the common law’129 approach to cross-border 
insolvency means that even though the common law jurisdictions in SSA might 
wish to effect a wholesale adoption of the common law, such endeavour could be 
severely limited by the state of the art of the common law. This is perhaps even 
worse given that although the law is said to be still in a developing state and 
progressing in a very positive direction,130 the speed with which it copes with the 
demand is likely to jeopardise the much desired predictability and certainty.131 Its 
                                                 
125 See Obongo v Municipal Council of Kisumu [1971] EA 91(CA). In this case, the court held 
that ‘as there were no evidence led to prove existence of qualifying circumstance, it cannot be 
held that there is an established body of law in Kenya or in East Africa, which precludes our 
following [the] opinions of [the House of Lords in Rhodes v Bernard]’ 
126 Obongo’s case (n 125) 94 
127 Ibid 
128 BS  Masoud, ‘Transnational Aspects of Tanzania’s corporate Insolvency Law’ (2006) 14 
IIUM LJ 124, 135 
129 Cambridge Gas case (n 22 )para 19 citing G Moss, D Bayfield and G Peters (n 22) 81 
130 G Moss, D Bayfield and G Peters (n 22) 82 
131This perhaps explains for the emerging trend towards much regards to authorities from other 
common law jurisdictions. See for instance Land Act 1999, s 180 (Tanzania) which qualifies the 
application of the common law, the doctrines of equity and statutes of general application. It first 
receives not only the substance of the common law and the doctrines of equity applied in 
England, but also the substance of common law and the doctrines of equity as applied from time 
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speed of development in ‘England as the progenitor of the common law legal 
family’132 is indeed curtailed by the extensive legislation that has been effected in 
this area to cope with the global demands of cross-border insolvency.133 
Nevertheless, the trends that prevail in English law suggest that the traditional 
common law itself is at a crossroads as there are centripetal forces both globally 
and within Europe designed to develop a unified system that would facilitate 
efficiency in dealing with multinational default.134 This situation is aggravated by 
the inherent contradictions, controversies, uncertainties and doubts that pertain in 
some principles which indeed add to unpredictability and uncertainties in which 
the law is likely to result.135One may wonder, though, if Re HIH Insurance and 
Rubin v Eurofinance can well be regarded as a renaissance.136 
 
Notwithstanding the ‘underdeveloped state of the common law’ and the 
development that has taken place recently, the  effectiveness of the common law 
depends on a good flow of and access to information on newly developed 
                                                                                                                                    
to time in other countries of the commonwealth which appear to the court to be relevant to the 
circumstances of Tanzania. 
132 M Wabwile (n 12) 27 
133 Cambridge Gas case (n 22) para 18; and IF Fletcher (n 34) 93. For the general concerns raised 
on the development and future of the common law, as well as the   impact of European Union and 
international legal regimes on the common law and  its relevance and suitability for common law 
jurisdictions, see, J Beatson, ‘Has the Common Law a Future?’ [1997] 56 Cambridge L J  291-
292; WR Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell 1996) vii; M Wabwile (n 12) 21-31; and TC Hartley, ‘The European 
Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Law’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 
813-828 in which the author painfully stated that ‘…[O]ne enters a new world once an area of 
private law becomes Europeanised…Other areas of conflict of laws are or soon will be, brought 
under the control of the European Court….Soon there will be little left to the common law.’ 
134 M Wabwile (n 12) 24; IF Fletcher (n 34) 93; and G Moss, D Bayfield and G Peters (n 22) 81 
and 82 
135 Cambridge Gas case (n 22) para 22 where the privy council said that ‘it is doubtful whether 
assistance could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form 
no part of the domestic system.’ ; LC Ho (n 78)  Ho finds the objection to application of foreign 
insolvency provisions to be unconvincing. In his considered view where English insolvency 
proceedings are ancillary to foreign insolvency proceedings, the application of the otherwise 
mandatory English insolvency provisions seems subject to a choice of law analysis as a matter of 
common law. As such, if a choice of law analysis may disapply English insolvency law, it may 
also logically apply foreign insolvency law. Ho’s position is based interalia on  Re HIH (n 22) 
25; and Banque Indosuez v Ferromet Resources [1993] BCLC 112. On the contrary, see, G Moss 
(n 22) 125.  While seemingly acknowledging the position as per Hoffmann in Cambridge Gas 
case, Moss states that the approach taken in Cambridge Gas case ‘…means in effect that the 
common law has developed to a stage where everything that can be done under s.426 [of the UK 
Insolvency Act 1986] can be done pursuant to judge-made law except the application of foreign 
insolvency law.’ Regarding the controversies surrounding recent developments, see n 28 above. 
136 Re HIH case (n 22); and Rubin case (n 28) 
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principles to address new demands.137 Unfortunately, such information and 
principles are not only restricted and not always readily available in SSA 
countries but also their development is entirely based on the legal accidents 
brought about by the chance and vagaries of litigation.138 Law reporting is still to 
date a serious problem in most SSA countries, so is access to and availability of 
law reports from other common law jurisdictions and especially the United 
Kingdom where the common law legal family traces its origin. 
  
Nevertheless, the pursuit for certainty and predictability which is at the heart of 
the competing theories on cross-border insolvencies and the international 
insolvency benchmarks would suggest that reliance on unlegislated rules or 
discretion in resolving cross-border insolvency matters is problematic.139 Indeed, 
it is the same pursuit that characterises the trend of conclusion of BITs and 
establishment of interregional economic arrangements mainly between 
developed and developing countries as a means of facilitating trade and flow of 
capital. The theory behind this pursuit is that certainty and predictability reduce 
transaction costs and enhance investment.140  
5.6 Conclusion	
The existing insolvency systems which are found in the countries under study are 
traceable from the historical colonial legacy. A fair assessment of the systems in 
place must take that fact into account and consider the corresponding legal 
families in which they are situated. The application of the common law to Anglo-
phone SSA countries is the best example of the continuing influence of the 
colonial legacy which also applies to cross-border insolvency aspects of the 
common law jurisdictions in SSA. The application of the common law on cross-
                                                 
137 M Akech, ‘The Common Law Approach to Liability and Redress: Its Applicability to East 
Africa’ (Paper presented in the Liability and Redress under Cartagena Protocol  Workshop 
organised by International Environmental Law Research, Mombasa 2003)  <  
http://www.ielrc.org/activities/workshop_0309/content/akech.pdf  > accessed 21 August 2011 
138 MN Wabwile (n 12) 28 
139 DA Ailola (n 86) 216. Notably, the much needed flexibility can also compromise certainty and 
predictability due to the inevitable  element of broad  discretion to tailor assistance as per the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, art 22. 
140 Whilst consideration is given to multinational enterprises, perhaps the best approach is to 
consider also the certainty and predictability from the perspective of developing countries such as 
SSA countries as discussed in chapter 7. 
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border insolvency would have the effect of pulling the cross-border insolvency 
frameworks of the relevant SSA countries towards modified universalism. 
However, the extent to which such common law would apply is seemingly 
unpredictable as it depends on several factors. The key factors are the extent to 
which the reception clauses that apply the common law at least in theory allow 
the common law to be brought into use; the extent to which existing legislation 
provides for cross-border insolvency; the judicial attitude towards the common 
law; the consideration of the extent to which the local circumstances permit 
and/or qualify its application; and the extent to which the common law has 
already developed a relevant principle for an existing problem.  
 
From the perspective of countries such as those of SSA, which might always be 
deferring to foreign jurisdictions in insolvency proceedings, the common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency could be relevant and appropriate. It offers a 
flexible framework that could enable such countries to evaluate each situation in 
relation to local interests before deciding whether and in what manner to co-
operate. The element of consideration of the local circumstances is seemingly 
important in keeping up with local adaptations. However, it is clear that the 
flexibility inherent in the approach and the wide discretionary powers that the 
court has at common law are the potential source of unpredictability and 
uncertainty of outcome. Thus the obvious challenge, if the countries under study 
were to concretise the application of such an approach, is how to minimise or 
eliminate such unpredictability and uncertainty.  
 
There is also scope for the flexibility and discretionary powers which the court 
may exercise under the common law approach to be limited by the operation of 
the bilateral investment treaties and other similar arrangements for trade and 
investments to which the countries under study are contracting parties. One 
argument is that the commitments such countries have under such arrangements 
may necessitate the discretionary powers under the common law approach to be 
only exercised in a manner that enforces the commitments of securing promotion 
and protection of foreign investments and investors. SSA countries have not been 
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much exposed to cases of cross-border insolvency. There is therefore a clear lack 
of experience with regard to the way the courts deal with the common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency. It however remains to be seen when, 
whether and to what extent the potential application of the common law in 
appropriate cases will consistently result into such an outcome that is in harmony 
with the existing treaty commitments. Such an outcome is even unpredictable 
and uncertain if one considers the limitations inherent in the very nature of the 
common law itself that seem to militate against its potential application in the 
countries under study.  It is instructive to consider in the next chapter the existing 
legislative framework for cross-border insolvency in SSA with reference to 
Tanzania and Kenya and determine whether or not it still has space for the 
common law and suits the endeavours for protection and promotion of cross-
border trade and investment. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
A SURVEY OF THE STATE OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS   IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA WITH 
REFERENCE TO TANZANIA AND KENYA 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The debate on the competing cross-border insolvency theories, together with the 
international insolvency benchmarks imply that developing countries have weak 
insolvency systems and might indeed be reluctant to modernise their systems and 
commit to universalism.1 However, there is a lack of comprehensive scholarship 
assessing the state of art of the existing legislative and policy frameworks for 
cross-border insolvency in Sub-Saharan African (“SSA”) countries. This chapter 
seeks therefore to take stock of the prevailing cross-border insolvency legislative 
frameworks in the light of the applicability of the common law approach to 
cross-border insolvency and against the backdrop of the competing cross-border 
insolvency theories, the international insolvency benchmarks, and the 
international trade and investment commitments.2 Tanzania and Kenya are used 
as representative case studies.  
 
Part one of this chapter provides an brief overview of the legal and socio-
economic setting of SSA using Tanzania and Kenya as the case studies before 
examining the international character of the prevailing cross-border insolvency 
legislative framework and the existing reform initiatives and their potential 
implications. Part two reflects on the limited extent of the application of the law 
                                                 
1 Text to n 153 in chapter 2. See also, F Tung, ‘Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ 
(2000-2001) 33 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 555, 556;  L Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: A 
British Perspective’(1995-1996) 63 Fordham L Rev 2507, 2510; and JAE Pottow ‘Greed and 
Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests"’ 
(2005-2006)104 Mich L Rev 1899, 1918-1919 
2 CG Paulus, ‘Global Insolvency Law and the Role of Multinational Institutions’ (2006-2007) 32 
Brook J Int’l L 755,761. Paulus found it to be astonishing that there has been little interest in how 
African countries deal with insolvencies and lack of representation from such countries in global 
insolvency forums. 
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and the occurrence of cross-border insolvencies in the countries under study. Part 
three discusses the extent of cross-border insolvency treatments in the regional 
groupings. The chapter concludes that, although there has recently been a 
growing trend towards reform of insolvency law, there is still space for 
application of the common law application. However, the prevailing law is still 
characterised by some unpredictability and uncertainties as to the extent and 
manner of its application and in particular in relation to the international treaty 
commitments of the countries under study. The contemplated reforms in Kenya 
seek however to significantly ameliorate the situation. Despite the growing trend 
towards regional groupings, it is within SSA only OHADA that has in the recent 
decades adopted an outstanding regime for cross-border insolvency occurring 
within its sixteen member states which do not include Tanzania and Kenya. On 
the other hand, the influence of colonial legacy is seemingly more noticeable 
than that of the international insolvency benchmarks in relation to the reform of 
insolvency law. 
6.2 A Brief Overview of Legal and Socio-Economic Settings in SSA with 
Reference to Tanzania and Kenya  
6.2.1  A Historical and Socio-Economic Backdrop 
When giving a broader consideration in approaching improvement of SSA states’ 
corporate governance, Sarra observed that ‘[t]he economic and social situation of 
Sub-Saharan African states is a critical consideration in thinking about domestic 
corporate activity and governance challenges in global markets, particularly 
given the serious poverty and the economic imbalance in power for these nations 
as they seek to strengthen domestic activity.’3 This is indeed an important context 
that informs consideration of the state of art of the international character of 
insolvency systems of SSA countries.  
 
                                                 
3 J Sarra, ‘Strengthening Domestic Corporate Activity in Global Capital Markets: A Canadian 
Perspective on South Africa's Corporate Governance’ (2004) GWU Law School Public Law 
Research Paper No. 118/2004 <  http://ssrn.com/abstract=628702 > accessed 15 September 2011 
[11]-[12]. Sarra is of the view that the diversity of SSA situations politically, economically and 
socially, among others, means that there is no one prescription or strategy for its problems. She 
notes further that the SSA situation and its associated challenges is made even complex by its 
history, post-colonial economic controls, and the politics of international developments. 
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Most of the SSA countries, including Tanzania and Kenya, attained their 
independence in the 1960s from their colonial powers, mainly the French and 
British. As observed in chapter five, Tanzania and Kenya inherited not only the 
legal systems imposed by their British colonial powers but also an economy that 
reflected the colonial interests.4 The economy was heavily dependent on the 
agricultural sector with heavy reliance on imported capital goods, raw materials, 
and consumer goods.5 The small manufacturing sector that was largely found in 
Kenya was meant to save the entire East African region. This unique history 
informs current trends in the international character of the existing insolvency 
systems and the reform processes.6 
 
Following independence, some governments in SSA countries, such as Tanzania, 
nationalised all major means of economy and placed them under public 
ownership and control and established and financed state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).7 Conversely, other countries, such as Kenya, ostensibly allied with a 
market economy but they in practice followed a statist strategy which led to the 
implementation of policies seeking to promote local entrepreneurs.8  Indeed, as it 
was apparent in Tanzania, most of the governments assumed the monopoly of 
developing the economic infrastructures, investing, running major businesses and 
providing social services.  
 
Whilst the post-independence governments in SSA countries sought to bring 
about significant changes in their economic set-up to speed up economic growth 
and development, the legal infrastructure that was in force and which was 
inherited from the colonial powers remained quite substantially unaltered. As a 
result, most of the commercially related pieces of legislation, inclusive of 
insolvency legislation inherited from the colonial powers, were rendered 
                                                 
4 J Sara (n 3) 11; CRP Poncy, ‘Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal Institutions 
as A Component of the Neo-Colonial’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 85, 95; and text to n 6, 7 
and 8 
5 J Loxley, ‘Financial Planning and Control in Tanzania’ (1972) 3 Dev and Change 43 
6 J Sarra (n 3) 11 
7 J Nellis, ‘The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-owned Enterprises to 
Private Participation in Infrastructure — and Back?’ ( 2005) FEEM Working Paper No. 117.05  < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=828764 > accessed 05 September 2011  
8 Ibid 
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redundant as they were regarded as irrelevant to the then newly independent 
African countries, especially those which, as was the case for Tanzania and 
Kenya adopted African socialist ideology and Africanisation policies 
respectively.9 There was therefore a lack of opportunity for testing the 
practicality of the law which could have contributed to its development and 
greater efficiency. The laws that were enacted only sought to institutionalise very 
specific aspects geared at implementing specific post-independence policies 
instead of overhauling the entire system and bringing it in tune with the 
circumstances, priorities and needs of the countries. 
 
The poor performance of the SSA economies as a result of both internal and 
external factors culminated in a very heavy foreign debt shouldered by the states 
as the guarantor of the SOEs’ loan. This situation forced the countries to adopt 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies championed by the multilateral institutions with 
the consequent privatisation of the economy and the continued demand for 
putting in place conducive policy and a legal environment for promotion and 
protection of private (both domestic and foreign) investment.10 The resulting 
private sector is now expected to contribute significantly to poverty reduction in 
partnership with the government. It is also expected to absorb the employees 
retrenched from the privatised SOEs and create more jobs for the growing SSA 
countries’ population which is subjected to the limited social welfare system 
inclined towards protecting only employed individuals.11 This is crucially 
                                                 
9 CM Dickerson, ‘Informal-Sector Entrepreneurs, Development and Formal Law: A Functional 
Understanding of Business Law’ (2011) 59 Am J Comp L 177, 197, observing that: ‘Historically, 
little practical attention has been paid to bankruptcy and insolvency laws in Sub-Saharan 
Africa…. [to the extent that]…even the local legal professionals [are] uninformed. This is 
unfortunate since these laws can be an effective means of putting unproductive assets back to 
productive use’ (footnotes omitted) and X Forneris, ‘Harmonising Commercial Law in Africa: 
The OHADA’ (2001) 46 Juris Périodique 77  
10 It may strongly be argued that the failure and insolvency of the state owned enterprises could 
have led to insolvency proceedings against them which (save for state guaranteeship of and 
intervention through loans extended to such enterprises and repayable by the state) would have 
potentially raised cross-border issues. This could have arisen from claims by foreign lenders from 
which the state obtained the funding for and on behalf of such enterprises. See for instance RW 
Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law and Reform in the People’s Republic of China’ (1995-1996) 64 
Fordham L Rev 2563, 2574-2575 
11 J Sarra (n 3). Sarra notes such expectation is notwithstanding that ‘[SSA] …receives a 
disproportionately small share of foreign direct investment as compared with other developing 
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relevant as unemployment and lack of funding for the same are a threat to the 
social order.  
 
Although initially it was thought significant policy-wise to define strategic areas 
which could not be open and available for foreign investment, this idea was 
short-lived and in fact overridden by the desire to facilitate enhanced 
productivity and efficiency necessary for competitiveness in trade and capital 
flows. Indeed, the laws and policies that have been put in place have tended to be 
more favourable to cross-border trade and investment than before as the 
countries under study strive to carve their places in the global economy and 
niches for their products in the international market.12 Worth noting is the 
significant changes in, and development of, economic conditions and policy 
taking place since the mid 1980s and early 1990s to date, although critics 
maintain that much of the changes effected thus far do not adequately address the 
realities of SSA countries.13Notwithstanding such inclinations, there were 
initially no significant efforts regarding the reform of cross-border  insolvency 
law, perhaps because of the lack of awareness and the possibility that such 
undertaking was considered to be less urgent and pressing than others. 
 
One of the challenges that SSA countries face is to strengthen the efforts seeking 
to attract more capital inflow, which now forms the basic consideration in all 
reform undertaking that SSA governments pursue. Addressing such challenge 
increases fundamentally the potential for the occurrence of cross-border 
                                                                                                                                    
and transition nations.’ The small share received thus far is largely confined in the natural 
resource sector. 
12 See for instance, Tanzania, National Trade Policy (Government Printer, Dar es salaam 2003) < 
http://www.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/tradepolicy.pdf > accessed 18/10/2010; Tanzania,  New Foreign 
Policy (Government Printer, Dar es salaam 2001) < 
http://www.foreign.go.tz/index.php/foreign/aboutus/category/foreign_policy/ > accessed 
18/10/2010; Tanzania, Sustainable Industrial Development Policy -SIDP (1996-2020) 
(Government Printer, Dar es salaam 1996)  < 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/sustainableindustrial.pdf > accessed 18/10/2010. Privatisation Act 
(Chapter 485 of Laws of Kenya) s 29 provides that both Kenyan and non-Kenyan are eligible to 
participate in privatisation of state owned enterprises, though the law is not meant to limit 
restrictions imposed by other legislation. 
13 Text to n 13 and 17 in chapter 4. Despite the reforms, Tanzania still in constitutional terms 
maintains the desire to build a socialist economy. This is notwithstanding concerns that such 
aspirations do not match with the realities of most of the government policies and law. 
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insolvencies which must also be addressed. While a complete analysis of these 
challenges is beyond the scope of this chapter, one must be cognizant of the 
connection between effective cross-border insolvency regulation and 
development concerns which potentially militate against effectiveness and the 
capacity to develop and implement an otherwise effective system.14  
6.2.2  Application of Law in Cross-Border Insolvencies in SSA Countries: 
Past, Present and Future 
Most of the SSA countries do not exhibit a history of being affected by and 
involved in international insolvencies and extensive implementation of measures 
aiming to assist co-operation in any cross-border insolvencies as is the case for 
most developed countries.15 There is a lack of high profile cross-border 
insolvency cases that involved SSA countries, as is the case for other developing 
countries.16 Because of such absence, there has been an alarming dearth of cases 
and literature covering SSA in relation to cross-border insolvencies, unlike the 
situation in developed countries, such as the UK and the US, and emerging 
economies. This is one reason for the persistent lack of legislative activity and 
the lagging behind of the relevant laws in SSA countries.  
 
There are theories which try to explain the lack of judicial and legislative 
activities in the area of insolvency and cross-border insolvency, in particular in 
SSA countries. One such theory associates the limited development of the law, 
its application and use with firstly, the inherent weaknesses in the manner in 
which the relevant laws were transplanted in SSA countries.17 The argument is 
                                                 
14 Nduhukhire-Owa-Mataze, ‘Africa: A Continent Existing and Entering a Century in a “Sick- 
Bay”’ (1999) 3 Mtafiti Mwa frika (African Researcher) 56, 60-63; and J Sarra (n 3) 13 
15 B Wessels, BA Markell and JJ Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Matters (Oxford, OUP 2009) 71 
16  DA Ailola, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Its Efficacy and 
Suitability as A Basis for A SADC Convention’ (2000) 11 Stell L Rev 215; and D Ailola, 
‘Recognition of Foreign Proceedings, Orders and Officials in Insolvency in Southern Africa: A 
Call for a Regional Convention’ (1999) 32 Comp and Int’l L J S Afr 54 
17 SE Merry, ‘From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization’ (2003) 28 Law & Social 
Inquiry 569; DB, K Pistor, ‘Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 
47 Eur Econ Rev 165; RJ Daniels, MJ Trebilcock, and LD Carson, ‘The Legacy of Empire: The 
Common Law Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies’ (2011) 56 
Am J Com L 111; LM Musikali, ‘The Law Affecting Corporate Governance in Kenya: A Need 
for Review’ (2008) 19 ICCLR 213, 219; AT Nguluma, ‘The Court of Appeal of Tanzania and the 
Development of Insolvency Law in Tanzania: A Historical Perspective’ in  CM Peter and HK 
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that the relevant laws were neither made in a scientific way to address specific 
issues arising from or connected to the economic activity of the day, nor were 
they a translation of the socio-economic set up in the colonies. Rather, it was a 
mere super-imposition of legal regimes that seemed to have worked well in other 
colonies or the colonising country. This made the law in many cases to remain 
redundant or to be applied in a manner that was different from what had been 
intended.18  
 
The other theory is that the economic forces in SSA countries were not strong 
enough to stimulate the growth and development of the necessary socio-
economic relations or corporate formations, as well as international commercial 
linkage that could trigger the application of insolvency laws in relation to cross-
border insolvency incidences.19 Accordingly, in SSA countries where the forces 
were relatively stronger than others, as it was the case, for instance, in South 
Africa, and to some extent, Nigeria and Kenya, the extent of application and use 
of the law at least to domestic insolvency was relatively higher than in other 
countries such as Tanzania.20  
 
Yet another theory which correlates with the foregoing theories is to the effect 
that, with the advent of political independence, the post-independence states in 
SSA inherited the colonial socio-economic set-up and radically institutionalised 
policies that had remarkable negative impact on the development of insolvency 
law, its application and enforceability in appropriate cases.21 This pursuit was 
characterised by nationalisation policies, and other radical socialist inclined 
policies which swept most post-independence SSA countries in the early days of 
                                                                                                                                    
Bisimba (eds), Law and Justice in Tanzania: Quarter of a Century of  the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania (Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Dar es salaam 2007)173,  176; BS Masoud, 
‘Transnational Aspects of Tanzania’s Corporate Insolvency Law: Challenges and Prospects’ 
(2006)14 IIUM Law Journal 119, 125 
18 Ibid 
19 AT Nguluma (n 17) 176 
20 There has always been a considerable volume of insolvent winding up cases in Kenya as 
compared to Tanzania. See   < http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/ > accessed 18 September 2011   
21 AT Nguluma (n 17) 173, 176; BS Masoud (n 17); D Himbara, ‘The Failed Africanization of 
Commerce and Industry in Kenya’ (1994) 22 World Dev 469-482 
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their post-independence period.22 The pursuit effectively frustrated foreign 
investors and led to SSA not being regarded as an appropriate foreign investment 
destination and saw most laws becoming redundant as they were considered to 
have the imperialist agenda and therefore irrelevant to the policies of the day.23 
This is particularly evident in Tanzania which clung to a planned economy and 
maintained a large public sector economy through SOEs.24 The lack of 
significant changes in the laws relating to insolvency inherited from colonial 
powers in Tanzania and Kenya, as is so for the majority of SSA countries, could 
as well be looked at and explained in this context. Indeed, whatever 
developments and changes were effected in the law and practice were indeed 
targeted at furtherance of the radical post-independence ideologies. 
 
Consequently, there are a handful of old reported cases on personal insolvency 
having an international element and involving the application of the rules of 
bankruptcy on co-operation between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.25 It is 
interesting that most of these cases occurred in the 1950s and 1960s and largely 
involved immigrants of Asian origin whose migration history into Eastern Africa 
is traceable from the British colonial power’s demand for cheap labourers. 
Crucial issues in most of such cases concerned jurisdiction and property of 
debtors situated in another jurisdiction within East Africa. In one of such cases it 
was clearly pointed out that: 
                                                 
22 D Katona, ‘Challenging the Global Structure Through Self-Determination: An African 
Perspective’ (1999) 14 Am U Int’l L Rev 1459, showing how such trend  lead to what was then 
referred to as the New International Economic Order (“NIEO”) movement. 
23 TJ  Moss, V Ramachandran and MK Shah, ‘Is Africa’s Skepticism of Foreign Capital 
Justified? Evidence from East African Firm Survey Data’, (2004) Centre for Global Development 
Working Paper No. 41/2004 <  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112683 > accessed 16 September 2010 
[12]; and V Mosoti, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral 
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?’ (2005-2006) 
26 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 95, 114. B Mihyo, Non-Market Controls and the Accountability of Public 
Enterprises in Tanzania (Macmillan, London 1994) 127 & 128   
24 See generally, B Mihyo (n 23). The state owned enterprises were wholly dependent on the 
states. The financially strapped ones were fully insulated by the states against collapsing through 
provision of financial subventions, subsidies, shifting of resources, and reorganisations which 
were motivated by political desires. For implication of state owned enterprises on insolvency law 
generally in other jurisdictions such as China, see RW Harmer (n 10) 2563; and R Parry and H 
Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles’ (2008) 8 JCLS 113. 
25 IR Macneil, Bankruptcy Law in East Africa (University of Dar es salaam, Dar es salaam, 1966) 
210-220 citing and discussing Re Dayalji Laxman [1959] EA 216 (U); Official Receiver v Messrs 
Ukamba Service Store 20 EACA 19 (1952); Official Receiver v Messrs Savadia & Co 18 EACA 
119 (1951); and Re Plataniotis [1958] EA 217 (K) 
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 …[i]t is plain that the provisions of the [law] to the effect that all 
property shall be divisible among the creditors is necessary for the 
“order and good government of the territory [i.e East Africa]”…If the 
bankruptcy court had no power over property of a bankrupt outside the 
local limits of his jurisdiction, a bankrupt would be able to transfer his 
property outside the country and deal with it at will in front of his 
creditors. Such a situation would stultify the administration of debtors’ 
estates in bankruptcy.26  
 
This is clearly relevant also to cross-border corporate insolvencies that occur in 
the context of an environment in which a foreign company is unrestrictedly 
allowed under a bilateral investment arrangement to transfer and repatriate funds 
and capital as it wishes from a host country.27  
 
There had also been an instance of the collapse of Zambia-Tanzania Road 
Services Ltd, a company incorporated in Zambia and having a branch in 
Tanzania.28 The collapse resulted in a members’ voluntary winding up of the 
company which eventually turned into creditors’ voluntary winding up as the 
company could not make a declaration of solvency because it was hopelessly 
insolvent.29  As there was a glaring lack of cross-border provisions under the 
respective laws of Tanzania and Zambia which could be employed to deal with 
the cross-border affairs of the company, the liquidators between Tanzania and 
Zambia, creatively employed protocols and a scheme of arrangements and ably 
solved the cross-border problems that had emerged with the collapse of the 
company.30  The scheme of arrangement proposed by the joint liquidators was 
made in accordance with Zambian law, approved by all creditors and sanctioned 
by the court in Zambia before it was recognised and so sanctioned by the court in 
Tanzania. The Zambian law under which the scheme of arrangement was made 
and sanctioned by the court was similar and had the same effect as the law under 
                                                 
26 Re Plataniotis [1958] EA 217 (K) 
27 Text to n 111, 112 and 113 in chapter 4 
28 This was a company established by the government of Zambia and Tanzania with the primary 
object of providing haulage services between the two countries and thereby solving the problem 
of import and export to and from Zambia, a landlocked country. In particular, the company 
served to transport copper from Zambia to Dar es salaam port in Tanzania for onward export to 
foreign countries. 
29 EB Mndolwa, MA Kashonda, and CS Binamungu, Liquidation Law and Practice in Tanzania 
Mainland (Mzumbe Book Project, Tanzania 2003) 40-51 
30 Ibid 
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which the arrangement was consequently sanctioned by the court in Tanzania.31 
The use of a protocol to facilitate implementation of the scheme of arrangement 
in both Zambia and Tanzania is in accord with the current trends world-wide.32  
 
With the globalisation of trade and investment, followed by privatisation of 
SOEs in SSA countries and liberalisation of private investment, there have over 
the recent years increasingly been signs of potentialities of a new chapter of 
gradual involvement of SSA countries in incidences of cross-border insolvency. 
Such incidences could be of local companies and individuals having cross-border 
commercial links with foreign commercial actors due to their increased 
participation in international commercial transactions.33 The incidences could 
also relate to foreign companies having commercial undertakings and even 
commercial establishments and property in SSA countries.34 Indeed, it is now not 
uncommon for companies to be incorporated elsewhere but carry on business in 
SSA countries after being assured of a favourable investment environment. It is 
also not uncommon to find companies incorporated in and carrying on business 
in SSA countries, as subsidiaries or affiliates of parent companies headquartered 
abroad. These developments challenge the preparedness of the legislative 
framework of the countries under study for dealing with cross-border 
insolvencies in a manner that is in harmony with their pursuit of attracting and 
promoting trade and capital inflows.  
 
Consistent with the above circumstances, it is now not surprising that SSA 
countries have quite recently been engaged in the on-going multi-jurisdiction 
insolvency proceedings of the Nortel Group which, with a parent company in 
Canada, had operations run through subsidiaries in North America, Europe, the 
                                                 
31 Companies Act (Chapter 686 of the Laws of Zambia)  ss 205-207; and Companies Ordinance 
(Chapter 212 of the Laws of Tanzania) ss 154 and 155  ( repealed) 
32 JM Farley and EB Leonard, ‘Encouraging Signs Emerge in Cross-Border Cooperation Courts, 
Insolvency Professionals Take the Lead’ Journal of Corporate Renewal, February 1, 2002 < 
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=874 > accessed 21 October 2010 
33 Text to n 3, 5 and 52 in chapter 3 
34 Ibid 
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Middle East and Africa.35  As the European, the Middle Eastern and African 
subsidiaries were highly integrated and managed as one region from the branch 
in the UK, the administration proceedings commenced in the UK were 
effectively meant to put under administrations all the companies in these region, 
namely Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.36 The court in the UK was satisfied 
that the ‘centre of main interest’ (“COMI”) of the Nortel Group for the 
subsidiaries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa was in England and as such it 
had jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings, namely administration, in 
respect of each of such subsidiaries in such geographic regions.37 Among the 
orders made was one to authorise the administrators to apply to the relevant 
judicial authorities in any other country for assistance as they considered relevant 
for the performance of their functions and to put in place an arrangement in such 
authorities under which they would be informed of any request or application for 
the opening of secondary insolvency proceedings in those jurisdictions in relation 
to any of the companies and provide administrators with an opportunity to be 
heard on any such application.  
 
While the Nortel Group case is purely one such case which would require 
provision of judicial assistance by the relevant judicial authorities in a manner 
that would best maximise the values of the insolvent company’s estate for the 
best interests of all involved, it remains to be seen how the relevant SSA 
countries  will play their part and accord due regard to the interests and 
expectation of the local creditors who may not know what to do in relation to 
their debts and what is going on globally with regard to the company. While such 
proceedings would essentially require judicial assistance and co-operation, the 
laws in SSA countries may not explicitly provide for such procedures and, if they 
                                                 
35 J Sarra, ‘Communications Gone Awry: The Insolvency of Nortel and the Challenge of Multi-
Jurisdictional Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings of Related Business Entities’ (A Paper given 
at the INSOL International Academics’ Group Meeting Radisson Blu Royal Hotel Dublin 11-13 
June 2010) 
36 Re Nortel Networks SSA and other Companies  [2008] EWHC 206 
37 Although the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (“ECIR”) may seem not to apply in 
other jurisdictions outside EU, by virtue of Re Brac Rent a Car [2003] 1 WLR 1421, [2003] All 
ER (D) 98 (Feb), the court of a member state has jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings in 
relation to a company incorporated outside the community, if the centre of the company's main 
interests was in that member state. This is said to be based on the construction given to ECIR art 
3. See also Re Ci4net.com Inc [2005] BCC 277. 
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do, such procedure may have never been invoked in the past with regard to 
insolvency proceedings. Reliance may need to be made on the common law 
where applicable or ‘…on ad hoc co-operation arrangements, which have not 
generally proven to be a satisfactory solution.’38 However, it might be of interest 
to note that, quite recently, the court in Uganda was reported to have employed 
its discretion, and offered judicial assistance to a receiver of the First Bank of 
Grenada to preserve some assets bought from funds defrauded from creditors in 
Grenada and the United States.39  
 
In yet another case that occurred in Tanzania involving the insolvency of Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Group Company (consisting of eight subsidiaries), there emerged 
key issues impliedly touching on cross-border insolvency issues.40 Firstly, apart 
from local creditors, the case involved foreign creditors, largely consisting of 
Pepsi-Cola International and its associates, which claimed a total of USD 
12,048,000.00 (consisting of a loan, interest on the loan, and a claim for payment 
for concentrate). The debt was consequently written off following the foreign 
creditors’ acquisition of the Pepsi-cola business in Tanzania under a scheme of 
arrangement proposed by the liquidator and approved by all creditors. 
 
While the creditors, inclusive of the foreign ones as above mentioned, 
unrestrictedly participated in such proceedings and the resulting scheme of 
arrangement, the part played by the foreign creditors was crucially significant as 
they contributed to the conclusion of the arrangement by the undertaking to 
acquire the insolvent companies under a new company. During the 
commencement of such proceedings, the Court of Appeal, while reacting to the 
appointment of one non-national liquidator in such domestic proceedings, stated 
                                                 
38 LA Bebchuk and AT Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis  of Transnational Bankruptcies’ (1999) 
42 JL & Econ 775, 786 and 787 
39 The First International Bank of Grenada (In Liquidation) vs  Theoderous Ten Brink & Others 
HCCS 298 of 2003 (Unreported).  For a brief discussion on this case, see C Bwanika and KK 
Kenneth, ‘Insolvency-Uganda Experience’ A paper given for Uganda Law Reform Commission 
Conference on Business Law and Development: The Way Forward under the Commercial Justice 
Reform Programme, Nile International Conference Centre 19-21st July 2004   
40 Fahari Bottlers Ltd and Southern Highlands Bottlers Ltd vs The Registrar of Companies and 
The National Bank of Commerce (1997) Ltd Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Revision No. 1 
of 1999; and Re Fahari Bottlers Ltd, High Court of Tanzania Civil Cause No. 155 of 1998 
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that ‘normally no person resident outside the jurisdiction of the court is qualified 
for appointment as a liquidator. It is our understanding that the same position 
prevails in England.’41 Indeed, this position would affect the recognition of 
foreign proceedings in Tanzania, which could otherwise allow a foreign office 
holder to act directly through the competent local court in respect of assets and 
creditors of an insolvent foreign company having an established place of 
business in Tanzania.42  
 
Instances are also starting to emerge which potentially might encourage SSA 
countries to consider co-operation with other jurisdictions to secure better 
protection of the interests of creditors and other legitimate local interests. This is 
apparent in a recent Nigerian case43 involving insolvency proceedings against 
Alan Dick and Company West Africa Ltd, a Nigerian incorporated company, 
having directors and a parent company in the UK.44 In these Nigerian 
proceedings consideration was given to seeking recognition of the Nigerian 
proceedings and judicial assistance in the UK to pursue the assets of the 
company in the UK, where the company’s directors are based and the parent 
company is situated.  The merit of such proceedings and the consideration given 
to seeking recognition in the UK is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, 
this move was regarded as critically significant in enabling the liquidators to 
examine the UK based directors and the UK based parent company, obtain vital 
information from the same and cause the directors to eventually contribute 
personally to offsetting the liabilities of the company.  
 
                                                 
41 Fahari Bottlers Ltd and Southern Highlands Bottlers Ltd vs The Registrar of Companies and 
The National Bank of Commerce (1997) Ltd, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Revision No. 1 
of 1999 (unreported). In support of such observation the court was guided by and in fact used  JJ 
Charlesworth and G Morse, Charlesworth and Morse Company Law (15th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1995) 752 as its authority 
42 Text to n 66 below  
43 Re Alan Dick and Company West Africa Ltd, Nigerian Federal High Court Suit No 
FHC/L/CP/654/08 discussed in A Idigpe, ‘Bridging Gap Between Nigerian Insolvency and 
Cross-Border Insolvency Best Practices: Alan Dick Case’, The Guardian ( Nigeria 08 June 2010) 
<http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12971:bri
dging-gap-between-nigerian-insolvency-and-cross-border-insolvency-best-practices-alan-dick-
case-&catid=42:law&Itemid=600   > accessed 24 August 2010 
44 For another raw example of such instances indicating the potentials for occurrence of cross-
border insolvencies involving the countries under study, see text to n 129 in chapter 7 
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There was a bona fide belief that the substantial part of the funds and assets of 
the company had been repatriated to the UK and or converted into foreign assets 
acquired by the directors who had since not submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Nigerian court.45 This was particularly so because, since they filed involuntary 
winding up proceedings against the company, the directors had allegedly sought 
to avoid meeting the more tasking statutory conditions for members' voluntary 
winding up.46   
 
Among the creditors to the company are banks, tax authorities, employees, 
suppliers, and other trading creditors. It is argued that the voluntary proceedings 
were hurriedly sought by the company when it had become clear that it was 
unable to settle its commercial commitment, and indeed after meetings held with 
its bankers, to attempt restructuring.47 Whether or not such consideration of 
recognition and judicial assistance in dealing with the insolvency proceedings of 
the company has merits and potentials to materialise is not a key issue in this 
study. What is important for the present purpose is how African countries are 
increasingly becoming aware of the significance of cross-border insolvency law. 
Obviously, the challenge in the implementation of such consideration by any 
SSA country is to meet the criteria for being eligible for receiving recognition 
and judicial assistance in appropriate cases, given the prevalence of an element 
of reciprocity, albeit in a varied way, within cross-border insolvency systems of 
different jurisdictions.48 
 
All the above developments, and indeed many more to come, challenge the 
preparedness of the legislative framework of the countries under study for 
dealing with cross-border insolvencies in a manner that is in harmony with their 
pursuit of attracting and promoting capital inflows but without being distanced 
from the local circumstances and the international insolvency standards. The 
                                                 
45 A Idigpe (n 43) 
46 Ibid. The conditions, for instance, required a declaration from the directors that the company 
was solvent, as well as registration of the company’s latest statement of assets and liabilities, 
among others. 
47 A Idigpe (n 43) 
48 JL Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum’ (1991) 65 Am Bankr LJ 457, 467 and 468 
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following part therefore takes stock of the state of the law in cross-border 
insolvencies in SSA countries using Tanzania and Kenya as case studies whilst 
taking account of the absence or rarity of the application of the law in relation to 
cross-border insolvencies in the countries under study and the signs of 
potentialities of a new chapter of gradual involvement of SSA countries in 
incidences of cross-border insolvency. 
6.3 The International Character of Tanzania’s Insolvency Related 
Legislation 
6.3.1 Cross-Border Insolvency Aspects in Tanzania’s Inherited Colonial 
Legislation 
Cross-border insolvency aspects of the Tanzanian insolvency law are 
supplemented by the English common law, which is applicable on the basis that 
the common law is one of the sources of law in Tanzania.  As noted in the 
previous chapter the basic structure of the law relating to insolvency traces its 
origin from the law that was inherited from the British colonial administration, 
which was mainly contained in the Companies Ordinance and the Bankruptcy 
Act (which was formerly known as the Bankruptcy Ordinance).49  
 
The law lacked an explicit provision for dealing with cross-border insolvency, 
although it is understandable that an insolvent foreign company could, on the 
discretion of the court, be subjected to winding up insolvency proceedings as an 
unregistered company ‘… incorporated outside Tanzania.’50 There were no 
legislative criteria on the basis of which the court could exercise its discretion. 
Perhaps by borrowing from the English common law, the court could potentially 
invoke, among other things, the criteria of the existence of a sufficient 
connection between the foreign company and the local jurisdiction in Tanzania 
and the presence of persons in Tanzania concerned or interested in the 
                                                 
49 Text to n 14 in chapter 5 
50 Companies Ordinance (Tanzania), s 314-315. Section 315 is similar to Companies Act 1929 
(English), s 338 which in part read: ‘Where a company incorporated outside Tanzania which has 
been carrying on business in Tanzania ceases to carry on business in Tanzania it may be wound 
up as an unregistered company under this Part of this Act notwithstanding that it has been 
dissolved or otherwise ceased to exist as a company under or by virtue of the laws of the country 
under which it was incorporated.’ 
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proceedings over whom it may exercise its jurisdiction.51 The outcome of the 
application of such criteria could not necessarily be the same as it would have 
been in England. The operation of the principle requiring consideration of the 
local circumstances and that of the local inhabitants could have mandated a 
different outcome.52 
 
The other thing that was not explicit in the legislation was the treatment of cross-
border insolvency issues in the local insolvency proceedings. A typical example 
in this regard is the treatment of foreign creditors along with the local ones in the 
local proceedings and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and office 
holders appointed in such proceedings. Although it was clear that insolvent 
winding up proceedings could be commenced by creditors or the company itself, 
it was not explicit whether foreign creditors could be brought within the ambit of 
such a provision. It could however be argued that the provision did not have 
anything to suggest that the intention was to render foreign creditors unable to 
commence such proceedings. In any case, such gaps were indeed the potential 
areas where in appropriate cases the common law could be adopted to resolve 
cross-border insolvency problems that emerge,53 subject however to due 
consideration being given to the local circumstances of the countries under study 
and that of their local inhabitants.  
 
It is interesting that while the Companies Ordinance did not contain provisions 
on cross-border insolvency issues, the Bankruptcy Act was and still is relatively 
comprehensive in terms of its approach in handling cross-border issues relating 
to personal insolvencies, especially co-operation between courts and office 
holders in respect of the proceedings originating in countries having reciprocal 
co-operation with Tanzania. The history of the imposition of English law in the 
colonies shows that such development owed its origin from the early co-
operation measures on enforcement of orders given by the English court within 
                                                 
51 Text to n 36 and 39 in chapter 5 
52 Text to n 9 and 10 in chapter 5.  See also Obongo v Municipal Council of Kisumu [1971] EA 
91(CA) discussed in text to n 125 in chapter 5 
53 Text to n 76 in chapter 5 
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the United Kingdom and a requirement of assistance to other British courts in the 
context of personal insolvency.54 Such developments were consequently 
incorporated in the bankruptcy legislation as a reaction to the surge in numbers 
of personal insolvencies affecting assets located in the Commonwealth 
jurisdictions.55 The underlying rationale of the incorporated provisions from 
which the relevant provision in Tanzania’s bankruptcy legislation56 seems to 
trace its origin, was ‘to co-ordinate proceedings and [enable] the courts to assist 
in the management of bankruptcy proceedings within their own jurisdictions. The 
making of an order seeking the aid of another court was deemed sufficient 
authority to enable the other court to exercise the jurisdiction it would if the 
matter were before it for consideration.’57 
 
In addition, the Bankruptcy Act also devotes a whole part of the legislation and 
the rules, namely, the Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules (“BRR”),58 made under 
section 164 of the Act, to reciprocal co-operation in matters of bankruptcy 
proceedings. Although the repealed Companies Ordinance had no explicit 
provision on cross-border insolvencies, as is the bankruptcy legislation did, it 
could be argued that section 258 of the Companies Ordinance had the effect of 
importing and applying the relevant parts of the bankruptcy legislation and the 
BRR to cross-border corporate insolvency proceedings involving any 
reciprocating jurisdiction.59  
 
                                                 
54 PJ Omar, ‘Developments in Cross-Border Insolvency Practice in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 
14 Bond LR 347, 362-363 
55 PJ Omar (n 54) 
56 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 115 (Tanzania). The marginal note to this provision reads: ‘court 
to be auxiliary to other reciprocating courts.’ 
57 PJ Omar (n 54) 363 
58 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) Part IX entitled ‘Provisions for Reciprocity with Other Countries’ 
and containing sections 150-163, which is the same as Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) Part IX entitled 
‘Provisions for reciprocity with Other Territories.’ See also Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules G.N. 
No. 38 of 1932(Tanzania) which is the same as Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules (LN 143/1962) 
(Kenya) 
59 The marginal note to the repealed Companies Ordinance (Tanzania) s 258 read: ‘Application of 
bankruptcy rules in winding up of insolvent company.’ Notably, this provision has now been re-
enacted as Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 366 (Tanzania). It is the same as the provision 
found in Companies Act (Chapter 486 of Laws of Kenya) s 310. Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 
clause 420(2) seeks to re-enact the same provision. 
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The above line of argument appears to have the following implications. One 
implication is that, not only were the procedures for aiding foreign insolvency 
proceedings applicable to personal cross-border insolvency, but also to cross-
border corporate insolvencies. The application of the rules led to expansion and 
enlargement of the scope of the law in addressing international elements of 
corporate insolvencies. Indeed, such co-operation and reciprocal arrangements 
provisions on cross-border bankruptcy under the bankruptcy legislation and the 
BRR could be read into the Companies Ordinance although there was no explicit 
provision requiring reciprocity in matters of aiding or acting auxiliary to foreign 
insolvency proceedings. Actually, if the BRR were applicable, the implication 
was to reduce the scope of the common law that would otherwise apply in 
corporate cross-border insolvency matters involving Tanzania and a 
reciprocating country. However, the common law will potentially still have wide 
space in the proceedings involving Tanzania and a non-reciprocating country. 
6.3.2 Legal Developments in Cross-Border Insolvencies in Tanzania 
The Companies Act 2002 repealed and replaced the Companies Ordinance. This 
new Act (“CA 2002”) overhauled the insolvency procedures for dealing with an 
insolvent company, which now refer not only to the inability of a company to 
pay its overdue debts but also a situation where the value of the company’s assets 
is less than the amount of its liabilities, taking into account the contingent and 
prospective liabilities of the company.60 In effect, the Act institutionalises the 
modern concept of rescue with regard to corporate insolvency, modelled on the 
UK’s Insolvency Act 1986.61 Apart from accommodating the old and common 
procedure, such as the winding up of an insolvent company, the CA 2002 
introduces two new forms of dealing with an insolvent company in a manner that 
has potentials for the rescue of the business of the company. These are 
administration and company voluntary arrangements, which can be invoked in 
the event of impending or actual insolvency of a company.62  
 
                                                 
60 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 280; and S Rajani and F Ringo, ‘Tanzania Updates 
Corporate Insolvency Legislation’(2007) 23 IL and P 76 
61Companies Act 2002 Part  VII ; and  S Rajani and F Ringo (n 60) 76 
62 Companies Act  2002 (Tanzania) s 235 
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While the CA 2002 has detailed provisions stipulating procedures for the rescue 
of an insolvent company ‘…which compare well with the existing legislation of 
more developed countries...,’63 it is not clear and elaborate in the way that it 
attempts to address cross-border insolvency issues.64 Notably, whereas the law 
was enacted about five years after the promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, no express reference is made by the law to the 
Model Law and other transnational legal sources in the field of insolvency law 
generally.65 The only directly relevant provisions of the CA 2002 read thus: 
 
275. The High Court shall have jurisdiction to wind up any company 
registered in Tanzania and a body corporate as mentioned in section 
279(2). 
 
279(2) A body corporate may also be wound up by the court if 
incorporated outside Tanzania and carrying on business in Tanzania 
and winding up proceedings have been commenced in respect of it in 
the country of its incorporation or in any other country in which it has 
established a place of business. 
 
281.-(I) An application to the court for the winding up of a company 
shall be by petition presented, subject to the provisions of this section, 
either by the company or by any creditor or creditors (including any 
contingent or prospective creditor or creditors), contributory or 
contributories, or by an administrator, or by all or any of those parties, 
together or separately: 
 
Provided that – 
(a)…….. 
(b)…….. 
(c)…….. 
(d) a petition for the winding-up of a body corporate on the ground 
mentioned in section 279(2) may be presented by the official receiver 
as well as by any other person authorised to do so under the provisions 
of this subsection, but the court shall not make a winding-up order on a 
petition presented by the official receiver unless it is satisfied that the 
                                                 
63 Ibid 
64 There are apparently only three sections that scantly provide for aspects which could be linked 
with cross-border insolvency only in respect of winding up of a company. It could be argued that 
effective application of such provisions may depend heavily upon the quality and experience of 
judges, or in the absence of that experience, upon the quality of the advice that courts are able to 
draw upon in making their decisions. For this line of reasoning, see RA Tomasic, ‘The 
Conceptual Structure of China’s  New Corporate Bankruptcy Law’ in R Parry, Y Xu, and H 
Zhang, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: Context, Interpretation, and Application 
(Ashgate, England 2010) 30 
65 S Rajani and FS Ringo (n 60). Interestingly, Companies Act 2002(Tanzania) s 2 makes 
reference to international accounting and auditing standards and practice with respect to generally 
acceptable principles of accounting applicable in Tanzania. As discussed in chapter 3, 
international insolvency standards as is the case for the international accounting standards, among 
others, are part and parcel of the international financial architecture that was introduced in the 
aftermath of the East Asia financial crisis. 
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liquidator or provisional liquidator of the body corporate in the country 
where winding-up proceedings have been commenced in respect of it 
has in the manner prescribed required the official receiver to present the 
petition.66 
 
Furthermore, the Company Insolvency Rules 2005 (“CIR 2005”)67 made under 
the  CA 2002 do not provide for cross-border insolvency issues, though a critical 
reading of the scant provisions on cross-border insolvency in the Act provides an 
impression that matters of details in so far as insolvency and especially cross-
border insolvency are concerned would have arguably been addressed by the 
rules.68 Despite such weaknesses, the insolvency related provisions under the CA 
2002 mark a significant development from the previous companies’ legislation. 
This is regardless of the fact that the provisions have, since they were brought 
into force in 2005, remained in disuse.  
 
In the absence of a clear and comprehensive law on cross-border insolvency, a 
number of issues may arise: whether the Tanzanian court may extend, and to 
what extent it is likely to offer, recognition and co-operation to foreign 
proceedings in appropriate circumstances; whether the Tanzanian court is 
prepared to defer to exterritorial  insolvency jurisdictions in cross-border 
insolvency cases involving multinational enterprises having investment in 
Tanzania; whether foreign creditors can prove in local proceedings and rank 
equally with the local creditors; and whether the foreign creditors can commence 
insolvency proceedings against  a debtor in a Tanzanian court. These issues 
                                                 
66 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 275, 279(2), and 281(1)(d) 
67 The Companies (Insolvency) Rules 2005 (Government Notice No. 43 of 11/2/2005) 
68 S Rajani and FS Ringo  (n 60); and  Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 479(I) provides that ‘ 
The Minister may make rules for carrying into effect the objects of this Act and for any matter or 
thing which by this Act is to be or may be provided for by rules. Any rules made under this 
section which are in the nature of rules of court shall not be made except after obtaining the 
advice of the Chief Justice.’ 
Companies (Insolvency) Rules 2005 rr 89, 90 and 91 which seem to exclude cross-border 
insolvency elements which are explicit in Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) ss 275, 279 and 281. It 
is important to note that other laws relating to foreign investment enterprises are silent on the 
treatment of cross-border insolvency, though they arguably envision general principles that 
would need to be taken into account in dealing with cross-border insolvency involving a foreign 
enterprise. See for instance, Tanzania Investment Act 1997(Tanzania). 
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pinpoint areas that may need to be filled up by the application of the common 
law subject to the extent permitted by the local circumstances.69 
6.3.2.1 Treatment of Foreign Companies and Creditors in Domestic 
Proceedings 
It is not quite clear if the statutory law as it stands allows domestic winding up 
proceedings to be commenced in respect of a foreign company which is unable to 
pay its debts - if for instance it is either proved to the satisfaction of the court that 
the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due or it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that the value of the company’s asset is far less than the 
amount of its liabilities.70  
 
The law has it that winding up proceedings may be commenced by ‘the company 
or by any creditor or creditors (including any contingent or prospective creditor 
or creditors), contributory or contributories or by an administrator or by all or 
any of those parties together or separately.’71 It is however not clear that the 
meaning of ‘any creditor or creditors’ in the commencement of the proceedings 
in Tanzania and the consequent ranking and proof of debts and claims is meant to 
include both local and foreign creditors.72 The legal framework is also not 
explicit that in a single Tanzanian proceeding foreign creditor claims can be 
admitted to proof and treated the same as equivalent ranking local claims. 
Conversely, the little experience available thus far suggests that there is no such 
discrimination between foreign and local creditors whatsoever.73  
                                                 
69 n 53 above 
70 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) ss 275, 279(1)(d),  279(2), and 280  
71 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 281(1) 
72 It is to be noted that it is not uncommon in other jurisdictions for the law to provide clearly that 
a non-national or foreign company will be treated in the same way as national or domestic 
companies. See K Anderson, ‘The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the 
Modified Universal Approach’ (2000) 21 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 679, 730 quoting a provision from 
the Japanese Bankruptcy and Composition Acts (art 2 and 11 respectively) which read: ‘An alien 
or foreign corporation shall have the same status as a Japanese national or Japanese corporation 
in regard to bankruptcy, provided however, that this shall apply only when Japanese nationals or 
Japanese corporations have the same status under the native laws of the alien or the foreign 
corporation.’ As Anderson puts it ‘[t]he obvious purpose of this section was to protect Japanese 
citizens (both natural and corporate) from discrimination by foreign countries.’ 
73 See rulings by Kalegeya J in Fahari Bottlers Ltd  v The Registrar of Companies and NBC 
(1997) Ltd. and Others Misc. Civil Cause No. 155 of 1998 (High Court of Tanzania) (unreported) 
dated 26 October 2000 and 21 November 2000 respectively. Full and non-discriminatory 
involvement of foreign creditors (i.e IPBCIL and its associates which included Pepsico 
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Notwithstanding the above ambiguities, the CA 2002 is explicit that winding up 
proceedings may be commenced in respect any insolvent foreign company.74 
However, it provides two conditions on the basis of which such proceedings may 
be commenced. Firstly, winding up proceedings should have been commenced in 
respect of the company either in its place of incorporation or any other country in 
which it has established business.75 And secondly, the company must have been 
carrying on business in Tanzania.76 It is not clear that proceedings commenced in 
a foreign jurisdiction where the company has its “centre of main interest” 
(“COMI”) other than its place of incorporation will well be within the 
requirements of this provision. Notably, COMI is now one of the recognised 
principles characterising the international insolvency benchmarks. 
 
One observation to be made from the relevant provisions is that the 
commencement  of such proceedings against a foreign company in Tanzania 
requires the foreign company to have an establishment in Tanzania, in the sense 
of carrying on business therein, not just presence or possession of property 
situated in Tanzania.77 The question is whether the court may in an appropriate 
case in future imply a requirement of presence or possession of property in 
‘carrying on business in Tanzania.’78 It is accordingly not clear if winding up can 
equally be commenced in respect of the company that has property in Tanzania 
                                                                                                                                    
International) in the proceedings made it possible for such creditors to acquire the insolvent 
companies under a scheme of arrangement. 
74 See n 66 above. This discretionary power of the court to order winding up seems to be in 
addition to similar powers that the court has by virtue of the provisions for winding up of a 
foreign company which has ceased to carry on business in Tanzania and has been dissolved or 
otherwise ceased to exist in its place of incorporation. See Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 427  
75 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 279(2)  
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid 
78 In other jurisdictions which have incorporated provisions on cross-border insolvency in 
companies law, such as the Cayman Islands, the law ‘allows the court to make a winding up order 
providing the company has property located in the Islands; is carrying on business in the Islands,’ 
among other things. See Companies (Amendment) Law 2007 (Cayman Island) s 91(d). For a 
succinct discussion of such provision, see S Dickson, ‘Changes to the Cayman Islands Insolvency 
Regime: A Brief Review’ (2008) 5 Int’l Corporate Rescue 269; and A Bolton and T H Wren, 
‘Cayman’s New Insolvency Regime’ (2009) 2.3 Corporate Rescue and Insolv 122  
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but which is held not to be carrying on business in Tanzania or having an 
establishment.79  
 
It is also of interest to see if the courts in considering whether or not to recognise 
foreign winding up proceedings could be guided by section 11 of Tanzania’s 
Civil Procedure Code Act 1966, which provides for principles to be taken into 
account in recognising and enforcing a foreign judgment.80 These include, 
jurisdictional competence of the foreign court involved; merits of the decision 
involved; whether or not the decision was founded on a correct view of 
international law; whether it entails a refusal of recognition of Tanzanian law in a 
case in which the law was applicable; failure of the foreign proceedings to adhere 
to natural justice; and fraud. 
 
Given the lack of details in a number of respects, it is clear that there is a wide 
scope for the common law to apply to fill in gaps in appropriate cases. However, 
the extent to which the relevant common law might be allowed to apply depends 
on several factors as discussed in chapter five.81 In the light of what emerges 
from the debate on the competing theories, and the international insolvency 
benchmarks this situation can arguably be described as contributing to 
uncertainty and unpredictability of outcome which may increase transactional 
costs. It must be stressed however that no approach, as one may gather from the 
cross-border insolvency theories’ debate discussed in chapter two, would 
necessarily be any more predictable and certain. 
 
Arguably, the key standards and principles of the bilateral investment treaties 
ought to be reflected in the treatment of foreign companies in insolvency 
proceedings. This is in particular where a foreign company’s home country and 
Tanzania, as a host country, are contracting parties to the treaty between the two 
countries. Arguably, on these aspects the law is not clearly and unambiguously 
                                                 
79 Cf. UNCITRAL Model Law and the Kenyan Insolvency Bill (n 145- 148) below 
80 Cf. Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law para 125, whereby ‘…the conditions for 
recognition do not include those that would allow the court…to evaluate the merits of the foreign 
court’s decision…’; and text to n 129 below 
81 See text to n 9-11 in chapter 5 and text to part 5.6 in chapter 5 
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consistent with the commitments arising from such treaties to which Tanzania is 
a party. Indeed, if the common law were to apply unrestrictedly, it would have 
the effect of pulling quite significantly the domestic law towards the direction of 
modified universalism and enhance the compatibility of the law in Tanzania with 
its commitments arising from the bilateral investment treaties and other similar 
arrangements it has concluded thus far. As noted earlier and extensively 
discussed in chapter five, the application of the common law and its potential 
outcome in a given cross-border insolvency case cannot be ascertained. 
6.3.2.2 Co-operation with and Recognition of Foreign Insolvency 
Proceedings 
The CA 2002 seems to accord recognition to foreign winding up proceedings 
commenced in the debtor company’s place of incorporation or any other country 
where the company has an established place of business and where there is proof 
of authorisation of the official receiver or any authorised person under the law to 
present a petition for the commencement of the proceedings in Tanzania.82  The 
effect of this is the grant of a winding up order by the court and thus 
commencement of the proceedings. Upon such proof, the official receiver may 
act for and on behalf of a foreign insolvency administrator in the conduct of such 
proceedings in Tanzania. However, the construction of the relevant provision 
suggests that it is at the discretion of the court to make an order commencing 
winding up proceedings against the company in Tanzania.  
 
It therefore means that the CA 2002 enables an officeholder appointed in foreign 
proceedings to cause commencement of insolvency winding up proceedings of a 
foreign company in Tanzania as a host country of a foreign investor from a 
foreign home country. This is achieved by such a foreign office holder requiring 
the official receiver in Tanzania to present the petition for the winding up of the 
company on the grounds already stated above. The construction of the relevant 
provision suggests that evidence of such authority and appointment to present 
such petition is crucially important for the winding up order not to be refused.83  
                                                 
82 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 281(1)(d) reproduced verbatim in text to n 66 above 
83 The law does not provide an indication of  instances on the basis of which an application for 
the commencement of proceedings against a foreign company may be refused other than a  lack 
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The law is silent on the recognised practice which allows a foreign office holder 
to apply directly to the local court to be appointed to act in the local proceedings, 
whether or not jointly with a local insolvency administrator in respect of the 
insolvency proceedings. It remains to be seen how the court will deal with such 
issues. Perhaps this also is an area where the common law may be employed to 
provide guidance. It would follow that co-operation may accordingly be effected 
whether the officeholder was so appointed in the proceedings commenced in a 
home country of the foreign company or in any other country where the company 
established a place of business.84  
 
There is no express mention of the nature of the winding proceeding to be 
commenced in Tanzania at the instance of a foreign office holder in relation to 
the proceedings taking place in the foreign country. It is not clear whether it will 
be  ancillary to the foreign proceedings with a view to dealing with key aspects 
such as; recognising the right of a foreign representative to act in Tanzania in the 
name of or on behalf of the company; enjoining the commencement or staying 
the continuation of proceedings against the company; staying enforcement of any 
judgement against the company; requiring a person in possession of information 
relating to the business affairs of the company to be examined by and produce 
documents to its foreign liquidator; and ordering the turnover to a foreign 
liquidator of any property belonging to the company.85 Perhaps these gaps mean 
opportunities where the court will have to exercise its discretion based on the 
common law.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
of evidence requiring the official receiver  to open proceedings in Tanzania on behalf of a foreign 
officeholder. Cf. UNCITRAL Model Law art 15-17 and text to n 129 and 142 below  
84 See Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 279(2) as quoted in text to n 66 above. This is a notable 
development which is similar to the recent developments at common law achieved by the 
decision of the Privy Council in Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC(IoM)) 
which made recognition and judicial assistance not entirely  dependent on having foreign 
proceedings commenced in the home country (i.e place of domicile) of the insolvent company but 
also in any other jurisdiction where a company has it is centre of main interest. 
85 For a discussion of such aspects, see S Dickson (n 78) 272 
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Notably, the provision in the CA 2002 also does not mention any thing as to 
exterritorial effects of local insolvency proceedings initiated in Tanzania to 
foreign territories. Contrary to the trend in many jurisdictions, there is no 
reference to the requirements of reciprocity of any form as an instrument to 
achieve co-operation in dealing with cross-border insolvencies86 - whether by 
singling out ‘trusted’ jurisdictions which are entitled to automatic co-operation87 
or by requiring conclusion of an appropriate agreement with willing countries or 
proof of existence of sufficient reciprocity.88 There is also a lack of explicit 
requirement as to conformity with other criteria such as public policy.  
 
The ambit of the provision seems to be confined to winding up proceedings 
whilst also giving discretionary power to the court to determine whether or not, 
for instance, to co-operate in cross-border insolvency proceedings in respect of a 
foreign company carrying on business in Tanzania that have been commenced in 
a foreign jurisdiction.89 Perhaps local interests and needs which also include the 
need to attract foreign investment and trade will be taken into account in such 
determination.  
6.3.2.3 Co-ordination and Communication 
While realisation of the legislative framework for cross-border insolvency would 
depend on co-operation with foreign courts, there is barely anything in the CA 
2002 which provides for facilitation of communication and co-ordination 
                                                 
86 LC Ho, ‘Overview’, in LC Ho (ed)  Cross-Border Insolvency: A Commentary on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law ( Globe Business, London 2006) 12 
87 LC Ho (n 86). See in particular, Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) s 426 designating specific countries 
to which the co-operation under such provision should be extended; K Dawson, ‘Assistance 
under Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986’ (1999) 8 Int’l Insolv Rev 109, 117, explaining that 
a court requesting assistance must be on the list of countries or territories designated by the 
Secretary of State. See also Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2000 (South Africa) s 2 (South Africa) 
requiring the Minister for Justice to designate countries to which the Act will apply. The minister 
must be satisfied that recognition accorded by a country to South African proceedings justifies 
application of the Act to such a country. 
88 JL Westbrook, CD Booth, CG Paulus, and H Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency 
Systems (World Bank, Washington 2010) 231; LC Ho (n 86). For recent developments in this 
regard, see Insolvency Act 2009 (Mauritius) ss 366 and 368(2) requiring sufficient reciprocity 
before the law is brought into force “in dealing with insolvencies with jurisdictions that have 
trading or financial connections with Mauritius, or that it is otherwise in the public interest to 
bring it into operation.” In this connection, there must be an agreement between Mauritius and a 
foreign country for mutual recognition of insolvency proceedings and appropriate protection for 
the interests of debtors and creditors in Mauritius. 
89 Text to n 66 above  
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between Tanzania and foreign jurisdictions for efficient handling of a cross-
border insolvency matter. The only aspect in this regard is in relation to the 
avenue that enables communication between a foreign office holder of a foreign 
proceeding and an official receiver in Tanzania whereby the former is entitled to 
require the latter to initiate proceedings in Tanzania. The law presupposes 
prescriptions of procedural details and requirements as to realisation of such 
communication and co-ordination.90 But, it is very unfortunate that the law does 
not provide such details nor has the recently enacted regulation.91 
 
The foreign office holder mentioned in the relevant provision is none other than a 
liquidator in respect of foreign winding up proceedings. It remains unclear 
whether any foreign office holder appointed in any proceedings other than 
winding up proceedings would equally enjoy the right to seek and require the 
official receiver to initiate proceedings in Tanzania which would recognise and 
facilitate co-operation with the foreign proceedings. Accordingly, it may not be 
surprising to find that an officeholder in respect of rescue proceedings in the 
nature for instance of administration or reorganisation is refused co-operation. 
This is one area where the common law might assist.92 
6.4 The International Character of Kenya’s Insolvency Related 
Legislation 
6.4.1 Cross-Border Insolvency Aspects in Kenya’s Inherited Colonial 
Legislation 
As is the case for Tanzania, Kenya inherited its legislation that contained 
provisions on how to deal with insolvencies from the British colonial power.93 
The provisions which are still applicable to date were and are mainly found in 
Kenya’s Companies Act94 and the Bankruptcy Act.95As far as the administration 
of corporate insolvency is concerned, there is glaringly a lack of appropriate 
provisions institutionalising a regime for dealing with cross-border insolvency 
                                                 
90 The phrase ‘…in the manner prescribed…’ in Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 281(1) (d) 
quoted in full in text to n 66 above is noteworthy. 
91 n 67 above 
92 Cambridge Gas case (n 84)  
93 Text to n 12, 13 and 14 in  chapter 5 
94 (Chapter 486 of Laws of Kenya) 
95 (Chapter 53 of Laws of Kenya) 
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problems. As was the case for the repealed Tanzanian Companies Ordinance, it 
seems that the only provisions that could be linked with cross-border 
insolvencies are those which provide for the winding up of a foreign company, 
by the court in Kenya, as an unregistered company.96 For such winding up to be 
effected the company must have ceased to carry on business in Kenya and must 
have been dissolved or ceased to exist in its place of domicile.  
 
Such limited situations where the legislation could be regarded as acknowledging 
some international effect of insolvency cannot however mean that the law caters 
and indeed provides for cross-border insolvency.97 This means that Kenya, as is 
the case for Tanzania, is still largely dependent on the English common law in 
dealing with cross-border insolvency cases, though the extent and manner into 
which the relevant common law will be invoked in an appropriate case remains 
uncertain and unpredictable.98  
 
The statutory provisions on persons entitled to commence insolvency 
proceedings, as well as those entitled to claim, prove and receive dividends from 
the distribution of proceeds of realisation of the assets of the insolvent debtor are 
silent on national treatment of foreign personalities and institutions involved in 
the local proceedings. 99 Indeed, the entire law is silent about giving non-
discriminatory treatment to foreign creditors.100 While such treatment might 
always be assumed to be the case as there is no express provision to the contrary, 
it is important to stress that in most legal systems local priorities are not always 
available to foreign creditors.101    
 
As observed and argued in relation to Tanzania, there is also in Kenya a scope 
and merit in favour of the extension and application of the rules of  law of 
                                                 
96 Companies Act (Kenya) s 359 
97 R Sandoval, ‘Chile Legislation and Cross-Border Insolvency’ (1998) 33 Tex Int’l LJ 575, 578 
98 Obongo v Municipal Council of Kisumu [1971] EA 91, 94; and Judicature Act 1967 (Kenya) s 
3(1) which provides common law as among the sources of law in Kenya. See also text to n 9-10 
in chapter 5 
99 Sections 221 and  311 of  the  Companies Act (Chapter 486 of Laws of Kenya); and JL 
Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (1998) 33 Tex Int’l LJ 27, 31 
100 JL Westbrook (n 99) 31 
101 Ibid 30 and 31 
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personal bankruptcy to govern cross-border co-operation in the winding up of an 
insolvent company having an international dimension.102 In fact, the provision 
under Kenya’s company law which extends the rules of bankruptcy law to the 
winding up of an insolvent company is the same as the one that is found in 
Tanzania.103 This is also true for the co-operation procedure in cross-border 
insolvencies under the respective countries’ bankruptcy legislation which is a 
subject of extensive discussion in a subsequent part below.104 The scope for the 
application of such co-operation procedures to cross-border corporate insolvency 
is a subject of extensive discussion below.  
6.4.2  Legislative Reform Initiative and Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regulation in Kenya 
The law relating to insolvency which is operative in Kenya has remained in force 
without any substantive reform for about five decades. The changing economic 
climate coupled with the drive by multilateral institutions for institutionalisation 
of the rule of law and good governance in developing countries have created a 
pressing need for amelioration of insolvency law and cross-border insolvency 
law in Kenya.105 The initiative is undertaken within the broad context of 
facilitating growth of trade and investment and foreign direct investment in 
particular with a view to reducing poverty.106 While the research for this study 
was in progress, the Kenyan government had already approved and published the 
                                                 
102 Section 310 of the Companies Act  (Chapter 486 of Laws of Kenya) 
103 n 59 above 
104 Bankruptcy Act (Chapter 53 of Laws of Kenya) ss 115, 151-164 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) 
Rules (LN 143/1962) (Kenya); and Cf  n 58 above. See also text to part 6.5 below for an 
extensive discussion of such co-operation procedures and their applicability to cross-border 
corporate insolvency. 
105 C Agimba, ‘Global Trends in the Four Doing Business Indicators-Closing a Business: Kenya’s 
Reform Experiences’ (Paper Given at Doing Business 2011 in Africa: Sharing Reform 
Experiences 2011) <  
https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=16717 > 
accessed 06 September 2011. It is reported that there has also been ‘‘[c]ontinuous pressure for 
reform of business laws from business community and proactive response to [the] need for 
reform from highest political leadership, key government ministries and agencies.  Close 
collaboration and synergies between government ministries and agencies (State Law Office, 
Kenya Law Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance) and private sector and other 
stakeholders.’ 
106  M Whitehead, ‘A New Insolvency Act is Coming……So Lenders, Borrowers and Insolvency 
Practitioners Get Ready’  [2009] Financial Focus 1, 8 <   
http://www.pwc.com/en_KE/ke/pdf/pwc-financial-focus.pdf  > accessed 17 August 2010; and C 
Agimba (n 105) 
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Insolvency Bill 2010.107 The Insolvency Bill was prepared by the Law Reform 
Commission and presented to the Attorney General’s office for review and 
drafting into a Bill. One source is to the effect that the Bill was drafted with the 
assistance of a German academic,108 and technical assistance from multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank.109 
 
The Bill is designed to replace the Bankruptcy Act, streamline procedures in 
bankruptcy and insolvency law and effectively remove insolvency related 
provisions from the companies’ legislation. The Bill is set also to provide for the 
rehabilitation of the insolvent debtor, unlike the present situation where 
insolvency almost always results in liquidation.110 The reform has been justified 
as crucially relevant to Kenya’s “vision twenty thirty”111 which seeks to 
transform Kenya into a competitive and prosperous middle income economy.112 
The Bill is thus intended to add to the efforts towards creating an enabling 
environment for making Kenya more competitive for business and investment. It 
is thus implicit that the proposed law has as its inherent object the reinforcement 
of the poverty reduction strategies through a rehabilitation and rescue procedure 
whose effective implementation would save jobs and revenue in the long term.113 
The Kenyan poverty reduction strategy seeks among other things to ensure that 
                                                 
107 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) < 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2010/Insolvency_Bill_2010.pdf   > 
accessed 06 September 2011; O Kimani, ‘Cabinet Hailed for Approving Bills’ Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (Kenya 12 November 2010) <  
http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=67544   > accessed 06 September 2011; and M Whitehead (n 
106) 8  
108 USAID, ‘Kenya’s Agenda for Action: Commercial Legal and Institutional Reform- Diagnostic 
of Kenya’s Business Environment’ (Business Climate Legal and Institutional Reform June 2009) 
<http://www.bizclir.com/galleries/country-assessments/Kenya.pdf > accessed 17/08/2010 [70] 
109 O Kimani (n 107) 
110 See the long title to Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) which in part reads . ‘…to provide for 
corporate and individual insolvency, to provide for the rehabilitation of the insolvent debtor and 
for connected purposes.’; and Part X (clauses 315 - 443) which provides for administration 
orders; and K Owino, ‘Shifting Receivership Process to Business Recovery’  (2001) The Point: 
Bulletin of Institute of Economic Affairs 1 
111 Kenya, Kenya Vision 2030 (Government of United republic of Kenya, Kenya 2007). See also 
text to n 54 in chapter 7 
112 HE Hon President M Kibaki, ‘Speech During the Official Opening of Parliament’ (the Fourth 
Session of the Tenth Kenyan Parliament 23rd February 2010)  
< www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task > accessed 12/04/2010 
113 Kenya, ‘Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation 2003-2007’ (Poverty Reduction Papers IMF Country Report No. 05/11, 
2005) < http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0511.pdf > accessed 01/09/2010 
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Kenya domesticates international Standards and Conventions which it is party 
to.114 One view given in relation to the potential areas for reform of Kenyan 
insolvency law,  which also reflects domestic concerns on local creditors 
interests, is to the effect that:  
There should … be a policy review of the issue of preferential debtors 
especially in favour of the government. Many bona fide creditors of 
insolvent companies do lose the opportunity to recover their money 
because of the consideration of the government as a preferential creditor. 
This policy is detrimental to the growth of other businesses that are not 
classified as secured creditors. Where they are unable to recover the 
money owed to them, they may also experience financial difficulties and 
eventually suffer liquidation as well with the effect that a series of 
receiverships occur and the momentum continues to build for more 
business failures. Government loss in the short term will certainly be 
compensated when the businesses have recovered and begin to pay 
taxes.115 
 
The Bill is, at least in theory, set to establish a key framework for cross-border 
insolvency regulation.116 Arguably, the proposed radical reforms establish key 
features that are critical in regulation of and co-operation in cross-border 
insolvencies. Firstly, the reforms seek to introduce two new legal procedures, 
namely, Company Voluntary Arrangements (“CVAs”) and Administration. And 
secondly, the reforms propose to introduce a requirement for any “insolvency 
practitioner” to be qualified. This proposed requirement closely, as is the case for 
most parts of the Bill, follows the UK Model. The Bill provides for the law to 
adopt the two tests of insolvency, namely cash flow test and the balance sheet 
test, either of which may be invoked to establish insolvency.117  
 
Commentators are of the view that if this Bill ‘ends up as legislation substantially 
unaltered it could result in some radical changes to the existing insolvency 
regime.’118 Nevertheless, implementation concerns have also been raised.119 The 
USAID report has it that: 
                                                 
114 Ibid 
115 K Owino (n 110) 1, 7& 8; Cf. text to n 98 in chapter 7 
116 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) Part XIII (clauses 462-466) contains general provisions. It 
provides inter alia for the power of the Minister to make regulations and domesticates the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Insolvency under a schedule to the Bill. Indeed, this method parallels 
the approach taken by the Great Britain in adopting the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
as a regulation made under the Insolvency Act 1986. 
117 Cf. text to n 3 in chapter 2 
118 M Whitehead (n 106) 8 
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Major legislation for a complete revamping of the bankruptcy process, 
including the adoption of a reorganization statute [which] has been 
pending for several years……would be a complete revision of 
bankruptcy law in Kenya……although a less ambitious revision (with a 
simple provision for the rehabilitation of a business) would be very 
likely to be easier for the overworked Kenyan court system to 
implement.120 (emphasis added) 
 
Notably, concerns on the need for simplified form of insolvency legislation for 
developing countries such as those in SSA were also raised in connection with 
the overhaul of Tanzania’s insolvency legal framework in 2002 which became 
operational in 2005.121 It was contended that:  
 
 Perhaps a word of warning will not be out of place here. In their zeal to 
continually improve their business rescue and insolvency regimes, [they] 
should avoid the pitfall of making them so over-regulated and complex 
as to become unwieldy and prohibitively costly. Any trend in this 
direction must be quickly identified and nipped in its bud. 122 (emphasis 
added) 
6.4.3 Cross-Border Insolvency Features Emerging From the Kenyan 
Reform Initiative 
6.4.3.1 Towards Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency 
Although cross-border insolvency regulation is not explicitly singled out as one 
of the primary objectives of the Bill, as is for rehabilitation of an insolvent 
debtor, reading through the Bill reveals that cross-border insolvency regulation is 
indeed one of the major and significant reforms and updates that the Bill seeks to 
achieve for Kenya.123 Apart from the traditional procedure of winding up of a 
foreign company as an unregistered company, which the Bill has incorporated, it 
seeks also to give effect to the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
border Insolvency as a schedule to the proposed Insolvency Act 2010.124   One of 
the relevant clauses under the Kenyan Insolvency Bill 2010 reads thus: 
                                                                                                                                    
119 M Whitehead (n 106) 9; and USAID (n 87) 70 
120 USAID (n  108) 70 
121 See Editorial entitled ‘The Band Wagon of Insolvency Law Reform Globally Rolls on’ 
(2006) 22 IL & P 97 
122 Ibid 
123 This is particularly so given the express commitment to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency 
124 n 116 above 
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The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency) shall have the force of law in Kenya 
in the form set out in the Fifth Schedule.125 
It is of interest to consider this development in Kenya in light of some of the 
prevailing features characterising adoption of the Model law as a domestic 
legislation. Firstly, it is common knowledge that the Model Law has been 
adopted differently in different countries which suggests the potential influence 
of local policies, priorities and culture, to mention but a few. Secondly, the test of 
reciprocity has proved to be one of the more common features of the adoption of 
the Model Law, and it is increasingly becoming also true for SSA countries that 
have to date adopted the Model Law.126 And thirdly, despite some variations as 
to how the Model Law has been adopted thus far, a public policy element is a 
prominent feature that has hardly been omitted in the adopted versions of the 
Model Law. The question is whether or not the proposed law to be adopted in 
Kenya is going to fit within this trend.  
6.4.3.2 Key Aspects of the Proposed Kenyan Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency  
The Kenyan Insolvency Bill 2010 that has been published thus far incorporates a 
proposed set of Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations as the 5th schedule to the 
Bill (herein after referred as the Bill). Clearly, the Bill is significantly in line with 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The following are 
some highlights of the fundamental aspects of the Bill as it proposes to address 
cross-border insolvency. 
6.4.3.2.1 Application of the Proposed Law to Foreign Jurisdictions and 
Proceedings 
The Insolvency Bill 2010 does not restrict its application to foreign jurisdiction 
and proceedings on a basis of a requirement for reciprocity.127 It appears that the 
intention is to welcome any application from any jurisdiction whether or not it is 
from a jurisdiction that has adopted the Model Law or one that has any reciprocal 
                                                 
125 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) clause 463 
126 Text to n 87 and 88 above. South Africa’s Cross-Border Insolvency Law and more recently 
Mauritius Cross-Border Insolvency Law are all based on some forms of reciprocity requirement. 
 
127 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya)  5th Schedule para 8 
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co-operation with Kenya. This is a point of significant contrast to the adoption of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in other SSA 
countries.128 Assistance may be refused on grounds of contravention of Kenyan 
public policy. The Bill proposes that if a refusal on grounds of public policy is 
sought, the court must consider appearance of the Kenyan Attorney General to be 
heard in relation to the public policy issue raised.129 This requirement is a 
positive development which is non-existent in the UNCITRAL Model Law.130  
More importantly, the extent of application of the proposed law may also be 
constrained by the existence of international obligations arising from 
international treaties to which Kenya is a party.131 It might be argued that this 
may include specific effects of bilateral investment treaties and such other 
treaties like the UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention where there is sufficient 
linkage with issues governed by the provision of the relevant national insolvency 
or cross-border insolvency law.132 This brings in such aspects as requirements for 
extending national treatment, most favoured national treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment and the right of a foreign investor to repatriate capital and 
funds from a host country as well as super-priority treatment to some of the 
claimants.133 
6.4.3.2.2 Treatment of Foreign Creditors and Foreign Representatives 
As a general rule, the Bill seeks to require “national treatment” of foreign 
creditors in addition to providing direct access for foreign representatives to the 
court in Kenya. It is to the effect that foreign creditors are to be treated in the 
                                                 
128 Text to n 87 and 88 above  
129 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule  para 8(1) & (2); and  Guide to Enactment of 
UNCITRAL Model Law para 124 and 25 
130 UNCITRAL Model Law art 2; see also Law Commission of New Zealand, Report 52: Cross-
Border Insolvency: Should New Zealand Adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency? (Report/Law Commission, Wellington 1999) xiii and xiv, from which such 
development in relation to public policy seem to have originated; and R Mason, ‘Implications of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law for Australian Cross-Border Insolvencies’ (1999) 8  Int’l Insolv Rev 
83, 88 
131 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule para 5; UNCITRAL Model Law art 3; and Guide 
to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law para 76 and 77 
132 Ibid; and text to n 30-32 in chapter 4 
133 Ibid; and text to n 30-32 in chapter 4. Based on the stipulations of the Guide to Enactment of 
UNCITRAL Model Law, it is important to note that there is nothing in the Bill that suggests that 
“…in order for article [5] to displace a provision of the national law, a sufficient link must exist 
between the international treaty concerned and the issue governed by the provision of the national 
law in question.” (emphasis added) 
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same way that local creditors are treated, including the right to commence and 
participate in a local insolvency proceeding.134 While the proposed law seeks to 
provide for exception to the application of non-discrimination principle in 
relation to application of priorities in distribution, it is silent on the establishment 
of a minimum level of fair treatment.135 The minimum requirement 
recommended in the Model Law is one that may provide that a foreign creditor 
must be treated in a distribution at least as well as a general, unsecured creditor, 
if a similarly situated local creditor would receive at least that treatment.136 
Rather, the Bill only provides that access of foreign creditors to a proceeding 
relating to insolvency ‘…does not affect the ranking of claims in a proceeding 
under [the proposed law] or the exclusion of foreign tax and social security 
claims from such a proceeding.’137 The rule governing ranking of claims 
proposed under the Bill is such that the priority of payment is first granted to a 
specified category of unsecured creditors, which includes administration claims, 
employment related claims, and tax claims, before it applies to other creditors 
starting with the secured ones.138 
 
The equality of treatment is reflected in the proposed requirement of having 
foreign creditors notified whenever notification to local creditors is required.139 
This is on an individual basis to known foreign creditors unless otherwise 
ordered by the court. The proposed law, as is the case for the Model Law, 
prescribes the specific information to be included in the notice. This includes 
information about the time and place for filing of claims and whether secured 
creditors need file claims as well as any other information required for local 
creditors or by order of the court.140 Such prescription as to notification is ideally 
                                                 
134 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) para 15 
135 UNCITRAL Model Law art 13(2) 
136 UNCITRAL Model Law art 13 (2); and JL Westbrook, ‘Multinational Enterprises in General 
Default: Chapter 15, the ALI Principles and the EU Insolvency Regulations’ (2002) 76 Am Bank 
LJ 1, 16 
137 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 13(2) 
138 Insolvency Bill clause 421,1st  Schedule para 1 
139 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 14; and Insolvency Bill 2010, Schedule 5  para 16 
140 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya), Schedule 5, para16(4); and UNCITRAL Model Law art 14 
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intended to facilitate the participation of foreign creditors in the local 
proceedings.141 
6.4.3.2.3 Recognition  
The Insolvency Bill adopts the procedure for recognition of foreign proceedings 
provided in the UNCITRAL Model Law.142 This procedure entails an application 
for obtaining local recognition filed locally by a foreign representative with 
relevant supporting documentation as a proof for existence of such a proceeding 
and appointment of the representative. The proposed presumption is that such 
documentation, if submitted in accordance with the law, must be deemed to be 
authentic. Of particular importance is that the application must identify all 
proceedings in respect of a debtor that are known to the foreign representative. 
Consistent with the Model Law, the proposed law seeks to make it mandatory for 
an application for recognition to be determined expeditiously.143 This is crucially 
critical in enabling ‘effective protection of the debtor’s local assets from 
dissipation and concealment.’144 The recognition and assistance that follow 
depend upon whether the foreign proceeding is the main proceeding, if it has 
commenced in the state where the debtor has its “centre of main interests”, or a 
foreign non-main proceeding, if it is based on the place where the debtor has an 
establishment.145 It is noteworthy that the proposed law seeks to allow and 
mandate international co-operation between courts to the maximum extent 
possible in cases involving proceedings based on the presence of assets.146 
According to the Bill such proceedings may still be commenced in Kenya after 
the recognition of foreign main proceedings if the debtor has assets in such 
                                                 
141 UNCITRAL Model Law art 14; and Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule para 16(4); 
and see also J Clift, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency- A Legislative 
Framework to facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2004) 12 Tul 
J Int’l & Comp L 307, 322 & 323 
142 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) Schedule 5 para 17; and UNCITRAL Model Law art 19 
143 Insolvency Bill 2010  5th Schedule para 19(3);  UNCITRAL Model Law art 17(3) 
144 See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency para 125 
145 Insolvency Bill 2010  5th Schedule, paras 4 & 19(2);  UNCITRAL Model Law arts 2(f), 17(2), 
and 20(1)(a) (b) & (c) and (2); and Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency paras 31, 72, 73 and 126  
146 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya), 5th Schedule, paras 27-29; and UNCITRAL Model Law art 25-
27; J Clift (n 141) 323-324 
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jurisdiction.147 It should be noted, however, that the effects of an insolvency 
proceeding commenced on the basis of the presence of assets only are normally 
restricted to the assets located in Kenya.148  
 
The basic principle that characterises the Bill with regard to relief (which is 
consistent with the Model Law) is that the recognition of foreign proceedings by 
the Kenyan court grants effects that are considered necessary for the conduct of 
cross-border insolvency subject to protection of interests of local creditors and 
other interested parties and conformity to public policy. 
6.4.3.2.4 Protection of Creditors 
The Bill explicitly provides for protection of creditors in a manner that is 
consistent with the provisions of the Model Law.149 As such, the court is required 
to satisfy itself that the interests of creditors, among others, are adequately 
protected, when granting or denying relief under the proposed law or modifying 
or terminating it.150 It has been contended that such provisions leave it to the 
discretion of the court whether to grant temporary relief upon an application for 
recognition or upon a decision to recognise a foreign proceeding.151  
 
Indeed, the protection of the creditors focuses, though not exclusively, on the 
local creditors.152 Local creditors concerns that may arise in cross-border 
insolvency cases, such as on issues related to turnover of assets to foreign 
representatives or other designated persons, may be addressed to the court which 
is required to be assured that the creditors’ interests as well as those of debtors 
and other stakeholders are adequately protected. For example, as is the case for 
the Model Law, the proposed law in Kenya is such that the court is entitled to 
ensure that interests of creditors in Kenya are protected when deciding whether 
or not to entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor's assets located in 
                                                 
147 Insolvency Bill 2010  5th Schedule para 30; and UNCITRAL Model Law art 28; and Guide to 
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency para 73 
148 Ibid 
149 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya)5th Schedule  para 22; and UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency art 22 
150 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule paras 21, 23 and 24 
151 J Clift (n 141)326 
152 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency para 35 
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Kenya to the foreign representative or another person designated by the Court.153 
Generally speaking, the proposed law seeks to empower the court to subject 
relief granted to conditions that it considers appropriate.154 
6.4.3.2.5 Communication, Co-ordination and Co-operation 
The Bill seeks to authorise and in fact make co-operation by any appropriate 
means and direct communication between the Kenyan court and foreign courts or 
foreign representatives mandatory. Such a requirement also applies at various 
levels between local insolvency administrators and foreign courts or foreign 
representatives.155 Of particular importance is the adoption of the express 
provision that the Kenyan court ‘…is entitled to communicate directly with, or to 
request information or assistance directly from, foreign Courts or foreign 
representatives.’156 This is seemingly a core element of the Bill with the object of 
enabling courts and insolvency administrators from Kenya and foreign 
jurisdictions to be efficient and achieve optimal results. The Bill suggests 
ways to co-operate which include communication of information; approval of 
agreements concerning the co-ordination of proceedings; and co-ordination of 
concurrent proceedings with respect to the same debtor.157 
6.4.3.2.6 Application of other Relevant Laws 
The Bill seeks to permit application of other laws in facilitating co-ordination 
and co-operation in cross-border insolvencies.158 Arguably, this provision will 
have the effect of enabling the Kenyan court to look beyond the Kenyan Model 
Law in the pursuit of providing assistance to foreign proceedings in respect of an 
insolvent company. The approaches to cross-border insolvency at common law 
may be applied to complement the proposed law as long as such application aims 
                                                 
153 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule para 23(2); UNCITRAL Model Law art 21(2) and 
Guide to enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law para 157 
154 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule para 24(2); UNCITRAL Model Law 21(2), 22(1), 
and 22(2); and Guide to enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law para 157 
155 Insolvency Bill 2010 5th Schedule Para 28; UNCITRAL Model Law arts 25-27; Guide to 
Enactment paras 173-177 
156 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule Para 28(1) 
157 Insolvency Bill 2010(Kenya) 5th Schedule para 29; and UNCITRAL Model Law art 27 
158 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) 5th Schedule para 9; and UNCITRAL Model Law art 7 
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‘…to provide additional assistance to a foreign representative…’159 or a 
‘…different… type of assistance’160 and not otherwise.  
 
Although the adoption of the Model Law is intended not to displace the laws that 
were already in place, it seems that the refusal of assistance or provision of any 
limited form of assistance might not be justified under this provision but perhaps 
other grounds that may be permitted by different provisions under the proposed 
law. As discussed below, it is this very provision that the application of relevant 
personal bankruptcy laws on cross-border insolvency co-operation could be 
based on. 
6.5 Applying the Relevant Bankruptcy Rules into Cross-Border 
Corporate Insolvency Proceedings  
As noted in the preceding parts of this chapter, the repealed company legislation 
in Tanzania had a provision that sought to apply bankruptcy rules in insolvency 
proceedings in respect of an insolvent company.161 The provision has been re-
enacted and reproduced verbatim as section 366 of the CA 2002 and in the same 
vein the Kenyan Insolvency Bill 2010 proposes to re-enact the provision under 
clause 420(2) &(2). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, similar provision is 
found in the Kenyan Companies Act,162 which is currently in the process of being 
repealed and replaced by a new Companies legislation. Essentially, such 
provisions read thus: 
In the winding up of an insolvent company, the same rules shall prevail 
and be observed with regard to the respective rights of secured and 
unsecured creditors and to debts provable and to the valuation of 
annuities and future and contingent liabilities as are in force for the 
time being under the law of bankruptcy with respect to the estates of 
persons adjudged bankrupt, and all persons who in any such case would 
be entitled to prove for and receive dividends out of the assets of the 
company may come in under the winding up and make such claims 
against the company as they respectively are entitled to by virtue of this 
section.163  
 
                                                 
159 Ibid; and Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law para 90 
160 Guide to Enactment of UNCITRA Model Law para 90 
161 Text to n 59 above 
162 Text to n 59 above 
163 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 366, whose marginal note is styled as ‘[a]pplication of 
bankruptcy law.’ Companies Act (Chapter 486 of Laws of Kenya) s 310; and Insolvency Bill 
2010 (Kenya) clause 420(2) & (3). The marginal note to such provisions reads as ‘application of 
bankruptcy rules in winding up of insolvent companies. 
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The argument that is advanced here is that the application of this provision 
requires an expansive and wide construction in determining the relevant rules in 
bankruptcy law and the extent to which they may be brought into use in 
insolvency proceedings in respect of an insolvent company. The underlying 
consideration is both historical and theoretical. It has been contended that the 
rules of personal bankruptcy have long had relatively more developed and clearer 
procedures for dealing with the insolvency of an individual than corporate 
insolvency.164  This was seemingly in response to the growing numbers of 
insolvencies of persons and partnerships affecting assets located in a number of 
commonwealth jurisdictions.165  
 
The origin and essence of the provision therefore was, it seems, to enable 
extension of such procedures as far as they were relevant to the circumstances 
pertaining to winding up proceedings in respect of an insolvent company under 
the provisions of the companies’ legislation. This would thus enable the insolvent 
company and the interested parties to benefit from the more developed and much 
clearer procedures as in force in the law of personal bankruptcy.  
 
As was judicially noted in the Cambridge Gas case,166 the rules of personal 
bankruptcy as developed in Britain and adopted in its colonial territories had long 
envisioned the universalist theory of personal bankruptcy and co-operation 
among courts in dealing with an insolvent person and rights of all persons 
interested in the process. Thus, principles and procedures had long been in place 
as regards co-operation of courts and fairness of treatment of creditors situated in 
different jurisdictions.167 Clearly, realisation of rights of secured and unsecured 
creditors, among other things, involves a judicial process dealing with the 
insolvent company. This would require the same treatment as accorded to 
individual insolvency.  
 
                                                 
164 L Hoffmann  (n 1) 2510; and PJ Omar, ‘Cross-Border Jurisdiction and Assistance in 
Insolvency: The Position in Malaysia and Singapore’ (2008) 1 PER 2, 33 
165 L Hoffmann (n 1) 2510; and PJ Omar (n 164) 33 
166 Cambridge Gas case (n 84) para 17; and L Hoffmann  (n 1) 2511   
167 See Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 HB1 131n 
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Indeed, the provisions governing the application of rules of bankruptcy to 
corporate insolvency proceedings are explicit that they are only applicable to 
winding up of an insolvent company. It would therefore seem that the stipulation 
that ‘…the same rules shall prevail…. as are in force for the time being under the 
law of bankruptcy...’168 includes the procedural rules on the cross-border co-
operation among countries (for example aiding of a reciprocating country and 
court in insolvency proceedings).169 This seems to have merit since one could 
read into the co-operation provisions an implicit desire to assist in ensuring 
proceedings were carried out efficiently with a view to seeing the greatest return 
to creditors.170 This argument is strongly reinforced by the fact that the co-
operation provisions descended from the bankruptcy procedural concerns.171 
6.5.1 A Glimpse at the Cross-Border Bankruptcy Rules  
Apart from the common law conflict rules by which foreign insolvency 
proceedings are recognised, assisted and managed; the law of personal 
bankruptcy in Tanzania and Kenya provides in detail the manner in which co-
operation in cross-border insolvency involving either of these countries with a 
reciprocating country or countries may be undertaken to help and not to hinder 
the administration of the insolvent debtor.172  
 
The respective Tanzanian and Kenyan laws provide the court that has jurisdiction 
in insolvency or bankruptcy matters a duty, upon request from another court, to 
provide assistance and make any order which could be made in bankruptcy 
proceedings in its own jurisdiction or in the jurisdiction of the requesting 
country. One of the key provisions under such bankruptcy legislation is to the 
effect that: 
                                                 
168 Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 366 
169 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) ss 115, 150-163 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules G.N. No. 38 
of 1932(Tanzania); and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) ss 115, 151-164 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) 
Rules Cap 30 (1948), Sub Leg LN 141/1962 (Kenya) 
170 Statement by PJ Omar (Personal email correspondence 16 September 2010).Views and 
contributions of PJ Omar on this aspect and his opinion that extending such provision to the co-
operation procedure might amount to reading the provision too far, although the issue seems to be 
open, is highly acknowledged.  
171 Ibid 
172 Official Receiver v Messrs. Savadia & Co 18 EACA 119 (1951) 
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The court…and all the officers thereof shall in all matters of 
bankruptcy, act in aid of every reciprocating court elsewhere having 
jurisdiction in bankruptcy or insolvency, and an order of the court 
seeking aid, with a request to this court shall be deemed sufficient to 
enable this court to exercise, in regard to the matters directed by the 
order, such jurisdiction as either the court which made the request, or 
this court could exercise in regard to similar matters within their 
respective jurisdiction, save that to enable the official receiver of the 
United Republic to act as the agent of an officer of a reciprocating court 
or to enable an officer of this court to seek the aid of an official receiver 
of a reciprocating court in the manner provided in part IX of this Act it 
shall not be necessary for this court or any reciprocating court to make 
any order or send any request under this section.173  
 
Notably, the application of the relevant statutory provision of the Bankruptcy 
legislation along with the relevant Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules (“BRR”)174 is 
hinged on reciprocity. One key criterion for the grant of reciprocity in 
accordance with the respective laws for Tanzania and Kenya is the similarity of 
the relevant laws in terms of their effect in the reciprocating countries.175 In the 
legislation for both Tanzania and Kenya, the determination of such similarity is 
the exclusive province of the Minister responsible for justice.176 This marks a 
departure from the original provision contained in the English Bankruptcy Act 
1914 (on which the Tanzanian and Kenyan provisions are based) which sought to 
‘co-ordinate proceedings and enable the courts within the Commonwealth to 
request other courts to assist in the management of bankruptcy proceedings 
within their own jurisdictions.’177  
 
                                                 
173 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 115. The marginal note to this provision reads: ‘court to be 
auxiliary to other reciprocating courts.’ Similar provision is found in Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 
115 whose marginal note reads: ‘court to be auxiliary to other Commonwealth courts.’ Notably, 
the Kenyan provision instead of reading “…act in aid of every reciprocating court elsewhere 
having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or insolvency…”, it reads that “…act in aid of and be auxiliary 
to every Commonwealth court elsewhere having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or insolvency….” 
174 Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules G.N. No. 38 of 1932 (Tanzania); and Bankruptcy 
(Reciprocity) Rules Cap 30 (1948), Sub Leg LN 141/1962 (Kenya) 
175 See Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 150; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 151 
176 Ibid 
177 PJ Omar (n 164) 35. Section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 provided that: ‘The High Court, 
the county courts, the courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy in Scotland and Ireland, and every 
British court elsewhere having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or insolvency, and the officers of those 
courts respectively, shall severally act in aid of and be auxiliary to each other in all matters of 
bankruptcy, and an order of the court seeking aid, with a request to another of the said courts, 
shall be deemed sufficient to enable the latter court to exercise, in regard to the matters directed 
by the order, such jurisdiction as either the court which made the request or the court to which the 
request is made, could exercise in regard to similar matters within their respective jurisdictions. 
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The implication of the reciprocity requirement is that it provides mandatory 
obligations to the relevant courts of Tanzania and Kenya to render assistance 
within the framework of the statutory provisions only to reciprocating 
jurisdictions that are party to such reciprocal co-operation arrangement. One 
condition is that a debtor must have a property situated in a reciprocating 
jurisdiction in order that such an arrangement can be invoked.178  
 
According to the respective laws for Tanzania or Kenya, an office holder for the  
bankruptcy proceedings against a debtor having property in a reciprocating 
country is empowered to appoint an agent from the reciprocating country 
utilising the relevant law and procedure obtaining in such reciprocating 
country.179 The agent may carry out such duties as the office holder may 
determine and delegate.180 The duties may include the power to admit or reject 
all proofs of debts filed with him in accordance with the relevant laws. The 
office-holder may alternatively choose not to appoint an agent and instead 
proceed directly, after making requisite publication of relevant orders, to exercise 
his powers in the reciprocating country over the administration of the property of 
the debtor situate in such reciprocating country.181 In view of rule 17 of the BRR 
in both Tanzania and Kenya the office holder ‘shall not take any steps to seize, 
recover or realise any property of the debtor or bankrupt situate in such 
reciprocating country until he has caused a notice of the interim or receiving 
order or order of adjudication, as the case may be, made by the court  to be 
published in the reciprocating country in the manner prescribed for the 
publication of notices in bankruptcy by the law of that country and in addition 
                                                 
178 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 151 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules GN No. 38 of 1932, r 7; 
and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 152 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules Cap 30 (1948), Sub Leg 
LN 141/1962 (Kenya) r 7 
179 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 162 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules G.N. No. 38 of 1932 rr 
12-18; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 163 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules Cap 30 (1948), 
Sub Leg LN 141/1962 (Kenya) rr 12-18 
180 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 162 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity ) Rules 1932 (Tanzania) rr 12-
15; bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 163 and Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules Cap 30 (1948), Sub Leg 
LN 141/1962 (Kenya) rr 12-15 
181 Rule 17 of the Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules G.N. No. 38 of 1932 
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has filed with the Registrar of the court in the reciprocating country a sealed copy 
of such order.’182  
 
In addition to the above, it has judicially been held that the office holder has 
discretion to determine the appropriate procedure to follow when it appears to 
him that the debtor has property in other reciprocating countries.183 However, the 
law in both Tanzania and Kenya mandates the respective courts to act on their 
own initiative if it appears that bankruptcy proceedings against a debtor having 
property in the local jurisdiction, have been commenced in a reciprocating 
country; and an appropriate office-holder in respect of such proceedings and 
administration of the debtor’s estate has been duly appointed. In this respect, the 
court is empowered to make such orders as may be seen to be appropriate to 
protect the debtor’s property situated in a local jurisdiction, the interests of 
creditors and other interested parties.184 Undoubtedly, this provision creates a 
basis and need for the court –to-court communication which may consequently 
expose the court to proceedings opened in one country against a debtor that has 
property in a local court’s jurisdiction.  
 
Conversely, the law in both Tanzania and Kenya provides for an appointment of 
a local official receiver as an agent of the foreign office-holder in foreign 
insolvency proceedings commenced in a reciprocating country against a debtor 
who has property in the local jurisdiction of the court.185 This entails having the 
agent served with the proceedings’ documents, including a list of known 
creditors and the nature and value of the debtor’s property in the local 
jurisdiction.186 It also involves publication of the appointment in a government 
                                                 
182 Rule 17 of Bankruptcy (Reciprocity) Rules G.N. No. 38 of 1932. The gist of the publication is 
seemingly to afford transparency and openness. 
183 IR Macneil (n 25) ; and Official Receiver v Messrs. Savadia & Co 18 EACA 119 (1951) 
where the then East Africa Court of Appeal stated: ‘The purpose of these reciprocal provisions is 
to help and not to hinder the administration of the bankrupt’s estate and it is clearly within the 
discretion of the official receiver or trustee to bring his action in such territory as he thinks most 
convenient and most likely to be productive of benefit to the administration.’ 
184 Section 158 of the Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 158 read together with ss 11 and 26; 
Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 159 read together with ss 11 and 26 
185 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 154; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 155 
186 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 155; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 156 
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gazette and filing of the requisite documents with the high court.187 While the 
appointment of the agent is in accordance with relevant local law, the 
administration of the bankruptcy estate in the local jurisdiction of Tanzania and 
Kenya is effected in accordance with the laws of the reciprocating country. This 
includes proof of debts and distribution of dividends.188 The agent is among other 
things duty bound to facilitate a local inspection by creditors and proof of debts. 
The proceeds realised from the local property of the debtor have to be remitted to 
the officeholder in the foreign proceedings having jurisdiction in the bankruptcy 
estate. In fact, insolvency proceedings commenced in a foreign reciprocating 
country are deemed to have the same effect as if they were commenced in a 
competent local court. Similarly, the debtor and his creditors are deemed to be in 
the same position and have the same rights and privileges, and are subject to the 
same disqualifications, restrictions, obligations and liabilities in every respect as 
if the proceedings had been commenced in the local jurisdiction.189  
 
The law anticipates the occurrence of concurrent insolvency proceedings which 
are defined as ‘…proceedings instituted concurrently against the same debtor in 
any two or more reciprocating countries, one of which may or may not be [the 
local jurisdiction].’190 The procedure for dealing with the concurrent proceedings 
is as follows.191 Firstly, the country where the proceedings were first 
commenced, in terms of having issued the adjudication order earlier than any 
other country, is regarded as having jurisdiction in managing the proceedings 
over the estate of the debtor and administering the property of the debtor 
wherever situated.192 Secondly, where there is no adjudication order made or in 
the event of same dates on which such orders were issued, the jurisdiction and as 
such the property of the debtor will vest in the reciprocating country which first 
issued the receiving order.193  
                                                 
187 Ibid 
188 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) ss 156 and 157; and Bankruptcy Act(Kenya) ss 157 and 158 
189 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 151; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 152 
190 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(1); and  Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 162 (1)  
191 See the entire provisions in Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 
162 for the relevant procedure for dealing with concurrent proceedings. 
192 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(2) ; and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 162(2)  
193 Ibid 
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Thirdly, the proceedings commenced against the debtor in the local jurisdiction 
will, if the jurisdiction vests in a reciprocating court have to be rescinded, 
annulled or dismissed as the court may deem appropriate.194 This is done in order 
to give way for the proceedings in the reciprocating country to administer the 
estate in all the reciprocating countries. And fourthly, in exceptional 
circumstances, the proceedings in a local jurisdiction may, upon proper 
application by creditors and upon the court’s inquiry, be continued and a special 
receiver or trustee in the local jurisdiction or other reciprocating country 
administers the debtor’s property situated in the local jurisdiction.195 This is 
particularly so where it has been shown that a majority of the creditors in number 
and value are resident in the respective local jurisdiction or another reciprocating 
country and the circumstances pertaining to the property suggest that it is more 
convenient to have the administration pursued in the local jurisdiction or another 
reciprocating country. The relevant provision reads thus: 
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section in any case where 
concurrent bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted in [the local 
jurisidiction] the court may, after such inquiry and reference to such 
reciprocating courts as it deems fit, order that the property of the debtor 
situated in the [local jurisdiction] shall vest in or be administered by a 
trustee or receiver in the local jurisdiction or in some reciprocating 
country other than that [of the jurisdiction where the proceedings were 
first commenced as ]determined under the provisions of subsection (2) 
hereof if, upon an application by the official receiver or any creditor or 
other person interested, it appears that a majority of the creditors in 
number and value are resident in the [local jurisdiction] or such other 
reciprocating country, and that from the situation of the property of the 
debtor or bankrupt or other causes his estate and effects may be more 
conveniently administered, managed and distributed in [the local 
jurisdiction] or such other reciprocating country.196 
 
However, it seems that notwithstanding continuance of the proceedings in 
respect of the property situated in the local jurisdiction, such proceedings, which 
could be described as secondary,197 still have to be undertaken in a manner that 
recognises the interests of other creditors and interested parties in the other 
                                                 
194 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(3) ; and Bankruptcy Act  (Kenya) s 162(3)  
195 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(4); and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 162 (4) 
196 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(4); and  Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 162(4) 
197 It could perhaps be argued that this is to some extent analogous to secondary proceedings 
opened where the debtor has an establishment under the EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings. 
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reciprocating countries.198 To be sure, this procedure is mandated by the quest for 
efficiency and effectiveness in administering, managing and distributing the 
property of the debtor.   
 
With the above account in mind, it is notable that the cross-border insolvency 
regime that is founded in the bankruptcy legislation and the BRR made under it, 
is characterised by the following key features which in a way bring it very close 
to the universality theory of cross-border insolvency. This is notwithstanding that 
it is not applicable to all cases of cross-border insolvency of a debtor that involve 
Tanzania and Kenya. Firstly, the regime as far as is applicable to reciprocating 
countries is controlled by the law of the country that is deemed to have 
jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of the debtor. It provides for 
automatic recognition and enforcement of proceedings commenced in a foreign 
country which is a reciprocating jurisdiction under the law. Notably, this is one 
principal element of the pure universalism which requires the law of the home 
country to control all administration of the assets of the debtor irrespective of 
their location. Secondly, the regime provides for remittance of the proceeds 
realised from the administration of the property in other jurisdictions (other than 
one having overall jurisdiction over the estate of the debtor) to the reciprocating 
jurisdiction having the overall and controlling jurisdiction over administration of 
the property of the debtor. Indeed, this is exactly what the advocates of 
universalism argue for. Thirdly, the regime vests controlling jurisdiction in one 
of the reciprocating countries in which the proceedings were first commenced. It 
will be noted that under universalism the principle is that one country must have 
overall and controlling jurisdiction over the other countries. And fourthly, the 
regime provides a framework for communication between official receivers in a 
bid to facilitate efficiency in the administration of the insolvency estate. The only 
notable difference is that while universalism advocates for the ‘home country’199 
of the debtor as a country having jurisdiction in insolvency proceedings against 
                                                 
198 Official Receiver v Messrs. Savadia & Co 18 EACA 119 (1951) 
199 According to the existing international insolvency benchmarks, the home country of an 
insolvent company could be its ‘centre of main interests’ (“COMI”) and not necessarily its place 
of domicile.  
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the debtor, this law as applies in Tanzania and Kenya vests jurisdiction in the 
country where the proceedings were first commenced. The other possible 
difference, which may render the regime to be a sort of modified universalism, is 
the fact that it provides for the possibility of concurrent proceedings which are 
not categorised as main and secondary proceedings though such categorisation 
seems to be envisaged in the regime.  
 
So far, it is only Kenya, Uganda and Malawi that are reciprocating countries for 
Tanzania,200 and only Tanzania and Uganda that are reciprocating countries for 
Kenya. This has been the status since the colonial days when the law was 
originally enacted and brought into force before being inherited at independence 
and recently renamed in Tanzania  as the Bankruptcy Act (as opposed to 
Bankruptcy Ordinance). It must also be stressed that the extension of the 
application of the cross-border insolvency rules under the bankruptcy legislation 
to apply to the whole of East Africa was an integral part of the overall early 
British colonial initiative (dating back to early 20th century) aiming at 
establishing or improving the overall commercial legal framework in East Africa. 
The initiative laid the basis for the East African co-operation, firstly as a customs 
union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, which the then Tanganyika (now 
Mainland Tanzania) joined in 1927, the East African High Commission (1948–
1961), the East African Common Services Organisation (1961–1967) and the 
East African Community (1967–1977). 
6.5.2 Impact of the Cross-Border Bankruptcy Rules for Cross-Border 
Corporate Insolvency Regulation  
A notable general impact of the application of rules of personal bankruptcy law 
to cross-border corporate insolvency and in particular the cross-border co-
operation procedure is to pull even further the existing law in Tanzania and 
Kenya towards a universalist approach. This is particularly the case if the 
                                                 
200 The existence of the reciprocal arrangements in bankruptcy proceedings between Tanzania, 
Kenya  
and Uganda can be questioned given the collapse of the East Africa Community in 1977. 
However, this argument is weak unless it is established that such arrangement had repealed in the 
respective countries. It is to be noted that Tanzania recently changed the legislation from 
Bankruptcy ordinance to Bankruptcy Act.  In so doing, it did not repeal rules and regulations that 
were made under the legislation. 
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countries under study use the opportunity and conclude as many reciprocal co-
operation arrangements with other countries as possible, which is not likely on 
account of the following. Firstly, the law has long been forgotten, if not 
abandoned in the statute book, to the extent that in some circles it is being argued 
that the co-operation arrangements concluded thus far had long ceased to 
function. And secondly, as is shown subsequently, the current drive for reform 
has the potential of phasing this law out of operation and existence. 
 
Using the corporate insolvency provisions under the CA 2002 as an illustration 
of the potential impact, it is important at the outset to reiterate that the law has it 
that an insolvent company incorporated outside Tanzania may be wound up in 
Tanzania if it has been carrying on business in Tanzania and it is being wound up 
in its place of incorporation or in any other country where it has established a 
place of business.201 Proceedings for the winding up of such a company may be 
commenced by the official receiver or any of the authorised persons under the 
provisions of section 281(d) of the CA 2002. It is not however clear if such 
authorised persons include creditors, administrators and the company itself which 
as a general rule they are entitled to petition for winding up.  
 
The implication of extending the rules of the law of personal bankruptcy as 
above discussed would have the following effect whose scope would largely rest 
on the extent of implementation of the reciprocity requirement. Accordingly, the 
Bankruptcy Act and BRR will only apply where there is existing reciprocal 
arrangement between Tanzania and a foreign jurisdiction;202 otherwise the 
procedure available under the CA 2002 will prevail and govern the proceeding. 
Thus a foreign office-holder may make an application to require a locally 
appointed office-holder or official receiver to act as his agent in Tanzania for the 
purposes of dealing with the affairs of the company in Tanzania as well as its 
assets. It appears that since the law empowers any authorised person to institute 
proceedings against such a company, an office-holder appointed in such 
proceedings would be competent, upon proper application and compliance with 
                                                 
201 Text to n 66 above 
202 Text to n 196 above 
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the rules as detailed in the law of personal bankruptcy to act as an agent of the 
office-holder appointed in a foreign proceeding in the company’s home country 
or in any other country where the company has established place of business.  
 
The effect of this is that the office-holder in Tanzania will have to cooperate with 
the foreign office-holder to administer the property of the company in Tanzania. 
In terms of the bankruptcy legislation and rules made thereunder, this will 
include to administer proof of debts for onward transmission to the foreign office 
holder, facilitate creditors’ inspections by inter alia ensuring ease access of 
relevant information to creditors in Tanzania, such as debtors’ statements of 
affairs and participation in creditors’ committees meetings, remittances of the 
proceeds from property situated in Tanzania to the foreign office-holder, and the 
consequent distribution of dividends to creditors. Such roles will be undertaken 
using the law of the country where the proceedings were commenced.  
 
The criterion that will be used to determine which foreign proceedings should 
prevail over the others is the first proceeding to be commenced.203 This seems to 
be particularly critical given that the CA 2002 recognises proceedings 
commenced not only in the home country of the company but also in any other 
country where the foreign company has established a place of business. This has 
in fact potentially opened the door for controversy including forum shopping, 
though it has done away with the problem of determining the centre of main 
interests of the company.  
 
According to the rules governing concurrent proceedings as contained in the 
bankruptcy legislation and the BRR, the court in Tanzania may, upon an 
application by creditors, official receiver or other interested parties, make an 
inquiry as to the convenience of deferring to the foreign proceedings in the 
foreign jurisdiction.204 The court will have to consider the creditors in terms of 
their number and value, nature of the property of the company within Tanzania 
and other factors to determine whether to continue the concurrent proceedings in 
                                                 
203 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(2) &(3) 
204 Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(4) ; and  Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 162(4)  
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Tanzania. As it will be recalled from the preceding discussion, this creates a very 
wide discretion for the court. It is to be noted that in the relevant provision the 
list of the factors that the court may have regard to is not exhaustive. 
 
More or less similar impact will happen in Kenya as a result of the application of 
such co-operation procedures which are based on reciprocity. For example, a 
domestic company being wound up in Kenya on grounds of insolvency may have 
property in another jurisdiction. Accordingly, it might be in the interests of 
creditors and other interested parties to have such property administered along 
with those which are situated in Kenya by the same officeholder appointed by the 
Kenyan court. Thus, if the other country in which the company has property is a 
reciprocating country to Kenya, for example Tanzania or Uganda, it will mean 
that, by virtue of the rules of the law of personal bankruptcy in Kenya, the 
officeholder will have the right to appoint an agent in the reciprocating country 
to assist in administering the property situated in such jurisdiction or the office-
holder appointed in Kenya may apply directly to the courts of the reciprocating 
jurisdictions.  The reverse of this scenario is also true. 205 
 
The dependence on reciprocity may be viewed as placing significant limitation 
on the application of these rules to cross-border corporate insolvency 
proceedings. Since it is only Kenya, Uganda and Malawi that are reciprocating 
countries to Tanzania and only Uganda and Tanzania are reciprocating countries 
to Kenya, it means that the regime established by the Bankruptcy legislation and 
the BRR may have potentially a very limited operation and effect.  It means that 
the common law will continue to apply in proceedings involving Tanzania and 
non-reciprocating countries. Nevertheless, the application of these rules 
effectively pulls the legal framework in Tanzania and Kenya for dealing with 
cross-border insolvency towards universalism and away from a territorialism 
stance.  Indeed, it offers an important basis from which any reform measure may 
be considered and pursued. 
                                                 
205 Bankruptcy Act ( Kenya) s 115; and Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 115 
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6.5.3 Effect of the Contemplated Kenyan Reform on the Future of Cross-
Border Insolvency Regulation 
It is notable that although the Insolvency Bill 2010 seeks to repeal and replace 
Kenya’s Bankruptcy Act and insolvency provisions under the current Kenyan 
Companies Act (which is also in the process for repeal), it provides that any 
regulation or other instrument made or issued and given effect under such laws 
will continue to have effect as if such regulation or other instrument were made 
or issued under the proposed insolvency law.206 This means that the BRR, made 
under the Bankruptcy Act (proposed for repeal by the Insolvency Bill 2010), 
which regulates the reciprocal cross-border co-operation in matters of insolvency 
would under transition provisions continue to be operational notwithstanding the 
repeal of the principal legislation.  
 
The phrase ‘other instrument’ used in the draft Bill is seemingly intended to 
accommodate things like declarations and forms.207 It is doubtful if such ‘rules 
and other instrument’ can be applied as such without inconsistencies and tensions 
given that the basis, namely the Bankruptcy Act, upon which they were founded 
would no longer be in existence.208 It would have, perhaps, been appropriate for 
the Bill to provide that such regulations and instrument would apply in so far as 
is practical and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Insolvency Bill 
2010. There is room for arguing that the adoption of the Model Law would have 
the effect of rendering the reciprocal arrangement reflected under the BRR as an 
exception to the adopted Model Law.209 This would mean that the adopted 
version of the Model Law will apply to the countries that are parties to the 
arrangement (which include Tanzania and Uganda) only to the extent that does 
not affect the additional assistance available under the reciprocal co-operation 
arrangement. 
                                                 
206 Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) clause 466(1) 
207 The Bankruptcy legislation in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda is rich in statutory documents 
designed for use in facilitating reciprocal co-operation among contracting member states. 
208 Notably, the Insolvency Bill 2010(Kenya) does not seek to re-enact the provisions of 
Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) ss 115,151-164) on the basis of which the BRR was made. However 
Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) clause 420(2) seeks to re-enact the provisions that apply relevant 
rules of personal bankruptcy to corporate insolvency.  
209 Text to n 138 above 
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6.6 State Owned Enterprises and the Treatment of Cross-Border 
Insolvency Aspects with Reference to Tanzania  
Notably, the law that has been discussed so far, especially so in Tanzania, has 
hardly been applicable to SOEs. Indeed, until recently, most SSA countries had 
maintained large and dominant public sector characterised by SOEs.210 Indeed, 
Tanzania was among such countries and could accordingly be discussed as a 
representative case to take stock of what was, and is, the implication in SSA of 
the maintenance of SOEs for cross-border insolvency regulation.  
 
While the Tanzanian government had established many SOEs, which used to 
obtain loans from inter alia international organisations through bilateral 
arrangement with the government as the main party and guarantor, the legislation 
lacked a tailor made provision stipulating how insolvency proceedings involving 
a SOE could be commenced and conducted.211 Conversely, the executive, 
through the president and in certain cases responsible Ministers, was and still is 
empowered to establish, dissolve or reorganise a SOE as it deemed fit and 
proper.212 This meant that it was and is still not clear in terms of procedure as to 
how a foreign creditor could proceed against a SOE that failed to settle its 
outstanding debts.  
 
Likewise, there were glaringly no provisions in other pieces of legislation under 
which other SOEs were established which were explicitly intended to provide 
procedures for dealing with insolvent state owned enterprises and their attendant 
cross-border insolvency aspects.213 It is indeed not surprising that, even the 
corporate insolvency provisions under the companies legislation that could 
appropriately be applied in the event of the insolvency of a SOE incorporated 
under such legislation were not brought into force to deal with affairs of the 
insolvent public enterprises. Ideally, this experience seems to reflect what has 
hitherto been described by Harmer as:  
                                                 
210 See generally, J Nellis (n 7); and B Mihyo (n 23) 
211 BS Masoud, ‘Corporate Insolvency Law and Public Enterprises: A Historical Perspective’ 
[2005] Tanzania Lawyer 23-36 
212 See for instance Public Corporations Act 1992 (Tanzania) s 4, 50 and 57A 
213 BS Masoud (n 211) 
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…..a strongly held view that a state enterprise, no matter how 
constructed or administered, is but an agency or branch of the state. 
Therefore, under this view, the state would be obligated to ensure that 
all the debts and liabilities of a state enterprise are met in full. Hence, a 
state enterprise could not, and should not, become bankrupt. Its 
existence might be terminated by the state, for whatever reason, but the 
state must meet its outstanding obligations. Accordingly, the possibility 
of bankruptcy for a state enterprise should not even be remotely 
suggested.214 
 
The legal framework which was put in place to deal with insolvent SOEs during 
the privatisation of such enterprises clearly reflected the theory that such 
enterprises were regarded as agencies or branches of the state and therefore 
entitled to enjoy the guarantee of the state as far as loans repayment was 
concerned.215 The clearly set procedures for privatisation of financially distressed 
state owned enterprises which included liquidation and restructuring did not 
clearly envisage cross-border issues.216 The procedures allowed the body (i.e the 
Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (“PSRC”)) entrusted with 
such functions and designated as an official receiver for such enterprises 
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act,217 to unilaterally write off, reschedule the 
payment of and suspend the accumulation of interest on any debt of a private 
creditor, another state owned enterprise or the government.218  
 
Similarly, co-operation in resolving cross-border insolvency issues was and still 
is not envisaged under the Tanzanian SOE legal regime.219 While the executive 
has all along been vested with powers to make orders and rules for regulation of 
the affairs of such enterprise, no such orders or rules have ever been made for 
regulation of either domestic or cross-border insolvency related issues involving 
SOEs.220 However, statutory guidelines regarding transfers of employees and 
                                                 
214 RW Harmer (n 10) 2574-2575 
215 See Public Corporation Act 1992 (Tanzania) s 51(6) as amended severally and in particular by 
Public Corporation (Amendment) Act 1993 (Tanzania) 
216 Public Corporations (Amendment) Act 1993 (Tanzania) s 43 
217 The effect of making the PSRC an official receiver in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 
(Tanzania) was to make the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act pertaining to official receivership 
part of the Laws regulating privatisation in Tanzania. 
218 Public Corporation (Amendment) Act 1993 (Tanzania) s 43 
219 Public Corporation Act 1992(Tanzania) ss 41and 43 
220 BS Masoud (n  211); AT Nguluma (n 17) 177 
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liabilities to another enterprise in the event of one enterprise ceasing to exist or a 
reorganisation have to some extent been provided.221  
 
There were no direct mentions of foreign creditors and the manner in which their 
interests were to be addressed and treated. It is safe to say that any cross-border 
issues concerning the insolvency of such state owned enterprises would 
necessarily ensure direct involvement of the state in so far as settlement of claims 
is concerned. In light of the fact that the commission responsible for the 
restructuring and privatisation of the enterprises was the official receiver of the 
financially distressed enterprises pursuant to the bankruptcy legislation, it might 
be argued that the provisions of such legislation and the powers, duties and 
responsibility of such an official receiver would necessarily include the roles that 
the receiver is entitled to play in relation to cross-border bankruptcy issues.   
 
This obscure state of affairs with regard to the handling of cross-border 
insolvency problems involving SOEs still persists at least in theory, though in 
practical terms the problem has hardly been felt. This is true in view of the fact 
that the existing legislation still lacks clear provisions on the treatment of cross-
border insolvency issues as they relate to the existing SOEs in the event of 
becoming insolvent. It is also not clear as to whether the relevant provisions 
under the CA 2002 could equally apply. Perhaps it is now high time that this 
vacuum was addressed given that privatisation of most of the SOEs has not only 
enlarged the private sector but also given way to a situation where a SOE can be 
owned by the government as the majority or minority shareholder and the private 
foreign investor as a joint shareholder.222 This corresponds with what has been 
happening in many jurisdictions in the developing world, as is the case with 
China, which had an equally huge sector of SOEs.223 
                                                 
221 Public Corporations Act 1992 (Tanzania) ss 50 and 59 
222 Public Corporation Act 1992(Tanzania) ss 3 and 5. In relation to the position in Kenya, see n 
12 above, where it is noted that Privatisation Act (Kenya) s 29 provides that both Kenyan and 
non-Kenyan are eligible to participate in privatisation of SOEs.  
223 RW Harmer (n 10); and R Parry and H Zhang (n 24) 113 
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6.7 Cross-Border Insolvency Treatment in SSA Regional Groupings with 
Special Reference to Tanzania and Kenya 
A predictable and certain arrangement for dealing with instances of cross-border 
insolvency has traditionally been used as one of the means of enhancing or 
addressing the consequences that would arise from economic co-operation 
among different countries. The regional groupings arrangements in SSA lack an 
institutionalised framework for resolution of cross-border insolvency within the 
context of the respective regional groupings. The OHADA, as noted in the 
previous chapter, is perhaps the exception.224 Notably, the presence of many 
regional groupings for which SSA countries are members and which overlap one 
another presents a potential challenge in addressing cross-border insolvency and 
crafting a workable and appropriate framework within the context of the regional 
arrangements.  
6.7.1 The East African Community as an Example of the General State of 
Cross-Border Insolvency Treatment in SSA Regional Groupings 
Apart from the arrangement for reciprocal co-operation in cross-border 
bankruptcy between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (“BRR”), which traces its 
existence from the colonial period, the revived East Africa community225 lacks a 
common arrangement explicitly set for securing co-operation and co-ordination 
in cross-border insolvency matters, just as it unambiguously provides for co-
operation in statistics, intellectual property rights, industrial development and 
agriculture and food security.226 Whereas the BRR arrangements do not cover 
                                                 
224 Text to n 173 in chapter 4 
225 Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community (“EAC”) 1999.  EAC consists of 
Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The history of co-operation in East Africa dates 
back to the early 20th century, including the customs union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, 
which the then Tanganyika (now Tanzania Mainland) joined in 1927, the East African High 
Commission (1948–1961), the East African Common Services Organisation (1961–1967) and the 
East African Community (1967–1977). 
226 See Protocol on Establishment of the East African Community Common Market arts 41-45.  
Notably, art 29 of the Protocol provides that: “1.The Partner States undertake to protect cross 
border investments and returns of investors of other Partner States within their territories.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Partner States shall ensure:  
(a) protection and security of cross border investments of investors of other Partner States;  
(b) non- discrimination of the investors of the other Partner States, by according, to these 
investors treatment no less favourable than that accorded in like circumstances to the nationals of 
that Partner State or to third parties;  
(c) that in case of expropriation, any measures taken are for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, 
and in accordance with due process of law, accompanied by prompt payment of reasonable and 
effective compensation.  
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Rwanda and Burundi, the on-going insolvency law reform trend is potentially 
phasing such a reciprocal co-operation arrangement out.  
 
Member countries have within the context of the East Africa community 
harmonisation of commercial law strategy been urged to reform their respective 
insolvency law systems which have recently been identified as among ‘such 
commercial laws that require harmonisation for purposes of supporting the [East 
Africa] common market.’227 Other laws include, company laws, partnerships 
laws, and business registration laws. Indeed, harmonised insolvency systems 
have long been seen as one way towards attaining universalism in cross-border 
insolvency law.228 Apart from the obvious emphasis on the harmonisation of 
commercial law, there are no common best practices and priorities set forth or 
agreed to inform and guide the harmonisation process. This situation is likely to 
affect the manner in which the reform to achieve harmonisation is undertaken. It 
is perhaps not surprising that the undertaking has been effected without 
consistency in form, emphasis, thrust and substance.229 While Kenya was 
                                                                                                                                    
3. The Partner States shall within two years after coming into force of this Protocol take measures 
to secure the protection of cross border investments within the Community.”  
227 The commencement of the common market in East Africa Community in which Tanzania and 
Kenya are member states means that both natural and legal persons have the right to establish 
themselves in any part of the community. This effectively means that since not all persons will be 
or are always successful in their business undertakings, the question of such persons becoming 
insolvents and subjected to insolvency proceedings cannot be underestimated. This is also true 
for foreign investments that are encouraged and attracted to take advantage of investment 
opportunities within the East Africa community context.  EAC, ‘Council Chairperson Assures 
Community on Ratification of Common Market Protocol’ Press Release April 2010 < 
http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=226:ratification-of-
common-market-protocol&catid=48:eac-latest&Itemid=69 > accessed  1 September 2010 
228 JL Westbrook (n 48) 468, contending that one of ‘[t]he…prerequisite to obtaining the benefits 
of universalism is general similarity of laws. Similar laws about distributions, avoidance, and the 
like are not in principle necessary to the acceptance of universalism, but in practice similarity is 
very important.’ 
229 The Consultancy project on Harmonisation of the Partner States’ Commercial Laws 
undertaken by Eversheds and reported to have commenced in October 2009 is seemingly centred 
at addressing such concerns and facilitating the harmonisation process. See East Africa 
Community Secretariat, ‘Approximation of National Laws in the EAC Context: Harmonisation of 
Commercial Laws in Progress in the Region’ Press Prelease (Nairobi 18 February 2010) < 
http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eacnews/377-meeting-on-approximation-of-national-laws-
nairobi.html  > accessed 19 September 2011; and Eversheds, ‘Eversheds Wins East Africa 
Community Institutional Reform Appointment’   < 
https://www.eversheds.com/uk/home/articles/index1.page?ArticleID=templatedata%5CEvershed
s%5Carticles%5Cdata%5Cen%5CFrench+newsletter%5Cen_Eversheds_wins_EAC_BM_03120
9 > accessed 01September 2010. According to the Co-Head of the Eversheds’ Africa group, their 
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working towards reform of its law relating to companies, insolvency, 
partnerships, marriage, matrimonial property, domestic violence, elections and 
reviewing laws on succession, evidence and land disputes; Tanzania was 
reported to be pursuing projects seeking to review a number of laws relating to 
civil procedure, agriculture, pastoralism, and a law establishing the Law Reform 
Commission.230  
 
In spite of the establishment of the East Africa Court of Justice (“EACJ”), the 
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain matters of insolvency cutting across 
member states and Tanzania and Kenya in particular. This is mainly attributable 
to the fact that the EACJ is vested with jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of 
the treaty and ensure that the treaty provisions are observed.231 The East Africa 
community has not yet enacted a modern law to govern matters of insolvency 
and cross-border insolvency in particular which would otherwise be eligible for 
application and interpretation in the EACJ in appropriate cases involving cross-
border issues among member states and beyond. This is notwithstanding the fact 
that it has long been acknowledged that ‘…this option is more cost effective than 
having to wait for [member states] to enact similar laws and then … begin the 
process of harmonization.’232 It follows that even though the reciprocal 
provisions under the respective countries’ bankruptcy laws could apply in 
appropriate cases, no appeal in such cases can presently lie in the EACJ. This 
marks a significant difference from the former East Africa Court of Appeal 
(“EACA”) which had, to a very large extent, jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
national courts of the member states in both criminal and civil matters.233  
 
                                                                                                                                    
appointment is partly due to their experience of harmonising laws with respect to the 
"Organization for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa" (OHADA) 
230 East Africa Community Secretariat (n 229) 
231 Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community 1999 (as amended) art 27 
232 AO Kinana, ‘The Role of the East African Legislative Assembly in Enhancing Popular 
Participation and Harmonisation of Laws in East Africa.’ (Annual Conference of the East Africa 
Law Society, Dar es salaam,  25 November  2005) [3]. The author was the first Speaker of the 
East African Legislative Assembly. He notes that the current practice leaves the responsibility of 
implementation of the harmonised law with each partner state. Notably, a parallel can well be 
drawn on this point with the EC Regulation on Insolvency. 
233 See n 25 above, listing a few cross-border bankruptcy cases in East Africa that involved 
Tanzania and Kenya and which reached the former East Africa Court of Appeal. 
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Arguably, the need for extending the jurisdiction of the EACJ to cater also for 
cross-border insolvency issues may indeed be accommodated by article 27(2) of 
the EAC Treaty which provides room for extension of the jurisdiction of the 
EACJ as the council of the EAC may determine and through the enactment of 
community law to regulate co-operation in cross-border insolvency matters.234 
Notably, the conclusion of a multilateral memorandum of understanding 
(“MoU”) on co-operation in regulation and supervision of the insurance industry 
between insurance regulators of the EAC partner states on 11August 2010 could 
be looked at as suggesting a step in the right direction towards the conclusion of 
a similar arrangement between judicial authorities of the partner member 
states.235 
6.7.2 SADC and the Inspiration for Adopting a Regional Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regime 
Unlike Kenya, Tanzania is one of member states of SADC,236 a regional 
grouping for Southern Africa whose thrust is on the promotion of sustainable and 
equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through deeper co-
operation and integration. Its key objectives are not different from other similar 
groupings. While SADC is yet to have a regional arrangement for dealing with 
cross-border insolvencies, consideration has long been given in this regard. 
Within academic circles, proposals have been made to use the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as a stepping stone for negotiation of 
transnational insolvency regime for member states.237 On the other hand the EC 
                                                 
234 SB Bossa, ‘Towards a Protocol Extending the Jurisdiction of the East Africa Court of Justice’ 
(2006) 4 EAJHRD 31-38; See also  Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community 
1999 arts 14(1)-(3)(b) and (d) and art 8(4). It is noteworthy that the Treaty under Article 8(4) 
grants sovereignty to community institutions and organs and elevates community law above 
national laws. 
235 The purpose of the MoU is to protect policy holders and potential policy holders of insurance 
companies and to promote the integrity, stability and efficiency of the insurance industry by 
providing a framework for cooperation, increased mutual understanding, the exchange of 
information and assistance to the extent permitted by laws, regulations and requirements. See 
EAC, ‘EAC Insurance Regulators Sign MoU’ (2010) 37 e-EAC Newsletter 3 < 
http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=70 > accessed 02 September 
2010 
236 SADC is an acronym for Southern Africa Development Community.  
237 See generally n 16 above; and JL Westbrook and others ( n 88) 247  
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Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency has also been given academic 
consideration.238  
 
Nevertheless, serious attempts to formulate and discuss proposals for such 
arrangements have not materialised within the SADC forums yet. This is 
contrasted by the increasing trend towards cross-border insolvency reform in a 
number of Southern African countries. An outlier is South Africa, which is 
unrepresentatively advanced in this regard. Notably, despite the persistent 
increase in cross-border trade and investment within the Southern Africa region, 
cross-border insolvency cases which would have inspired the need to speed up 
enactment of a regional cross-border insolvency framework are still not rampant. 
Accordingly, the perception towards the urgency and need for such a framework 
seems to differ markedly across the region depending on a particular country’s 
level of development and integration. 
6.7.3 OHADA as an Exceptional Case in Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regulation in SSA 
While OHADA remains exceptional and the leading regional arrangement in 
SSA for making and implementing the uniform international insolvency regime 
in recent times, Tanzania and Kenya are neither among its 16 member states nor 
have they been reported, unlike Ghana and Nigeria, as considering joining the 
organisation.239 Its members consist of mainly Francophone SSA states. 240 The 
procedures governing cross-border insolvency, as reflected in the Uniform Act 
Organising Collective Proceedings, is based on the ECIR.  The regime was made 
in response to the upsurge of the unavoidable effects of globalisation and the 
                                                 
238 Ibid 
239 The OHADA Treaty was signed and became operational in 1995. See P Agboyibor,  
‘OHADA: Business Law in Africa’ [1999] Int'l Bus LJ 228 
240 See text to n 16 and 17  in chapter 1 for details on the member countries and their colonial 
heritage. See also, CM Dickerson, ‘Harmonising Business Law in Africa: OHADA Calls the 
Tune’ (2005-2006) 44 Colum J Transnat’l L 17, 19 describing the arrangement as reflecting an 
agreement by member states ‘to give up some national sovereignty in order to establish a single, 
cross-border regime of uniform business laws, immediately applicable as domestic  laws of each 
country.’ Elsewhere CM Dickerson, ‘A Comparative Analysis of OHADA’s Uniform Business 
Laws in West Africa: A French Civilian Structure’s Impact on Economic Development’ < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=630623  accessed 12 July 2010, described the initiative as ‘a novel 
approach to self-determination though [its] articulated purpose is to attract foreign investment 
which in its turn is favourable to economic development.’ 
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concomitant quest for investment opportunities by ensuring security among 
investors and the wellbeing of trade undertakings as a whole and through the 
existence of a harmonised system of business laws in the region.241  
 
The regime establishes an international framework for collective insolvency 
proceedings.242 It is founded on one of the fundamental principles of the treaty 
establishing the OHADA which makes Uniform Acts directly applicable and 
binding in all member states notwithstanding any conflicting provision of 
national law.243 The framework provides for automatic recognition of 
proceedings commenced in a contracting state. Accordingly, where a decision 
commencing or closing collective proceedings in a contracting state has become 
irrevocable it is rendered to be res judicata in other contracting states.244 This is 
effectively intended to make recognition mandatory among the contracting states.  
 
However, despite the automatic recognition of the collective proceedings 
initiated in one contracting state, competent courts in other contracting states are 
not constrained from commencing other collective proceedings.245 Whereas the 
proceedings commenced in the principal place of business of the debtor are 
according to this framework the principal proceedings, any other proceeding in 
any other contracting state becomes a secondary collective proceeding. The 
framework provides for appointment of officeholders in relation to the collective 
proceedings and accords them authority to exercise their powers under the 
Uniform Act in the other contracting states within the OHADA region as long as 
                                                 
241Ibid 
242 This framework is found in OHADA Uniform Act Organising Collective Proceedings Part VI, 
art 247-256. For a discussion on this framework see B Martor and others, Business Law in Africa: 
OHADA and the Harmonisation Process (Kogan, London 2002) 159 
243 OHADA Treaty art 10. The article incorporates a policy of supranationality. It has the effect 
of abrogating national laws, contrary or identical to those of the Uniform Acts, and precludes the 
Contracting States from legislating contrary to the Uniform Acts. See B Martor and others (n 
242)20; and RF Oppong ‘Re-Imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in 
the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa’ (2007) 30 Fordham 
Int’l LJ 296, 307 and 308 quoting in support M Kone, Le Nouveau Droit Commercial Des Pays 
De La Zone Ohada: Comparaisons Avec Le Droit Francais 5 (2003) 
244 OHADA Uniform Act  Organising Collective proceedings art 247 
245 Ibid art 251 
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there are no proceedings that have been opened in any other member state.246 The 
decision appointing the receiver may also where necessary be published to other 
member states where such publication is necessary for security and the interests 
of creditors.247  
 
The regime provides for pari passu treatment of all creditors.248 Accordingly, a 
creditor who obtains payment of their claims from the property of the debtor 
located in another contracting state is required to return such payment to the 
office holder without necessarily affecting his recovery entitlements.249 What is 
crucially relevant in relation to co-operation and co-ordination in cross-border 
insolvency is that the regime makes it a requirement for the officeholders of the 
principal collective proceedings and secondary collective proceedings to co-
operate and co-ordinate with one another, and communicate, without delay, 
information relevant to the proceedings.250 In this connection, the framework 
mandates office holders to produce all claims of creditors that have been lodged 
in their respective proceedings. Consequent to settlement of the claims, the office 
holders are required to return any surplus asset to other proceedings in other 
states. In the event of the existence of many proceedings, the return shall be 
distributed equally among them.251  
 
Notably, despite the niceties of the OHADA regime, it is only applicable where 
the cross-border insolvency matter involves contracting states.252 
                                                 
246 Ibid art 249 
247 Ibid art 248 
248 Ibid arts 253 and  255 
249 Ibid  art 250 
250 Ibid art  252 
251 Ibid  art 256; and JA Owusu-Ansah, ‘The OHADA Treaty in the Context of International 
Insolvency Law Developments’ ( LL.M Paper, University of Frankfurt 2004) < 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/398/1555.html > accessed 19 September 
/2011; B Wessels, International Insolvency Law (Kluwer, Netherland 2006) 47. The only case 
discussed in existing literature where the mechanism was applied thus far is the liquidation of Air 
Afrique, established in 1961 and owned by eleven francophone African countries, the French 
Development Agency and some private stakeholders. 
252 This is the same as the Bankruptcy cooperative arrangements applicable (or was applicable) in 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Indeed, this regime is similar to the OHADA framework in that 
both provide for automatic recognition and enforcement; publication in other contracting states; 
possibility of concurrent proceedings; communication and co-ordination; and equality in 
treatment of creditors; and uniform law. However, the scope of concurrent proceedings is very 
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Notwithstanding the uniform legislation in the regulation of insolvency 
proceedings, there is glaringly a lack of provision stipulating guidelines on court-
to-court communication and co-ordination on insolvency proceedings with a 
non-contracting state where also an insolvent debtor may have had an 
establishment or assets.253 It is thus uncertain how other jurisdictions can 
cooperate in proceedings undertaken in the context of the OHADA Uniform Act 
Organising Collective Proceedings. It has in this regard been argued that this 
anomaly is one that exactly points to the significance of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law which, if implemented, could come into play when a debtor happens to have 
establishments in non-contracting states and provision of recognition, co-
operation and assistance between courts is desirable.254 It has similarly been 
argued that it would also be possible to apply the Uniform Act to the case subject 
to any contrary mandatory provision in the laws of the third party state.255 
 
The substantive law that characterises this framework is based on the French 
civil law system allegedly adopted with modification to suit the needs of the 
developing countries.256  It has long been contended by law and finance theorists 
that countries that inherit or adopt civil law systems, and in particular the French 
civil law system, tend to be less economically successful than the countries that 
inherited or adopted the common law system. However, the modern analysis 
suggests that the French civil system only correlates negatively with 
development, but does not impede development.257  
                                                                                                                                    
restricted compared to the position in the cross-border bankruptcy co-operation arrangement 
under the bankruptcy legislation and BRR in Tanzania and Kenya. On this point See text to n  
192 above 
253 JL Westbrook and others (n 88) 263 
254 JL Westbrook and others (n 88) 263-264; and JA Owusu-Ansah (n 251) 7 
255 DN Ngaundje, ‘The OHADA Bankruptcy Law: An Important Step for Regulatory Reforms in 
Africa’ (INSOL International Academics’ Conference, Radisson Blu Royal Hotel Dublin 11-13 
June 2010) 
256 B Wessels, International Insolvency Law (Kluwer, Netherlands 2006) 45, indicating that the 
implication of the OHADA Uniform Act organising Collective proceedings in most of the 
OHADA member states was the replacement of an ancient French colonial law, the Code de 
Commerce (Commercial Code) of 1808 
257 CM Dickerson, ‘Harmonising Business Law in Africa’ (n 240) 31; R La Porta and others, 
‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 J Pol Econ 1113, 1118; R La Porta and others, ‘Legal 
Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 J Fin 1131;and PG Mahogany, ‘The Common Law 
and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’ (2001) 30 J Legal Stud 503; N Thompson, 
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Although the debate on suitability of either the common law over the civil 
system or civil law over the common law in attracting development is not 
relevant in the present context, it is instructive that the theories that characterise 
the debate have the potential of leading the Anglophone SSA countries, 
especially Nigeria and Ghana, which have long been described as contemplating 
membership not to accomplish such aspiration.258 It has been argued that ‘the 
supremacy and direct application clause may be one of the reasons why there is 
currently no common law member of OHADA.’259 Additionally, the fact that 
OHADA’s official language is French could also be seen as posing critical 
challenge to the integration of Anglophone African countries.  
 
To be sure, while French is the official language, OHADA still has three member 
states whose official languages are not entirely French.260 This could thus be a 
potential for making OHADA multilingual (as is the case with the EU). In 
addition, since a majority of regional groupings in SSA have, as their core 
agenda, harmonisation of commercial laws, integration with OHADA might not 
be as difficult as one might have thought. Since the supremacy clause is 
seemingly becoming not uncommon in regional integrations, there are also 
chances for it not to be a crucial factor for consideration in deciding to join the 
OHADA. There could be more advantages than otherwise for the countries under 
study to integrate with OHADA. Firstly, this regime is now well known and 
highly commended among multilateral institutions and insolvency scholars as 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Common Denominator’ (2005) Legal Aff 46; and FA Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (CUP, 
Chicago,1960) 54-70 
258 RF Oppong (n 243) 309; CM Dickerson, ‘Harmonising Business Law in Africa’ (n 240) 67; 
JA Owusu-Ansah (n 251) 7; B Martor and others (n 242) xxi, xxii, and 7. However, B Martor and 
others argue that: ‘[although [t]he Uniform Acts…[are] based on civil law and ha[ve], to a certain 
extent, borrowed from modern French business law…..they are far from being a simple 
transposition of French law……numerous aspects of the legislation [are] quite familiar to 
common law jurists and in certain areas it should also be possible for contracting parties, should 
they so wish, to apply common law concepts within the framework laid down by the Uniform 
Acts.’ 
259 RF Oppong (n 243) 
260 CM Dickerson  (n 240) 19. Such countries with their respective languages in brackets are 
Equatorial Guinea (Spanish and French); Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese) and Cameroon (French and 
English). 
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setting an important benchmark for SSA countries and other developing 
countries.261 Secondly, the integration of the other members such as Anglo-phone 
countries might present opportunities for improvement of the regime given the 
experiences and lessons that have been learnt over the years within OHADA and 
from other arrangements whose membership is not strictly confined to states of a 
particular legal family. 262 
6.8 Conclusion 
There is a growing awareness of the importance of effective insolvency systems 
incorporating cross-border insolvency aspects in SSA countries. This is partly 
reflected in the emerging reform trends that address cross-border insolvency 
issues. Hitherto insolvency related laws recorded not only low awareness among 
the various stakeholders and general public but also remained largely in disuse. 
This emerging trend seems to have been significantly influenced by the desire 
and thrust of competing in attracting trade and capital inflows into SSA countries 
as host countries of foreign direct investments in the international economic co-
operation as opposed to increasing incidences of insolvency with international 
character.  
 
The survey of the state of the law in SSA countries, as represented by Tanzania 
and Kenya, revealed that the laws and their respective developmental trends in 
these countries still reflect the prevailing colonial legacies and are greatly 
influenced by the legislative developments in the former colonial powers, and 
partly by the international insolvency benchmarks. What is clear from the 
insolvency reform trends is that there is a marked contrast among the countries 
under study as to the extent to which reform has been effected, and the manner in 
which they seek to approach cross-border insolvency. Such a contrast is 
notwithstanding that these countries are subjected to the same reform drivers, 
share the same legal history and socio-economic circumstances.  Despite the 
general thrust on facilitation of flow of investment and trade, such a drive is yet 
to be clearly and unambiguously reflected within the laws. It remains to be seen 
                                                 
261 JL Westbrook and others (n 253) 247, 262-264, observing inter alia that OHADA ‘shares the 
main features of modern trans-border insolvency legislation…’ 
262 JL Westbrook and others (n 253) 262-264 
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whether the current reform initiative and the implementation of the resulting law 
will eliminate the uncertainties and unpredictability that are in place as to the 
manner in which the relevant authorities, courts in particular, in these countries 
may approach and deal with various issues that relate to cross-border insolvency.   
 
The emerging reform initiative and the reformed law that is in place or being 
proposed seem to suggest that the common law approach to cross-border 
insolvency is still relevant and indeed applicable to supplement the international 
character of the law by filling up what might be seen to be lacking in the enacted 
law. One critical implication arising from the consideration of international 
commitments, such as the bilateral investment treaty commitments, means that 
such commitments may need to be read into the laws and taken into account 
during the reform and implementation of the law. Clearly, such implications may 
potentially mandate the application of the law to be done in a manner that will 
make such commitments prevail. For examples, the commitments as to extending 
national treatments, most favoured national treatments, fair and equitable 
treatment, right to repatriation and transfer of funds and capital, and protection 
and promotion of foreign investment may limit, reduce or prescribe the scope 
and manner in which the law must be invoked.  It must be reiterated that the 
commitments reflect the obligation on the part of the host countries to provide a 
favourable legal environment within which foreign investors operate. It seems 
that, save for the contemplated reform in Kenya, the current law in both Tanzania 
and Kenya does not guarantee such an outcome that is in line with the 
commitments. 
 
While in SSA it is only OHADA that has widely been acknowledged for 
institutionalising a regional cross-border insolvency regime based on uniform 
law, there has long been in existence a harmonised legal regime for Tanzania, 
Kenya (including Uganda) for reciprocal co-operation in cross-border 
insolvency. Despite being forgotten in statute books and based on the personal 
bankruptcy legislation, there is scope for arguing that such a regime is still in 
force, and that it is also meant to apply to cross-border insolvencies. While the 
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arrangement still seems to have the potentials for making an effective cross-
border insolvency regime within the East African regional context and providing 
an important historical context for crafting a modern regional framework for 
EAC, there are also many benefits that could be achieved by integrating with the 
OHADA regime. There is a possibility of overcoming the factors that may 
present difficulties for Anglophone countries integrating with the OHADA given 
the inspiration that is in place for regional co-operation among SSA countries. 
Considering the existing legislative frameworks as whole and the direction of the 
reform initiatives it is clear that there is a strong pull away from territorialist 
approach.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR CONSIDERATION IN 
DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE 
CHALLENGES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The challenge that Sub-Saharan African (“SSA”) countries face is developing an 
appropriate and workable cross-border insolvency law system. This means the 
development of a system that is sensitive to the local context and takes account 
of international benchmarks, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (“the Model Law”). The looming danger in the countries 
under study is that the forces presented by the challenges discussed in the 
previous chapters are likely to lead to unsuitable legislative reform which rigidly 
adheres to international benchmarks and/or the theoretical models at the expense 
of the local contexts. Despite the international insolvency benchmarks and the 
theoretical models that countries may have regard to in reforming their laws, it is, 
as shown in chapter two, settled that local policies tend to have significant 
influence in informing and shaping the insolvency system of a country and its 
cross-border insolvency regime.1 The influence informs and shapes both the 
ingredients and the overall theoretical framework of the law to be adopted.  
However, the challenge is in identifying the local policies, which reflect such 
aspects as the historical, social, political, cultural, economic, and philosophical 
contexts of SSA countries, using Tanzania and Kenya as case studies.  The other 
challenge is in identifying the policy implications of specific cross-border 
insolvency issues and making appropriate choices around those implications in 
relation to theoretical aspects of cross-border insolvency and the international 
insolvency benchmarks such as those provided by the Model Law. This chapter 
                                                            
1 Text to n 14-15 in chapter 2; and text to n 2 - 4 below. See also, JL Westbrook, CD Booth, CG 
Paulus and H Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (World Bank, Washington 
2010) 228 and 229 
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seeks to do just that, by employing selected national policies of the countries 
under study which bear the most relevant local policy perspectives.  
The primary concern of the chapter is twofold. The first is to demonstrate how 
the relevant local context of the countries under study can be identified from 
national policies and used to inform and shape the cross-border insolvency 
reform process. And the second is to demonstrate how the local policy 
perspectives may be employed to determine the appropriate theoretical approach 
and the extent to which the existing international initiative, such as the Model 
Law, might be relevant. The discussions that ensue proceed from the perspective 
of the countries that would be expected to defer to foreign proceedings in a cross-
border insolvency setting.  
The chapter shows that the local policy perspectives emerging from the analysis 
of the national policies provide an important insight into the local interests that 
are essential for a deep reflection and understanding of the context within which 
a cross-border insolvency framework in SSA countries and its requisite 
ingredients can be made. The potential challenges presented by negotiating the 
place of the local perspectives in the development of a suitable cross-border 
insolvency law system are also considered in the discussions. The chapter argues 
that the policy perspectives that emerged point to modified universalism as the 
appropriate theoretical approach relevant to the SSA context. The chapter, among 
other things, maintains that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (“the Model Law”) is relevant and suitable for cross-border 
insolvency law reform in the countries under study as, given its nature and 
attributes, it can be customised and adapted to reflect the relevant theoretical 
approach. The special policy emphasis placed in strengthening of existing 
regional co-operations and traditional and long standing relations with some 
foreign countries suggest that a rather special arrangement might be needed for 
such countries. Among the issues raised in the discussion, which might need to 
be further considered in future research is in relation to adoption of the Model 
Law as a regional instrument (i.e East Africa Community (“EAC”) law) to help 
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realise even further the whole idea of regional market enlargement for facilitation 
of trade and foreign investment. 
7.2 Context for Consideration in Developing a Cross-Border Insolvency 
Framework  
The challenges exposed by various forces to which SSA countries are subject, as 
identified in the preceding chapters, present key elements which must arguably 
be taken into account in a consideration and crafting of a framework for cross-
border insolvencies in these countries. While there is no need to repeat the 
relevant challenges from the previous chapters, it is important to point out three 
issues which provide important scope and context for the present chapter.  
The first is the view that the challenges expose SSA countries to the risk of 
undertaking unsuitable legislative reform which may only take account of the 
current global wave and international standards, while ignoring the local policies 
which are necessary for making the law relevant and enforceable. The second is 
the perspective of a country that might always be deferring to foreign proceeding 
which the countries under study must adopt when giving consideration to policy 
choices to be made in crafting a suitable framework.  The perspective derives 
from, and account must therefore be taken of, the fact that the countries under 
study are merely the hosts of the much needed foreign direct investments. The 
argument here is that the above two issues set an important context for 
considering the local policies that must be served by a cross-border insolvency 
law system to be developed. The third and last issue regards a theoretical 
framework that would enable development of a regime that reflects local values 
of the countries under study. It is argued in this chapter that modified 
universalism adopted in the form of the Model Law could be an appropriate 
approach in enabling the countries under study to take account of the 
characteristics emerging from their local policy perspectives. 
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7.3 Policy Choices in the Development and Implementation of Cross-
Border Insolvency Law 
7.3.1 Local Policy Sensitive-Aspects of Cross-Border Insolvency 
It is a widely held view that insolvency law is particularly sensitive and 
responsive to societal values.2 Such sensitivity and responsiveness explain the 
basis of the existing divergence of insolvency systems of different countries. 
Cross-border insolvency systems are without exception as they ‘take into account 
multiplicity of considerations resulting from the economic system of the 
respective country, the overall purpose of its insolvency law, the whole 
legislative body relating to the pre-insolvency situation…., its relationship with 
particular other countries, or the hoped-for treatment of its business abroad.’3 A 
cross-border insolvency law must therefore be largely based on and reflect the 
domestic insolvency law of the respective country and the multiplicity of 
considerations which relate to the country’s societal values to mention but a 
few.4 Thus, consideration of any potential framework for cross-border insolvency 
legislation must identify and consider aspects of cross-border insolvencies which 
are sensitive to deeply held local policies that reflect historical, social, political, 
economic, philosophical and cultural contexts of a society.5 As pointed out in 
chapter two, it is however, not that easy to determine the local contexts that are 
not only truly representative of a nation-wide consensus of a country but also 
relevant to cross-border insolvencies.6 The multiplicity of problems that SSA 
countries experience, the lack of practical application of the law relating to 
insolvency and involvement in the high profile cross-border insolvency cases that 
                                                            
2 TC Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between 
Global Norms and National Circumstances’(5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Beijing, 27-
28 April 2006)  <http://www.oecd.org/DAF/corporate-affairs/ > accessed 17 July2009  [3]; and N 
Martin ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The 
Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 4; JL Westbrook and others  
(n 1) 228 and 229. See also, W Menski, Comparative Law in Global Context: The Legal Systems 
of Asia and Africa 2nd ed (CUP, England 2006) 26-37 and text to n 14-15 in chapter 2. 
3 JL Westbrook and others  (n 1) 228 and 229 
4 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 228, noting that “the common understanding is that the treatment 
of foreign creditors is an issue purely for domestic regulation-recommended rule being that of 
equal treatment”; and JL Westbrook, ‘Priority Conflicts as a Barrier to Cooperation in 
Multinational Insolvencies’ (2008-2009) 27 Penn St Int’l L Rev 870 
5 See for instance, P Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 Legal Stud 232,236; and JL 
Westbrook and others (n 1) 228 and 229 
6 Text to n 161 in chapter 2. See also  JL Westbrook, ‘A Comment on Universal Proceduralism’ 
(2009-2010) 48 Colum J Transnat’l L 503, 515-516 
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occurred recently and in the recent past means that it is even complex to identify 
the most relevant aspects for SSA circumstances and perhaps also to have them, 
once identified, reflected in the framework being developed.7 Extensive 
application of the law and involvement in high profile cross-border insolvencies 
would have enabled the countries under study to gain enough experience to better 
understand and identify relevant policies and policy issues.8 
One key area which is prone to and informed by the local policies is the overall 
policy objective of the entire insolvency system including cross-border 
insolvency.9 The debate on the policy objective of a given insolvency law system 
reveals that theorising of an insolvency system should not remove the policy 
analysis too far from reality of the societal values, as doing that exposes the 
exercise to the risks of becoming meaningless in helping to inform the system.10 
This is an important starting point as it is this general objective of the insolvency 
system that determines the inclination of other aspects within the system. Thus, 
the choices made or which should be made as to a particular aspect of insolvency 
and its implication depend on the local circumstances, needs, priorities, culture 
and legal tradition, its relation or contemplated relation with particular other 
countries and the likes that characterise the relevant country’s local policies. 11  
 
                                                            
7 TC Halliday (n 2); and TC Halliday, and BG Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and 
Systemic Financial Crisis (Stanford University Press, California 2009). These works are the only 
ones out of the reviewed works for this study that at least discuss this issue and attempt to 
propose a model for negotiating reform using international insolvency benchmarks in a manner 
that is sensitive to the local context. The work reveals the policy hurdles that are likely to be 
encountered in the process. 
8 See JL Westbrook (n 4) 870, 877, noting, for example, the importance of having enough 
litigation on matters relating to treatment of tort claims in international insolvency co-operation 
as a key aspect in finding a solution for the existing concern on treatment of tort claimants under 
universalism. 
9 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993-1994) 92 Mich L Rev 336; 
and S Davydenko and J Franks 'Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, 
Germany, and the UK' (2008) 63 Journal of Finance 565 
10 E Warren (n 9) 377-378; JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (1999-
2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2277, starting that ‘[insolvency law ] is one of those laws that cannot 
perform its function unless it is symmetrical to the market in which it operates. Virtually all 
theorists share this view and it is reflected in the nearly unanimous practice of nations….’   
11 TC Halliday (n 2) 2; JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 228 and 229; and ED Flaschen and TB 
DeSieno, ‘The Development of Insolvency as Part of the Transition from a Centrally Planned to a 
Market Economy’ (1992) 26 Int’l L 667, 694 
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It follows that one step that the governments of SSA countries must take is to 
consider and articulate clearly broad policy objectives that the cross-border 
insolvency law system must serve. Since the wider national interests of SSA 
countries are inclined towards economic growth as it relates to achieving poverty 
reduction, it can be argued that the overall policy objective should take that into 
account.12 This raises an issue as to whether and to what extent such a unique 
aspect can be so reflected and form the policy basis of the law without affecting 
other interests which are equally important.13 
Local policy influences are also more pronounced in some specific aspects of the 
insolvency law system and especially those related to domestic priority rules, 
avoidance rules, the choice between liquidation and rehabilitation, and 
recognition of, and co-operation with foreign insolvency proceedings. These are 
the very aspects that have notable implications which facilitate or impede co-
operation in a cross-border insolvency situation.14 It is common ground that these 
aspects differ markedly from one system to another notwithstanding some 
important commonalities.15 Westbrook and LoPucki respectively characterise 
such aspects as ‘the big four’ and the ‘core bankruptcy issues’ of any given 
insolvency system and its cross-border insolvency regime. 16  
Rules of priority are the most controversial and important in cross-border 
insolvencies as they ‘impact…larger decisions beyond turnover or allocation of 
proceeds, including decisions about the scope and nature of asset sales and the 
choice of liquidation versus reorganization.’17 In the context of the competing 
theories for cross-border insolvencies discussed extensively in chapter two, each 
of such elements would, under universalism, be governed by the law of the 
                                                            
12 Text to n 27 in chapter 2; and text to n 71, 143 and 153 in chapter 3. See also, ED Flaschen and 
TB DeSieno (n 11) 694 
13 See JL Westbrook, ‘Locating the Eye of Financial Storm’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 1019, 
1021, stating that ‘[e]very aspect of any national bankruptcy law is part of an integrated set of 
decisions about the policies to be benefited.’ 
14 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 227 and 228 
15 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’ (1998-
1999) 84 Cornell L Rev 696,709; and  JL Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (1998) 33 Tex Int’l LJ 
27, 30 
16 JL Westbrook (n 13) 1021-1022; and LoPucki  (n 15) 709 
17 JL Westbrook (n 15) 27 
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foreign main proceedings whilst under territorialism they are virtually governed 
by the law of the country in which the assets are located.18 Under modified 
universalism, which is arguably the appropriate theoretical framework for cross-
border insolvency regulation for the countries under study, the objective is to 
govern the elements by the law of the foreign main proceeding. However, such is 
not always the case, given the flexibility that the modified universalism accord to 
countries other than the foreign main jurisdiction to evaluate the fairness of the 
foreign proceeding when determining the extent and manner in which they have 
to cooperate.  
Despite the wide acceptance of universalism at least in literature, one policy 
argument against its full implementation is in its potential for marginalising the 
national policies that an insolvency system is supposed to serve.19 Indeed, this is 
evident in the conflict of priority systems which represents a serious obstacle to 
implementation of universalism theory.20 Difference in priority systems in a 
cross-border insolvency co-operation setting reflects and explains two things. 
The first is the fear on the part of creditors of having their claims subjected to a 
different and unfavourable priority system. And the second is the resistance of 
local proceedings to cooperate with a foreign proceeding.21 The difference in 
priority systems explains further why modified universalism has been preferred 
in practice to universalism despite the latter’s wide academic approval. Such 
practical preference of modified universalism lies in its ability to accommodate 
and respect some legitimate local interests reflected in the local policies (served 
by the domestic systems) in a cross-border insolvency setting.22   
                                                            
18 Text to Part 2.5.2 in chapter 2 
19 JL Westbrook (n 13) 1021-1022; JL Westbrook (n 10) 2298, arguing that the experience of the 
US points to the fact that ‘most of the law applied to an international insolvency case will to a 
large extent continue to be national law.’ 
20 JL Westbrook (n 4) 870 
21 JL Westbrook, ‘Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies’ (1999) 17 Brook J Int’l L 
499; JL Westbrook (n 15) 34; and EJ Janger, ‘Virtual Territoriality’ (2009-2010) 48 Colum J 
Transnat’l L 401, 415, Janger illustrates this point by making reference to In re Treco 240 F 3d 
148 (2d Cir. 2000) arguing that ‘US Court declined to send assets to the Bahamas because a 
secured creditor’s claims were subordinate to the…costs of administration of the estate.’ 
22 JL Westbrook (n 6) 515-516, attributing the legitimate local interests to ‘...interests that are 
truly local so that a person committed to a global approach to multinational insolvency would 
nonetheless agree that this or that sort of claim or claimant would best be governed by local 
insolvency law.’ 
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Coming back to the aspects that are sensitive to insolvency law system and its 
cross-border insolvency regime, it is doubtful that such aspects as are found in 
insolvency systems of the countries under study match the local policies of such 
countries. This doubt relates to the fact that insolvency systems existing in these 
countries were mainly imposed from the systems existing in former colonial 
powers and have ever since received very low usage.23  The lack of practice has 
accordingly meant that their usefulness has neither been tested nor have there 
been opportunities of benefiting from practical policy issues which would have 
served to establish whether they really do reflect the local policies.24 The existing 
rules of priority in the countries under study do not go beyond favouring only a 
limited number of the common claims. These are claims on wage and salary 
earned within a specified limited period prior to insolvency proceedings 
(normally capped at a certain amount), employment indemnification, government 
taxes, and secured credit. They fail even to mention the administrative claims as 
one of the favoured claims.25  
To this extent, drafting of the law needs to be done with utmost care to reflect 
those values as well as economic needs, as opposed to having the law emerge 
randomly or in a vacuum.26 On the one hand, this enables the insolvency systems 
to be in harmony with other national laws and government actions that are 
                                                            
23 See text to n 16 in chapter 2. Apparently, even the emerging trend for reform draws much from 
the systems that have been implemented elsewhere. The most dominant practice is to reform the 
law in tune with what exists in former colonial powers or in sister countries which were also 
under the same colonial power, or in advanced countries with systems that are believed to have 
been tested and worked well. See  R Parry, ‘Introduction’ in K Gromek-Broc, and R Parry (eds), 
Corporate Rescue in Europe: An overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries in 
Europe (Kluwer, Netherlands 2004) 1-18  
24 Arguably, the practice that has been in place runs counter to one envisaged in the insolvency 
systems. It reflected general rejection of the insolvency system. It impliedly rendered the system 
as unsuitable to the countries under study given the then existing circumstances. This was 
particularly so in Tanzania which explicitly advocated for  “ujamaa” ideology (some form of  
socialism adapted to the African or Tanzanian situation). The rejection to some extent reflected 
the nature of socio-economic conditions that existed which sustained this thinking and belief and 
rendered the law impractical and redundant. 
25 Companies Act (Chapter 486 of Laws of Kenya) s 311; Companies Act 2002 (Tanzania) s 367; 
and Insolvency Bill 2010 (Kenya) clause 421 which is far more elaborate than  the existing 
legislation in Kenya and Tanzania seeks also to define administration claims as among the 
favoured claims. 
26 N Martin (n 2) 5 and 35 
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founded on the very local policies.27 On the other hand, it reflects the challenges 
that SSA countries such as Tanzania and Kenya face in their consideration for 
reform process as ‘… [t]he more that national lawmakers draw on international 
norms or foreign experiences, the more susceptible they are to legal transplants 
that do not work-the so-called “transplant effect.”’28 Indeed, ‘the trade-offs in 
this choice determine not only the degree of harmonisation or convergence with 
insolvency regimes in other countries, including major trading partners and 
sources of investment, but also the probability of effective implementation in a 
particular domestic situation.’29 Certainly, the key to this endeavour in the 
countries under study is in identifying the relevant and ‘truly local interests’30 
that must be served in and by the insolvency law and proceedings and thus 
considering a theoretical approach that could best serve such interests. 
7.3.2 Examples of Local Policy Influence on Priority System and Cross-
Border Insolvencies Regulation 
The priority treatment differences prevail notwithstanding the overwhelming 
inclination towards universalist based approaches and the drive towards global 
convergence of insolvency laws.31 Since every country has its special 
                                                            
27 JM Weiss, ‘Tax Claims in Transnational Insolvencies: A ― “Revenue Rule” Approach’ (2010) 
30 Va Tax Rev 261  
28 TC Halliday (n 2) 
29 TC Halliday (n  2)  
30 JL Westbrook (n 6) 515-516 
31 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 13, 187-201; and CF Symes, Statutory Priorities in Corporate 
Insolvency Law: An Analysis of Preferred Creditor Status (Ashgate, England 2008); AR Keay, A 
Boraine, D Burdette, ‘Preferential Debts in Corporate Insolvency: A Comparative Study’ (2001) 
10 Int’l Insolv Rev 167-194. There is an increasing trend towards abolishing the tax claim 
priorities. Accordingly, some countries, such as the UK and Australia, have been reported to have 
completely abolished it, though such abolition, as it is in the UK, according to Davis ‘does not 
affect the super-priority which HMRC enjoy in respect of post-liquidation (and post-
administration) tax liabilities….’ The seminal authority from which this assertion flows is Re 
Toshoku Finance UK plc, Khan v IRC [2002] UKHL 6; [2002] 1 WLR 671. Associated with tax 
claim priority is the dominant traditional approach of non-enforcement of foreign tax claims 
which has long been recognised as a major barrier to cross-border co-operation. See for instance, 
JM Weiss (n 27) 288; BK Morgan, ‘Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative 
International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy’ (2000) Am Bankr LJ 461, 
500; A Davis, ‘ “Compromise or Fudge?” Reflections on the Law of the UK as it Affects the 
Taxation of Insolvent Companies’ (2010) BTR 148, 150; and Uganda Law Reform Commission, 
A Study Report on Insolvency (Uganda 2000) Recommendation 20; Westbrook (n 15) 37, & 38; 
and JL Westbrook (n 6) 877 stating that the problem of non-enforcement of foreign tax claims 
‘...requires special attention [as]...many insolvency laws refuse to enforce such claims in favour 
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characteristics of its local policies, each country has its peculiarity as to the most 
favoured creditors, whose recoveries get priority over the general body of 
creditors.32 While there are commonalities in favoured creditors, the extent to 
which they are treated and enjoy the protection varies from one jurisdiction to 
another depending on a given country’s local circumstances and policies.33  
The types of creditors that are generally favoured in most jurisdictions and which 
reflect the respective local circumstances of such jurisdictions include secured 
claims, administrative expenses, government tax and other public claims,34 and 
employment related claims.35 Pension benefits’ claims that take the form of post-
petition super-priority,36 and insurance policy claims,37 have also recently been 
included as among the favoured and protected creditors in some jurisdictions. 
However, the pension related priority as it is the case in the UK and Canada is in 
addition to the common employment related claims preference which 
characterise most insolvency law systems.38 Interestingly, the US is perhaps the 
only country so far which grants special priority protection over general creditors 
to, grain producers; fishermen; ex-spouses and children; and consumers who 
have made deposits with retail stores and landlords, in certain cases.39 Perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                                
of foreign tax authorities. It is probably [now] essential to international cooperation to pay such 
claims locally before transferring property to a main jurisdiction that has such law.’ 
32 JG Canedo, ‘Comparative Analysis of Bankruptcy Legal Provisions from Mexico and United 
States: Which Legal System is More Attractive’ (2007-2008) 6 DePaul Bus & Comm LJ 19, 24 
33 For some thoughts on the policies underlying local priorities see generally, JL Westbrook (n 
15) and CF Symes (n 31) 
34 See n 31 above 
35 J Sarra, ‘An Investigation into Employee Wage and Pension Claims in Insolvency Proceedings 
Across Multiple Jurisdictions: Preliminary Observations’ (2007) 16 Norton J Bankr L & Prac 
835; JL and others (n 31) 187-201; and CF Symes (n 31) 107-156 
36 C Clayton and A Nackan, ‘The Vexed Issue of Pension Priorities- a UK and Canadian 
Perspective’ (2011) 1 INSOL World 17-20 
37 This is the case in the US (though regulated at state level), Australia and recently the UK. See 
for instance JL Westbrook (n 4) 872, noting that ‘[b]y the time of the decision in the House of 
Lords the English system had been altered to give a similar priority to insurance claimants,’ 
adding that though ‘the change did not apply to the HIH case, [it] naturally made it easier to 
conclude that England had no great policy antagonism to the Australian system.’ 
38 In the UK, such pension benefit claim priority was introduced through amendment to the UK 
Pensions Act 2004. The treatment of claims relating to defined benefit pension schemes is still 
live in the UK at the moment following the recent decisions regarding the priority status of such 
claims. See for example the recent Court of Appeal decision in Bloom v The Pensions Regulator 
[2011] EWCA Civ 1124.  For a brief concise account on this kind of priority, its future and 
implication for cross-border insolvencies, see C Clayton and A Nackan (n 36) 17-20.  
39 JL Westbrook (n 15) 30, 34; F Tung, ‘Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2000-
2001) 33 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 555, 573 starting that the ‘favoured industries are peculiar to the 
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such categories of creditors can be equated with an example of small creditors, 
and justification for their protection is based on such status, particularly, their 
inability to diversify risk or absorb loss. 
It must be stressed, however, that there is a significant variation as to the extent 
and manner in which the priorities are invoked in particular cases in different 
jurisdictions.40 The variation ranges from broad to limited priorities.41 All such 
forms of priority protection and the way they are exercised underlie specific local 
policies and interests that are sought to be served by the respective insolvency 
systems and which may be based on values that are not shared by other 
jurisdictions.42 Clearly, the peculiarities and emerging trends within the local 
priority systems with their concomitant implications for cross-border 
insolvencies are worth noting and indeed, highly instructive to the countries 
under study in two respects. The first is due to their expected deferring status to 
exterritorial jurisdiction in the cross-border insolvency scenario43 and thus the 
expected rules of priority in distribution of value they might be subjected to.44 
And the second is due to the need for having a workable framework that is 
sensitive to local policies and the global insolvency norms that incorporates 
international insolvency benchmarks. Modified universalism, which is a common 
feature of most of the existing international initiatives, seems to be fit for the 
purpose because of its inherent flexibility that allows evaluation of fairness of 
foreign proceedings in relation to local policies before deciding the manner in 
which co-operation should be effected.  
                                                                                                                                                                
United States…there is no widespread international norm that suggests grain producers and 
United States fishermen deserve special protections in the face of corporate financial distress.’; 
11 USC S 507(a)(2006) 
40 See for instance CF Symes (n 31 ); and JM Weiss (n 27) 288 
41Mexico is well known for the extent to which its system places employees in a dominant 
position. It gives priority to wages for the last two working years prior to the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings. This is in addition to claims for employees’ indemnifications which also 
have priority over any other category of creditors’ claims. See, JG Canedo (n 32) 24; and J Sarra 
(n 35) 835 
42 JL Westbrook (n 15) 30 and 34; and F Tung (n 39) 555 and 573 
43 F Tung (n 39) 576-577. 
44 JL Westbrook (n 21); JL Westbrook (n 15) 27 and 34; and EJ Janger (n 21) 415; and JL 
Westbrook (n 4) 869, 870 
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7.4 Identifying Relevant Local Policies for Cross-Border Insolvency 
Law: The Potential Role of National Policies  
In view of the above discussion, this part demonstrates how various national 
policies for the countries under study are useful in resolving the inadequately 
addressed problem and challenge of identifying the local policies and interests 
that arguably ought to underpin and be served by the cross-border insolvency 
regime in the countries under study. Informed by the competing theories on 
cross-border insolvency and the insight from the previous chapters, the chapter 
considers the potential implications of the identified local national policies and 
interests for the policy-sensitive aspects of a cross-border insolvency system 
(such as rules of priority treatment) and identifies modified universalism as a 
theoretical framework that is appropriate in serving and promoting the local 
policies and interests whilst having regard to the international insolvency 
benchmarks.   
7.4.1 An Overview of the National Policies as They Relate to the Cross-
Border Insolvency Reform Process 
Over the recent decades, Tanzania and Kenya, and several other SSA countries, 
have made and developed a number of national policies on different key sector-
specific areas of national interests. This is partly a result of the liberalisation 
drive and the efforts put in place to institutionalise transparency by, among other 
things, clearly and broadly defining the governments’ positions, aspirations and 
values, based on, for example, their historical, social, economic, political, 
cultural, philosophical and psychological context, in various aspects considered 
to be of national interest.45 These policies are intended to provide the context 
within which legal reform needs can be made and chart out the direction of 
government actions for national development purposes.46 They identify problems 
and needs that Tanzania and Kenya may have and prioritise them as they provide 
                                                            
45 See for example, Tanzania, New Foreign Policy (Dar es salaam, Government Printer 2002) 2, 
stating that ‘…the redefined foreign policy shall target areas of critical interest to the country.’; 
and Kenya,  ‘Foreign Policy’  <  http://www.kenyamission-
un.ch/?About_Kenya:Kenya_Foreign_Policy > accessed 20/03/2011, stating that ‘Kenya’s 
foreign policy has since independence been guided and shaped by its own national interest. This 
self-interest could be grouped into three main categories [which include]’ security/political, 
economic advancement or development, geo-political factor and regional integration. 
46 KB Smith, ‘Typologies, Taxonomies, and the Benefits of Policy Classification’ (2002) 30  
Policy Studies Journal 379–395 
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strategies in resolving and addressing the problems and needs identified. They 
also seem to envision and present local interests that should be served in the law 
and which may give rise to legitimate expectations for investors as to the course 
of governments’ action.  
These policies, arguably, provide an invaluable basis for determining some of the 
local interests that should inform, and be sufficiently addressed in, the 
development of a workable and appropriate cross-border insolvency framework 
for these countries. They provide a solution to a problem of determining the 
relevant local contexts that should inform the development of a cross-border 
insolvency law system. The importance of these policies is not only in the local 
perspectives that they provide on different aspects that are relevant for a cross-
border insolvency law system but also on the fact that they are expected to have 
evolved from participation and consultation of different stakeholders and people 
from all walks of life, in these countries.47 This means that they, expectedly, 
reflect interests that are truly local and representative of a nation-wide 
consensus.48   
An examination of selected national policies for Tanzania and Kenya reveals 
fundamental perspectives that any reform measure for a workable framework for 
a cross-border insolvency law should consider and address. Admittedly, some of 
the policy aspects of such perspectives cannot be addressed in a cross-border 
insolvency law, but in other laws that are integral to the effective operation of the 
cross-border insolvency law.49 
                                                            
47 See for instance, Tanzania, National Trade Policy (Ministry of Industry and Trade, Dar es 
salaam 2003) (ii), in which Dr JA Ngasongwa (then Minister for Industry and Trade) in his 
foreword to the policy states that ‘The policy is the output of an extensive consultative process of 
involved stakeholders from different walks of life in the public and private sectors, civil society 
and the academia.’ 
48 See text to n 236 below for the concerns raised on the national policies and how to deal with 
them in cross-border insolvency law reform process. 
49 ED Flaschen and TB Desieno (n 11) 674. An understanding of the policies that should underlie 
such other laws is regarded as important to the formulation of an effective insolvency law; and 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, paras 13[pg 13  and 68[pg 60] 
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Among the selected policies that this chapter considers are national trade 
policies,50 investment promotion policies,51 employment related policies,52 
foreign policies,53 the respective documents for Tanzanian and Kenyan 
development visions,54 national environmental policies,55 and poverty reduction 
strategy documents for the two countries.56 The crucial issue that needs to be 
considered in the cross-border insolvency examination of the policies is whether 
one can discern ingredients and a theoretical approach the policies are inclined to 
and how they implicate and shape cross-border insolvency regimes of the 
countries under study.  
7.4.2 ‘Particularities’ Emerging From a Review of the Selected National 
Policies: A Pointer to Modified Universalism 
A review of the above mentioned selected national policies reveals a number of 
common perspectives, which provide relevant local contexts for cross-border 
insolvency regulation in the countries under study. It is such perspectives that 
point to a modified universalism as a relevant theoretical option which can be 
adopted by customisation of the Model Law as discussed later in this chapter.  
                                                            
50 Kenya, National Trade Policy (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Trade, 
Nairobi 2009)  < 
http://www.eac.int/trade/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=12&Itemid=12
4  >, and at < http://www.trade.go.ke/images/stories/pdf/draft_trade_policy.pdf  >, accessed 23 
March 2011; and Tanzania (n 47) 
51 Tanzania, The National Investment Promotion Policy 1996 (Presidency office, Planning 
Commission, Dar es salaam) 21,  <  
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/nationalinvestmentpromotionpolicy.pdf   >, accessed 23 March 
2011; UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review Kenya (United Nations, Geneva 2005) <  
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20058_en.pdf  > accessed 24 March 2011. 
52 Kenya, ‘National Youth Policy’  (Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage and Sports 2002); 
Tanzania, National Employment Policy (Minister of Labour, Youth and Employment, United 
Republic of Tanzania 1996) <  http://www.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/thenationalemploymentpolicy.pdf     
> accessed 23 March 2011. 
53 See n 45 above   
54 Kenya, Kenya Vision 2030 (Government of United Republic of Kenya, Kenya 2007); and 
Tanzania, The Tanzania Development Vision 2025  <  
http://www.tanzania.go.tz/vision.htm#FOREWORD   > 
55 Tanzania, National Environmental Policy (Vice President’s Office, Dar es salaam 1997); and  
Kenya, ‘The Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1999 on Environment and Development’ (Ministry of 
Environmental Conservation, Nairobi 1999) < 
http://www.fankenya.org/downloads/Kenya'sDraftEnvironmentPolicy.pdf  > accessed 26/3/2011 
56 Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction II (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, Dar es salaam  July 2010) < www.povertymonitoring.go.tz ; www.mof.go.tz ; 
www.tanzania.go.tz  > accessed 27/03/2011 [2]; Kenya, Poverty Reduction paper: First Medium 
Term Plan 2008-2012 (Office of the Prime Minister, Nairobi 2008) < www.planning.go.ke > 
accessed 27 March 2011[10] 
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The first perspective is the endeavour to promote and facilitate equitable and 
sustained economic growth which focuses on poverty reduction, promotion of 
justice and equity, trade and investment.57 The strategies that the policies provide 
take cognisance of the following key aspects; rapid and sustainable growth as a 
fundamental factor for poverty reduction; capacity improvement of the poor to 
participate in growth and take advantage of the opportunities that growth 
generates; the role and contribution of private sector in sustainable growth and 
fighting poverty; and the provision of accessible, affordable and quality social 
services; and maintenance of rule of law and good governance. 58 
The second perspective regards the transformation of Tanzanian and Kenyan 
economies to strong and competitive economies.59 This perspective emphasises 
the significance of diversification, private enterprises and building of excellent 
economic ties with the outside world and indeed, co-operation in addressing 
problems emerging from the challenges of the global economy and putting in 
place a conducive legal environment. 
The third perspective acknowledges the special position of local enterprises, 
which are mostly engaged in informal sectors in small and medium scale 
business activities. This perspective notes that such enterprises use domestic 
resources, create employment and generate income chiefly for the local 
population.60 Transformation of these businesses to enable them to inter alia 
                                                            
57 See for instance Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, Oversees 
development Institute, and Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, ‘Trade Policy 
and Poverty Linkages in Kenya’(A study prepared for Ministry of Trade and Industry in the 
Government of Kenya, under the DFID-funded Africa Trade and Poverty Programme ) <  
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1186.pdf  > accessed 23 March 2011 [7]; and 
Tanzania (n 44) 12 
58 Kenya (n 50); and  Kenya, Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis and others (n 57) 
7 
59 See Kenya (n 50); Kenya (54); Tanzania (47); Tanzania (54) 10; Tanzania (50) 21; and Kenya 
(n 50). See also n 50 above; Tanzania (n 45) 27; and Kenya (n 45)  above 
60 Tanzania, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
Dar es salaam 2002) < http://www.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/smepolicy.pdf  > accessed 29 May2011.  
For policy issues regarding small and medium scale enterprises in SSA countries, see CM 
Dickerson ‘Informal-Sector Entrepreneurs, Development and Formal Law: A Functional 
Understanding of Business Law’ (2011) 59 Am J Comp L 179; and Economic Commission for 
Africa, ‘Enhancing the Competitiveness of Small and Medium Enterprises in Africa:  A Strategic 
Framework for Institutional Support’ ( February 2001 ) < 
http://www.uneca.org/gpad/SME%20Strategic%20Framework.pdf  > accessed 29 May 2011 
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participate in the global market is regarded as critical for the long term 
sustainability of the economies of the countries under study.61 The underlying 
policy strategies envisage measures to support and promote domestic enterprises 
whilst addressing the consequences of market distortion and disturbances.62 For 
example, to strengthen the ability of the domestic enterprises to transact on a 
mutual basis with foreign enterprises in anticipation that the domestic enterprises 
may eventually benefit from transfer of technology, joint economic ventures, and 
accessing international finance.63 Emphasis is seemingly placed in creating an 
appropriate institutional framework that forges and encourages international co-
operation with multinational enterprises.64 Notably, the policy pre-conditions for 
such international co-operation are that there must be mutual and beneficial 
commercial advantage to be gained; and the relationship should be one that 
preserves options a country may have as ‘an independent and sovereign nation.’65  
The fourth perspective regards recognition of the importance and need for a 
conducive environment for actors to effectively utilise resources and contribute 
in economic growth. The aim is to ensure maximisation of values, stability, 
continuity, and predictability of the environment in which businesses are 
conducted and economic decisions are made. In a broader context, the spirit is to 
improve every regulatory regime relating to aspects affecting both foreign and 
domestic investment activities which include insolvencies.66 Kenya’s national 
trade policy explicitly mentions insolvency law as among the instruments for 
serving the policy and bringing it into operation.67 One of the consequences of 
unsuitable environments that the policies seek to address and eliminate is high 
                                                            
61 Tanzania (n 51) 21;  Tanzania (n 47) 10 
62 Kenya (n 50 ) 25 ; Economic Commission for Africa (n 60)5 ; MR Agosin and R Machado, 
‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Does it Crowd in Domestic Investment’ (2005) 33 
Oxford Dev Stud 149, 152; and CM Calcopietro and D Massawe, ‘Tanzania Small And Medium 
Scale Enterprise Policy Proposals’ (UNIDO 1999)  <   
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/smallandmediumscaleenterprises.pdf   > accessed 29/05/2011   
63 Tanzania (n 45) 27 
64 Tanzania (n 45) 14 
65 Tanzania (45) 27 
66 See for example, Tanzania (n 50) 11; Tanzania (n 47 ) 52; and Kenya (n 50) 
67 Kenya (n 50) 
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transaction costs which the policies recognise have potentials of discouraging 
inflow of foreign investment and expansion of domestic investments.68  
The fifth perspective regards maximisation of opportunities available in regional 
and international co-operation.69 Significant importance is accorded to regional 
integrations of which Tanzania and Kenya are members and to countries with 
which the countries under study have traditional long standing relationships and 
other countries that are willing to cooperate mutually with them.70 This 
underscores the issues and concerns given to trust of another country’s systems 
in co-operation with other nations.71 There are several principles reflected in the 
Kenyan and Tanzanian foreign policies that govern their conducts and decision 
making.72 They include the following. The first is to maximise opportunities 
from such co-operation which should focus on economic gains.73 The second is 
to ensure that co-operation and participation do not compromise their territorial 
integrity, independence and sovereignty.74 The third is to consolidate and 
prioritise the long standing historical relationship and co-operation and their 
membership in regional groupings. And the fourth is to ensure active and result 
oriented participation in a selected international arrangements where the political 
and economic interests of the nation can be secured and promoted.75  
The sixth perspective of the policies relates to conservation and protection of the 
environment and promotion of domestic and international environmentally 
friendly trade and investment activities.76 Strategies that are inherent in the 
policies include strengthening of the institutional and legal framework for the 
implementation and enforcement; and mainstreaming environmental issues in 
business and investment regulation and related aspects given the cross-cutting 
                                                            
68 Tanzania (n 47) 21 
69 See Kenya (n 54) 14 
70  Kenya (n 49) 16 and 17; Tanzania (n 45) 18-23 
71 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 240 and 241 
72 See Tanzania (n 45) 2 and 3; and Kenya (n 45) 
73 See for example, Tanzania (n 45) 3, stating that Tanzania seeks to open up its co-operation 
with other countries ‘where potential for national gain exists.’   
74 Tanzania (n 45) 2 
75 Tanzania (n 45) 3 
76 Kenya (n 49) 64 and 65; and see n 55 above 
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nature of environmental issues.77  This is not only relevant to SSA countries 
because of environmental issues that arise in the undertaking of business 
activities, but also because the economies of SSA countries and the investments 
that are made are largely natural resource-dependent.78 Understandably, this 
perspective takes account of economic and social costs involved in 
environmental damage and its adverse impact on the quality of human life and 
health.79 Other critical issues and challenges addressed under the various policies 
and governments’ documents include unemployment and job creation as they 
relate to poverty reduction.80   
7.4.3 Significance and Implication of the Local Policy Perspectives for 
Cross-Border Insolvencies 
The perspectives emerging from the above analysis of the policies have, albeit 
indirectly, the potential implication for the formulation of cross-border 
insolvency regimes for Kenya and Tanzania which, according to Westbrook and 
others, require a multiplicity of considerations resulting from, for example, ‘the 
economic system of the respective country, its relationship with particular other 
countries and the hoped for treatment of its business abroad.’81 Thus, the 
perspectives provide a useful insight in identifying policy choices that must be 
made in the legislative process to fit and serve the aspirations of these countries.  
Arguably, such perspectives, viewed as a whole, point to the relevance of 
modified universalism (adopted in the form of a customised and adapted version 
of the Model Law) as the most appropriate approach. However such perspectives 
appear to suggest that a special arrangement might be needed to regulate cross-
border insolvency involving firstly, member states within a regional integration 
and secondly, foreign countries that are in a special relationship with the 
countries under study. 
One challenge that emerges is balancing the global insolvency norms with the 
distinctive national path dictated by the characteristics of the policy perspectives 
                                                            
77 Kenya (n 50) 64 and 65  
78 Tanzania (n 55) 8 
79 Tanzania (n 47) 7 
80 Kenya (n 52) 
81 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 228 and 229 
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which are indicative of the local interests and priorities.82 While negotiating the 
place of such perspectives during the processes of developing a cross-border 
insolvency legal framework, the countries under study must take cognisance of 
the position of the international insolvency benchmarks that discourage 
construction of insolvency systems based exclusively on social and political 
concerns, as opposed to commercial bargains.83 This is in addition to the 
limitations implied by the existing international treaty commitments to the SSA 
host countries as to, for instance, standards of treatments to be accorded to 
foreign investors and investments.84 
7.4.3.1  Private Investments and Economic Growth  
Private enterprise and its role in economic growth is a fundamental feature in 
almost all policy perspectives drawn from the selected national policies.85 The 
nature of the private sector that is envisaged reflects both domestic and foreign 
firms.  One legitimate expectation of the policy makers is that the facilitation of 
the private sector leads to a strong and competitive export led private sector 
which will contribute to the economic growth. The underlying rationale is to 
reduce poverty and contribute to social equality among the people.   
To address this policy objective consideration will have to be had to 
‘institutionalising mechanisms that enable a risk-taking enterprise to reap the 
benefits of any success it is able to achieve.’86 In the event of financial 
difficulties leading to insolvency of such an enterprise, there should be means 
which might preserve rather than destroy going concern value of the enterprise. 
This could be achieved by rescue mechanisms for dealing with enterprises that 
fail, equitable treatment of all players irrespective of their nationalities and 
protection of the debtor’s establishment, assets and other interests of creditors. 
The latter is achievable through granting of a relief that is meant to protect the 
insolvent estate of the debtor which includes the local assets and interests of 
                                                            
82 TC Halliday (n 2) 2; EJ Janger (n 21) 401-44;  and TA Sullivan, E Warren and JL Westbrook, 
‘The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Experience From the Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts’ (1994) 17 Harv J L & Pol’y 801, 804 
83 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law paras 13 [pg 13] and 68 [pg 60] 
84 Text to part 4.4, 4.5.1, and  4.6.1 in chapter  4 
85 See for example  text to n 57, 59 and 60 
86ED Flaschen and TB Desieno (n 11) 667 
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creditors. This may include a stay and restriction on the right to transfer or 
dispose of any asset. Such a protection is fundamental to a successful rescue and 
augurs well for the commitments arising from the bilateral investment treaties 
concluded thus far.87  
Since these policy aspects also envision the aspiration of encouraging foreign 
investments, any rescue mechanism to be formulated must take that policy 
consideration into account together with other relevant legislation for promotion 
and protection of investment that is already in place.88 This means that the law 
should clearly articulate the scope of its approach in cross-border insolvency co-
operation from the perspective of a country that would ordinarily face the 
challenge of deferring to foreign proceedings, given the current pattern of global 
trade and flow of investments.89 Alongside, the formulation of such a law must 
be mindful of achieving a high degree of efficiency, predictability, and certainty 
to reduce transaction costs and enhance availability of credits to investors. The 
implication of the implementation of rescue procedures in respect of a 
multinational enterprise is that the business of such an enterprise can be rescued 
with the possibility of continuing its operation in the countries under study and 
providing jobs to the people.  
In support of the rescue mechanism, consideration could be given to the 
suitability of and the scope to be accorded to prioritisation of governments’ tax 
claims which is one of the thorny issues in cross-border insolvency.90 Such a 
consideration has to be taken in light of the theory that advocates against 
prioritisation of tax claims as it runs counter to the policy underlying business 
rescue. The underlying rescue policy seeks, wherever possible, to preserve the 
debtors’ continued existence as a viable entity, protecting jobs and reducing 
damages to the economy.91 Consistent with this theory is the view that the 
                                                            
87 Text to part 4.5.2.4 in chapter 4 
88 It is to be noted that most of the investment promotion and protection legislation enacted by 
SSA countries guarantees fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and most favoured 
nation treatment to foreign investments.  
89 F Tung (n 39) 576 and  577 
90 JL Westbrook (n 4) 877; and JM Weiss (n 27 ) 295 and 299-303; and UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law para 71[pg 271] 
91 A Davis (n 31 ) 149; and JM Weiss (n 27) 295 
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potential harm to other creditors of having government tax priority and thereby 
failing to recover their claims may cause substantial hardship and precipitate 
additional insolvencies.92 In fact, the loss to the government of one company not 
paying taxes could be minimal, while the potential harm to other creditors of the 
company of having a tax priority is often large.93 Above all, it is understandable 
that government normally has other means of enforcing its claims, such as 
imposing penalties and high interest rates, or using statutory liens.94A successful 
business rescue means continued existence of a business as a viable undertaking, 
which leads to protecting jobs and  avoiding unemployment related cost being 
incurred by the government while ensuring continued payment of the 
government taxes.95 However, any decision as to the treatment of tax claims need 
to take account of the local circumstances.96 Uganda is one of the countries in 
SSA that has given consideration to the abolition of tax claim priority.97 
However, taking account of the local circumstances, the Ugandan Law Reform 
Commission recommended that:  
‘[Foreign experiences] cannot be adopted without caution being 
taken. Government and public stand the risk of being cheated by 
unscrupulous directors who will collect the government tax and 
pocket it well knowing that in the event of insolvency, the company 
will be absolved from passing on tax collected to Government. For 
example a company that has been collecting PAYE from its 
employees for a long time before insolvency sets in is left to go away 
with it. The primary victim shall be the employees whose wages were 
deducted. [It is thus recommended that only] taxes collected by the 
insolvent as a quasi-agent of the state should be recovered as 
preferential debts while taxes directly payable by the insolvent should 
be treated as ordinary debts.98 
Notably, no consideration has so far been given on cross-border implications of 
tax claim priority.99  
Further consideration may need to be given as to whether some actors within the 
private sectors can be accorded special protection under the priority systems and 
                                                            
92 A Davis (n 31 ) 149; and JM Weiss (n 27) 295 
93 BK Morgan (n 31) 466 & 467;  and JM Weiss (n 27) 295 
94 Ibid  
95 A Davis (n 31) 149 
96 See n 31 above 
97 Similar consideration seems to have recently been made in literature in respect of the Kenyan 
reform initiative. For this consideration see text to n 115 in chapter 6  
98 Uganda Law Reform Commission (n 26) Para. 2.2.15; Cf text to n 115 in chapter 6 
99 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, para 71[pg 271-272] 
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how such protection may influence cross-border insolvency approaches. One 
way of doing this is allowing the foreign creditors to enjoy the protection 
accorded by the local priority system. This may help foreign companies having 
investment in the countries under study to get finances from international lenders 
in anticipation that in the event of insolvency they will be able to claim locally 
and benefit from the existing priority system.100 It is important that this strategy 
be considered and weighed against the stipulation of the existing international 
insolvency benchmarks. Accordingly, as far as the Model Law is concerned the 
minimum protection that a country may accord to foreign creditors is to treat 
them in a distribution at least as well as a general, unsecured creditor.101 Indeed, 
the treatment in relation to the distribution can be even ‘lower than the general 
non-preference claims if an equivalent local claim (e.g. claim for a penalty or 
deferred-payment claim) has a rank lower than the general non-preference 
claims.’102 This is particularly important as the policy perspectives envisage that 
protection of local interests should not be pursued in a manner that affects 
foreign enterprises, although there is a clear intention of nurturing the locally 
owned small scale business enterprises.103 Understandably, the treatment of 
foreign creditors in a local distribution is different from the equality of treatment 
of creditors regarding commencement of proceedings in the local court.104 
                                                            
100 Notably, the majority of foreign companies that operate in Tanzania and Kenya for example 
are not run as branches of their foreign parent countries abroad but as separate entities 
incorporated under the laws of the respective countries in which they have operations. However, 
a company will still be categorised as foreign by virtue of majority foreign shareholding. In 
Tanzania the law is explicit that a foreign company can also access credit in local financial 
institutions. See Tanzania Investment Act 1997 (Tanzania) s 25 
101 JL Westbrook, ‘Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, 
and the EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2002) 76 Am Bankr LJ 1, 16; Model Law art 13(2); Guide to 
Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Para 104 [pg 331] 
102 An alternative provision which a country may consider incorporating to replace art 13(2) is to 
the effect that: ‘Paragraph 1 of this article does not affect the ranking of claims in a proceeding 
under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency] or the exclusion of foreign tax 
and social security claims from such a proceeding. Nevertheless, the claims of foreign creditors 
other than those concerning tax and social security obligations shall not be ranked lower than 
[identify the class of general non-preference claims, while providing that a foreign claim is to be 
ranked lower than the general non-preference claims if an equivalent local claim (e.g. claim for a 
penalty or deferred-payment claim) has a rank lower than the general non-preference claims’ 
103 See text to n 60-65 above 
104 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency art 13(1); and Guide to Enactment of 
UNCITRAL Model Law paras 103-105 
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The rescue mechanism discussed above is one form of providing the 
contemplated protection to small local enterprises during insolvencies or 
financial difficulties and it could certainly help viable yet insolvent local small 
businesses to be nursed back to business in appropriate cases. As some of these 
local businesses are increasingly engaged in international business transactions, 
they are likely also to have foreign liabilities arising from their meagre 
international trade operations. Consideration of participation of foreign creditors 
in the local insolvency proceedings as above stated is thus inescapable.  
As already discussed, such small local enterprises could be potential claimants in 
insolvency proceedings including cross-border insolvency proceedings. It would 
appear that some form of protection can be achieved by accommodation of some 
local industries, small and medium scale enterprises that represent legitimate 
local interests in the systems of priority of distribution of the countries under 
study. Such favourable treatment will protect them against any potential harm 
that might result from failure of claims recovery. However, this should, if at all 
necessary, be confined to sectors considered exceptionally important to the 
economy. As it has rightly been pointed out in the policies, as far as Tanzania is 
concerned, this pursuit may involve making decisions on types of the local 
enterprises to be protected, together with the rationale and costs of protection.105 
A lesson could be learnt from the special protection accorded in the US to grain 
producers and fishermen, who, alongside consumers, ex-spouses and children, 
enjoy priority over general creditors in special cases.106 However, care must be 
taken since such policy choices may put the whole system at risk of being 
regarded as inefficient and unfriendly to foreign investors.  
Indeed, some of these local creditors could be small suppliers to some foreign 
businesses that may have operations in the countries under study. In the context 
of a cross-border insolvency involving a business having operations and assets in 
the countries under study, there could be legitimate concerns about small, local 
creditors which undoubtedly include suppliers and employees. It is common 
knowledge that ‘these creditors cannot be expected to be sophisticated in 
                                                            
105 See for example Tanzania (n 47) 10 
106 Text to n 39 above 
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planning for insolvency risks or able to protect themselves in distant 
proceedings.’107 As such, one policy option available, especially where deference 
to foreign main proceedings is preferred, is providing for local processing of the 
local claims.108 Such claims or specific category of such claims could thus be 
paid locally ‘…. in full from local assets before the assets are transferred to the 
main proceedings.’109 The local processing for the benefit of the local creditors 
can well be achieved by having provisions for protection of creditors, avoiding 
acts detrimental to creditors as well as through concurrent proceedings as 
provided for under the Model Law.110 Understandably, the relevant provisions of 
the Model Law could be adapted in the manner that suits the local circumstances 
as reflected in the policy perspectives. Indeed, this kind of protection of certain 
category of local creditors will potentially add towards poverty reduction efforts 
as discussed subsequently because it will help minimise the potential harm to, for 
instance, small local supplier creditors which could otherwise have led to 
substantial hardship and possibly insolvency.  
7.4.3.2 Increasing Participation of Local Enterprises in the Global 
Market and Access to International Finance 
As mentioned above, in a bid to ensure the countries under study attain 
sustainable economic development, the policies endeavour to facilitate 
transformation of identified sectors that characterise local enterprises. The 
transformation is with a view to making them more competitive and enabling 
them to participate in the global market; access global commercial capital; 
benefit from transfers of technology; and engage in joint economic venture 
arrangements in order to benefit from the operations of the multinational 
enterprises. As far as Kenya is concerned, this pursuit is regarded as the most 
important strategic priority for the future of local enterprises.111 On the part of 
Tanzania, this involves strategic identification of the local enterprises to be 
                                                            
107 JL Westbrook (n 4) 876-877. See also PJ Omar, ‘The Landscape of International Insolvency 
Law’ (2002)11 Int’l Insolv Rev 173, 177. Notably, participation by creditors in foreign 
proceedings depends on the availability of knowledge and information, their ability to be diligent 
and to overcome procedural obstacles. 
108 JL Westbrook (n 4) 876-877; and JL Westbrook (n 6) 515 
109 JL Westbrook (n 4) 876-877; see also UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
arts 28-32 
110 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, arts 22-23 and arts 28 - 32 
111 Kenya (n 50) 25 
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protected, the rationale and costs of protection, and the maximum duration for 
the protection.112 This policy strategy reinforces the participation of the small 
local enterprises in the global market and hence the potential for being exposed 
to cross-border insolvencies in either of the following two ways.  
Firstly, it could be by virtue of the local enterprises themselves being insolvent 
while indebted to foreign creditors. This brings in policy choices to be made as to 
participation of foreign creditors in local proceedings and in particular their 
treatment in the local priority system as above discussed.  It must however be 
added that enabling local enterprises to access international capital requires 
predictability and certainty in the treatment of foreign creditors in the local 
insolvency proceedings. Indeed, efficiency of insolvency systems and their cross-
border insolvency regime is one of the factors that international finance considers 
in funding projects, especially those being executed in developing economies, 
such as those of the countries under study.  
And secondly, it is by virtue of having claims against an insolvent foreign 
enterprise that does not necessarily have assets or an establishment locally. This 
brings in the trouble that such local enterprises may encounter in their attempt to 
enforce their claims at a distance. Much as the provision for local processing of 
local claims is ideal, its effectiveness largely depends on the presence of local 
assets and the ability of local jurisdictions to restrict transfers of assets at least for 
a while which could also be achieved under articles 22 and 23 of the Model Law 
as above discussed or any adapted version of the measures stipulated in such 
provisions of the Model Law. The possibility of lack of local assets raises an 
issue that requires the countries under study to consider if they really require 
adopting a system that strictly favours local processing of assets for it is not 
always that an insolvent foreign debtor will have sufficient amounts of assets, if 
any, in the local jurisdiction. The issue also links to a consideration of having an 
arrangement with a foreign country that provides for mutual treatment of debtors 
and creditors from each country and one that provides appropriate protection for 
the interests of debtors and creditors from either of the jurisdictions within the 
                                                            
112 Tanzania (n 47) 10 
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arrangement. Such arrangements could, in appropriate cases, save time, cost and 
inconvenience associated with litigations involving determinations of several 
issues that may arise, such as, whether interests of creditors and other interested 
parties are adequately protected in the relevant foreign proceedings. The 
challenge is that it is not all countries that may have incentive to conclude such 
an arrangement based on the reciprocity.  
7.4.3.3 Poverty Reduction through Continuation and Protection of 
Businesses and Employment  
Fighting poverty is central to the reviewed policies. Job creation and ensuring 
that those who are in employment continue to keep their jobs are considered as 
strategically important in reducing poverty. Adoption of a rescue system, as 
above noted would contribute to poverty reduction in a number of ways. Firstly, 
a successful business rescue prevents or at least limits the job losses caused by a 
business failure. Thus, it will enable some people who would otherwise lose their 
jobs in liquidation to keep their jobs. Secondly, continuation of the business 
through implementation of the business rescue system will also contribute to 
economic growth and the potential for further creation of more jobs. And thirdly, 
encouraging risk taking and further creation of businesses from both local and 
foreign entrepreneurs. This will add towards facilitation and promotion of private 
investments which under the policies are an engine of economic growth and the 
consequent creation and saving of jobs.  
It is well known that ‘[w]here insolvency strikes an employer, there will almost 
invariably be employees to whom money is owed by way of unpaid salary or 
other obligations arising under the employer/employee contract that have not yet 
been paid by the employer.’113And perhaps the most drastic consequence is that 
such employees stand to lose their jobs which can have a devastating effect on 
them and their families.114 Special protection of employment claims in 
distribution of the proceeds of an insolvent estate is therefore another obvious 
option to ensure that such claims are met before those of some other creditors to 
                                                            
113 JL Westbrook and others  (n 1) 183 
114 R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011) 
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reduce poverty.115 Although such protection is to a certain extent provided in the 
existing laws,116 it is very limited and perhaps inadequate compared to the 
position in other countries, inclusive of the developed ones.117 Consideration of 
improving the nature and scope of such special protection might be worthwhile 
to pursue. This is critical on account of the peculiar socio-economic 
circumstances of the countries under study that mandate different standards at 
least for a short run. In the context of cross-border insolvency, it will be absurd 
that a poor employee of a SSA country whose salary and other dues remain 
unpaid should have to wait and pursue his claims with the general body of 
creditors of a foreign jurisdiction in a foreign proceedings of a company that had 
assets or an establishment in the local jurisdictions of the countries under 
study.118 However, while care must be taken not to render an insolvency system 
to serve the functions of other laws such as social security legislation, the 
position of the countries under study could (in light of the international 
insolvency benchmarks) be treated as exceptional until such time as when these 
countries have comprehensive welfare systems.119  
Indeed, failure to address the above issue, which is directly linked to the lack of 
an adequate social welfare system, would mean that there might be potential 
threats for social order as a result of unemployment and a lack of funding for the 
same.120 This could potentially thwart successful rescues and prevent the 
                                                            
115 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 184 stating inter alia that ‘[t]here can be little doubt that the 
overall effect on employees and their families is qualitatively far worse than it is on other 
creditors….[U]nlike other creditors [they] are severely undiversified.’ Undoubtedly the situation 
is even worse in SSA where in most instances the wages are low and there are no welfare states. 
116 See text to n 25 above 
117 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 188-190. This is particularly the case if for instance one takes 
account of indirect forms of employees’ related priorities like pension claims. More so if 
considered in the context of the requirement of protection of employees’ rights in the event of a 
transfer of undertaking which enacts a principle of automatic transfer of contract of employment. 
118 JL Westbrook (n 4) 
119 For a more or less similar reasoning, though with respect to China, see, RW Harmer, 
‘Insolvency Law and Reform in the People's Republic of China’ ( 1995-1996) 64 Fordham L Rev 
2563, 2565 and 2566; R Parry and H Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives 
and Principles’ (2008) 8 J Corporate L Stud. 113, 132; R Parry, ‘Underlying Factors and Legal 
Cultures Influencing the New Chinese Bankruptcy Law’ in B Wessels and PJ Omar (eds), 
Insolvency Law in the United Kingdom: The Cork Report at 30 Years (INSOL Europe, 
Nottingham 2010) 103 
120 RW Harmer (n 119) 2565 and 2566; R Parry and H Zhang (n 119) 132; R Parry (n 119) 103 
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development of much needed stability for continued investment by multinational 
enterprises. On the contrary, in giving consideration to implementation of the 
policies that seek to ensure employment to the people, protecting them from 
losing income and being stricken by poverty, the policymakers must take 
cognisance of the effect such implementation may have on any rescue attempt. 
Such a consideration is relevant since such an attempt might have a much better 
beneficial effect on the economy on longer terms.121  
7.4.3.4  Environmental Protection Aspects 
The policy perspectives examined above also point to the significant place of 
environmental issues and obligations in the description of local interests that cut 
across all sectors and which have increasingly been receiving constitutional 
status in SSA.122 These issues might accordingly need to be considered in so far 
as their treatment in a cross-border insolvency setting is concerned.123 This is 
rather exceptional in Tanzania and Kenya, as it is for the rest of SSA countries, 
given the potentials for environmental damages caused by businesses and their 
consequent implications for lowering the standard of living and increasing 
poverty.124 While most commercial operations taking place in these countries 
entail, whether directly or indirectly, exploitation of natural resources and hence 
the potential danger to the environment, there is an emerging trend of according 
fundamental constitutional status to environmental related rights, duties and 
compensation under the constitutions although this trend is yet to be reflected in 
rules of priority in insolvency legislation.125  
                                                            
121 See for example, A Loubser, ‘The Interaction Between Corporate Rescue and Labour 
Legislation: Lessons to be Drawn from the South African Experience’ (2005) 14 Int’l  Insolv Rev 
57, 67- 69 
122 See Constitution of Republic of Kenya 2010 arts 42 and 70, which provides, among other 
things, for the peoples right for a clean and healthy environment and the right for compensation 
to victims of failure to carry out environmental obligations. See also, F Okomo-Okello, ‘The Role 
of the Private Sector (Banks) in Promoting Compliance with Environmental Law (The Kenyan 
Experience)’ (2007) 1 Kenya Law Review 30, 40-41; and sections 101, 151, 198 of the 
Environment Management Council Act 2004 (Tanzania) ss 101, 151 and 198 
123 Ibid 
124 See generally, DB Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, 
Contextual and Absolute Norms’ (1999) 1 Colo J Int’l J Envt’l L & Pol’y 69 
125 Q Dongmei & J Qu ‘Research on the Priority of Environmental Tort Obligation in Bankrupt 
Enterprises Under the Background of Low Carbon Economy’ (2011) 4  J Sust’ble Dev 150; Q 
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The question is whether and to what extent environmental policy issues can be 
reflected in a cross-border insolvency context in SSA countries, for reasons 
explained above. A majority of multinational enterprises investing in SSA are in 
one way or the other involved in the exploitation of the natural resources, as are 
small and local enterprises in most SSA countries engaged in export of primary 
produce. Despite the divergence in the local policies and interests which are 
mostly reflected in the rules of priority as to treatment of creditors and the 
importance of environment issues in recent decades, environmental claims are 
yet to universally receive a separate preferential treatment in existing insolvency 
law systems across the globe.126 In the US, this has been a subject of intensive 
debate among scholars and it has long received different judicial treatment in 
different states.127  
It can be argued that environmental claims concern people’s lives and health, 
properties, security and social benefit which means that giving a priority claim to 
the environmental liability is not only consistent with the inherent need to realise 
the fair distribution of the insolvent estate, but also the inevitable choice to 
develop an environment sustainable economy.128 To be sure, it is not surprising 
that cross-border insolvency proceedings involving local environmental 
obligations claims are very likely given the increasing awareness on 
environmental issues, environmental legal enforcement and the underlying 
                                                                                                                                                                
Dongmei, ‘Low Carbon Economy and the Priority of Environmental Tort liability in Bankrupt 
Enterprises’ (2011) 5 Energy Procedia 1814, <  www.sciencedirect.com > accessed 29/05/2011; 
SP Chitre ‘Cleaning Up Bankruptcy: Limiting the Dischargeability of Environmental Clean up 
Costs’ July 2010 < http://works.bepress.com/sonali_chitre/2 > accessed 29/05/2011; JV Stitt, 
‘Dischargeability of Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Resolution to Diametrically Opposed 
Goals’ (2002) 17 J Nat Resources & Envt’l L 27; and  LT Manolopoulos, ‘A Congressional 
Choice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates’ (1990-1991) 9 UCLA J 
Envtl L & Pol’y 73 
126 PR Wood, Principle of International Insolvency Law 2nd Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
2007); and CF Symes (n 31 ) 189 - 224 
127 SP Chitre (n 125); J Stitt (n 125); and  LT Manolopoulos (n 125); KR Heidt, ‘Automatic Stay 
in Environmental Bankruptcies’ (1993) 67 Am Bankr LJ 69-130; SP Chitre, ‘Cleaning up 
Bankruptcy: Limiting the Dischargeability of Environmental Cleanup Costs’ July 2010, < 
http://works.bepress.com/sonali_chitre/2 > accessed 05 May2011. There are signs for emergence 
of debate in China as to the need of prioritising environmental claims in insolvency legislation. 
See Q Dongmei & J Qu (n 113) 150;  and Q Dongmei (n 113) 1814  
128 Q Dongmei & J Qu (n 125) 150; and Q Dongmei (n 125) 1814 
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commitment for compliance with international environmental obligations which 
provide for the principles of environment responsibility.129 In light of the Guide 
to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, it may not 
be surprising to find environmental issues taking the form of public policy 
exception given the growing trend of providing constitutional guarantees to 
matters related to environmental protection and compensation for environmental 
damages.130 While it is important that public policy is understood more 
restrictively reflecting the realisation that international co-operation would be 
unduly hampered if public policy would be understood in an extensive manner, 
environmental issues at present are at the heart of international co-operation 
given their fundamental importance in the international and domestic arena that 
relates to health and safety. 
While the experience elsewhere shows that environmental claims tend to be so 
huge that they may, especially so if accorded priority, scoop all proceeds from 
the insolvent estate and leave other creditors unable to recover anything, the 
environmental effect giving rise to such claims contributes to massive poverty in 
affected localities.131 It must be added that the danger is that such claims can also 
have the effect of spoiling any potential rescue, which if it were concluded could 
contribute to poverty reduction efforts in different ways including continued 
                                                            
129 For an example of the nature of claims arising from environmental obligation, see KR Heidt (n 
127) 69-130; and P Kameri-Mbote and C Odote, ‘Courts as Champions of Sustainable 
Development: Lessons from East Africa’ (2009) Sustainable Development Law & Policy 31  < 
www.ielrc.org > accessed 5 April2011. In fact, it has quite recently been alleged that Bioshape, a 
clean energy company based in Neer, The Netherlands, is going through insolvency proceedings 
after spending $9.6 million on a failed biofuel project in Tanzania. It is claimed that the 
ambitious project to produce clean energy for the Netherlands and Belgium has degenerated into 
a controversial abuse of natural resources. It is unclear whether the environmental damages 
resulting from the uncompleted project will be presented as a claim in the insolvency proceedings 
of the company and what status they are likely to be accorded. For details on this issue that 
indicates the crisis on the intersection between environmental concerns and insolvency see, Inter 
Press Service, ‘Biofuel project stalls as foreign investors go into bankruptcy’ Business Daily, 30 
March 2011 < 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Biofuel+project+stalls+as+foreign+investors+go+into+bank
ruptcy/-/539546/1135174/-/te135wz/-/ > accessed 9 March2011  
130 Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency paras 87-89 
131 KR Heidt (n 127) 
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employment to those already employed and potential for further job creations, 
and revenues to the government through taxes.132 
However, it has been argued that some of the major creditors have a share of 
responsibility as they are the very ones who provide funding against major 
criteria of technical and economic feasibility of the projects.133 Whilst most of 
the large creditors will be secured and sophisticated in planning for insolvency 
risks or able to protect themselves in distant proceedings, the environmental 
damage claimants are not. In view of the above, it is safe to say that the presence 
of operations and assets that pose a danger to the environment and sufferance of 
the victims, which could translate into recourse to public funds to remedy the 
situation,134 is a relevant factor in deciding what preference certain local 
environmental claims might receive. Even if there are no assets in a local 
jurisdiction, local environmental interests may be so universally considered as 
important and deserving as to receive special treatment in SSA countries.135  
7.4.3.5 Sovereign, National Interests, International Co-operation and 
Regional Integrations 
In so far as international co-operation is concerned, the policy perspectives 
provide for promotion of good relations with other countries and economic 
diplomacy in particular. This is a positive gesture in the handling of cross-border 
insolvency cases. However, the policies may be applied to identify criteria that 
may need to be incorporated in the law to determine the nature and scope of 
granting recognition and co-operation to other countries. The choices that the 
criteria implicit in the policies point to are that in a cross-border insolvency 
context the manner of extending recognition and scope of co-operation to be 
                                                            
132 KR Heidt (n 127) 69-130 
133 F Okomo-Okello (n 122) 40-41. This is understandable if looked at in the context of corporate 
social responsibility which is a complex issue, the consideration of which is well beyond the 
scope of this work. 
134 See A Keay and P de Prez, ‘Insolvency and Environmental Principles: A Case Study in a 
Conflict of Public Interests’ (2001) Env LR 90, 107; and CF Symes (n 31) 198 
135 See JL Westbrook (n 6) 516, arguing that there are local interests that are universally 
recognised as deserving protection irrespective of whether or not there are local assets; and DB 
Magraw (n 124 ) 69, discussing differential treatment to developing countries in undertaking 
international environmental obligations.  
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extended might vary depending on existence or non-existence of any of the said 
criteria.  
Arguably, the criteria imply flexibility in the manner in which the countries 
under study will determine recognition and the scope of co-operation to be 
committed to which directly correlate with modified universalism. It can thus be 
said that the implication of the policy criteria suggests that the countries under 
study will not prefer to automatically and directly recognise and cooperate in 
foreign proceedings or allow the foreign proceedings to have universal scope and 
effect in their jurisdictions, unless it is so mandated by the criteria. The 
underlying rationale of the implied criteria is the requirement of trust of the 
foreign country’s legal system, such as its adherence to the rule of law and/or the 
comparability of its insolvency policy objectives.136 It must be stressed that the 
implication of the importance accorded to regional integration and international 
co-operation and the characteristics attached to the nature of such co-operation 
would potentially mandate special arrangements informed by the objectives of 
such co-operation and regional integrations and the principles of trust among the 
contracting member states. This could also be true for other countries such as 
those with which they maintain bilateral co-operations and historic, common and 
long standing traditional plus a legal or economic interrelationship.137 As the 
countries under study seem to extend or willing to extend general trust of the 
countries that fall within this category, they may therefore consider either 
unilaterally adopting a regime that will extend automatic recognition and co-
operation to such countries or adopting with them a cross-border insolvency co-
operation arrangement that grants automatic recognition and co-operation, as is 
the case with the general rule underlying, for example, the ECIR to member 
states’ proceedings. As already explained above, a major drawback seems to be 
that such arrangement could not be a priority for a country with which the 
countries under study would wish to enter in mutual arrangements. The other 
option is negotiating and concluding such arrangements when negotiating / 
renegotiating the bilateral investment treaties with the contracting states. 
                                                            
136 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 240 
137 Ibid 
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The emphasis on sovereignty and national interest protection potentially 
underlines the concerns about the subordination of their national interests and 
institutions to foreign influence, which is one of the common objections against 
the adoption of a universalist approach in a cross-border insolvency regime.138 
This can influence policy choices to be made in formulation of the law in many 
respects including a total refusal to recognise foreign proceedings. However, a 
total refusal is unlikely to be envisioned in the present context given the 
emphasis placed on attraction of foreign capital through the creation of a 
conducive legal environment, and participation in global markets and 
international co-operation generally.  
It may be argued that the policy perspectives point to cautiousness that the 
countries under study would wish to exercise in cross-border insolvency co-
operation as opposed to blindly and automatically recognising, cooperating and 
deferring in all foreign proceedings. The cautiousness is arguably in relation to 
the quest for fairness to the local interests on a case-by-case basis and avoiding 
any detrimental effect the foreign proceedings might have to the local interests. 
The perspective might thus be said to envisage different safeguard measures that 
may be put in place by any local jurisdiction. Indeed, such safeguard measures 
could reflect those stipulated under articles 22 and 23 of the Model Law. Clearly, 
the ability to refuse co-operation that would prejudice local interests, and 
invoking some measures designed to safeguard the local interests against 
prejudice as the countries under study co-operate in the proceedings, could be 
among such measures. With the exception of some foreign countries that may 
have the benefit of enjoying automatic recognition and co-operation, 
consideration of cooperating with other countries may be subject to a 
determination as to whether or not recognition should be granted and 
determining an appropriate mode of co-operation that could retain some kind of 
control for the local jurisdiction. Determining an appropriate mode of co-
operation may thus warrant offering co-operation through ancillary or parallel 
                                                            
138 See text to n 72, 74 and 75 above. See also JAE Pottow, ‘Greed and Pride in International 
Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”’ (2005-2006) 104 
Mich L Rev 1899 
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proceedings.139 A further consideration in this regard is to be had in ensuring 
clarity as to the conditions of recognition, and methods and effects of recognition 
and co-operation that ensue. This may include, for example, the conviction that 
the relevant foreign proceeding meets the domestic functions and requirements of 
an insolvency proceeding.140 This consideration may help address issues of 
efficiency, transparency, predictability and certainty in some ways. 
Enforceability of government tax and other public claims is another aspect that is 
implicit in the above mentioned policy perspective that relates to national 
interests.141 There might be need of considering the best way to enforce the tax 
liabilities from insolvent foreign enterprises. This is the case because the 
proceedings may be taking place in a foreign jurisdiction which does not enforce 
foreign tax claims in favour of foreign tax authorities. One option available is 
cooperating in proceedings whilst undertaking to pay such claims locally before 
transferring the insolvent enterprise’s property to the foreign jurisdiction.142 This 
option is only possible if the enterprise has assets in the local jurisdictions. 
Indeed, most of the multinational enterprises that could be involved in insolvency 
proceedings in the countries under study may have in one way or the other 
benefited from extended periods of tax holiday and other forms of incentives 
before becoming insolvent with huge back tax liabilities after operating for a 
while.143  
Certainly, the existing bilateral investment commitments that provide for a right 
to repatriation of capital may easily facilitate the transfer of everything belonging 
to such enterprises (in anticipation of insolvency proceedings or upon opening of 
insolvency proceedings in respect of them in foreign jurisdictions) leaving 
behind the local tax authorities and other claimants struggling to press for their 
                                                            
139 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 241 
140 Ibid 241 and 242 
141 See Tanzania (n 45) 2 and 3; Kenya (n 45) 
142 UNCITRAL Model Law on Insolvency art 13(2); and JL Westbrook (n 4) 877.  According to 
Westbrook, ‘[n]either fairness nor public reaction could abide permitting a foreign corporation to 
hoodwink local taxing authorities or otherwise milk the local public purse and then whisk away 
the local assets without payment of these public claims.’ 
143 Almost all investment promotion and protection related legislation in SSA to some extent 
guarantees generous tax holidays to foreign investors. See for example  Tanzania Investment Act 
1997s s 3 and 19 and Investment Promotion Act 2004 (Kenya) s 15 
295 
 
payment in a distant forum.144 In this regard, even if the local processing of the 
local claims could be practical, nothing will have been left in the insolvency 
estate. Besides, such countries may have potentially been left with a mess of 
environmental damage to clear and compensate the victims. In relation to this 
challenge, one possible policy decision is to provide for a disclosure requirement 
of information concerning insolvency of the company or its parent company or 
any sister company within a group.145 The other option worthy of considering its 
practicality is in according such kind of transfers that are motivated by 
anticipation of insolvencies, some voidable status in the nature of, or similar to, 
pre-bankruptcy preference or fraudulent disposals or transfers. 
The other instance emerging from the emphasis on sovereignty and national 
interest protection is on the theoretical framework on which the law should be 
situated. It is noteworthy that one of the arguments levelled against universalism 
by the territorialists is that universalism intolerably compromises sovereignty and 
national interests.146 Accordingly, the policy choices that might be considered 
and made in relation to this instance point to modified universalism as an 
appropriate theoretical framework and are a subject of discussion in the 
following part. 
7.5 Modified Universalism As an Appropriate Theoretical Approach for 
SSA Situations    
In the context of the cross-border insolvency theories, the question could be 
which theory corresponds with and is therefore relevant to the local policies of 
                                                            
144 Such practices are not novel in the world of cross-border insolvencies and practice. See JL 
Westbrook (n 6) 511 and 512, discussing how funds were transferred from England to the US 
after Lehman Bros filed for bankruptcy in the US and noting also that there is a further problem 
of a debtor transferring assets to the advantage of insiders at a time of financial distress. The right 
to repatriate is also incorporated in most of the SSA countries foreign protection and promotion 
legislation; and see also text to n 113, 114 and 115, 116 in chapter four; and Guide to Enactment 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency para 14, which notes that ‘[f]raud by 
insolvent debtors, in particular by concealing assets or transferring them to foreign jurisdictions, 
is an increasing problem, in terms of both its frequency and its magnitude. The modern, 
interconnected world makes such fraud easier to conceive and carry out. The cross-border 
cooperation mechanisms established by the Model Law are designed to confront such 
international fraud.’ 
145 UNCITRAL Model Law art 18 is an example of such requirement. For the purpose of the 
present argument, it is proposed that there is need for having a requirement which would apply to 
a foreign investor whenever transfer of funds is sought. Adoption of an effective law will 
minimise chances of such detrimental acts. 
146 JAE Pottow (n 138) 1915-1921 
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the countries under study. Arguably, a system that these countries might wish to 
formulate has to be developed from the standpoint of a country that, in the 
increasingly globalised economy, will regularly have to consider recognition of 
foreign proceedings and possibly to defer to other jurisdictions. Based on such 
perspectives, a responsible jurisdiction will have an incentive to safeguard its 
legitimate local interests against potential prejudices of a foreign jurisdiction and 
proceeding while endeavouring to compete in promoting foreign capital inflow 
and increasing its participation in global trade generally. 
On the one hand, much as the countries under study may wish to pursue a 
territorial approach in a bid to protect their legitimate local interests and provide 
special protection for some creditors, such endeavour is no longer realistic 
because of the policies and pragmatic reasons. The countries under study still 
heavily depend on, and actually attract and protect, foreign capital whilst their 
exports are predominantly characterised by primary commodities. Such 
dependence on the foreign capital and export trade of predominantly natural 
products effectively connects the countries under study to the operations of 
multinational enterprises and other foreign entities not necessarily of a 
multinational nature. This international commercial connection, as discussed in 
chapter four, increases the potential for the countries under study being involved 
in cross-border insolvency. Consistent with such dependence is the fact that even 
the national policies have been developed with consideration and cognisance of 
the international commerce and co-operation.147 For example, the policies take 
note of the growth of multinational corporations in both size and scope of 
involvement in pioneering economic globalisation and strategise to develop 
creative and active economic partnerships with the corporate world while 
presenting options as independent and sovereign countries.148  Arguably, it is 
contrary to the local policies, and the prevailing international commitments of the 
countries under study for the development of a cross-border insolvency 
                                                            
147 See n 56 above 
148 See n 45 above  
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framework to have just an inward focus without taking account of circumstances 
happening elsewhere and at global level.149 
On the other hand, even if such states were willing to commit to a pure 
universalist approach, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to implement it. 
Understandably, the nature of such countries’ economies may, in particular 
situations, have to adopt protective development measures for the local 
institutions and industries in order that they benefit through for instance “crowd 
in” effects from the inflows of foreign capital and trade.150 In some other 
situations, they may also be justified to institutionalise measures to protect small 
local creditors who are not sophisticated enough to pursue their claims 
remotely.151 Although extending special protection to legitimate local interests 
could be regarded as a ‘poor approach,’152 it might be a justified option at present 
for SSA countries rather than rapidly taking wholesale universalist reforms 
which are potentially open to resistance and risk of outright rejection. As shown 
above, almost all insolvency systems, including those that have long been tested, 
seem to accord some kind of protection to certain local interests that correlate 
with their local circumstances and values that are not shared by other 
jurisdictions.153 
Given the special significance of foreign investment and trade to the economic 
growth and poverty reduction strategies, and the bilateral commitments that the 
countries under study might have, it is unlikely that the protection of local 
claimants can be expected to entail discriminating against foreign stakeholders 
beyond the limit stipulated in the existing international insolvency 
benchmarks.154 Rather, states, in the protection of local interests, may only 
undertake to provide adequate protection against prejudice and inconvenience 
that local interests (e.g local creditors) may be exposed to or be subjected to in a 
                                                            
149 JL Westbrook (n 1) 227 and 228 
150 Text to part 4.7 in chapter 4. See also M Agosin and R Machado (n 62) 152  
151 See for example, Tanzania (n 47) 27 which recognise that one of the critical issues…[is] 
[a]dopting an appropriate framework of measures for…safeguarding domestic industry and 
economic activity threatened by liberalisation including identification of sectors to be protected,  
the rationale and costs of protection….’ 
152 JL Westbrook (n 6) 514 
153 See for example, JL Westbrook (n 4) 869; and  text to n 31 above 
154 See text to n 101 and 102 above 
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foreign proceeding or enforcement of a foreign law. This perhaps includes 
having the distribution of proceeds being effected in accordance with, or the 
same as undertaken by, the laws of the countries under study. The importance of 
this consideration reflects an observation made with regard to the protection of 
local interests under the US Chapter 15 which is the US version of the Model 
Law: 
The requirement of sufficient protection of domestic creditors before 
turning the assets over to a foreign representative allows the state to 
safeguard the interests of its constituents, thus letting it fulfil its duty 
while submitting to the foreign law. This mixed approach seems to 
provide the best of both worlds: protecting the interests of local 
creditors in cases where the value of assets located in a particular 
jurisdiction is greater than the debt owed to local creditors and, at the 
same time, allowing foreign recovery in cases where the debt owed to 
local creditors is greater than the assets located in that jurisdiction. 
The success of such system, however, hinges upon just the right 
balance between universalism and territorialism. There is a fine line 
that the courts need not cross in order to preserve the integrity of the 
system: providing local creditors some protection while maintaining 
deference to the foreign law.155  
An appropriate choice that is commensurate with the local circumstances of the 
countries under study is adopting a regime that is based on a strictly modified 
universalist approach which provides the flexibility needed by such countries. 156 
The flexibility has the potential of allowing such countries to recognise foreign 
proceedings and cooperate accordingly to the extent permitted by the local 
policies while viewing the entire proceedings from a global perspective.157 If the 
local jurisdiction determines that local interests would be treated fairly in the 
foreign main proceedings, they can then condition the protection of assets within 
their jurisdiction from local creditors’ claims on the main proceedings’ assurance 
                                                            
155 KV Proskurchenko ‘Chapter 15 Cross-Border Insolvency: Is it True to Its Universalism 
Aspirations?  (2008) 5 Rutgers Bus LJ 96, 112-113. Notably, the US enactment of the Model 
Law is largely faithful to the text of the Model Law which is not surprising given the US’ lead 
role in the drafting of the Model Law. 
156 JL Westbrook (n 10) 2302 and 2324, stating that ‘Modified universalism is "modified" 
precisely because it permits local courts to evaluate foreign law and foreign courts before 
deferring to a main proceeding.’; See also, JAE Pottow (n 138 ) 1915-1919, stating that 
‘Modified universalism replaces the “must” of deference to the home country’s bankruptcy 
laws…..with a “may.”’ 
157 JL Westbrook (n 10) 2301.  Notably, national interests, sovereignty, independence issues and 
selective co-operation which potentially link with the proposition for a flexible approach are 
central aspects emerging from the national policies discussed above. 
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that there will be a special distribution of those assets in a way that protects the 
local interests.158 This might be viewed as a weaker form of modified 
universalism. However, it appears to be the most appropriate approach for any 
cross-border insolvency law reform initiative in the countries under study, based 
on the incremental grounds discussed in chapter two and three of this thesis and 
the prevailing historical, political and socio-economic aspects in these countries.  
If the reverse is true, the local jurisdictions will be entitled to refuse to submit to 
the exterritorial effect of the foreign proceedings and will instead open parallel 
proceedings and administer the assets themselves.159 The suitability of this 
approach is in its flexibility which provides room for consideration of the extent 
to which the proceedings affect local interests as determined by the local 
policies. Perhaps the most suitable formulation of modified universalism on the 
basis of which a theoretical framework for any cross-border insolvency regime 
for the countries under study should be based is one that ‘…accepts the central 
premise of universalism, that assets should be collected and distributed on a 
worldwide basis, but reserves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of 
the home country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors.’160 
The exception, as above discussed, could be where there is separate and special 
co-operation arrangement that is based on the well-established trust derived from 
a ‘long-lasting common tradition plus a legal or economic interrelationship.’161 
Indeed, the modified universalism approach reflects the broad theoretical sense 
of legal systems and heritage of most SSA countries that have a common law 
background as has already been discussed.162 However, while this could be seen 
as supporting the argument for embracing the modified universalist approach, 
construction of such a framework must be mindful of the fact that the existing 
laws, including the relevant common law, have generally been in disuse. The 
                                                            
158 J Pae , ‘EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: The Need for a Modified Universal 
Approach’ (2004)27 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 555, 578 
159 JL Westbrook (n 10) 2301 
160 JL Westbrook (n  21) 517; and JL Westbrook (n 10) 2301 
161 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 240.  See also Tanzania (n 45) 3, which provides for placing 
due priority on consolidation of the traditional relations [Tanzania has] had with [other countries 
such as] her trading and development partners.’ 
162 Text to n 9-10 and 82-85 in chapter  5 
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other consideration is on the application of the common law which is subject to 
being compatible to local circumstances. All these seem to dictate and reiterate 
the need of crafting a simple, practical and realistic regime that is not only free 
from complexities but is also responsive to the characteristics of the developing 
economies and the limits beyond which they are unlikely to embrace.163  
Because of over dependence on foreign capital and the existence of long standing 
traditional and established relationship with some foreign countries including 
those emanating from such arrangements as the bilateral investment treaties, it 
seems that the countries under study must be careful in having such a flexibility 
in the law of deciding whether or not to cooperate and to whom such a law 
should apply.164 Apparently, any such decision may have far reaching 
implications for the inflow of the foreign capitals and trade co-operation with 
foreign countries. However, as it became clear in chapter four and chapter five, 
the bilateral investment commitments could be a hindrance in applying modified 
universalism, as it is likely to undermine the predictability and certainties and 
fair and equal treatment that the treaties seek to achieve.165  As discussed above, 
this is the very reason why the countries under study may need to consider 
having a different arrangement for contracting states under bilateral investment 
treaties, regional integration and with those that they may have outstanding 
relationship. 
7.6 A Critique of the Relevance and Suitability of Existing Initiatives  
In the foregoing discussions, it has been argued that modified universalism could 
be the most appropriate theoretical approach on the basis of which the countries 
under study should develop their respective cross-border insolvency frameworks. 
In the recent past, there have been significant achievements in the development 
of initiatives for dealing with cross-border insolvencies. These initiatives have 
                                                            
163 IF Fletcher, ‘Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global Standards and 
Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2006-2007) Brook J Int’l L 767, 774; and IF 
Fletcher, ‘European Union Convention on Insolvency proceedings: Choice of Law Provisions’ 
(1998) 33 Tex Int’l LJ 119, 124, and 139 
164 F Tung, ‘Is International Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Possible?’ (2001-2002) 23 Mich J Int’l L 31, 
67 
165 See text to n 66 and 67 in chapter 4 and text to part 5.3 and 5.4  in chapter  5 
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elsewhere been subjects of extensive scholarship thus far. The cross-border 
insolvency theories have been employed to explain these initiatives.166 It is 
common ground that most, if not all, such models are inclined towards 
universalism, although they represent examples more of a modified universalism 
than pure universalism. As discussed above, this is a clear reflection of the 
persistence of tension in the attempt to strike a balance between globalisation of 
trade and investment on one hand and containing local interests. As such, one 
dominant outcome of this tension is having regimes that reflect modified 
universalism which advocates of universalism describe as a transition towards 
universalism.167  
For the present purposes, the outstanding initiatives thus far are the Model Law, 
the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (“ECIR”) and for the SSA region, 
the OHADA Uniform Organising Collective Proceedings (“OHADA Law”).168 
The question is whether and to what extent such initiatives are relevant to the 
circumstances of the countries under study in so far as development of an 
appropriate framework for their cross-border insolvency is concerned. To the 
extent that the initiatives considerably reflect a modified universalism, they are 
relevant. However, the question remains how and to what extent. The relevance 
of such initiatives is explored below based on the policy perspectives that 
emerged from the analysis of the selected national policies of the countries under 
study and the relevant historical context that is characterised by what has hitherto 
and at least in theory been in place in dealing with cross-border insolvencies. It is 
in this discussion that the relevance and suitability of the Model Law as an 
appropriate initiative in adopting the modified universalism and the local 
interests is made.  It is also under this part whereby a consideration is made as to 
how crafting a regional cross-border regime using East Africa Community 
(“EAC”) as a case study can be done based on the existing regional initiatives 
and the relevant historical contexts.  
                                                            
166 See for example, JL Westbrook (n 10) 2276 - 2277; LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative 
Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (2002) 98 Mich L Rev 2216, 2218; and Pae (n 158) 
167 JL Westbrook (n 101) 9; and RK. Rasmussen, ‘Where Are All the Transnational 
Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for Universalism’, (2007) 32 Brook J Int‘l L 983, 983 
168 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 246 - 265 
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7.6.1 Customising the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency for Respective SSA Countries: Is it Possible and Suitable? 
The relevance of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as it relates to 
specific concerns that arise from the policy perspectives has already been 
addressed in the respective sections above and which need not to be repeated. 
What is important in the present context is to consider how the Model Law as a 
governing framework can well be adapted to reflect such concerns among others 
which mainly reflect protection of local interests.  
To be sure the Model Law is ‘designed to assist states to equip their insolvency 
laws with a modern, harmonised and fair framework to address more effectively 
instances of cross-border insolvency.’169 It is designed to operate by allowing a 
foreign representative to apply for recognition,170 determining whether the 
foreign proceeding is main or non-main, and granting the appropriate relief and 
circumstances on basis of which different measures may be invoked to protect 
creditors, debtors and other interested persons. It provides that the court must 
decide whether or not to recognise the foreign proceeding and, if recognised, 
how to recognise the proceeding, including the nature of the proceeding on 
whether it is main or non-main proceeding. Accordingly, when a proceeding is 
recognised as a foreign main proceeding, all the local legal actions are stayed, the 
debtor’s insolvency is accordingly proved and consequent proceeding is pursued 
if the debtor has assets in the state.171 One notable assumption of the Model Law 
is that recognition of a foreign proceeding does not restrict the right to initiate a 
domestic proceeding which can accordingly be given local priority as against the 
foreign proceeding.172 However, whenever there are two or more proceedings 
pending, the Model Law provides for their co-ordination by means of co-
operation. Such co-operation may entail and be reflected in the support for the 
                                                            
169 Guide to Enactment, para 1; BM Devling, ‘The Continuing Vitality of the Territorial 
Approach to Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2001-2002) 70 UMKC L Rev 435, 444 
170 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 15 
171 Text to n 144 above. There is a risk that a multinational enterprise will not apply for 
recognition in a local country where it is capable of marshalling the assets without involvement 
of the local court and local law. This seems to be potentially possible for most SSA countries 
given the implementation of bilateral investment treaties that provide right for transfer and 
expropriation of funds and capital. A proper and effective regulation as above suggested will 
ensure transparency. For a discussion on the right to transfer capital and funds see text to Part 
4.5.2.4 in chapter 4 
172 JL Westbrook (n 1) 248 & 249 
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foreign representative, recognition of dividend in respective proceedings, and 
turnover of local assets for distribution in the main proceedings and handing over 
of surplus in a non-main proceedings to the main proceeding.173 
The question is whether the Model Law is well positioned to accommodate the 
local policy perspectives of the countries under study without marginalising its 
basic features, ideas and affecting its utility. This is arguably possible given its 
‘partial and rather abstract provisions’174 and the fact that it is ideally meant to be 
used as templates for adaptation. One element of the preamble to the Model Law 
directly correlates to the national policy endeavours for poverty reduction 
through job creation and ensuring that those that are already in employment do 
not lose their jobs, stipulating that the Model Law seeks to ‘provide effective 
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency so as to promote 
the objective of facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, 
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.’175 It appears that a 
well customised version of the Model Law has the ability to protect local 
interests whilst also signing to recognition of international insolvency interests. 
However, paragraph 12 of the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law explicitly 
states that while countries are free to make any changes they see fit, ‘…in order 
to achieve a satisfactory degree of harmonization and certainty, it is 
recommended that States make as few changes as possible in incorporating the 
Model Law into their legal systems.’176 Such recommendation is reinforced by 
article 8 of the Model Law which requires courts to have regard to the 
international origins of domestic implementing legislation – which does entail 
some degree of commitment to participating in an international interpretive 
community dominated by the leading common law countries and economies, 
                                                            
173 See for example UNCITRAL Model Law art 32 
174 JL Westbrook and another (n 1) 250, contending that as the Model Law does not ‘go too 
deeply into details and that important features are …left aside….it leaves the interested countries 
much space to fill the gaps individually.’ 
175 UNCITRAL Model Law art 68 
176 See also the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide para 13 [pg 13] and para 66 [pg 271]. The Guide 
recognises that insolvency laws must balance the interests of the debtors’ stakeholders against the 
relevant social, political, and other policy considerations that have an impact on the economic 
and legal goals of insolvency proceedings. 
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especially, the UK, US, Australia, and Canada which are generating Model Law 
jurisprudence.  
Accordingly, states seem to have space, with some restriction as above noted, to 
decide for themselves which part(s) of the Model Law they incorporate into their 
legislation and to what extent. It is thus not surprising that the Model Law has 
been adopted differently by different jurisdictions.177 It is therefore safe to say 
that customisation of the Model law is reasonably possible as far as it is seen fit 
to reflect national peculiarities and does not affect the certainty and predictability 
that are sought to be achieved by its adoption.178 Besides, the adaptation of the 
Model Law is not meant to displace local laws or to limit the court’s power to 
provide additional assistance in a cross-border insolvency setting. This is 
particularly so if an action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of 
the countries under study.179 
From the perspectives of the countries under study, the Model Law offers a 
useful framework in the following respect.180 Firstly, it offers the opportunity to 
make decisions as to whether or not to recognise and, if recognising, the nature 
of co-operation that should be provided. This means space and maximum 
flexibility for these countries to consider the extent to which co-operation 
through deference, or any other relief available, could prejudice the countries’ 
local interests. It seems that making the most of this flexibility requires expertise 
                                                            
177 See generally, LC Ho (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency: A Commentary on the UNCITRAL 
Model Laws 2nd edn (Globe Business, London 2009) 
178 BM Devling (n 169) 447 while referring to Guide to Enactment states that ‘…if a nation 
chooses to adopt the Model Law, that nation is free to amend or delete provisions. The scope of 
the Model Law is limited to the procedural aspects of cross-border insolvencies. The law is not 
intended to alter the enacting nation’s substantive insolvency laws.’ 
179 Notably, the UNCITRAL Model Law has been criticised in this context in that it ‘..leaves 
open the possibility of discrimination in the application of priorities when distributing assets to 
creditors.’ See, C Farley, ‘An Overview, Survey, and Critique of Administrating Cross-Border 
Insolvencies’ (2004-2005) 27 Hous J Int’l L 181, 216 citing in support JM Goffman and EA 
Michael, ‘Navigating Through a Multinational Restructuring: Cross-Border Insolvencies, 
Proceedings and Workouts, Cross-Border Insolvencies: A Comparative Examination of 
Insolvency Laws of Industrialised Countries (American Bankruptcy Institute 5th Ann, New York 
2003) 
180 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 250, noting that the very nature of the Model Law ‘…add some 
attractiveness to it since it leaves the interested countries much space to fill the gaps [left by it] 
individually’ 
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and practical experience in dealing with cross-border insolvency matters which is 
hugely lacking in these countries. 
Second, it seems possible for the Model Law to be adopted to also deal with 
cross-border insolvencies that concern proceedings from foreign countries that 
maintain bilateral co-operation arrangements with the countries under study and 
perhaps other countries that have close ties with the countries under study. The 
underlying basis is the mutual relationship and trust that exists between the 
countries and which makes it possible, under the Model Law, to extend 
automatic recognition and co-operation to such countries in cross-border 
insolvencies and, as appropriate, according treatments to foreign creditors and 
debtors from contracting states that correspond with the standards stipulated in 
the respective bilateral investment treaties and such other international co-
operation arrangements. There is scope for arguing that alongside this approach, 
such general provisions for recognition (subject to fulfilment of certain 
conditions) of proceedings originating from other countries can be maintained.  
It would follow that all other countries that are not subject to the automatic 
recognition may only enjoy recognition and co-operation on a case-by case basis 
if there is sufficient fulfilment of the conditions set forth (e.g the conviction that 
the foreign proceeding fulfils the domestic functions and desirable features of an 
insolvency proceeding) or that it is otherwise in the public interest to extend such 
co-operation.181 Mauritius’s law that has recently adopted the Model Law seems 
to be based on this reasoning, though it requires the existence of an agreement 
for the mutual recognition of insolvency proceedings with any foreign 
jurisdiction (notwithstanding any prevailing long standing relationship) that 
provides appropriate protection for the interests of debtors and creditors in 
                                                            
181 It has been argued that full and willing co-operation is only achievable through the existence 
of an appropriate international agreement. See for instance PJ Omar (n 107) 173; and ML Nauta 
and F Bulten, ‘Introduction to Spanish Cross-Border Insolvency Law-An Adequate Connection 
with Existing International Insolvency Legislation’ (2009) 18 Int’l Insolv Rev 59, 71 and 72; and 
K Yamauchi, ‘Should Reciprocity Be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency?’(2007)16 Int’l Insolv Rev 145; and LC Ho (n 177) 11 and 12 
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Mauritius.182 Much as this corresponds with the perspectives that emerge from 
the policies, consideration must be had to the pros and cons of various forms of 
reciprocity in cross-border insolvencies, and as mentioned earlier, the extent to 
which foreign jurisdictions might have incentive to strike agreements for the 
mutual recognition of insolvency proceedings with the countries under study. 
Incentive for concluding such agreements cannot be guaranteed as it largely 
depends on the extent of the capital flow and trade between the countries.  
Indeed, failure to conclude such agreements will have a direct consequence of 
making the law inapplicable. 
The Legislative Guide, which recommends that states enact the Model Law, 
encourages the use of lex fori concursus in determining the applicable law in 
cross-border insolvencies and advocates that the forum state's laws should 
control "all aspects of the commencement, conduct, administration and 
conclusion"183of the proceeding. Given the significance of requirement of trust 
which is also reflected in the policy perspectives, this could be made to have 
direct effect only to countries that have traditional and long established 
relationships; concluded bilateral investment treaties with the countries under 
study; or those that are member states in the same regional integration groupings. 
It might also be applied within the context of an agreement for mutual co-
operation among contracting parties, as above discussed. A potential problem is 
in relation to the ability of the countries under study to exercise independent 
views and wishes as to how best they should enact the Model Law in to a 
domestic law.184 
7.6.2 Searching for a Framework for a Regional Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regulation  
One of the striking features of the national policies of the countries under study is 
the emphasis placed on regional co-operation and integration matters. Indeed, 
Tanzania and Kenya are among SSA countries that are member states of several 
                                                            
182 See Insolvency Act 2009 (Mauritius) ss 366 and 368. It is not clear whether the existing 
bilateral investment treaties may be held to fall within the scope of the envisioned agreement for 
mutual co-operation. 
183 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (Recommendation 31) 
184 See for example text to n 85 in chapter 3 
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regional integration arrangements.185  The policies reflect the aspiration and the 
need to strengthen and cooperate in regional integrations. As trade and 
investment expand and grow due to the enlargement of the market in a regional 
integration, competitiveness increases and thus also the potentialities for cross-
border insolvencies affecting the member states. While addressing the challenge 
of cross-border insolvencies at a national level is a step in the right direction, 
cross-border insolvencies with a regional and global flavour would necessarily 
require a regime that reflects the objectives of the regional integration and one 
that will encourage trading and investing across the regional integration.186  
These objectives point to a regional approach to cross-border insolvency that 
might arguably influence the manner of adoption of a framework such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. As discussed in the previous section, the Model Law 
can well be customised and adapted in a manner that is commensurate with the 
local policy perspectives. 
7.6.2.1 Benefiting from Selected Regional Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regimes 
In considering a framework on the basis of which regional cross-border 
insolvency for SSA countries can be developed, one must have regard to the 
existing cross-border insolvency regimes crafted for regional integration 
purposes. The first is the ECIR which provides a coordinating measure for co-
operation in cross-border insolvency matters among EU member states.187 The 
ECIR has potentials of having possible influence in SSA owing to the following 
facts. On the one hand is the historical influence that Europe has had on SSA for 
centuries, which is clearly apparent in the legal systems of all SSA states.188 And 
                                                            
185 Text to n 137 in chapter 4. On average each SSA country is a member of at least two regional 
integrations 
186 JL Westbrook (n 101) 38 and 39. Westbrook underscores the importance of having regional 
integration being also ‘part of the continuing expansion of economic ties among all nations 
around the world.’ And that they should ‘avoid the reality, or even the appearance of creating a 
“club” that looks only inward.’ 
187 A Walters and A Smith, ‘“Bankruptcy Tourism” under the EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings: A View from England and Wales’ (2010) 19 Int’l  Insolv Rev 181 
188 These ties also explain why much of the bilateral investment treaties that SSA countries have 
concluded thus far were with developed countries from Europe. Notably, it is clear from the 
existing literature that the OHADA cross-border insolvency regime was also heavily influenced 
by the ECIR. However, OHADA was in fact implemented earlier than the ECIR because of the 
time spent in negotiating the EU regime. 
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on the other hand is the economic influence that Europe has through the EPA and 
similar arrangements discussed in chapter four which entail a requirement for 
African countries to undertake reform, implement the rule of law, good 
governance, and undertake further liberalisation of trade and investments.189 The 
second is the OHADA Law discussed in chapter six of this thesis and which is 
highly regarded as the only SSA regional based cross-border insolvency 
regime.190 The other is the little known historical East African arrangement 
discussed in chapter six of this thesis and which is in this thesis referred in brief 
as BRR.191 As is the case for the OHADA Law, BRR is based on uniform law 
and practice among member states. While these regimes offer some lessons for 
crafting a regional based cross-border insolvency regime for regional integrations 
that do not have one, it is not necessarily the case that they all present workable 
models for wholesale transplantation by SSA regional arrangements without 
adaptation to reflect local situations, traditions and values. 
Clearly, uniformity and divergence of domestic insolvency systems in member 
states in the respective regional arrangements are the crucial factors that shaped 
the nature of such regimes. The divergence or uniformity reflects the extent to 
which the concerned member states differ or share similar history, culture, and 
other aspects of the local circumstances. This means that because of the widely 
differing substantive insolvency laws based on territorial sentiments and 
protection of local interests, it is in many instances difficult to have a regional 
system that provides for commencement of proceedings having universal scope 
and effect under its applicable law throughout the member states of the relevant 
                                                            
189 Notably, the approach of the EU towards SSA countries especially within the context of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (“EPA”) is mainly through the SSA regional groupings rather 
than individual countries. This is also the case with the current US approach. See text to  n 48, 
144, 145, 150, 168 and 169 in chapter 4 
190 See text to n 16-18 in chapter 1; and text to part 6.7.3 in chapter 6. See also B Martor, N 
Pilkington, DS Sellers and S Thouvenot, Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the 
Harmonization Process (Kogan Page, London 2002) 191 and 192; and JL Westbrook and others 
(n 1) 247 
191 See text to part 6.5.1, 6.5.2 and 6.7.1 in chapter 6.  For a historical application of the BRR see, 
IR MacNeil, Bankruptcy Law in East Africa (Dar es salaam University College, Dar es salaam 
1966). One theory that explains the non-application of this legal regime is the socio-economic 
condition that prevailed after independence following policies that were pursued by most SSA 
countries including Tanzania and Kenya.  
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regional grouping.192 The implication is that the process leading to conclusion of 
a workable regime may be protracted and tedious. A practical solution is to 
attempt to balance the different interests in order that the proposed system 
becomes relevant and practical. 193  
The ECIR offers a good example of how universal jurisdiction may be limited in 
some ways on account of, or in order to, protect the divergent legitimate local 
interests whilst guaranteeing legal certainty in proceedings.194 The treatment of 
security interests, the right to set-off, reservation of title, contracts relating to 
immovable property, payment systems, and financial markets, employment 
contracts, rights subject to registration and detrimental acts offer an example of 
how compromise was struck between the conflicting interests and yet at the 
expense of having a universal jurisdiction.195 Accordingly, it is such inherent 
differences in such policy aspects among the EU member states that determined 
and shaped the regime’s approach,196 notwithstanding the fact that the region in 
which the ECIR operates is leading the world in having a highly integrated 
market.197  
Notably, most countries and regional integrations in SSA have more or less 
similar history, culture, socio-economic circumstances and legal background. It 
must also be added that with the liberalisation drive, it is also a fact that national 
policies that have hitherto been adopted for these countries share similar 
objectives, aspirations, needs, and priorities while the preoccupation of fighting 
poverty through economic growth and sustainable development is their central 
premise. Indeed, one reason for such similarities in the policies is the influence 
of the Washington Consensus policies which have been reflected in the IMF and 
World Bank reform prescriptions for developing economies. This kind of 
uniformity is a crucial factor insofar as harmonisation within some, if not all, 
                                                            
192 A Walters and A Smith (n187) 186 
193 B Wessels, ‘The European Union Insolvency Regulation: An Overview with Trans-Atlantic 
Elaborations’ (2003) Ann Surv Bankr L 481, 491 
194 See ECIR arts 6, 7, 8, 11 and 10. For a discussion of this issue, and in particular how certain 
aspects  were carved from the general choice of law rule, see SM Franken, ‘Three Principles of 
Transnational Corporate Bankruptcy Law: A Review’ (2005) 11 Eur L J 232, 254 
195 See ECIR art 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 13; and SM Franken (n 194) 254 
196 A Walters (n 187) 9; and S Davydenko and J Franks (n 9) 565; and J Pae (n 158) 568 
197 See text to n 51 in chapter 3 
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SSA regional integrations is concerned.  The EAC which traditionally consisted 
of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda and more recently, Rwanda and Burundi, as its 
new members, is an example in this regard. While Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
have an English common law background, Rwanda and Burundi have a civil law 
background.  
Given that the majority of EAC member states are of the English common law 
background, there is merit to consider whether there is still potential for 
harmonisation of the insolvency laws of member states and the possibility of 
having a regime that provides for proceedings having universal scope and effect 
across member states. One point discussed in chapter six of this work that must 
be raised in this connection is the fact that the EAC, as it is for all other regional 
integrations in SSA, implements the policy of harmonisation of all laws, 
especially those related to trade and investment with a view to creating a 
sustainable environment for cross-border trade and investment across the region 
through inter alia the enlargement of the regional market.198  
Despite some inherent weaknesses, there are positive developments in other 
sectors which in fact add to the need for having a uniform cross-border 
insolvency regime for the entire community.199 This would mean taking a 
different approach from one taken by the EU in some respects for reasons that 
will become clear in the discussion below. The foundation for such endeavour is 
in the BRR regime that, though forgotten, is still potentially in force between 
member states of the traditional East African region that includes Tanzania and 
Kenya. If harmonisation of cross-border insolvency law is pursued, it means that 
the region will have made one step towards eradication of the potential problems 
                                                            
198 See Treaty for the Establishment of East Africa Community, art 8(4) and (5). It is on the basis 
of such provision that the EAC established the Task Force on Approximation of National Laws in 
EAC context and a Project on harmonisation of commercial law which is still under 
implementation. It is also worth noting that East Africa Community is in the process of finalising 
its Industrialisation Policy and Strategy which will provide a detailed regional framework for co-
operation in the field of industrial and SME development. The goal of co-operation in industrial 
development is to enable Partner States to collectively and individually attain accelerated, 
harmonious, and balanced development, as outlined in Article 5 of the Treaty of the 
Establishment. See < http://www.eac.int/about-eac/events.html  > accessed 13 Novwem2011 
199 See text to n 226 and 227 in Chapter 6 
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of forum shopping,200 which is not uncommon in other regional communities, 
such as the EU and the North America Free Trade Agreement countries 
(“NAFTA”) mostly between the US and Mexico.201  
Since harmonisation of insolvency laws is the basis of the OHADA, there seem 
to be two opposing options to be considered. The first is the feasibility and 
practicality of other SSA countries, such as Tanzania and Kenya joining the 
regime. The second is to craft a cross-border insolvency regime that is based on 
the OHADA model; but one that is mindful of the EAC circumstances, including 
the BRR that has been in place from the colonial administration era. The first 
option could be desirable for the interests of the whole of SSA and one that could 
be pursued within the context of the African Union (“AU”) in the longer term.202 
On the contrary, the second option is more feasible and if pursued will provide a 
foundation towards the adoption and implementation of an African-wide cross-
border insolvency regime in the longer term.203  
In the context of formulating a modern regime for EAC, as it might be the case 
for other regional integrations in SSA, consideration and resolution will need to 
be made in three aspects. The first is on the issue of whether or not the centre of 
main interest (“COMI”) test should be used as the only jurisdiction test.  This is 
contrasted by the presence of the debtor’s assets cum the ‘first proceedings to be 
commenced’204 test which is applicable in the BRR that has hitherto been in 
place between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.205 In the event of concurrent 
proceedings being opened in more than one member state under the BRR, the 
jurisdiction to continue and administer the proceeding having universal scope 
                                                            
200 JAE Pottow, ‘The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency’, 
(2007) 32 Brook J Int‘L L 785, 787, and 792 
201 See for instance, A Walters and A Smith (n 187); G McCormack, ‘Reconstructing European 
Insolvency Law - Putting in Place a New Paradigm’ (2010) 30 Legal Stud 126 ; WG Ringe, 
‘Forum Shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2008) 9 Eur Bus Organisation LR 579 ;  
and JG Canedo (n 32) 25 & 28 
202 For further views in relation to this point see text to n 261 and 262 in Chapter  6 
203 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 247 and 248 
204 See text to n 191-194 in chapter 6 for a detailed treatment of this test along with its 
corresponding provisions of law in Tanzania and Kenya. 
205 This test can be compared with the test that applies in the ECIR when two or more 
proceedings in two or more member states are opened as main proceedings. 
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and effect throughout the member states will vest in a member state that, apart 
from having the presence of some of the debtor’s assets, was the first to 
commence the proceedings.206 This effectively leads to rescission and/or 
dismissal of the other proceedings and/or any order issued under it.207  The 
second aspect concerns whether or not there should be secondary proceedings in 
other member states other than one that has controlling jurisdiction with 
universal scope and effect and, if so, under what circumstances and how they 
should relate to the main proceedings.208 And the third aspect is in relation to 
making the regime ‘part of the continuing expansion of economic ties among all 
nations around the world.’209 
While the COMI test applicable in the ECIR and in the OHADA Law (as the 
principal place of business of the debtor) is in accord with the international 
insolvency benchmarks, it has proved to have practical complications.210 The 
most notable one is its potential problems of forum shopping and difficulty of 
ascertainability by third parties. In the EAC context, for example, the implication 
that the COMI approach may have, is having the COMI often located in a few 
specific countries, and more particularly in Kenya. Although, this is not that bad, 
it has potentials of having far reaching and negative implications for the future of 
the community. This is understandable from the historical, political and socio-
economic points of view which are worth noting herein below.  
Most businesses are likely to have their administration headquartering in Kenya, 
which is considered as being relatively more advanced than the other member 
states. This means that most of the businesses are likely to have their COMI in 
Kenya.211 Indeed, Kenya has had a far more liberalised economy than any of the 
                                                            
206 Text to n 192 in Chapter 6 
207 Text to n 194 in Chapter 6. See also JL Westbrook (n 4) 873-875, describing how dismissal 
solution could be effective in resolving the problem of local rules constraining co-operation in 
cross-border insolvency. 
208 See text to n 195-198 in Chapter  6 
209 JL Westbrook (n 101) 38 and 39 
210 G McCormack (n 201) 126. McCormack describes the COMI as a fatal flaw at the heart of the 
ECIR.  
211 Indeed, the Treaty establishing the EAC recognises asymmetry as a core principle 
underpinning the formation of the EAC custom union. It is justified on the basis of the 
understanding that the three countries are at different levels of economic development. 
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other member states within the EAC. Above all, Kenya has all along been 
regarded as the most advantaged of all other member states because of reasons 
which trace their origin from the British administration in the East African 
region.212 In fact, the British administration made Kenya, which was the only 
settler colony in East Africa, the central headquarter of the whole of the East 
Africa High Commission.  To be sure, this is one of the common features in most 
regional integrations in SSA which should be given thought in any attempt to 
develop a regional cross-border insolvency regime.213 
A reflection from a few of the old cases in which the test of location of assets 
cum the first proceeding to be commenced was invoked shows that it did not 
pose any difficulty whatsoever.214 However, there is scope for arguing that the 
domestic courts of member states may potentially have incentive to expedite the 
opening of the proceedings. The incentive is in respect of anticipation of 
becoming the first to commence such proceedings, which could not only render 
subsequent proceedings in other member states rescinded or dismissed but also 
have universal scope and effect throughout the member states’ jurisdictions.  
The role of the former East African Court of Appeal in this regard could well be 
taken by the East Africa Court of Justice headquartered in Tanzania, as discussed 
in chapter six of this thesis.215 There could be some merits in integrating the 
COMI test within the test applicable in the BRR. For example, the COMI test can 
be made to apply only if it happens that two proceedings in two or more 
jurisdictions were commenced at the same time and filing of the respective 
petitions for the proceedings were made at the same time as well. It can also 
apply where it appears that ‘the estate and effects may be more conveniently 
                                                            
212 This was in fact one reason for the collapse of the former EAC in 1977. Notably, the revived 
EAC has made efforts to reflect and address that fact in most of its policies. 
213 The same seems to be the case for South Africa in SADC, Cameroon in OHADA, and Nigeria 
in ECOWAS,  
214 IR MacNeil (n 191), discussing cases that entailed application of the BRR. Notably, since this 
regime is based on location of assets, there could still be potentials for litigation over the legal 
location of assets instead of litigation over the COMI. 
215 Text to n 231- 234 in Chapter 6 
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administered, managed and [perhaps even] distributed’216 in the country where 
the COMI of the debtor is located. 
The implication of harmonisation of cross-border insolvency law makes it 
necessary to consider whether and, if so, to what extent, secondary proceedings 
should be allowed to co-exist with the main and controlling proceedings. The 
general approach taken by the BRR is such that the controlling proceedings have 
direct effect and force in other states where a debtor has assets in the same 
manner in all respects as if commenced and made in such states.217  
The insolvency administrator appointed in the main proceedings under the BRR 
in another member state may either act directly or opt to require the official 
receiver of the another country where the debtor has assets to act as his agent 
either in regard to any specific matter, or generally to take all such steps as may 
be lawful for the discovery, seizure, protection, disclaimer or realisation of any 
property of the bankrupt situated within such other country.218 Any such 
proceedings opened against a debtor in other states whilst similar proceeding had 
already been first opened in another member state (where the debtor has assets) 
must be rescinded, annulled or dismissed (as the case may be) in deference to the 
proceeding that was the first to be opened.219 Although this approach is based on 
uniformity of laws, the termination of the other proceedings in deference to the 
first opened proceeding in another member state would ideally solve any 
potential problem of local rules constraining co-operation.220 This approach is 
contrasted from one that characterises the ECIR and OHADA which allow 
competent courts in other member states to open secondary proceedings and 
provide for a co-operation requirement between the main proceedings and 
secondary proceedings. Indeed, an absence of secondary proceedings has 
                                                            
216 See for example Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(4); and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 162(4) 
217 See for instance Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 159 and Bankruptcy Act (Kenya) s 160 which 
both read ‘[a]ny order, warrant or search made or issued by a reciprocating court shall be 
enforced by the court [ in Tanzania/ of Kenya] in the same manner in all respects as if such order, 
warrant or search warrant had been made or issued by itself.’  
218 In Re Plataniotis [1958] EA217 (Kenya) ; and IR Macneil (n 191) 215-219 
219 See for instance, Bankruptcy Act (Tanzania) s 161(4). For a discussion of a more or less 
similar approach which involve dismissal of one proceeding in deference to one that was first to 
be opened and its advantages and obstacles see, JL Westbrook (n 4) 874-877 
220 JL Westbrook (n 4) 874 
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potentials to enhance any business’s chance of rescue, at least if key assets are 
situated in member states which would otherwise constitute secondary 
proceedings jurisdictions.221 It also adds towards speed and efficiency of the 
proceedings which is always of utmost importance in cross-border cases.222 
However, since the BRR provides a very limited space within which concurrent 
proceedings may occur,223 if such a regime were to be developed and 
modernised, it could be important to include in it in an explicit manner the duty 
to cooperate between such proceedings as such a requirement at the moment is 
not clearly stated. 
The approach reflected in the BRR seems to be relevant for Tanzania and Kenya 
in the context of the present EAC. This is on account of its historical and cultural 
basis, let alone the fact that it had albeit for some decades ago, been tested and 
proved to have worked well. It is also justified by the extent of harmonisation, 
which to a great extent dates from the colonial period; and the small number of 
countries involved in the arrangement.  
The joining of the civil jurisdictions of Rwanda and Burundi in the East Africa 
Community is likely not to impede the level and extent of harmonisation and 
adoption of the regime based on the BRR for the EAC, which now comprises 
Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Although these countries seem 
to have different legal systems and culture, they share much of their historical, 
geo-political, economic, philosophical, dialect and other cultural backgrounds, 
which are more deeply rooted to the societies than the legal system and legal 
culture. More importantly, Rwanda and Burundi have so far been undertaking 
reforms which signify transformation of their civil law based legal systems and 
                                                            
221 A parallel can be drawn from the lessons that can be drawn and learnt from the case of Re 
Collins & Aikman Corp. Group [2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch) whereby avoiding opening of 
secondary proceedings enabled the administrators to achieve the purpose of administration on 
group-wide basis. See G Moss, ‘Group Insolvency-Choice of Forum and Law: The European 
Experience under the Force of English Pragmatism’ (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 1005, 1017-18 
222 JL Westbrook (n 1) 241 
223 Text to n 195 and 196 in chapter 6 
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culture towards the common law traditions.224 Such transformation is indeed part 
of the implications arising from the joining of the EAC. 
7.6.2.2  Adopting the Model Law by and for a Regional Integration 
As discussed above under part 7.6 in relation to the relevance and suitability of 
existing cross-border insolvency initiatives, it is arguably practical for the 
countries under study to customise the UNCITRAL Model Law to suit their 
circumstances. Using the EAC as a case study this part takes this point further by 
considering the adoption of the Model Law as a regional community instrument.  
Consideration of adoption of the Model Law as a regional community instrument 
is novel and raise questions of its practicality.225  Clearly, the Model Law does 
not envision its adoption as a regional community instrument. This is 
notwithstanding that the Model Law was significantly influenced by the 
development of the EU regional based cross-border insolvency regime226 and it 
was developed when the global phenomenon of countries to organise themselves 
in regional groupings was already common all over the world.  
The adoption of the Model Law as a regional  instrument and as part of the 
regional harmonisation and unification of laws policy requirement would be a 
very significant development that is commensurate with the need for enlargement 
of the markets that the regional communities, such as the EAC, seek to 
achieve.227 The implication of this endeavour, if pursued, would enable 
standardisation, harmonisation and unification of the procedures for dealing with 
                                                            
224 R Mugabe, EAC wants Rwanda, Burundi to adopt Common Law System< 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13914&article=16230 > accessed 25 May 2011;  
International Legal Assistance Consortium, Justice in Rwanda: An Assessment, 2007 < 
http://www.ilac.se/sites/default/files/Rwanda_Report_2007.pdf  > accessed 25 May 2011; 
Business Climate Legal and Institutional Reform, Overhauling Contract Enforcement: Lessons 
From Rwanda, March 2007  < 
http://www.bizclir.com/galleries/bestpractices/01.128.08BP17_Rwanda.pdf > accessed 25 May 
2011; USAID, Report on Rwanda Library Needs Assessment,  <  
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADU580.pdf  > accessed 25 May 2011 
225 For practicality and advantages of taking this approach within the context of a regional 
integration and issues that may arise in adopting and implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
see JL Westbrook (n 101) 38 and 39;  and JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 248 and 264 
226 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 255 
227 Text to n 201 above. See also SL Sempasa, ‘Obstacles to International Commercial 
Arbitration in African Countries’ (1992) 41 Int’l & Com L Q 387, 412 for this line of reasoning, 
and its socio-economic advantages. 
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cross-border insolvency involving non-member states in the same way as it has 
already been or is being effected in other aspects relating to trade and investment 
with non-member states. This will potentially encourage more intra and inter-
regional economies of scale and developing wider markets and large economic 
affiliations which are essential in producing infrastructure conducive for 
international business.228  The challenge is reflected in several questions that 
might need to be resolved when pursuing this approach. Westbrook captures the 
challenge when briefly considering the possibility of the adoption of the Model 
Law as a regulation under EU with respect to non-EU proceedings in the 
following words: 
...[T]here would obviously be some additional provision to consider. 
Perhaps one court could be given international jurisdiction to 
recognize foreign main proceedings under article 7. If so there could 
be questions like these: Could that court also grant interim relief 
effective throughout the community? Which law would apply under 
article 20? Could that court release assets found in all EU countries? 
229 
Notably, if the approach for regional regulation of cross-border insolvencies 
within the EAC which this thesis made a case for were adopted, it would provide 
a foundation for the adoption and implementation of a customised Model Law 
for the regional integration’s co-operation with foreign proceedings having 
connections in more than one member state. This would be consistent with the 
policy aspects seeking to promote co-operation in the context of regional 
integrations and beyond. Notably, adopting a regional cross-border insolvency 
framework entirely based on BRR, or any other existing regional frameworks, 
alone will not save the relevant policy perspectives that seek to promote co-
operation beyond the regional integration. Understandably, the common feature 
of the existing regional cross-border insolvency initiatives is that they focus on 
the relations among nations in the region.230 As a result, they almost completely 
‘neglect…the world outside [their] member states…[and this]…creates, 
                                                            
228 SL Sempasa (n 227) 412. As discussed in chapter 4, there is a trend now for the advanced 
economies such as the US and EU to deal with SSA countries in matters regarding economic co-
operations and reforms  through the SSA regional groupings. The US has so far concluded 
several agreements with some regional groupings including EAC. On this trend, see text to n 48, 
168 and 169 in chapter 4. See also n 189 above. 
229 JL Westbrook (n 101) 40 
230 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 248 
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irrespective of [their] internationality, something like a territoriality principle on 
a larger…scale.’231 This characteristic feature of the regional cross-border 
insolvency regime, arguably, defies the very essence of the enlargement of 
markets and its resulting consequences. 
This idea arguably merits research in its own right.  However, there are some key 
considerations that deserve brief attention. Firstly, in pursuing this idea, it might 
be a practical approach to consider enabling the Model Law adopted as a 
regional instrument to apply in certain respects within the context of the regional 
cross-border insolvency that operates among member states. As far as EAC is 
concerned, one possibility is to enable proceedings commenced under the 
adopted Model Law in one member state to have effect in all other member states 
in the nature of the universal effect of the proceedings commenced in a regional 
framework such as BRR.232 In this regard, it is the law of the member state in 
which such proceedings have been commenced that would apply to the other 
member states. Indeed, there should be no problem in this approach given that 
the law of member states will be a harmonised law and therefore similar in all 
respects. The competent courts in the other member states may only, if need be, 
have a very limited power in such proceedings as it is the case under the BRR.233 
Again the East Africa Court of Justice could very well serve as an appellate court 
in matters originating from the competent court of respective member state 
jurisdictions. 
The second and probably less complicated approach is providing for 
customisation and adoption of the Model Law by member states of the EAC as 
part of the harmonisation policy requirement without having the Model Law 
enforced and applied at a regional level but unilaterally by individual member 
states in matters involving a non-member state. Despite the simplicity of this 
approach, it does not augur well for the policy perspective of strengthening of 
regional integration and enlargement of markets in a regional context for 
development of trade and investment. Additionally, it does not necessarily 
                                                            
231 Ibid 259 
232 Text to n 220 above 
233 Text to n 226 above; and text to n 195 and 196 in chapter 6 
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provide any clear link with a regional cross-border insolvency regime.234 The last 
possible option would be to incorporate third countries or regions by means of 
treaties into the applicable scope of the regional initiative.235 
7.7 Thinking Outside the Box: Resolving Indeterminacy of Local Policies 
As noted above, despite the potential utility of the national policies, they could 
be indeterminate in many respects including the fact that they might not 
necessarily encapsulate truly relevant local interests. In particular, there are 
concerns as to the degree of community participation in social policy formulation 
in both countries and the extent to which they truly represent the local contexts. 
The concerns are such that the participation is limited and the masses are not 
empowered, politically and economically to take an effective role in formulating 
and implementing the policies.236  
These concerns may mandate the need to resort to extraneous means beyond the 
national policies and having regard to realities of the societies to gain an 
understanding of what is truly representative of a national-wide consensus of a 
country.237 A consensus from which local interests relevant to cross-border 
insolvencies can be derived ‘…so that a person committed to a global approach 
to multinational insolvency would nonetheless agree that this or that sort of claim 
or claimant would best be governed by local insolvency law.’238 Clearly, such 
undertaking requires full involvement of highly qualified peoples ‘…already in 
the countr[ies] deeply knowledgeable about [them] and working daily on solving 
                                                            
234 JL Westbrook and others (n 1) 248, 263 and 264 
235 Ibid 264 
236 AST Mchomvu, TFK Ngalula, GS Nchahaga, FSK Tungaraza, and S Maghimbi, ‘Social 
Policy and Research Practice in Tanzania’ (1998) 13 J Soc Dev in Afr 45, 48. Some policies 
stipulations seem to be based on the Washington Consensus or neo-liberalism which could mean 
that their prescription could not necessarily reflect the local contexts. Some policies could also be 
too old to reflect the present needs and priority. And thirdly and lastly, although in many cases, 
these policies raise elements which pose a danger for contradiction in implementation, it is not 
always clear how a balance should be struck. This is particularly with regard to protection of 
local enterprises and promotion of investment both foreign and local. It seems that one must be 
aware of these concerns while making use of the policies. 
237 PH Brietze, ‘The Politics of Legal Reform’ (2004) 3 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 1, 24 and 25; 
and G Johnson, ‘Towards International Standards on Insolvency: The Catalytic Role of The 
World Bank’ (2000) Law in Transition online 1. <http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/lit072.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2009  
238 JL Westbrook (n 6) 515-516. 
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those countr[ies’] problems.’239 It is these very people that may help interpret 
better the policies, venture beyond the national policies and draw attention of 
insolvency experts to the relevant local aspects which, if reflected in the law, 
could facilitate its smooth implementation, usage and achievement of its 
objectives. This consideration also informs the nature of the reform process.240 It 
follows that reform undertaking should not be an overnight or dramatic process 
which would increase the chances of missing the local contexts. Rather, what is 
required is an incremental, gradual and less complex process aiming at a less 
complicated output which is not wholesalely alienated from the local concerns 
and policies. Accordingly, there is also merit in having the propositions made in 
this chapter, which are less complex than they may seem to be, approached in a 
piece meal basis rather than rapidly.  
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the challenge of identifying local contexts that have to 
inform and be served by a cross-border insolvency law system. It has 
demonstrated that official national policies of the countries under study 
potentially offer an insight into the local contexts within which reform and 
implementation of cross-border insolvency law can be effected in SSA using 
Tanzania and Kenya as case studies. The examination of selected official 
national policies of the countries under study identified relevant policy 
perspectives that should inform any cross-border insolvency law reform effort 
and help determine the extent to which these countries may ‘…assimilate [the 
international benchmarks] as they deem to be compatible with their social goal 
and priority.’241 Clearly, the policy perspectives appear to inform both the 
ingredients of the cross-border insolvency law systems, such as the nature of the 
priority system in the cross-border insolvency setting, and the theoretical 
approach appropriate in serving and promoting the identified local policies and 
interests whilst having regard to the existing international insolvency 
benchmarks. The theoretical approach of modified universalism was found to be 
                                                            
239 J Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent (Penguin Books, London 2000) 34-36. See also 
text to n 113 in chapter 3 
240 See text to part 2.7 in chapter 2; and  text to part 3.6 in chapter 3 
241 IF Fletcher (n 163) 774 
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the most appropriate as it enables a country to evaluate the fairness of a foreign 
system before cooperating and/or deferring. This approach is significant in 
enabling the countries under study to address policy aspects, for example, those 
related to national interests and protection of small local creditors. Given the 
nature of the Model Law, this chapter found that it has the capacity of being 
customised and adapted in a manner that is commensurate with the local interests 
using modified universalism as the overall organising theoretical approach. 
Throughout the discussion of the characteristics of the local policy perspectives, 
it became clear and it was vividly shown how the Model Law, customised and 
adapted for its fitness for purpose, is relevant and suitable to the circumstances of 
the countries under study. However, a slightly different approach is arguably 
needed to deal with co-operation in cross-border insolvencies involving member 
states in a regional community whereby the EAC was used as a case study and 
other countries with which the countries under study have, for example, long 
standing relationships and bilateral co-operation.  
Indeed, the significance of using the official governments’ policies is essentially 
crucial as it helps create harmony and predictability in the entire legal systems of 
the countries under study, since it is from such policies that most of the on-going 
reforms and governments’ actions are based. Clearly what is needed for these 
countries is to overcome their socio-economic vulnerability that could lead them 
to succumb to international pressure and end up making improper policy choices 
as discussed in chapter four. 
In view of the foregoing, the overall recommendations in this chapter can be 
outlined as thus. First, modified universalism is the appropriate theoretical 
approach for crafting a cross-border insolvency law system for the countries 
under study, given the special circumstances of the countries under study as 
discussed above. Second, the Model Law is relevant and indeed well suited to 
accommodate the local contexts using modified universalism as the organising 
theoretical framework. Third, the existing bilateral co-operations and long 
standing traditional relationships between the countries under study and foreign 
countries appear to dictate a different approach that is based on existing trust. On 
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this point, it is argued that such special arrangement can still be well 
accommodated within the adopted version of the Model Law or through 
conclusion of a separate mutual agreement. And fourth, given the importance 
accorded to regional integration in SSA, it is important to have a regional cross-
border insolvency regime that is based on the relevant historical, cultural, and 
socio-economic values. However, the Model Law should also be adapted within 
the context of the relevant regional integration to facilitate co-operation with 
foreign countries that do not fall within the regional integration.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study. It is divided into four main parts. The first part 
summarises the main insights that emerged from different chapters of this study. 
The contribution to knowledge which was made by this study is outlined in part 
two. In part three, legal and policy implications of the contributions made are 
highlighted before pointing out the limitations of the study and possible avenues 
for further direction of research.  
8.2 Main Insights of the Study 
This study has carried out an in-depth examination and discussion of the 
challenges that SSA countries face in reform and application of cross-border 
insolvency law.1 The study sought to address the potential challenges of cross-
border insolvencies emerging from the globalisation of trade and capital. 
Tanzania and Kenya were used as case studies for SSA countries, though 
occasionally and where appropriate reference was made to other countries or 
regions within SSA. The focus of the study was on the risk of failure of SSA 
legislative processes to properly address the potential challenges of cross-border 
insolvencies in a manner that is sensitive to the local contexts and which 
provides a balance with international insolvency benchmarks. The traditional 
doctrinal legal scholarship was the main approach used in pursuing the study. 
The following are the major insights of the study. 
 
The context for the study was provided in chapter one, which also served to 
justify the need for undertaking a study of this nature from the perspective of 
SSA. It was argued in this chapter, and consistently proved in subsequent 
                                                 
1 See text n 21 in chapter 1 whereby South Africa is excluded from the scope of this study on 
account of the fact that it has inter alia received a relatively more attention in insolvency 
discourse than any other SSA country or region in SSA. 
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chapters in the course of reviewing the literature, that although a substantial body 
of literature has developed in recent years in the area of cross-border insolvency, 
this scholarship has been lacking in a perspective from developing countries in 
SSA. The preoccupation of the thesis therefore was to provide this perspective. 
 
Chapter two of this study made a theoretical and conceptual analysis of the cross-
border insolvency landscape from the perspectives of SSA whilst clearly 
bringing out the issues that emerge in the quest for crafting a workable and 
appropriate cross-border insolvency framework for SSA countries.  It was argued 
that the theories and the debate that ensued have exclusively been developed and 
addressed from the viewpoints of developed economies, which might not 
necessarily be relevant to SSA.  Since examination of this area in relation to SSA 
(except South Africa) has almost been overlooked by existing literature, the 
argument posed in chapter one in the course of setting the context of this study 
became much clearer and was indeed further established. It was accordingly 
maintained that the position of developing countries, in particular the least 
developed economies such as those in SSA, deserves to be considered, given the 
pressures towards globalisation and the potential for this pressure to result in 
unsuitable legislative reforms. While it could be argued that the theoretical 
models emerging from the scholarship may help provide and perhaps develop an 
important benchmark for any reform measure in SSA, it still presents challenges 
of convincingly translating such models to the local circumstances and contexts 
of SSA. It further became clear that the endeavour of exploring the relevant local 
contexts does also present challenges in the reform process. Nevertheless, it was 
clear that the theoretical debate serves to expose the benefits and ills of each 
theoretical approach and a theoretical model which any reform measure ought to 
take into account, though from the perspectives and local contexts of SSA 
countries.  
 
Examination of the global drivers for convergence of insolvency law systems 
including cross-border insolvency regimes was undertaken in chapter three in the 
context of the quest for an appropriate and workable framework for cross-border 
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insolvency regulation in SSA countries. It was observed that in view of the 
globalisation of trade and capital and the extent to which SSA is increasingly 
integrated into the global economy, the development of effective cross-border 
insolvency systems is now more relevant in SSA countries than ever before. The 
international insolvency standards therefore have, arguably, the potential of 
facilitating the reform of cross-border insolvency law. 
 
However, an important challenge presented by the international insolvency 
standards that emerged and was discussed in chapter three is that although these 
benchmarks envisage local innovations and adaptation, in reality they still seem 
to envisage that ‘one-size-fits-all’, especially in relation to the vulnerable SSA 
countries which do not have the capacity to challenge the prescriptions of the 
responsible multilateral institutions. The other major limitation inherent in these 
international insolvency standards is that their compliance and assessment 
process conducted by the multilateral institutions does not seem to delve into the 
details of the local contexts that may influence the shape and implementation of 
the insolvency laws, and correspondingly cross-border insolvency law of a 
country. This is critical because the international insolvency standards do not 
contain a version translated into the contexts of circumstances specifically 
pertaining to SSA, though they appear to allow, with some inherent restrictions, 
innovations to reflect local circumstances. The other limitation is perhaps in the 
extent and manner in which local experts are employed in the process, which 
limits their role and influence in the assessment exercise and compliance process. 
Nevertheless, the key challenge is to balance the local contexts against the 
international insolvency benchmarks in a manner that will improve and 
modernise their cross-border insolvency frameworks.  The danger is looming that 
these countries may adopt the benchmarks in their laws to please the 
international community and the responsible multilateral institutions in 
anticipation of attracting financing without necessarily having them complied 
with in the actual practice.  
 
 326
Two theoretical approaches for complying with the standards were noted in 
chapter three as offering frameworks on how effective adoption and 
implementation of the standards by low income countries such as SSA countries 
could be effected without jeopardising the interests of such countries. The first 
approach insists on the importance of ensuring that standards adoption, 
implementation and assessment give due consideration to the domestic focus, 
experience, needs, and capabilities of a low income country with the objective of 
market development and enhancing market efficiency. The other approach insists 
that countries must adopt a more gradual approach to the implementation of the 
standards when a substantial amount of reform is required. Notably, whereas the 
former approach was seen to reflect the theoretical view against transplants and a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and to encourage consideration of local contexts, the 
latter reflects the incrementalist theory which advocates for modesty and gradual 
reform of global insolvency law giving allowance for substantial deviation while 
also reducing the risk of outright rejection. Nevertheless, both approaches 
complement one another in so far as their application to a developing country is 
concerned. The emerging practice of reforming insolvency laws and their cross-
border insolvency regimes as part of the poverty reduction strategy is welcome. 
However, the close involvement of the multilateral institutions in the 
formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of such strategies 
including provision of technical and financial support for the whole process may 
present some form of indirect pressure which could again lead to legislation 
being adopted just for the sake of pleasing such institutions without having due 
regard to the local contexts. 
 
Chapter four examined various arrangements for facilitation of cross-border trade 
and investment in which SSA countries have been involved and considered the 
extent to which, and how, the arrangements implicate cross-border insolvency 
regulation in such countries. The arrangements were considered in the context of: 
(i) the SSA market liberalisation and reform strategies undertaken under the 
auspices of the multilateral institutions (mainly the IMF, and the World Bank); 
(ii) international trading systems as they affect developing countries in SSA; (iii) 
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the bilateral investment treaties concluded between SSA countries and, mainly, 
developed countries; and (iv) regional and interregional economic co-operation 
among SSA countries and between SSA countries and developed and emerging 
economies respectively. It was found that while such arrangements, especially 
the bilateral investment treaties that SSA countries have been concluding, 
mainly, with developed countries, provide an important base for determining the 
needs of SSA countries and shaping their respective cross-border insolvency 
frameworks, they significantly limit the space in which SSA countries as host 
countries of foreign investors could regulate the foreign investments and deal 
with them in insolvency proceedings in a manner that does not compromise local 
circumstances.  
 
It further became clear in chapter four that the growing body of these treaties and 
other arrangements restrict the ability of these countries to customise the 
international insolvency standards to suit their local circumstances and interests, 
as in doing so they have necessarily to take into account their obligations and 
promises under such treaties. This, for instance, means that the ability of the host 
countries in SSA to adopt a policy within the framework of a cross-border 
insolvency system that may seem to treat domestic interests more favourably 
than foreign ones, or treat investors from a certain country more favourably than 
others, is significantly restricted.  An interesting feature that emerged from the 
chapter with regard to the bilateral investment treaties is that they are based on 
reciprocity and do not generally recognise the special circumstances of SSA 
countries in the world of finance, trade, investment and technological 
advancement which could have necessitated giving prominence to protection of 
local interests, such as the promotion of local industries, protection of natural 
resources, and poverty reduction.  
 
It was pointed out further in chapter four that the implication of the arrangements 
for facilitation of trade and investment suggests that SSA countries would not 
need an entirely different framework from those suggested by the consensus 
emerging from the debate on the theories and the international insolvency 
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benchmarks which again link to the question of how SSA can have its broader 
local contexts reflected in cross-border insolvency regulation without violating 
its various international treaty commitments.  It was in that respect noted that the 
arrangements effectively pull potential cross-border insolvency frameworks of 
SSA countries towards a universalist stance and away from territorialist 
approaches. The key finding of this study was that such arrangements, as 
characterised mainly by the bilateral investment treaties, embody general 
principles of law which inform and determine the nature and content of SSA host 
countries’ cross-border insolvency frameworks. This is reinforced by the 
requirements explicitly advanced by interregional economic arrangements for 
undertaking and maintaining liberalisation, the rule of law and good governance 
and the consequent enhancement of the interaction of SSA countries with 
multinational enterprises involved in international business and hence the 
potential of SSA countries being involved in a cross-border insolvency situation. 
It was argued that the increasing number of arbitration claims against developing 
countries based on the alleged violation of bilateral investment treaties coupled 
with the emerging trend of renegotiation of such treaties, show how these 
countries have been caught in between. 
 
An examination of the influence of the colonial legacy on SSA countries’ legal 
systems as it relates to cross-border insolvencies was undertaken in chapter five, 
using the application of the English common law in Tanzania and Kenya as a 
case study. The English common law was chosen for its pronounced influence in 
the common law jurisdictions in SSA. The chapter evaluated the common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency and the landscape within which it is applied, 
before considering the following issues. The first is the suitability of the English 
common law in helping to address and resolve cross-border insolvency problems 
as they arise. And the second is the impact of the application of the English 
common law in the positioning of the existing cross-border insolvency 
frameworks in SSA countries within the competing cross-border insolvency 
theories and the international insolvency benchmarks.  
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It was found that the application of the English common law approach to cross-
border insolvency would have the effect of pulling the cross-border insolvency 
frameworks of the relevant SSA countries towards modified universalism. 
However, the extent to which the English common law might apply is, arguably, 
unpredictable and uncertain as it depends on several factors that cannot be 
ascertained by any interested party upfront. The key factors are: the extent to 
which the reception clauses that apply the English common law at least in theory 
allow the common law to be brought into use; the extent to which existing 
legislation provides for cross-border insolvency; the judicial attitude towards the 
common law; the consideration of the extent to which the local circumstances 
permit and/or qualify its application; the extent to which the common law has 
already developed a relevant principle for an existing cross-border insolvency 
problem; and the extent to which judges in the relevant SSA jurisdictions are 
well facilitated and equipped to access recent developments in the English 
common law.   
 
From the perspective of countries such as those of SSA which might always be 
deferring to foreign jurisdictions in insolvency proceedings, the common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency could be relevant. It offers a framework that 
could enable such countries to evaluate the fairness of foreign proceedings in 
relation to local interests before deciding whether and in what manner to 
cooperate. However, the scope of discretionary powers which the court could 
exercise under the common law would be limited by the existence of bilateral 
investment treaty commitments. Such commitments would require the common 
law to be applied in a manner that is consistent with the stipulations of the 
relevant bilateral investment treaty. One argument is that the discretionary 
powers could only be exercised in a manner that promotes and protects foreign 
investments and investors or is in accord with the legitimate expectation of the 
investors. Thus, the implication of the cross-border trade and investment 
arrangements is to restrict the scope of discretionary powers which the court in 
the countries under study could otherwise exercise under the English common 
law.  
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A critique of the existing legislative frameworks for cross-border insolvency in 
SSA undertaken in chapter six with reference to Tanzania and Kenya made it 
clear that the limited extent to which they cover cross-border insolvencies means 
that they provide a potentially wider scope for the application of the common law 
approach to cross-border insolvency. However, the actual application of the 
common law would remain unpredictable on account of the factors outlined 
above which were discussed in chapter five. The unpredictability as to the 
application of the common law is arguably inconsistent with the underlying 
reasons for the conclusion of the cross-border trade and investment 
arrangements. 
 
The survey of the state of the cross-border insolvency legislative frameworks in 
respect of the countries under study revealed that the laws and their respective 
developmental trends still reflect the prevailing colonial legacies and are greatly 
influenced by the legislative developments in the former colonial powers. While 
the general thrust of the governments of SSA countries is on facilitation of the 
flow of investment and trade (as is reflected in the bilateral investment treaties 
concluded thus far), the drive is yet to be widely reflected within the existing 
insolvency legal frameworks. Lack of clarity in such frameworks is also 
evidently reflected in the lack of clear adherence to the local contexts in some 
important respects. The current reform initiative in Kenya seeks to address the 
situation by benchmarking the cross-border insolvency reform process using the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. A critical look at the Bill 
seeking to adopt the Model Law made it clear that Kenya is contemplating to 
make such adoption with indeed very little adaptation if any, the main intention 
being to improve its ranking in the Doing Business Reports and contributing in 
attracting investments. The extent to which such a move seeks to serve the 
Kenyan local policies as a whole is not that clear. It remains to be seen if the Bill 
will, once it turns into law, and if the law really happens to be fully implemented, 
address the uncertainties and unpredictability in the application of the law and 
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provide an appropriate balance between the international benchmarks and the 
local contexts. 
 
The other insight from chapter six is that while within SSA it is only OHADA 
that has widely been acknowledged for institutionalising a regional cross-border 
insolvency regime based on uniform law, there has long been in existence a 
harmonised legal regime for Tanzania and Kenya (in addition to Uganda) for co-
operation in cross-border insolvency, referred in this thesis as BRR. Despite 
being forgotten in the statute books, there is scope for arguing that such a regime 
is still in force, and that it is also meant to apply to both personal and corporate 
insolvencies as it is so stipulated in the relevant laws of the relevant countries. It 
was thus argued that any attempt for development of a modern regional cross-
border insolvency regime for the East Africa Community (“EAC”) in which 
Tanzania and Kenya are member states should start from and be based on, such a 
historical framework which is already in place and had to some extent been 
tested. The EAC was used as a representative case study for other SSA regional 
integrations. 
 
The primary concern of chapter seven was to demonstrate how the relevant local 
context of the countries under study can be identified from official national 
policies and used to inform and shape the cross-border insolvency reform process 
and eliminate the potential risk of ‘too rigid an adherence to global norms which 
will contribute to a transplant effect of incomplete implementation.’2 While it is 
certain that local policies inform and shape insolvency systems of different 
countries, there is limited scholarship on how such policies can be identified, 
integrated and reconciled with the global insolvency norms in the process of 
development of a cross-border insolvency law system for a given country. The 
chapter argued that the perspectives that emerge from the analysis of the selected 
national policies are twofold. Firstly, they point to modified universalism as the 
                                                 
2 TC Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between 
Global Norms and National Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Beijing, 
27-28 April 2006)   < http://www.oecd.org/DAF/corporate-affairs/ > accessed  accessed 17 July 
2009 [33] 
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appropriate theoretical framework in SSA context. This theoretical approach 
could be implemented by the adoption of a customised version of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law that reflects the local policy perspectives emerging 
from the relevant official national policies of the countries under study. And 
secondly, they provide an important insight into the local policy perspectives that 
are essential for a deep reflection and understanding of the context within which 
a cross-border insolvency framework in SSA countries would be crafted and 
operate using the Model Law as a template. Such adaptation can, among other 
things, be done in a manner that also reflects and recognises the need for a 
special arrangement based on long established trust with countries with which 
the countries under study have bilateral co-operations and long standing 
relationships. 
 
It was noted that some of the local interests emerging from the local policy 
perspectives may not fall directly within the ambit of the insolvency law system 
but in other laws which must be considered as they might be integral to the 
effective operation of the cross-border insolvency law.  It was shown that the 
policy perspectives also inform the ingredients of the cross-border insolvency 
law systems, such as the nature and scope of priority system in the cross-border 
insolvency setting. The significance of using the official policies was noted to be 
important because they help create harmony in the entire legal systems of the 
countries under study since it is from such policies that any reform in any area of 
law in such countries must be based, as is the case also for most of the actions of 
the governments.  
 
Given the policy emphasis placed on regional co-operations, it was argued that a 
special arrangement might be needed for dealing with co-operation in 
insolvencies involving member states in a regional integration such as the EAC. 
While the BRR, OHADA Law and ECIR were found to have relevance in the 
EAC which was used as a case study, it was argued that any reform measure for 
the EAC cross-border insolvency regime should take account of the BRR which 
offers an important historical context. Consideration was also given to the 
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significance of adoption and implementation of the Model Law as a regional 
integration instrument in the EAC as part of its harmonisation policy 
requirement. This would be a very significant development that is commensurate 
with the need for enlargement of the market that the EAC seeks to achieve. 
Despite the novelty of such idea, which may require further research as to its 
practicality, its implementation would help to create a clear link with the outside 
world in matters of cross-border insolvency.  
 
The merits of the EAC (as an example of SSA regional integrations), integrating 
with OHADA were noted as a step towards achieving an African-wide cross-
border insolvency framework in the longer term. In addition, the chapter also 
considered the practicality of Tanzania and Kenya (i.e as it is for the rest of the 
SSA countries) joining OHADA, despite the existence of a number of factors 
hindering such a move. 
8.3 Original Contribution of the Study to Knowledge 
This study contributes to the existing scholarship on cross-border insolvency in 
different respects. Firstly, it contributes to the literature by tackling cross-border 
insolvency from the perspective of SSA countries, using Tanzania and Kenya as 
case studies. As pointed out above, such perspective has been lacking in the 
literature, although a substantial body of literature has developed in recent years. 
One possible reason is owing to the fact that this scholarship has been dominated 
by scholars from the United States and Europe writing from the viewpoints of 
advanced economies which might not necessarily be relevant to SSA. 
Nevertheless, the literature was immensely beneficial in providing general 
theoretical backgrounds necessary in considering and developing the SSA 
perspective based on Tanzania and Kenya as representative case studies. 
 
Secondly, the study contributes to knowledge by generation of an in-depth 
theoretical insight and understanding of the dynamics of the challenges that SSA 
countries face in the endeavour of crafting a workable and appropriate 
framework for cross-border insolvency legislation. The challenges are 
multifaceted as discussed above.  
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A few instances of the challenges include the following: the challenge presented 
by the theoretical frameworks for the cross-border insolvency landscape, 
reflecting the perspectives of developed economies, on the basis of which the 
laws in the studied countries could be based and the strong push towards and in 
favour of universalism. Another instance is in respect of the pressures emanating 
from the global convergence for insolvency systems as against the inability of the 
countries to withstand the pressures and avoid unsuitable legislative reforms that 
rigidly adhere to the global norms at the expense of the local contexts which are 
known to inform and make the law practical and relevant. Another challenge 
which is equally important to exemplify here is in relation to the bilateral and 
multilateral commitments that the countries maintain which restrict the ability of 
the countries under study to regulate cross-border insolvencies in accordance 
with their local policy choices unless such choices reinforce the objectives of 
such bilateral and multilateral arrangements for cross-border trade and 
investment.  
 
Thirdly, the study contributes to knowledge by generation of an original doctrinal 
legal scholarship understanding of the cross-border insolvency legal frameworks 
of the studied countries within the broader context of the following aspects. 
Firstly, the existing cross-border insolvency theories, and the international 
insolvency benchmarks; and secondly, the increasing cross-border co-operation 
in trade and investment arising from globalisation and regionalism. Using the 
English common law as a case study for the influence of the continuing colonial 
legacy in the legal systems and culture of most SSA countries, it was shown that 
the existing legislative framework (as it is the case for the contemplated reform) 
still has a space for the application of the English common law approach for 
cross-border insolvency which would effectively pull the law towards modified 
universalism and away from territorialism. This position is however not in 
harmony with the cross-border trade and investment arrangements, for example, 
the bilateral investment treaties which restrict the scope for a country to decide 
whether or not to recognise, defer and cooperate and, if doing so, how to do so 
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and to what extent. The implication of such arrangements is to render the 
flexibility to be only exercised in a manner that promotes the objectives of the 
arrangements. 
 
Fourthly, the study also contributes to knowledge by providing an insight into the 
link between the increasing cross-border trade and investment and the growing 
challenge of cross-border insolvencies.  Although the international insolvency 
benchmarks could be useful in helping reforms that would address the 
challenges, such contribution might not be achieved given the inherent 
weaknesses of the initiative for assessment of the observance of the standards.  
 
Last but not least, the study contributes to knowledge by providing a framework 
for determining the local policy context that might be considered for use as 
guidance in crafting a workable and appropriate legislation for cross-border 
insolvency which is sensitive to local interests and international insolvency 
benchmarks. Most studies underscore the crucial role played by the local policies 
but they do not address the challenge of identifying the same and negotiating 
them against and in relation to the existing international benchmarks in crafting a 
suitable framework for legislation. This study addressed this gap by employing 
official national policies of the studied countries to demonstrate how they can be 
used to provide the local contexts and the challenges that may arise in the 
process. The local policy perspectives that emerge from the national policy 
analysis, strongly suggest the following key reform measures. Firstly, modified 
universalism is the appropriate theoretical approach for crafting a cross-border 
insolvency law system for the countries under study, given their special 
circumstances. Secondly, the Model Law is relevant and indeed well suited to be 
customised and adapted to accommodate the local contexts using modified 
universalism as the organising theoretical framework. Thirdly, the existing 
bilateral co-operations and long standing traditional relationships between the 
countries under study and foreign countries appear to dictate a different approach 
that is based on the existing trust. On this point, it is argued that such special 
arrangement can still be well accommodated within the adopted version of the 
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Model Law or through conclusion of a separate mutual agreement. And fourthly, 
given the importance accorded to regional integration in SSA using the EAC as a 
case study, it is important to have a regional cross-border insolvency regime that 
is based on the relevant historical, cultural, and socio-economic values. However, 
the Model Law should also be adapted within the context of the regional 
integration to facilitate co-operation in cross-border insolvencies with foreign 
countries that do not fall within the regional integration.  
8.4 Recommendations and Implications for Policies and Legislation 
The insights from the findings of this study have significant implications for 
policies and legislation in the studied countries and in the discourse regarding 
cross-border insolvency and law reform in developing economies. Firstly, this 
study underscores that development of effective cross-border insolvency systems 
is now more relevant in SSA countries than it was before. The increasing 
involvement and integration of SSA countries into the global economy through 
cross-border trade and investment is the main contributing factor. This factor is 
underpinned by the efforts that these countries have over the years been making 
to compete in promoting and attracting cross-border trade and investment 
through liberalisation of their economies and the creation of a conducive legal 
environment with support from the multilateral institutions. This calls for an 
informed intervention which is conscious of both local circumstances and the 
existing international insolvency standards. Such an intervention will eliminate 
the risk of falling into unsuitable legislation that rigidly adheres to the global 
norms at the expense of the local contexts.  
 
Secondly, consideration should be given to official national policy documents to 
help in setting the local contexts that the law should serve or be based upon. To 
avoid any potential problem of indeterminacy of the local policies it is important 
that any reform undertaking should also resort to extraneous means that go 
beyond the official national policies. Such undertaking must involve local 
experts knowledgeable in the local circumstances. Thirdly, the existence of 
bilateral investment treaties and other similar arrangements means that such 
countries must pay close regard to such arrangements when considering and 
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undertaking the actual reform. In addition, such countries must be prepared to 
renegotiate such arrangements, such as the bilateral investment treaties, with a 
view to clearly addressing the approach that has to govern cross-border 
insolvencies involving the contracting states. Renegotiation of bilateral 
investment treaties can validly be pursued within the on-going trend of 
renegotiation of the treaties which is supported by the UNCTAD through its 
capacity building programmes. Fourthly, lack of experience and cases in these 
regards means that these countries should avoid complexities and adopt a gradual 
approach to the reform. The recommendation offered in this study as to how 
reform could be approached is unlikely to result in a complicated legislative 
framework. The reform in that regard could also be undertaken gradually in a 
piece meal manner. 
8.5 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
There are several limitations in this study. Firstly, materials relevant to the study 
for SSA countries were not readily available and accessible. This was aggravated 
by the lack of scholarship on this area undertaken from the perspective of SSA 
countries. Analysis of the situation of these countries relied much on the primary 
sources of law though it was not that easy to lay hands on a significant amount of 
the few cases that could be relevant to the discussed issues. As case law reporting 
is inadequate and in some instances non-existent, it was rather difficult to 
establish the existence of relevant cases. Analysis of the reports by the IMF and 
World Bank, especially ROSCs was conducted on only a handful of such reports 
covering African countries that were published and available from the websites 
of such institutions during the research period for this study. Further reliance had 
to be made on secondary sources addressing matters related to such reports. 
These included text books, papers and journal articles, some of them from 
disciplines other than law.  
 
Furthermore, the scope of the study meant that matters that were relevant and 
topical but too peripheral to the study were not pursued in detail. Additionally, 
although cursory and random regard was given to a few of the other SSA 
countries in specific aspects, it was only two countries that received in depth 
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consideration as case studies for SSA countries, especially those which do not 
yet have an effective cross-border insolvency system. Further research may entail 
consideration of the following areas:  
 
Firstly, conducting similar research with a specific focus in other countries in 
SSA. Secondly, as SSA countries’ insolvency laws (no matter how archaic they 
are/were) have not been in use due to various theories considered in this thesis, 
further research could look at the practices that have, or had, been in use as an 
alternative to formal insolvency law. This could provide a deep insight into 
additional aspects that need to be considered in undertaking reform. Thirdly, as 
the effectiveness of insolvency laws depends on the institutional framework in 
which it is being used and enforced, the emerging trend of reform in SSA can be 
considered in future research in light of the suitability of the existing institutional 
framework in which the reformed law is to operate. Fourthly, as most of banks 
that operate in SSA countries are affiliated to foreign banks in the UK and 
France, there could be some merits in future research to look at the SSA 
legislative approaches to bank insolvencies in relation to the existing 
international practices and the experiences in the countries from which such 
banks have connections. Such line of research is critical given the recent bank 
crisis and as bank insolvency was not within the scope of this study. Fifthly, 
research can also be conducted on cross-border insolvency challenges involved 
in the emerging cross-border co-operation in trade and investment between SSA 
countries and emerging markets such as China, India and others. Such research 
may help bring into light issues involved and how they can be addressed. This is 
particularly important given the fact that statistically the cross-border co-
operation between SSA countries and emerging economies has for decades now 
been on a sharp rise to the extent of threatening the future well-being of the 
traditional commercial links that have been in place between SSA and developed 
economies. The last area for further research is on the adoption and use of the 
Model Law as a regional instrument as discussed and recommended in this study. 
This area can be looked at alongside the issue as to whether or not the Model 
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Law or other international insolvency benchmarks might need to be amended to 
clearly reflect this idea. 
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